Battle of Korsun-Shevchenko(Hitler agreed with of gen. lie)

[phylo_roadking]

Myself is already waiting for 4 pages that anythings comes that support the claims Yuri does repeat like a mantra, that western generals, historians etc. all lie and only the yuri version of history is right, with his phantasized french, czech and polish divisions supporting the wehrmacht in the East

And I hope YOU will note that reference to THIS thread and the matter under discussion that Jan-hendrick put in his short post. Your reply to him was deleted for it IMMEDIATELY went off-topic into other material on other websites and a number of not-so-subtle attacks on him. Stay on-topic, and either answer his concerns with verifiable source material or concede the points.

[Yuri]

Myself is already waiting for 4 pages that anythings comes that support the claims Yuri does repeat like a mantra, that western generals, historians etc. all lie and only the yuri version of history is right, with his phantasized french, czech and polish divisions supporting the wehrmacht in the East

And I hope YOU will note that reference to THIS thread and the matter under discussion that Jan-hendrick put in his short post. Your reply to him was deleted for it IMMEDIATELY went off-topic into other material on other websites and a number of not-so-subtle attacks on him. Stay on-topic, and either answer his concerns with verifiable source material or concede the points.

Well, I have understood.
From all world community of generals I did not single out east, western, southern or northern.
From the world community of generals I allocate only the German generals, as possessing surprising propensity to make odious lie even in a period of war. This branch is created for this purpose.
"Western generals" it is absolutely new element for this branch. Introduction in discussion of this element radically changes original sense of creation of this branch.

About "the western historians", about "western etc"., about "Yuri's history", about "the French divisions", about "the Czech divisions", about "the Polish divisions" and other imagination of ours dear Yan-Hednrick in next time.

Yuri

[Yuri]

Well, some words about "the western historians"

Certainly that,, overfed with mantras about "the brilliant tactical victories" of the German generals the western community of researchers would like to receive the qualitative information reflecting real events on fronts of the Great Patriotic War which Soviet Union and its Red Army has conducted against a coalition of the European states headed by Third Reich.
Under these circumstances there is nothing surprising that some western military historians aspire to satisfy information hunger of the fellow citizens. This part of the western historians searches for possibilities for objective all-round coverage of the events occurring in WWII on East front.

Among this part of military historians it is possible to name, in particular, John Erickson, Norman Davies, Geoffrey Roberts and D.Glants. In works of these historians it is not difficult to see mass of errors, excesses and misrepresentation. However it is necessary to see at this group of historians and obvious aspiration to objectivity.

There is nothing surprising and that other part of historians in the west, despite a huge file of the archival documents published in Russia for post-war time (especially last twenty years), clings for old and continues to repeat infinite mantras about the brilliant tactical victories of the German generals. Earlier I knew one such historian - professor Stolfi who with naive admiration sang dithyrambs to general Balck for the brilliant tactical victory, ostensibly, gained by this the German military leader on the river Chir.
(Who wishes to know true results of a "the brilliant tactical victory" of general Balck, that can glance here).

Now, thanks to this branch, I had a possibility will get acquainted with products of the second such, if one may say so, the military historian -mr. Niklas Zetterling.
In a following post I will specify main in what is consists the mr. Zetterling 's swindle when it criticises the Join Staff's "Study"

[mellenthin]

Yuri is clearly a blind follower of the red army and the ussr .

[Igorn]

Yuri is clearly a blind follower of the red army and the ussr .

Mellenthin, accusations and personal attacks are not highly welcomed on this forum.

[Igorn]

You've been banned from a number of forums so far; don't add this one to it.

Dear, administrator Phylo!

I inform you, that your informants absolutely on what are not suitable. Can cut down with quiet conscience it a payment! They mislead you.
The matter is that to today's I have been forbidden only at one forum, namely, it is more than year back efforts of one of Russophobe, located in staff of Axis History Forum, I have been "banned" at that forum. About it, by the way, I have warned at once as soon as was registered at your forum.

If, respected Phylo, at your forum it is allowed to with impunity to distort a position of the Russian participant I will not object to that your forum became the second at which against Yuri the inscription "banned" will flaunt.
Because I under no circumstances will disagree, that distortion of my point of view remains without consequences.
There are no doubts that removing my post it was necessary to remove simultaneously and provocative the Yan-Hendrick's post:

Myself is already waiting for 4 pages that anythings comes that support the claims Yuri does repeat like a mantra, that western generals, historians etc. all lie and only the yuri version of history is right, with his phantasized french, czech and polish divisions supporting the wehrmacht in the East

which has no relation to a theme of this branch and which distorts my point of view in spite of the fact that I repeatedly specified to it Yan-Hendrick in inadmissibility of such behaviour

I hope you me will understand correctly.

Sincerely,
Yuri

Yuri,

I have a respect to your efforts to post rarerly available information and attract attention of forum members that there is a different perspective on the events of many combats on the Ost Front rather than interpretation of bitten German generals and western historians. However, the reality is that many westerners infected by the cold war mentality are loath to any facts that contradict to the Ost Front history version written by Huderian, Manstein, Mellenthin etc. and show the Red Army in the good light. Russophobia is a normal thing on many US/western military forums as the Russian victory in the war is still like a pain in the neck for many cold war warriors. Based on this take it easy and know that there are people who value your contribution to the forum and keep smiling!

Best Regards,

[jerijerod]

I have no Russo-phobia and find Yuri's post interesting and yeah it does open up a whole different side to the ost front that i think has been overlooked.

Just some of the terminology worries me: Like "Pan european" when talking about the Wehrmacht. As i said in a prievious post the majority of the invaders were German, Austrian, Italian. There were other nations like Hungary, Roumania and the baltic states but thats it... Hardly the whole west moving east.

[Yuri]

Well, let's continue.
In what mr . N. Zetterling's swindle consists?
In a few words its swindle is reduced to the following.

Russians distinguish in the military art three levels of management (and this distinction very accurate):
1. Tactical level - this level for commanders (komandirs), that is for military leaders from the squad commander to the corps commander. The commander maneuvers the personnel subordinated to it and combat material on a landscape (it operates combat).
(note: owing to distinction of terms, with reference to armies of the western countries tactical level comes to an end on the division commander).
2. Operative level - this level for commanders of troops (komanduyushchy), that is military leaders from the commander of troops of Army to the commander of troops of Front . The commander of troops of Army or Front maneuvering forces on area of war action.
3. Strategic level - this level corresponds for Commanders-in-Chief (Glavnokomanduyushchy) of directions, Chief of Join Staff and to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Verkhovny Glavnokomanduyushchy), and as to members of the Stavka (of General headquarters).

The western military art distinguishes only two levels: tactical and strategic.
Thus, in the German Wehrmacht the corps commander is the strategist. And, as is known, each strategist thinks itself not more low than Napoleon. Thus, A.Hitler had, already, a whole batallion little and big Napoleons.
On the other hand, at Red Army in the West was only four strategic directions and, hence, four Commanders-in-chief of a direction: Northwest, Western, Southwest and North Caucasian directions and, hence, at comrade Stalin was only five own Napoleons, namely: four Commanders-in-chief directions - Marshal Voroshilov, general Zhukov, Marshal Timoshenko and Marshal Budyonny, and as the Chief of the Joint Staff marshal Shaposhnikov (then general Vasilevsky, then general Antonov).
To watch five Napoleons a problem extremely difficult, but everything, realizable.
On the other hand, the problem on bridling of a batallion of little and big Napoleons surpasses possibilities of the person and even such as the Fuhrer of the Third Reich A.Hitler.
Presence in Wehrmacht of a batallion of napoleons here the main reason of loss by Germany and its allies of war

Yes, however, we will return to ours mr. N. Zetterling.
So, "Study of Join Staff" intends for military leaders of operative level, that is for commanders of troops of Armies and Fronts (for komanduyushchy), for those who maneuvers forces around area. And mr. N. Zetterling criticises "Study" from a position Tactics, that is from a position of those who conducts combat on a landscape (from position of komandir).
Easier saying, that criticises mr. N. Zetterling, in Study is not present.

But it does not mean that mr. N. Zetterling is not occupied with a cheating at tactical level. So, for example, from its article, it is visible, that it does not consider units of 10th and 17th air-defence divisions of Luftwaffe operating as on a site III Pz K and as on a site XLVII Pz K.
And it neither is a lot of nor a little about 20,000 personnel and about 1,000 barrel of guns of calibre from 2.0, 3.7 and 8.8 sm, many of which were two and four barrel guns on self-propelled carriages /chassis of easy tanks - PzI, PzII, 35, 38 (t) or "Renault"/
And such errors in mr. N. Zetterling's to article, as Russians speak, a pond dam up (there is plenty).

[Yuri]

/cut/

Here is how figures of semi-annual requirement in manpower OKL for completion of losses look:

- for an aircrew - 20,000;
- for Air Forces units - 50,000;
- for a division "Herman Goering" - 10,000;
- for an antiaircraft artillery - 140,000;
- for communication units - 45,000;
- for Landwehr units - 12,000;
- for Air Defence Forces units - 5,000
- for LuftWaffe Field Divisions - 40,000

In Ukraine in the end of 43 - the beginning 44 three number air-defence divisions and one educational-field air-defence division, air-defence school, and also huge weight of separate air-defence artillery and searchlight batallions (Abteilungs) a reserve of the main command operated. In the sum it made not less than six air-defence divisions. Air-defence formations operated, to main, on land to the purposes as anti-tank defence. Number manpower of these divisions was considerable. So, for example, 9th air-defence division had in November, 1943 of 17,000 persons, 800 guns of different calibre and 140 searchlight plants of 60 and 150 centimetres

Requirement for a manpower for completion of losses and acquisition of units of Air Defence Forces (which defended from air attack of a city and industrial objects) it was shown separately and made everything, as shown above, 5,000.
It speaks that in air defence units in a mass order civilians, working factories, and as prisoners of war (mainly Frenchmen and Yugoslavs, but as Russian prisoners of war). Besides to structure of subdivisions of air defence went the persons called in the area of service of a labour duty.

Apparently, the German air forces (Luftwaffe) it first of all land war, and already then actually war in air and air defence of territory of the country.

Nope. The manpower requirements for Flak units were huge, but only a small percentage of them were at the Eastern Front. According to Flak: German Anti-aircraft defenses 1914-1945, out of 4,267 heavy and light batteries as of early 1944, only 639 were in Russia.

Excuse, Gary, but it is nonsense.
And, nonsense in several directions.
First, we will look, what was on the beginning of 1944 structure of the personnel of air-defence the Luftwaffe's formations arranged on "expanded territory of Reich".

But in the beginning some words about how in documents Luftwaffe territories occupied Wehrmacht were called. All occupied territories broke into three "territories". The largest was, certainly, «expanded territory of Reich» - so in documents Luftwaffe designates territory of actually the Great Germany (including the attached areas of Czechia, Poland, Luxembourg and France), and as territories of protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, the general-governorship, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway and Denmark and, besides, territories of military districts "Ukraine" and "Baltic" /«Ostland»/. Differently, «expanded territory of Reich» joined also some unit of an occupied territory of the USSR (Ukraine, Belarus, Baltic).

The second "territory" it «South territory» - Italy, Romania and the Balkans.

At last, the third territory "Russia" as which it was understood not all occupied territory of the USSR but only that unit which placed between a front line and rear border of the army groups operating in East. On 1/1/1944 in East was four army groups "North", "Center", "South" and "A".

Well, on 1/1/1944 Luftwaffe had twenty four air-defence divisions, nine of which were in "Russia" that is operated together with four army groups specified above.
Arranged in the Polar region, Finland, and as in military districts "Ukraine" and "Baltic" /«Ostland»/ air-defence Abteilungs of Luftwaffe (which actually operating against forces of Red Army) under the term "Russia" did not join.
Further, in Luftwaffe was available the big figure, so-called, railway air-defence Abteilungs. All these Abteilungs submitted to commanders of rail transportation. In particular, railway air-defence Abteilungs which accompanied the railway echelons transporting cargoes and the personnel in the south of Russia, submitted in the operative relation to "the commander of rail transportation of the South of Russia". The commander of rail transportation did not submit OKX. Clearly, that before opening of the Second front all railway air-defence Abteilungs were on an occupied territory of the USSR. Thus (as it is visible from German sources) railway air-defence Abteilungs are enlisted in number were on «expanded territory of Reich». All it would be ridiculous, if is not so sadly.

Then, in each of three air-defence corps operating in Russia together with army groups "North", "Center", "South" and "A" there were air-defence schools, and as educational-field regiments. And educational and as schools they were called conditionally. For example, in the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944 1st school of an antiaircraft artillery and an educational-field regiment of 1st air-defence corps operated together with corps group of general Shörner in region Nikopol, Bolshaya Lepatiha. Together 1st school and an educational--field regiment had 20 (twenty) air-defence batteries (I have possibility to read reports of their commanders).
I summarise told above, we will not be mistaken, if we will assume that was actual in "Russia" more than 1000 air-defence batteries Luftwaffe.

And now we will look at structure of the personnel of the air-defence divisions operating in the beginning of 1944 on «expanded territory of Reich».
We take 24. Flakdivision which was for 1/1/1944 years around Vienna (Ostmark - Austria).
We read:

«Das Personal bei der Flak bestand nur bei den leitenden Funktionen aus Soldaten. Andere Aufgaben wurden durch Behelfspersonal erledigt. Insgesamt waren bei der 24. Flakdivision bis zu rund 16.200 Personen eingesetzt.
Es waren dies:
- 4,000 Flaksoldaten
- 4,000 Luftwaffenhelfer (Oberschüler und Gymnasiasten der 6. und 7. Schulstufe sowie Lehrlinge - alles 16 bis 18 jährige)
- 1,800 Männer des RAD (Reichsarbeitsdienst)
- 2,000 Flakwaffenhelferinnen
- 1,500 RAD-Maiden (Frauen im Reichsarbeitsdienst)
- 1,500 Mann ausländisches Hilfspersonal (hauptsächlich Italiener und russische Hilfswillige)
- 800 Flakwehrmänner der Heimatflak (Betriebsangehörige von Großbetrieben sowie Landarbeiter)
- 600 Stabshelferinnen

Frauen kamen hauptsächlich im Stab, an den Scheinwerfern bzw. an den Nebelmaschinen zum Einsatz, wurden in geringerer Zahl aber auch bei den MESS - und Trossstaffeln, in Ausnahmefällen auch an den Geschützen - allerdings nicht als Geschützführer oder Munitionskanonier - eingesetzt. »

Specially for our dear Jan-Hendrik I translate from German into English (certainly, preliminary having carried out an intermediate translation into Russian).

«Only the main functions near antiaircraft guns were carried out by soldiers. All other work was executed by support personnel. As a whole in 24. Flakdivision 16,200 persons were used nearby. It were:
- 4,000 soldiers anti-aircraft gunners;
- 4,000 assistants to Air forces (senior pupils and grammar-school boys of 6th and 7th school steps and as pupils - all are more senior 16 till 18 years)
- 1,800 men RAD - an imperial labour duty
- 2,000 assistants- women anti-aircraft gunner
- 1,500 maidens from RAD (women of an imperial labour duty)
- 1,500 men the foreign voluntary personnel (mainly Italians and Russian volunteer assistants)
- 800 personnel of local air defence (from working large manufactures and agricultural workers)
- 600 headquarters assistants (women).

Women mainly carried out headquarters functions, were used in crews searchlights and smoke plants, less often used in measuring stations of a fire control and crews a cable /aerostat/ layers, in unusual cases at antiaircraft guns, but never as commanders or the carrier of shells ».

Apparently, as a part of crews of antiaircraft guns it is less than 25 % were anti-aircraft gunners men. And it were, mainly, not healthy men, and from among recovering and invalids not suitable for service at the front. From here a conclusion, practically all of 100 % those of 140,000 men that were called by autumn of 1943 and winter of 1944 for service in an antiaircraft artillery Luftwaffe got to Russia. And only after having got to Russia wound they, being in commands recovering, joined in structure of crews of the antiaircraft guns finding on "expanded territory of Reich".
And the basic unit of crews of antiaircraft guns here made, as it we saw above:
Luftwaffenhelfer, Männer des RAD, RAD-Maiden ausländisches Hilfspersonal (hauptsächlich Italiener und russische Hilfswillige), Flakwehrmänner der Heimatflak (Betriebsangehörige von Großbetrieben sowie Landarbeiter), Stabshelferinnen.
To it it is necessary to add: that functions of members of crews of antiaircraft guns carried out as - captured Frenchmen and Yugoslavs, firemen and policemen.
Differently, in "expanded territory of Reich" members of crews consisted of those who formally not was in Wehrmacht.

[GaryD]

Yuri, thank you for proving my case. This particular disagreement got started when you originally said that the figure for antiaircraft artillery reinforcements/replacements, 140,000, was larger than for other categories and deduced from this that "Apparently, the German air forces (Luftwaffe) it first of all land war, and already then actually war in air and air defence of territory of the country."

I replied: "Nope. The manpower requirements for Flak units were huge, but only a small percentage of them were at the Eastern Front. According to Flak: German Anti-aircraft defenses 1914-1945, out of 4,267 heavy and light batteries as of early 1944, only 639 were in Russia."

You replied to this by ignoring my statement and telling us that the flak units in the rear was staffed in part with various auxiliary units. Obviously true, but this irrelevant to the fact that most flak units were not on the Russian front and therefore could not by any stretch of the imagination be considered part of a "land war" organization.

You then go on to reinforce my point by saying that "Russia as which it was understood not all occupied territory of the USSR but only that unit which placed between a front line and rear border of the army groups operating in East." Therefore, according to this interpretation, the figures in Edward Westermann's book of 639 heavy and light flak batteries in "Russia" out of a total of 4,267 batteries shows that the largest front of the war had only 15 percent of all Luftwaffe batteries, and even those only had a POSSIBILITY of engaging in ground combat since many were probably defending places in the rear.

You said "Clearly, that before opening of the Second front all railway air-defence Abteilungs were on an occupied territory of the USSR." This is clearly false. The Germans also used many railway flak units to protect strategic installations in the Reich (Westermann p. 189, 266).

You said "I summarise told above, we will not be mistaken, if we will assume that was actual in "Russia" more than 1000 air-defence batteries Luftwaffe." This disagrees with Westermann, who has actually researched this topic and written a book which is very well sourced.

Gary

[GaryD]

Well, let's continue.
In what mr . N. Zetterling's swindle consists?
In a few words its swindle is reduced to the following.

<snip>

So, "Study of Join Staff" intends for military leaders of operative level, that is for commanders of troops of Armies and Fronts (for komanduyushchy), for those who maneuvers forces around area. And mr. N. Zetterling criticises "Study" from a position Tactics, that is from a position of those who conducts combat on a landscape (from position of komandir).
Easier saying, that criticises mr. N. Zetterling, in Study is not present.

Mr. Zetterling is not critiquing the tactical or operational level; he's criticizing the General Staff study's basic command of the facts and the American editors for calling it accurate. Basically, it seems like much that the study has written about German strength is wrong, sometimes by a lot. This goes to the heart of an operational study, for if you have the force ratios wrong, how can you make an intelligent analysis of the fighting at any level? These studies were intended as educational tools, were they not?

http://www.militaryhistory.nu/critiques ... nstudy.pdf

[Jan-Hendrik]

After Yuri had finally presented that he was not able to understand Zetterling's points at all (which does not surprise me anymore)...


...he should maybe first try to understand what he is really translating

We take 24. Flakdivision which was for 1/1/1944 years around Vienna (Ostmark - Austria).

Thanks. Did you ever thought about the point that there was a difference between Heimatflak, units that were solely deployed in home areas?

Differently, in "expanded territory of Reich" members of crews consisted of those who formally not was in Wehrmacht.

It is on you to bring us evidence that those units with this personal was used at the russian front. So far you were not able to present us more than rubbish interpretations in typical Yuri style

From here a conclusion, practically all of 100 % those of 140,000 men that were called by autumn of 1943 and winter of 1944 for service in an antiaircraft artillery Luftwaffe got to Russia.

Thats your own imagination, but not a conclusion



Jan-Hendrik

[Michate]

Actually the Lufwaffe ration strength figures for the different Luftflotten as well as the ration strength figures for all services (including also civilians and foreigners) show that only a limited part of the Luftwaffe personnel in 1943/44 (some 15-20%) was deployed in the East, while roughly half of the personnel belonged to Luftflotte Reich, with the rest deployed in France, Italy, Scandinavia and the Balkans.
In 1944, more Luftwaffe personnel was deployed in France than at the whole Eastern front.

[Yuri]

Differently, in "expanded territory of Reich" members of crews consisted of those who formally not was in Wehrmacht.

It is on you to bring us evidence that those units with this personal was used at the russian front. So far you were not able to present us more than rubbish interpretations in typical Yuri style

Jan-Hendrik

Well, for ours dear Jan-Hendrick, and exclusive for the sake of the Russian-German friendship, I will translate from German on English pieces from article
«ORGANISATION TODT in War.
Labour duty /(Reichs)Arbeitsdienst/ in Germany during war» by engineer Walter Kumpf from the book «Bilanz des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Erkenntnisse und Verpflichtungen für die Zukunft». - Hamburg, 1953.

I hope, ours dear Jan-Hendrick will open for itself much that interesting about OT and RAD in Russia.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Organisation TODT in War
…
War in the East was special ordeals for organisation TODT
In pockets near Stalingrad, Kholm, Demjansk and Nikopol the ordinary structure of organisation TODT fulfilled the duty in the same way as its soldiers of all other battle units carried out.
{Certainly, the ordinary structure of organisation TODT was present and at those pockets which were not mentioned by engineer Walter Kumpf. In particular, in Korsun-Shevchenkovsky pocket, in Crimea, Belarus, Brody, Jassy - and so on and so forth - Yuri}
.....

Labour duty /(Reichs) Arbeitsdienst/ in Germany during War

In the first years of war the considerable unit of groups of a labour duty has been held on various works within the Germany.
However special conditions of war in Russia have gradually changed general conditions, and the building units of a labour duty working far in the East, quite often entered battle as it has happened, for example, in defensive battle near Rzhev in the summer of 1942. Their operations and high disciplined behaviour of staff and commanders have deserved a special praise and gratitude from command of front units.

...
The labour duty for young men in a course of war has lost the former sense and has turned to usual military service
…

The general deterioration in the situation on fronts began to make since 1943 on service of a labour duty the big impact. To liberate for front it is more than people and simultaneously to fill up antiaircraft artillery staff, 400 antiaircraft batteries have been transferred service of a labour duty. Thanks to well adjusted preparation of commanding structure of service of a labour duty already after a while it has appeared possible to make some chiefs of groups commanders of batteries.

Last year wars the service of a labour duty should assist army of a reserve and incur problems of combat training of recruits. Because of shortage of instructors and teachers of military science and a lack of the educational weapon, and also in the absence of sufficient time for training this problem caused by exclusively heavy military conditions, dared rather unsatisfactorily.
….
Thus, within last two years of war under the influence of worsening military conditions the service of a labour duty turned to the improvised military organisation more and more. However, it still was called as service of a labour duty, but from its former shape almost remains nothing. With it it was necessary to be reconciled, and parents if they were not at the front, have been compelled to give reluctantly to the state of one's own not fully fledged baby birds.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Yuri]

Yuri, thank you for proving my case. This particular disagreement got started when you originally said that the figure for antiaircraft artillery reinforcements/replacements, 140,000, was larger than for other categories and deduced from this that "Apparently, the German air forces (Luftwaffe) it first of all land war, and already then actually war in air and air defence of territory of the country."

I replied: "Nope. The manpower requirements for Flak units were huge, but only a small percentage of them were at the Eastern Front. According to Flak: German Anti-aircraft defenses 1914-1945, out of 4,267 heavy and light batteries as of early 1944, only 639 were in Russia."

You replied to this by ignoring my statement and telling us that the flak units in the rear was staffed in part with various auxiliary units. Obviously true, but this irrelevant to the fact that most flak units were not on the Russian front and therefore could not by any stretch of the imagination be considered part of a "land war" organization.

You then go on to reinforce my point by saying that "Russia as which it was understood not all occupied territory of the USSR but only that unit which placed between a front line and rear border of the army groups operating in East." Therefore, according to this interpretation, the figures in Edward Westermann's book of 639 heavy and light flak batteries in "Russia" out of a total of 4,267 batteries shows that the largest front of the war had only 15 percent of all Luftwaffe batteries, and even those only had a POSSIBILITY of engaging in ground combat since many were probably defending places in the rear.

You said "Clearly, that before opening of the Second front all railway air-defence Abteilungs were on an occupied territory of the USSR." This is clearly false. The Germans also used many railway flak units to protect strategic installations in the Reich (Westermann p. 189, 266).

You said "I summarise told above, we will not be mistaken, if we will assume that was actual in "Russia" more than 1000 air-defence batteries Luftwaffe." This disagrees with Westermann, who has actually researched this topic and written a book which is very well sourced.

Gary

Gary, the air-defence battery is Personnel + Guns&Ammunition. And in such an order: Personnel + Guns&Ammunition. Belonging of personnel defines an belonging of units - in this case belonging the air-defence batteries placed in expanded territory of Reich.
Belonging of personnel defines belonging of units, no reverse.
Ridiculously to name air-defence batteries as Luftwaffe- belonging when their personnel for 75-80 percent consisted from RAD-young men and RAD-girls, 15-16th years schoolboys and schoolgirls, workers and working women of factories, foreigners and other non-Wehrmacht public. It is especially ridiculous, because 20-25 % which were in these batteries Luftwaffe-soldier it were those soldiers who consisted in commands recovering after stay in hospital.
For example, in the USSR all who served in an antiaircraft artillery (not important in what place - in deep back or at the front) were taken at the staff Red Army.

Now to steam of words about reliability of the German sources.
Gary, much to our regret, it is possible to ascertain, that in the German post-war sources figures of force of the Wehrmacht, operating in East are essentially distorted. As a rule, these sources give the figures underestimated concerning actual figures on 35-50 % and more.

As an example, it is possible to compare OoB Flak-Division 15, defined in a post-war German source, and OoB Flak-Division 15 (mot) defined on German documents of a wartime which are stored in TsAMO and which I have possibility to read.
So, we find in a modern German source about OoB Flak-Division 15 following:

Flak-Division 15

Flak-Division 15
1. Einsatz und Unterstellung
Aufgestellt am 1. März 1942 in Rumänien aus dem Stab der in Ploesti eingesetzten Flak-Brigade III. Die Division wurde durch die Flak-Division 5 abgelöst und im Mai 1942 in Südrußland bei Mariupol unter der Heeresgruppe A eingesetzt.
Am 19. März 1943 unterstand die Division der 6. Armee und wr wie folgt eingesetzt:
Reserve-Flak-Abteilung 147
Flak-Regiment 7
Flak-Regiment 153
Am 30. Juni 1943 unterstand die Division der 6. Armee und war wie folgt eingesetzt:
Flak-Regiment 7 zum Luftschutz in Losowaja, Jassinowataja, Stalino-Nord und Charzyssk
gemischte Flak-Abteilung 147 (v) zum Luftschutz in Mariupol
Am 7. Oktober 1943 unterstand die Division der 6. Armee und war wie folgt eingesetzt:
Flak-Regiment 7 beim IV. Armeekorps
Flak-Regiment 4 beim XXIX. Armeekorps
Flak-Regiment 153 zum Schutz der Dnjepr-Brücken
1943 und 1944 erfolgte der Einsatz bei der Heeresgruppe Südukraine in Besserabien, Ungarn und Stuhlweißenburg

The preliminary note:

a)OoB for Flak-Division 15 from a modern German source
b) OoB Flak-Division 15 (mot) under German documents of the wartime, stored in TsAMO (142000, the city of Podolsk, the Moscow area, Russia)
Divergences in data between two sources are allocated by a boldface font.
Now we compare

I. As of 19. März 1943
a) OoB Flak-Division 15 according to a modern German source:
Reserve-Flak-Abteilung 147
Flak-Regiment 7
Flak-Regiment 153

b) actual OoB Flak-Division 15 ( mot ) under the trophy German documents of a wartime:
Reserve-Flak-Abteilung 147
leichte Flak-Abteilung 77 ( mot ) - on self-propelled gun carriages (Abteilung it is restored in February, 1943, the previous structure is destroyed in Stalingrad).
Flak-Regiment 4 ( mot )
Flak-Regiment 7 ( mot )
Flak-Regiment 153 ( mot )

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II. As of 7. Oktober 1943
a) (OoB Flak-Division 15 according to a modern German source):
Flak-Regiment 4 XXIX. Armeekorps
Flak-Regiment 7 IV. Armeekorps
Flak-Regiment 153 zum Schutz der Dnjepr-Brücken

b) actual structure OoB Flak-Division 15 ( mot ) under trophy German documents of a wartime:
Flak-Regiment 4 ( mot )
Flak-Regiment 7 ( mot )
Flak-Regiment 153 ( mot )
Flak-LehrField Regiment - Bolschaja Lepatiha beim XXIX Armeekorps land defence
Flak-Schule 1 (I. and II./Abteilung) - Bolschaja Lepatiha zum Schutz der Dnjepr-Brücken, then anti-tank defence and struggle against an infantry of the opponent
schwere Flak-Abteilung 301 -Werchnednjeprowsk zum Schutz der Dnjepr-Brücken, then Apostolovo land defence
transport column 7

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As you can see, OoB Flak-Division 15 ( mot ) in a post-war German source it is distorted on 35-40 %. It is necessary to tell, that such percent of reduction of forces from the actual forces of Wehrmacht operating in days of war in East, is characteristic practically for all post-war German of sources.
Such situation speaks in many respects that the western researchers do not burn with the desire to work with documents of Russian archives. Clearly, that, not having studied documents of archives stored in Russian, it is impossible to make a high-grade truthful picture of events on Great Patriotic War fronts (or on East front if to look from a West side).


So, Gary, And one more.
As it is possible to understand, you mix two kinds of Flak-units: easy railway Abteilungs /leichte Flak-Abteilung (Eisb.)/ and schwere Flak-Abteilung having antiaircraft guns, gun carriages at which were railway platforms. These two kinds had different mission.
The first had 2.0 and 3.7 guns and intended for protection of the railway echelons transporting manpower, battle technics and an ammunition near to a front line. Batteries such leichte Flak-Abteilung (Eisb.) took places between echelon cars with which moved. Till June, 1944 Flak-Abteilung (Eisb.) there was no work in the expanded territory of Reich.
As to second kind Flak-Abteilung (gun carriages on railway platforms) these on the beginning of 1944 was very little. Their figure has increased only to autumn of 1944.