Could someone inform me of the reason France and England declared war on Germany for invading Poland but not Russia who did the same thing? If by some chance the German attack on the western front had failed, would the French and English have asked Stalin to kindly remove his troops from Poland?
jbets
Poland, England, France
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Poland, England, France
History is what we repeat if we don't study it.
Hmmm...interesting question. IMO the answer could be chalked up to the realities of the time.
When the Soviets crossed into Poland on Sept. 17, they did so under the pretense that they needed to protect their western border from the anarchy of a collapsing Poland and ensure the safety of their "fraternal populations in Belorussia and the Ukraine."
Of course a rough German-Soviet demarcation line had already been sketched in August by the two states' secret non-agression pact. Stalin and Hitler worked out the final border in 1940, giving the Germans all the Polish-speaking territory and the Soviets the rest, most notably Lithuania.
I guess what I'm saying is I don't think that the British or French necessarily saw the Soviet incursion as an invasion per se, but rather as a defensive move aimed at ensuring Soviet territorial safety. In hindsight, it seems pretty obvious that the Soviets made a land-grab, but at the time, the August '39 Soviet-German pact was still secret. I'm not sure that the Brits and French had strong reasons to believe that Stalin and Hitler were in cahoots, and they certainly didn't need to be at war with another empire.
Regards,
LowTech
When the Soviets crossed into Poland on Sept. 17, they did so under the pretense that they needed to protect their western border from the anarchy of a collapsing Poland and ensure the safety of their "fraternal populations in Belorussia and the Ukraine."
Of course a rough German-Soviet demarcation line had already been sketched in August by the two states' secret non-agression pact. Stalin and Hitler worked out the final border in 1940, giving the Germans all the Polish-speaking territory and the Soviets the rest, most notably Lithuania.
I guess what I'm saying is I don't think that the British or French necessarily saw the Soviet incursion as an invasion per se, but rather as a defensive move aimed at ensuring Soviet territorial safety. In hindsight, it seems pretty obvious that the Soviets made a land-grab, but at the time, the August '39 Soviet-German pact was still secret. I'm not sure that the Brits and French had strong reasons to believe that Stalin and Hitler were in cahoots, and they certainly didn't need to be at war with another empire.
Regards,
LowTech
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sid guttridge
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Hi Guys,
I think Low Tech's final statement holds the key. There is no point in fighting unwinnable wars and to add the USSR to Anglo-French enemies would have been to make an already bad situation so much worse.
A question - Did Poland declare war on the USSR as a result of its move into eastern Poland?
A second question - As a majority of the population of the areas taken over by the USSR was non-Polish, did it consider Polish rule legitimate in the first place?
Cheers,
Sid.
I think Low Tech's final statement holds the key. There is no point in fighting unwinnable wars and to add the USSR to Anglo-French enemies would have been to make an already bad situation so much worse.
A question - Did Poland declare war on the USSR as a result of its move into eastern Poland?
A second question - As a majority of the population of the areas taken over by the USSR was non-Polish, did it consider Polish rule legitimate in the first place?
Cheers,
Sid.
But what if:
Good replies but are we using knowledge of the situation as we know of it today and not limiting ourselves to that of that time.
I have a big collection of Latvian magazines of pre-1940 and as the timline gets closer to war the articles shift to defense , chemical attacks. army etc. Placing myself as a reader of that time and trying to forget the present gives me an insight to what the population and government was thinking. Everybody knew there was a war comming and the question was when.
France and England guaranteed Polish borders and not people for then they could not respond to the German attack saying there is a German population in Western Poland that should be with Germany. As in the Baltic countries , the Germans living there moved to Germany before the Russian occupation so the same could be said in Poland.
The British and French had no expectation of losing and many of the Polish people thought the Russians were comming to their aid so this was a blindside hit but the question of Polish borders was still there.
jbets
I have a big collection of Latvian magazines of pre-1940 and as the timline gets closer to war the articles shift to defense , chemical attacks. army etc. Placing myself as a reader of that time and trying to forget the present gives me an insight to what the population and government was thinking. Everybody knew there was a war comming and the question was when.
France and England guaranteed Polish borders and not people for then they could not respond to the German attack saying there is a German population in Western Poland that should be with Germany. As in the Baltic countries , the Germans living there moved to Germany before the Russian occupation so the same could be said in Poland.
The British and French had no expectation of losing and many of the Polish people thought the Russians were comming to their aid so this was a blindside hit but the question of Polish borders was still there.
jbets
History is what we repeat if we don't study it.
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sid guttridge
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Hi Lacplesis,
I don't think there is much argument that almost all of Europe sensed that there was a war coming. The massive rearmament undertaken by virtually every country from the mid 1930s proves that beyond reasonable doubt. What could not be predicted with clarity was who was going to attack who in what order, and which countries were going to end up on what side.
I don't understand your paragraph about the Anglo-French guarantees and the German populations of Poland and the Baltic States. Can you clarify that?
The British and French may have had no expectation of losing the war with Germany, but they were also by no means certain of winning it. The German Reich's population was twice that of France and only a little smaller than that of France and Britain combined. Britain and its colonies also had a very small army which would take years to expand. The French and British already had their hands full with Germany. Adding the Soviet Union to the list of enemies would have been suicidal.
This same debate about adding the USSR to their enemies took place about helping Finnland over the winter of 1939-40. A plan was developed to send Anglo-French forces through northern Norway and Sweden, but was abandoned as completely impractical.
The questions I asked last time remain relevant:
Did Poland itself declare war on the USSR in 1939? If it did not, then one can hardly expect Britain and France to do so.
As a majority of the population of the area taken by the USSR was not Polish, did it regard Polish rule as legitimate in the first place? The answer in Galicia is certainly no. The Poles had to spend much effort in the 1920s and 1930s in suppressing Ukrainian nationalism in the area. This is not a matter of hindsight. It was a very live contemporary issue. A quarter of the Polish army consisted of non-Poles in 1939, which did nothing to improve its cohesiveness and morale. If many people in Polish uniform fropm the area were not particularly keen to defend Poland's eastern borders, why should the Anglo-French be expected to go to war over the issue?
Cheers,
Sid.
I don't think there is much argument that almost all of Europe sensed that there was a war coming. The massive rearmament undertaken by virtually every country from the mid 1930s proves that beyond reasonable doubt. What could not be predicted with clarity was who was going to attack who in what order, and which countries were going to end up on what side.
I don't understand your paragraph about the Anglo-French guarantees and the German populations of Poland and the Baltic States. Can you clarify that?
The British and French may have had no expectation of losing the war with Germany, but they were also by no means certain of winning it. The German Reich's population was twice that of France and only a little smaller than that of France and Britain combined. Britain and its colonies also had a very small army which would take years to expand. The French and British already had their hands full with Germany. Adding the Soviet Union to the list of enemies would have been suicidal.
This same debate about adding the USSR to their enemies took place about helping Finnland over the winter of 1939-40. A plan was developed to send Anglo-French forces through northern Norway and Sweden, but was abandoned as completely impractical.
The questions I asked last time remain relevant:
Did Poland itself declare war on the USSR in 1939? If it did not, then one can hardly expect Britain and France to do so.
As a majority of the population of the area taken by the USSR was not Polish, did it regard Polish rule as legitimate in the first place? The answer in Galicia is certainly no. The Poles had to spend much effort in the 1920s and 1930s in suppressing Ukrainian nationalism in the area. This is not a matter of hindsight. It was a very live contemporary issue. A quarter of the Polish army consisted of non-Poles in 1939, which did nothing to improve its cohesiveness and morale. If many people in Polish uniform fropm the area were not particularly keen to defend Poland's eastern borders, why should the Anglo-French be expected to go to war over the issue?
Cheers,
Sid.
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Enrico Cernuschi
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Poland 1939
Gentlemen, I think that you are forgeting a pair of NOT minor details.
First: the legitimate Polish government was interned in Romania on 15 and 16 Sept. 1939 (President Moscichi, premier Slawoj-Skladkowsky, ministers Kosorzycki, Beck, gen. Ridz-Smigly ect.). Once in Bucarest all these "guests" were frozen, under Anglo-French request (paid cash in weapons and not only) and so london and paris could, at least, made their own-made, and more palatable, government in exile by Gen. Sikorsky. I don't mean this last was a purely puppet government but its situation was, at best, a precarious one. The only active European powers who went on recognizing the original Polish Government were Italy (she dind't delare war to Poland on 10 June 1940 and then) and Vatican, which recognized, at least, the Sikorsky's one on June 1943.
Polish government was so unable to declare war to USSR when the Red Army invaded the eastern half of the favourite Russian - German tennis camp on 17 Sept. 1939. The matter is so not what the colonel-government coming from Warwaw would like to do but what the "Allies" were going to do with Moscow.
As a matter of fact on Sept. 1939 there was a debate between London and Paris regarding this very subject. The Decartes French mentality would like to fight both Germany and USSR (they believed to be able to defeat both this supposedly fragile powers) while the British favoured a more traditional wait and see policy. As in the western alliance the horse was French and the Cavalier from UK this was the final resolution. The allies however palnned and build up a chirurgical sereis of air raids against Baku with a composed French-British Group mounted on US made Marylands and Blenheims startung from Syria and which would have used Turkish and Iranian facilities too.
The German surprise on 10 May 1940 stopped the plan (but the French government tried until middle June 1940 to attack the Russinas hoping so to arrive at a USA involvlent in the war, something like the Spanish Republican dream (Minister of the war I. Prieto) to provoke, at least, a world war which could save their own doom on 1937-1939).
To debate about the rightness of a Polish rule on the ex Eastern poland territories is not history. Local poeple was in large part formed by ukranians but they were catholic too and the idea of the inevitable red scare there was not welcomed at all (even the not many photos which the TASS let see abroad of the local 1939 "fraternization" between soldiers and inhabitants do not indicate any bienvenue).
Hoping in some replay EC
First: the legitimate Polish government was interned in Romania on 15 and 16 Sept. 1939 (President Moscichi, premier Slawoj-Skladkowsky, ministers Kosorzycki, Beck, gen. Ridz-Smigly ect.). Once in Bucarest all these "guests" were frozen, under Anglo-French request (paid cash in weapons and not only) and so london and paris could, at least, made their own-made, and more palatable, government in exile by Gen. Sikorsky. I don't mean this last was a purely puppet government but its situation was, at best, a precarious one. The only active European powers who went on recognizing the original Polish Government were Italy (she dind't delare war to Poland on 10 June 1940 and then) and Vatican, which recognized, at least, the Sikorsky's one on June 1943.
Polish government was so unable to declare war to USSR when the Red Army invaded the eastern half of the favourite Russian - German tennis camp on 17 Sept. 1939. The matter is so not what the colonel-government coming from Warwaw would like to do but what the "Allies" were going to do with Moscow.
As a matter of fact on Sept. 1939 there was a debate between London and Paris regarding this very subject. The Decartes French mentality would like to fight both Germany and USSR (they believed to be able to defeat both this supposedly fragile powers) while the British favoured a more traditional wait and see policy. As in the western alliance the horse was French and the Cavalier from UK this was the final resolution. The allies however palnned and build up a chirurgical sereis of air raids against Baku with a composed French-British Group mounted on US made Marylands and Blenheims startung from Syria and which would have used Turkish and Iranian facilities too.
The German surprise on 10 May 1940 stopped the plan (but the French government tried until middle June 1940 to attack the Russinas hoping so to arrive at a USA involvlent in the war, something like the Spanish Republican dream (Minister of the war I. Prieto) to provoke, at least, a world war which could save their own doom on 1937-1939).
To debate about the rightness of a Polish rule on the ex Eastern poland territories is not history. Local poeple was in large part formed by ukranians but they were catholic too and the idea of the inevitable red scare there was not welcomed at all (even the not many photos which the TASS let see abroad of the local 1939 "fraternization" between soldiers and inhabitants do not indicate any bienvenue).
Hoping in some replay EC
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sid guttridge
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Hi Enrico,
I haven't got any sources with me to answer some of your points at present. However, I would ask why the Polish government had fled to Romania one or two days BEFORE the Russian attack? This hardly signals a willingness to defend Poland's borders to the last. If the Polish government had already given up the struggle against Germany from its own soil, why should Britain and France have taken up a new struggle against the USSR on its behalf?
One cannot blame the Polish government for making a pragmatic decision to leave the country in a hopeless situation, but equally one cannot blame the Anglo-French for not then wanting to add to their own list of enemies once this had happened.
Whilst a declaration of war by the Polish government would have had little practical value, it would still have had symbolic value. A declaration of war could have been made, even in exile. But was it?
The Baku plan was part of a projected Anglo-French campaign against Germany's sources of oil. Some preparations were made after the fall of Poland, including reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union's Caucasus oil fields, and a British attempt to block the Danube and cut off the main conduit for Romanian oil to Germany was actually launched in 1940 but foiled.
The population of Galicia were largely catholic Ukrainians and they were overwhelmingly anti-Communist. However, they were also anti-Warsaw and this was a source of weakness for Poland, which Germany exploited. There was already a Ukrainian battalion serving with the German army when it attacked Poland at the very start of the war.
Cheers,
Sid.
I haven't got any sources with me to answer some of your points at present. However, I would ask why the Polish government had fled to Romania one or two days BEFORE the Russian attack? This hardly signals a willingness to defend Poland's borders to the last. If the Polish government had already given up the struggle against Germany from its own soil, why should Britain and France have taken up a new struggle against the USSR on its behalf?
One cannot blame the Polish government for making a pragmatic decision to leave the country in a hopeless situation, but equally one cannot blame the Anglo-French for not then wanting to add to their own list of enemies once this had happened.
Whilst a declaration of war by the Polish government would have had little practical value, it would still have had symbolic value. A declaration of war could have been made, even in exile. But was it?
The Baku plan was part of a projected Anglo-French campaign against Germany's sources of oil. Some preparations were made after the fall of Poland, including reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union's Caucasus oil fields, and a British attempt to block the Danube and cut off the main conduit for Romanian oil to Germany was actually launched in 1940 but foiled.
The population of Galicia were largely catholic Ukrainians and they were overwhelmingly anti-Communist. However, they were also anti-Warsaw and this was a source of weakness for Poland, which Germany exploited. There was already a Ukrainian battalion serving with the German army when it attacked Poland at the very start of the war.
Cheers,
Sid.
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Enrico Cernuschi
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Poland best friends
Hello Sid, it's quite a pleasure to meet you again.
a) The Polish Government (and an appreciable slice of his army with the best troops, air force and more modern armoured units) went in Romania confiding in that country help and according his allies suggestions. When they were there (Warsaw was considere, rightly not defendable) they were simply arrested by King Carol personal dicatorship regime following the Anglo-French desire not to have anything more to do with that unpredictable colonel government that had fulfilled in a too much precipitate way (an year of advance on the original British 1939 schedule) his originary mission to precipitate the European crisis with Germany and had, meanwhile, proofed unable to sustain, against the British Marshall Ironside opinion declared during his July 1939 visit in Poland, that the Polish Army could fight against Germany at least until the next spring. Being all put under arrest (in spite of a fiable French protest to the too much strong ally on the other side of the Channel) the unfortunate Polish ministers were simply unable to declare war or, maybe, to dictate a simple declaration to the press.
b) The final Anglo-French decision not to declare war (or, at least, to broke the diplomatic relations) with Moscow was not to much different from the actual, global situation where a villain without a ready atomic bomb (Saddam) is going to pay the bill not only for his innumerable acts of offence but also the crimes of his ideal comrade Kim who is credited to be able to launch an ICBM nuke and is so able to espace the same Iraq dictator eventual fate.
c) Reconnaissance flights over Russia? This is a great piece of news. May you be so kind to release any more detail? Was recordman Sidney Cotton (who performed similar tasks in the Italian metropolitan and colonial skyes on 1939 and 1940) involved?
d) An Ukrainan battalion under German colours in 1939? (I knew about two small battalions on 1941). This is an other interesting news. When was this unit raised? Perhaps during the winter 1938-1939 time when Stalin declared at the perty congress to be afraid about a possible German-Polish attack against USSR with the purpose to gain all Ukraina to these traditional western enemies? (When the Polish foreign minister Beck had a summit with Ribbentrop on January 1939 he believed that the bargain Danzig-corridor for Slovakia, first step of the following Ukrainan campaing was accomplished. The news that Berlin had changed the course was quite a shock for him and his cabinet collegues).
A last, humanitarian, detail. The 104 Polish professors of the Cracow University were able to come home, on 1940, from the deportation in Germany only thanks a strong Mussolini request to Hitler. As a matter of fact the Polish national himn recalls the gen. Dombrowsky fight in Italy, during the Napoleonic years, the Italian-Polish traditional friendships since the XVII Century fighting the Islamic Turks on the land (Poland) and the sea (Venice, Genoa, Napoli, Rome, Savoy and Tuscany) and the following XIX Century common wars against Austria and Russia and says: "... for ours, yours, common freedom". It was a granted promise (and not a Katyn or Yalta one). Next time EC
a) The Polish Government (and an appreciable slice of his army with the best troops, air force and more modern armoured units) went in Romania confiding in that country help and according his allies suggestions. When they were there (Warsaw was considere, rightly not defendable) they were simply arrested by King Carol personal dicatorship regime following the Anglo-French desire not to have anything more to do with that unpredictable colonel government that had fulfilled in a too much precipitate way (an year of advance on the original British 1939 schedule) his originary mission to precipitate the European crisis with Germany and had, meanwhile, proofed unable to sustain, against the British Marshall Ironside opinion declared during his July 1939 visit in Poland, that the Polish Army could fight against Germany at least until the next spring. Being all put under arrest (in spite of a fiable French protest to the too much strong ally on the other side of the Channel) the unfortunate Polish ministers were simply unable to declare war or, maybe, to dictate a simple declaration to the press.
b) The final Anglo-French decision not to declare war (or, at least, to broke the diplomatic relations) with Moscow was not to much different from the actual, global situation where a villain without a ready atomic bomb (Saddam) is going to pay the bill not only for his innumerable acts of offence but also the crimes of his ideal comrade Kim who is credited to be able to launch an ICBM nuke and is so able to espace the same Iraq dictator eventual fate.
c) Reconnaissance flights over Russia? This is a great piece of news. May you be so kind to release any more detail? Was recordman Sidney Cotton (who performed similar tasks in the Italian metropolitan and colonial skyes on 1939 and 1940) involved?
d) An Ukrainan battalion under German colours in 1939? (I knew about two small battalions on 1941). This is an other interesting news. When was this unit raised? Perhaps during the winter 1938-1939 time when Stalin declared at the perty congress to be afraid about a possible German-Polish attack against USSR with the purpose to gain all Ukraina to these traditional western enemies? (When the Polish foreign minister Beck had a summit with Ribbentrop on January 1939 he believed that the bargain Danzig-corridor for Slovakia, first step of the following Ukrainan campaing was accomplished. The news that Berlin had changed the course was quite a shock for him and his cabinet collegues).
A last, humanitarian, detail. The 104 Polish professors of the Cracow University were able to come home, on 1940, from the deportation in Germany only thanks a strong Mussolini request to Hitler. As a matter of fact the Polish national himn recalls the gen. Dombrowsky fight in Italy, during the Napoleonic years, the Italian-Polish traditional friendships since the XVII Century fighting the Islamic Turks on the land (Poland) and the sea (Venice, Genoa, Napoli, Rome, Savoy and Tuscany) and the following XIX Century common wars against Austria and Russia and says: "... for ours, yours, common freedom". It was a granted promise (and not a Katyn or Yalta one). Next time EC
Tis a lovely day gentlemen.
I am seeing the light. The French wanted a go at it and the English had a wait and see and the Polish government was running for its life.
In response to a question above, when Hitler signed his treaty with Russia , the German-Latvians could stay or move to Germany except the German-Latvian Jews who had to stay. The League of Nations and the involved governments agreed on borders. If the people didn't like who represented them they had a choice to cross the border.
EnglAND and France agreed to help defend Polands borders reguardless of who lives where.
A case in point is Latvia. The area around Daugavpils in Southeastern Latvia before the war was 65% Latvian and the rest from Russia, Ukrain etc. Due to Russian coloninization during the occupation years, the area now is 90% non Latvian speaking. The people scream about non representation but the government points to the border and gives them the option of becomming Latvians or moving but the border stays.
It would be the same as giving the southern part of Texas back to Mexico because of all the illegal immigration has made the majority there hispanics.
In response to a question above, when Hitler signed his treaty with Russia , the German-Latvians could stay or move to Germany except the German-Latvian Jews who had to stay. The League of Nations and the involved governments agreed on borders. If the people didn't like who represented them they had a choice to cross the border.
EnglAND and France agreed to help defend Polands borders reguardless of who lives where.
A case in point is Latvia. The area around Daugavpils in Southeastern Latvia before the war was 65% Latvian and the rest from Russia, Ukrain etc. Due to Russian coloninization during the occupation years, the area now is 90% non Latvian speaking. The people scream about non representation but the government points to the border and gives them the option of becomming Latvians or moving but the border stays.
It would be the same as giving the southern part of Texas back to Mexico because of all the illegal immigration has made the majority there hispanics.
History is what we repeat if we don't study it.
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Enrico Cernuschi
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Latvia, Dr. Doom and Stan Lee
Hello Lacplesis, your letter is an important one. The 1939 Baltic German-Jew not allowed return in Germany is an interesting and, here, unknow, particoular. I confess not to know very much about Latvia; I was able to discover it, when I was a child, only by the famous Fantastic Four enemy Victor von Doom (Dr. Doom), by long my favourite comic villain. Is smiling Lee (Stan Lee, alias Stanley Lieber, born in 1920 in N.Y.) of Latvian origin? This is hardly a German military history question but I'm a very inquisitive people. ("The alien factor" novel by Stan lee and Stan Timmons novel, edited on 2001, about the search for alien technology from the wreck of a star ship fall in France in 1942 is, however, an enjoiable one). Bye EC
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sid guttridge
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Hi Enrico,
According to my information, the Polish government crossed into Romania on 18 September, AFTER the Soviet attack. This gave it time to declare war from its own soil. But did it?
a) The best Polish troops were not in south-east Poland. Why would they be when they had had Germany to fight on the western borders of the country for the previous fortnight? Only the remnants of the air force reached Romania and the armour that reached Romania consisted of a single battalion of French R-35 tanks that had been delivered via Romania only days before.
The Polish Government in exile in Romania could still conduct some business. For example, on 30 September President Moscicki transferred his powers to Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz in Paris. If he could do that he could equally well declare war on the USSR. But did he?
Rackzkiewicz had Sikorski form a government. It had 20 members. If it was representative of the pre-war Polish population it should have had three Ukrainian and one Byelorussian members. It had none. Why? If the Poles weren't prepared to give the eastern districts over run by the Soviet Union any representation, why should Britain and France go to war on Poland's behalf for these areas?
I fully accept that in the terms of the Anglo-French guarantee to Poland, the British and French should technically have declared war on the USSR. However, can anyone explain how this would have been of benefit to Poland?
Poland's national identity as a state was eventually restablished (albeit imperfectly) by the Red Army, not the Franco-Anglo-Americans. If Germany and Russia had been forced into the same camp by an Anglo-French declaration of war on the USSR, then it is unlikely that Poland would have re-emerged at all.
c) I will dig out the details of the RAF overflights of the Caucasus oil fields. I have the necessary book. If memory serves me correctly, it was carried out by a specially converted Lockheed Electra civil airliner at high altitude.
d) The Ukrainian battalion was raised in the summer of 1939 from Ukrainian nationalist Sich Guards driven out of Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia) when the Hungarian Army invaded in March 1939. Many of Carpatho-Ukraine's Sich Guards were actually Ukrainian exiles from Polish Galicia.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Hi Lacplesis,
I see where you are coming from now. You have a Latvian nationalist perspective coloured by the particular situation your country finds itself in now after decades of Soviet-induced migration by Russians and other Slavs. I fully appreciate that the massive scale of this migration threatens Latvian national identity.
However, I do not think that your analogy with the US-Mexican border is entirely apt. As I understand it, south-eastern Latvia was never previously a Russian-majority area, whereas much of the south-west USA was hispanic before the Anglo-Americans arrived.
It seems a pity that Hitler didn't adopt the same policy over the Germans in the Danzig Corridor as he did over Latvia's Germans in 1939. Then there would have been no war at all!
Regarding Latvia - As I understand it, many Baltic Germans returned to Latvia after its conquest by Germany, so the solution adopted by Hitler in 1939 was not regarded by him as final. It was merely a temporary, tactical population shift.
Cheers,
Sid.
According to my information, the Polish government crossed into Romania on 18 September, AFTER the Soviet attack. This gave it time to declare war from its own soil. But did it?
a) The best Polish troops were not in south-east Poland. Why would they be when they had had Germany to fight on the western borders of the country for the previous fortnight? Only the remnants of the air force reached Romania and the armour that reached Romania consisted of a single battalion of French R-35 tanks that had been delivered via Romania only days before.
The Polish Government in exile in Romania could still conduct some business. For example, on 30 September President Moscicki transferred his powers to Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz in Paris. If he could do that he could equally well declare war on the USSR. But did he?
Rackzkiewicz had Sikorski form a government. It had 20 members. If it was representative of the pre-war Polish population it should have had three Ukrainian and one Byelorussian members. It had none. Why? If the Poles weren't prepared to give the eastern districts over run by the Soviet Union any representation, why should Britain and France go to war on Poland's behalf for these areas?
I fully accept that in the terms of the Anglo-French guarantee to Poland, the British and French should technically have declared war on the USSR. However, can anyone explain how this would have been of benefit to Poland?
Poland's national identity as a state was eventually restablished (albeit imperfectly) by the Red Army, not the Franco-Anglo-Americans. If Germany and Russia had been forced into the same camp by an Anglo-French declaration of war on the USSR, then it is unlikely that Poland would have re-emerged at all.
c) I will dig out the details of the RAF overflights of the Caucasus oil fields. I have the necessary book. If memory serves me correctly, it was carried out by a specially converted Lockheed Electra civil airliner at high altitude.
d) The Ukrainian battalion was raised in the summer of 1939 from Ukrainian nationalist Sich Guards driven out of Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia) when the Hungarian Army invaded in March 1939. Many of Carpatho-Ukraine's Sich Guards were actually Ukrainian exiles from Polish Galicia.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Hi Lacplesis,
I see where you are coming from now. You have a Latvian nationalist perspective coloured by the particular situation your country finds itself in now after decades of Soviet-induced migration by Russians and other Slavs. I fully appreciate that the massive scale of this migration threatens Latvian national identity.
However, I do not think that your analogy with the US-Mexican border is entirely apt. As I understand it, south-eastern Latvia was never previously a Russian-majority area, whereas much of the south-west USA was hispanic before the Anglo-Americans arrived.
It seems a pity that Hitler didn't adopt the same policy over the Germans in the Danzig Corridor as he did over Latvia's Germans in 1939. Then there would have been no war at all!
Regarding Latvia - As I understand it, many Baltic Germans returned to Latvia after its conquest by Germany, so the solution adopted by Hitler in 1939 was not regarded by him as final. It was merely a temporary, tactical population shift.
Cheers,
Sid.
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Enrico Cernuschi
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The Polish decoy, the British fisher, the German shark, 1939
Hello Sid, I was waiting for your letter and, as always, it was an useful one.
a) Polish Ministers and prominenten (The Pilsudsky family for istance) arrived in Romania on 16 and 17 Sept. (Source Valerio perna, Galeazzo Ciano, Operazione Polonia, ed. Luni, Milano, 1999, ppgg. 189-193; The book is based upon the Italian diplomatic records and this particoular on the ambassadors despatches from Warsaw, Bucarest abd Bucarest dd 16 and 17 sept. 1939). The Russian invasion started on 17 Sept. 1939 and the same sources confirm, with a lot of details, the requestes, advanced both by London, Paris and Berlin on 18 Sept. to "shut up" the peregrine Polish cabinet. You may find a brillinat Life corrispondence by John Phillips on July 1943 and a full reportage and interview to the Polish Premier Slawoi Skladkowski in Jerusalem where that unfortunate gut was interned by the British governor after his escape from Romania on June 1940 favoured by a Paris establishment quite embarassed by the "Perfida Albione" (Sorry Sid, I'm quoting and this is Latin) too much explicit way to confirm worldwide that the Conservative Cabinet didn' give a damn for Poland integrity but had only exploited that unfortunate accident not for Warsaw' sake but only to arrive at his historical and traditional purpose to resolve again, after a 25 years truce, the German problem posed not by Hitler, The Kaiser or whatever was the periodical German ruler but only by the reluctance to admit its decadence in front of the economical Germany development since 1890 (I'm quoting now Correlli Barnett The Audit of War, ed. Macmillan, 1986).
b) The idea to form a Polish government in exile based on the national slices of that composite country is in interesting one; I presume it was not tried for the same reasons which prevented Churcill, on May 1940, to include in his cabinet on National Union an IRA man too.
c) The German government considered, officially, no more exixtent the legitimate Polish government and the Polish state on Sept. 1940. Mussolini defended openly in front of Hitler the necessity to rebuilt a smaller Poland since January 1940 until July 1943 (at the Feltre meeting, on 19 July 1943). A measure which was in Italy interest, of course, as the Sikorsky Government had assured, on Dec. 1941, his active interest to arrive, through Rome, to a general peace between Germany, Italy and USSR. As a consequence of this underground feelers the Polish brigade was retired from the western desert on January 1942 and no more employed against the Italian. During late spring 1943 Sikorsky refused to send his two Divisions, arrived from Russia and Iran to Palestine on August 1942, to be sent in Sicily. As you know he died by an accident on July 1943. What a pity.
d) If the Lockeed Electra data is confirmed it was the same plane used over the Italian skyes on 1939 and so:"Ther's a method in this craziness" (Shakespeare). Next time EC
a) Polish Ministers and prominenten (The Pilsudsky family for istance) arrived in Romania on 16 and 17 Sept. (Source Valerio perna, Galeazzo Ciano, Operazione Polonia, ed. Luni, Milano, 1999, ppgg. 189-193; The book is based upon the Italian diplomatic records and this particoular on the ambassadors despatches from Warsaw, Bucarest abd Bucarest dd 16 and 17 sept. 1939). The Russian invasion started on 17 Sept. 1939 and the same sources confirm, with a lot of details, the requestes, advanced both by London, Paris and Berlin on 18 Sept. to "shut up" the peregrine Polish cabinet. You may find a brillinat Life corrispondence by John Phillips on July 1943 and a full reportage and interview to the Polish Premier Slawoi Skladkowski in Jerusalem where that unfortunate gut was interned by the British governor after his escape from Romania on June 1940 favoured by a Paris establishment quite embarassed by the "Perfida Albione" (Sorry Sid, I'm quoting and this is Latin) too much explicit way to confirm worldwide that the Conservative Cabinet didn' give a damn for Poland integrity but had only exploited that unfortunate accident not for Warsaw' sake but only to arrive at his historical and traditional purpose to resolve again, after a 25 years truce, the German problem posed not by Hitler, The Kaiser or whatever was the periodical German ruler but only by the reluctance to admit its decadence in front of the economical Germany development since 1890 (I'm quoting now Correlli Barnett The Audit of War, ed. Macmillan, 1986).
b) The idea to form a Polish government in exile based on the national slices of that composite country is in interesting one; I presume it was not tried for the same reasons which prevented Churcill, on May 1940, to include in his cabinet on National Union an IRA man too.
c) The German government considered, officially, no more exixtent the legitimate Polish government and the Polish state on Sept. 1940. Mussolini defended openly in front of Hitler the necessity to rebuilt a smaller Poland since January 1940 until July 1943 (at the Feltre meeting, on 19 July 1943). A measure which was in Italy interest, of course, as the Sikorsky Government had assured, on Dec. 1941, his active interest to arrive, through Rome, to a general peace between Germany, Italy and USSR. As a consequence of this underground feelers the Polish brigade was retired from the western desert on January 1942 and no more employed against the Italian. During late spring 1943 Sikorsky refused to send his two Divisions, arrived from Russia and Iran to Palestine on August 1942, to be sent in Sicily. As you know he died by an accident on July 1943. What a pity.
d) If the Lockeed Electra data is confirmed it was the same plane used over the Italian skyes on 1939 and so:"Ther's a method in this craziness" (Shakespeare). Next time EC
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sid guttridge
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Hi Ernesto,
I can only reiterate my single source for the day the Polish Government crossed into Romania: 18 September. It is in the Cambridge Enyclopedia of the Second World War.
a) Of course the British cabinet had no inherent interest in Polish territorial integrity. Why should it? All national governments are there to act in their own national interest, not to lay down their citizens' lives for someone else. Britain, as always, was interested in ensuring there was no single dominant European power. Germany, with nearly twice the population of France, was the only such threat at the time. The point about the guarantee to Poland is that it was the "line in the sand" chosen to stop further German expansion threatening to Britain. Significantly, it came only AFTER Germany began to absorb non-German-speaking territory in Bohemia-Moravia. Britain did not go to war against Germany until it was blindingly obvious that Hitler was not merely intent on reversing Versailles, but wanted total continental dominance. In legal terms Britain could have gone to war as early as the German Army's entry into the Rhineland in 1936, but it did not.
If Britain was really intent on war mongering against Germany, it would have acted much earlier. It would not have provided the main troop contingent guaranteeing the fairness of the Saarland plebiscite that returned that territory to Germany in 1935. It would have had more than two (yes, ONLY TWO!) divisions available for continental commitment at the time of the Munich crisis in September 1938, etc., etc.
b) Your analogy with Britain and the IRA is wrong. The point about the Sikorski Government was not that it had no terrorist representation, but that it had no minority representation for Ukrainians or Byelorussians at all. The British Parliament, imperfect as it may be, has had Irish representation since at least 1801.
The information about the Caucasus reconnaissance flights is in "Hitler's Oil" by Ronald C. Cooke and Roy Conyers Nesbit., London, 1985. (ISBN 0-7183-0573-6)
On 2 December 1939 the British issued a report on the vulnerability of Russian oil fields. On 19 January 1940 the French prepared a memorandum for a possible intervention to destroy the Russian oilfields.
On 30 March a British civil Locheed 14 Super Electra flew from Habbaniya in Iraq to photograph Baku and on 5 April it did the same over Batumi. Grozny was just out of range.
(As you suspected, this was the same type, but apparently not the same aircraft, used secretly to photograph Italian naval and air bases on the the north shore of the Mediterranean in the spring of 1939 and German factories and airfields in the summer.)
The French were most keen to bomb the Russian oil fields and a joint raid by 120 medium bombers was planned. Five squadrons of French Marylands were to hit Batumi and Grozny, while four squadrons of British Blenheims and one squadron of Wellesleys were to hit Baku.
However, on 16 June 9th Panzer Division captured the French plans and copies of the British reconnaissance photos and told the Russians.
Cheers,
Sid.
I can only reiterate my single source for the day the Polish Government crossed into Romania: 18 September. It is in the Cambridge Enyclopedia of the Second World War.
a) Of course the British cabinet had no inherent interest in Polish territorial integrity. Why should it? All national governments are there to act in their own national interest, not to lay down their citizens' lives for someone else. Britain, as always, was interested in ensuring there was no single dominant European power. Germany, with nearly twice the population of France, was the only such threat at the time. The point about the guarantee to Poland is that it was the "line in the sand" chosen to stop further German expansion threatening to Britain. Significantly, it came only AFTER Germany began to absorb non-German-speaking territory in Bohemia-Moravia. Britain did not go to war against Germany until it was blindingly obvious that Hitler was not merely intent on reversing Versailles, but wanted total continental dominance. In legal terms Britain could have gone to war as early as the German Army's entry into the Rhineland in 1936, but it did not.
If Britain was really intent on war mongering against Germany, it would have acted much earlier. It would not have provided the main troop contingent guaranteeing the fairness of the Saarland plebiscite that returned that territory to Germany in 1935. It would have had more than two (yes, ONLY TWO!) divisions available for continental commitment at the time of the Munich crisis in September 1938, etc., etc.
b) Your analogy with Britain and the IRA is wrong. The point about the Sikorski Government was not that it had no terrorist representation, but that it had no minority representation for Ukrainians or Byelorussians at all. The British Parliament, imperfect as it may be, has had Irish representation since at least 1801.
The information about the Caucasus reconnaissance flights is in "Hitler's Oil" by Ronald C. Cooke and Roy Conyers Nesbit., London, 1985. (ISBN 0-7183-0573-6)
On 2 December 1939 the British issued a report on the vulnerability of Russian oil fields. On 19 January 1940 the French prepared a memorandum for a possible intervention to destroy the Russian oilfields.
On 30 March a British civil Locheed 14 Super Electra flew from Habbaniya in Iraq to photograph Baku and on 5 April it did the same over Batumi. Grozny was just out of range.
(As you suspected, this was the same type, but apparently not the same aircraft, used secretly to photograph Italian naval and air bases on the the north shore of the Mediterranean in the spring of 1939 and German factories and airfields in the summer.)
The French were most keen to bomb the Russian oil fields and a joint raid by 120 medium bombers was planned. Five squadrons of French Marylands were to hit Batumi and Grozny, while four squadrons of British Blenheims and one squadron of Wellesleys were to hit Baku.
However, on 16 June 9th Panzer Division captured the French plans and copies of the British reconnaissance photos and told the Russians.
Cheers,
Sid.
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Enrico Cernuschi
- Patron
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- Joined: Sun Dec 15, 2002 2:05 am
- Location: Pavia
Hi Sid, from Mussolini-Churchill to Poland (but how the hell is possible to discriminate such a composite argoument) here I'm again.
a) My sources about the 16, 17 and 18 Sept Polish government escape in Romania (after a forst tentative to go in hungary with the Italian help), are quoted from the Documenti diplomatici italiani (Official Italian Foreign Ministery records edited since 1953). Perhaps the Cambridge version is a comprensive one recording the last top brass who corssed the line (ther's an article of the Corriere della Sera dd 17 Sept. 1939 which states that a polish Colonel in one of the last cars preffered to put a bullet in his head insted to go abroad. If it's true honour to this man).
b) The information about the Electra flights is gold. Thank you very much for the datas. I ordered that book an hour ago.
c) "a line in the sand" is an imaginative but interesting sentence. I saw, sometimes, it in the cartoon - Duffy Duck I think - and now I know what was the meaning. It' not too much different from our "Hic Rhodus, hic salta". Let me add, however, that in the Italian common speaking ther's an other sentece "Scritto sulla sabbia" (Wrote in the sand) to state a promise someone is not going to respect from the very beginning. I think this is a good example.
d) You are right about the IRA matter. Six to zero for you.
Sincerely, Enrico
P.S. If you are interested about Mussolini's oil send me a private despatch. I wrote three long articles about this subject, they are in Italian but you are clearly able to read it and I think they may be of some interest for your works. EC
a) My sources about the 16, 17 and 18 Sept Polish government escape in Romania (after a forst tentative to go in hungary with the Italian help), are quoted from the Documenti diplomatici italiani (Official Italian Foreign Ministery records edited since 1953). Perhaps the Cambridge version is a comprensive one recording the last top brass who corssed the line (ther's an article of the Corriere della Sera dd 17 Sept. 1939 which states that a polish Colonel in one of the last cars preffered to put a bullet in his head insted to go abroad. If it's true honour to this man).
b) The information about the Electra flights is gold. Thank you very much for the datas. I ordered that book an hour ago.
c) "a line in the sand" is an imaginative but interesting sentence. I saw, sometimes, it in the cartoon - Duffy Duck I think - and now I know what was the meaning. It' not too much different from our "Hic Rhodus, hic salta". Let me add, however, that in the Italian common speaking ther's an other sentece "Scritto sulla sabbia" (Wrote in the sand) to state a promise someone is not going to respect from the very beginning. I think this is a good example.
d) You are right about the IRA matter. Six to zero for you.
Sincerely, Enrico
P.S. If you are interested about Mussolini's oil send me a private despatch. I wrote three long articles about this subject, they are in Italian but you are clearly able to read it and I think they may be of some interest for your works. EC
Re: Poland, England, France
Neither Polish government, nor High Command, nor soldiers escaped to Romania before 18.09.1939:
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=32575&p=229106&hil ... on#p229106
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=32575&p=229106&hil ... on#p229106