Mr. Paul, I think it will be useful for you to get aquainted with the opinion of David Glantz about the view of the westerners on the Red Army, which he expressd in his introduction to the publication of August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945:F/PAUL wrote:As a long-time student of the Russo-German War, I have noticed the increasing number of sovietophile, stalinist apologist, and revisionist postings appearing on many boards. I have learned that, like all agenda based parties, said revisionist/apologist parties have their own schedule to press. In short, the brave, courageous, brilliantly led and equipped soviet army in its crusade against the evil, cowardly fascists. This type of agenda only allows for the soviet army to appear in perfect terms. Since the enemy is a horrific monster, it cannot be seen to have any redeeming qualities. Having seen much of this I have learned that trying to debate, discuss or sanely discourse with these people is fruitless so I have given up. I treat their postings as Tabloid Journalism. I read them, am amused by them, and discard them. In short, for example, an enormous hoopla is made out of the red army reconquest of Kharkov in 1943. They say nothing about the 420 tanks Rominstrov lost to do it. Examples like this are numerous. Suffice it to say that Igorn will continue to post this 'material' , I will read it and then go on to more serious research.
"This critical examination of the final Soviet strategic offensive operation during World War II seeks to chip away at two generally inaccurate pictures many Westerners have of the war. Specifically, Westerners seem to think that only geography, climate, and sheer numbers negated German military skill and competency on the eastern front, a view that relegates Soviet military accomplishments to oblivion. Moreover, Westerners have concluded that little worthy of meaningful study occurred in the Asian theaters of war. These impressions reflect a distinct German bias in the analyses of operations on the eastern front and an anti-Asian front bias concerning World War II in general. Both impressions are false. Yet, over the decades since World War II, they have perpetuated an inaccurate view of the war, particularly of Soviet performance in that war. This Western misconception perverts history, and that perversion, in turn, warps contemporary attitudes and thus current assessments of Soviet military capabilities past, present, and future. Our view of the war in the east derives from the German experiences of 1941 and 1942, when blitzkrieg exploited the benefits of surprise against a desperate and crudely fashioned Soviet defense. It is the view of a Guderian, a Mellenthin, a Balck, and a Manstein, all heroes of Western military history, but heroes whose operational and tactical successes partially blinded them to strategic realities. By 1943-44, their "glorious" experiences had ceased. As their operational feats dried up after 1942, the Germans had to settle for tactical victories set against a background of strategic disasters. Yet the views of the 1941 conquerors, their early impressions generalized to characterize the nature of the entire war in the east, remain the accepted views. The successors to these men, the Schoeners, the Heinricis, the defenders of 1944 and 1945, those who presided over impending disaster, wrote no memoirs of widespread notoriety, for their experiences were neither memorable nor glorious. Their impressions and those of countless field grade officers who faced the realities of 1944-45 are all but lost. This imbalanced view of German operations in the east imparts a reassuring, hough inaccurate, image of the Soviets. We have gazed in awe at the exploits of those Germans who later wrote their personal apologies, and in doing so we have forgotten the larger truth: their nation lost the war-and lost it primarily in the east against what they portrayed as the "artless" Soviets. Our second bias, so conspicuous in our historical neglect of the Pacific theater of World War II, has combined with our acceptance of the German interpretation of the eastern front so as to blind us to what was the preeminent Soviet military effort in World War II-the Soviet strategic offensive of 1945 in Manchuria. For the Soviets, the Manchurian offensive was the logical by-product of their war experience, a surgically conducted offensive with almost predestined results. The fact that Japan was a seriously weakened nation by the summer of 1945 was clear. What was not clear was the prospect of an immediate Japanese surrender. The likelihood of a Japanese G'otterdaimmerung on the scale of Germany's loomed large in the eyes of American and Soviet planners. The potential cost in Allied manpower of reducing Japan could be deduced from the fanatical Japanese resistance on Okinawa as late as April-June 1945, when more than 49,000 (12,500 dead) Americans fell in battle against about 117,000 Japanese troops. And the Home Islands still had more than 2.3 million Japanese soldiers; Manchuria, more than 1 million. So Allied planners expected the worst and designed operations in deadly earnest for what they believed would be prolonged, complicated campaigns against the remaining Japanese strongholds. Based on proven capabilities of the Japanese High Command and the individual Japanese soldier, Soviet plans were as innovative as any in the war. Superb execution of those plans produced victory in only two weeks of combat. Although Soviet planners had overestimated the capabilities of the Japanese High Command, the tenacious Japanese soldier met Soviet expectations. He lived up to his reputation as a brave, self-sacrificing samurai who, though poorly employed, inflicted 32,000 casualties on the Soviets and won their grudging respect. Had Japanese planners been bolder-and Soviet planners less audacious-the price of Soviet victory could well have been significantly higher. Scope, magnitude, complexity, timing, and marked success have made the Manchurian offensive a continuing topic of study for the Soviets, who see it as a textbook case of how to begin war and quickly bring it to a successful conclusion. They pay attention to the Manchurian offensive because it was an impressive and decisive campaign.
Our neglect of Soviet operations in World War II, in general-and in Manchuria, in particular-testifies not only to our apathy toward history and the past in general, but also to our particular blindness to the Soviet experience. That blindness, born of the biases we bring to the study of World War II, is a dangerous phenomenon. How can we learn if we refuse to see the lessons of our past for our future?"
![:[]](./images/smilies/icon_study.gif "Study"){kind=icon}
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources ... nt.asp#aug
Best Regards from Russia,
