Who had the better strategy in Italy?

German campaigns and battles 1919-1945.

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Imad
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Post by Imad »

....and it MAY have been half a million men, but it WAS over two years!
But remember also the reason it took so long also had to do with Allied bungling as much as German proficiency. I doubt the campaign would have taken two years if Clark was a little less self-centred and Lucas a tad bit more aggressive. I daresay the Germans in a similar situation and with the proper resources would have made short work of the Italian campaign.
I might be a little biased here but the performance of 1st Canadian and 5th Canadian Armoured Division in Italy is a fine illustration of what a finely trained army with aggressive, opportunistic leadership could have achieved there.
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VikingTiger
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Rommel was a tactical genius, but a substandard strategist.

Post by VikingTiger »

derGespenst wrote:I've always felt that after Alamein, Rommel was finished as a competant commander, probably a case of battle-fatigue, and this "strategy" is more evidence of that. No defensive line, however strong, was going to stop the Allies forever. They just had too much stuff. this is as bad as deploying 21st Panzer astride a river in Normandy or thinking he could counterattack the beaches in the face of naval gunfire. He should have retired after he took Tobruk.
I agree totally and would even go further than that. El-Alamein is something that he has to take the MAIN responsibility for. Not only was the logistics hopelessly inadequate for staying in the offensive, so close to the allied counteroffensive, but it seems like Rommel never had any strategic vision that matched his tactical role. If his "vision" was to link up with the japanaese in India, that is fine, but his realities on the ground did NOT put him in a position to use his forces in accordance with that.

His failure to capture Tobruk the first time is another thing that leaves his legacy more than questionable, but this goes more into the typical inability of german forces to capture defended cities. He should have shortened his supply lines, held his advance and never crossed the Egyptian border they way his strategic situation was. This was not France-1940 where he led unstoppable Pz-gruppen and his inability to adopt his tactics after the strategic situation makes me question if he even should have commanded much more than a division to begin with.

Just Imagine Rauss, or Von Mannstein in Afrika in 1941 instead of Rommel. They might certainly not have put up as flamboyant offensives, but you can guarantee they would have put up much more tenacious and stratgically sound defenses.
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mellenthin
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Re:

Post by mellenthin »

Imad wrote:
A withdrawal like that would have had to have been a fighting withdrawal...so you STILL take losses, and end up by default giving away huge amounts of territory to your enemy with as little of a fight as you can get away with
No. Not really. I think what Rommel wanted was for a complete withdrawal from southern Italy before any Allied landings took place.
I never considered Rommel a great strategist anyway. Brilliant tactician but very flawed overall strategic view. Just look at the way he insisted on following Auchinleck to Egypt on a wild goose chase after the fall of Tobruk instead of insisting on the taking of Malta first. Anyway that's a different topic.
Pursuing a beaten enemy to the hilt is standard practice. And Rommel only wanted the taking of Malta postponed.
The point of view he took in Italy was valid as the danger of being outflanked was real.
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mellenthin
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Re: Rommel was a tactical genius, but a substandard strategist.

Post by mellenthin »

VikingTiger wrote:
derGespenst wrote:I've always felt that after Alamein, Rommel was finished as a competant commander, probably a case of battle-fatigue, and this "strategy" is more evidence of that. No defensive line, however strong, was going to stop the Allies forever. They just had too much stuff. this is as bad as deploying 21st Panzer astride a river in Normandy or thinking he could counterattack the beaches in the face of naval gunfire. He should have retired after he took Tobruk.
I agree totally and would even go further than that. El-Alamein is something that he has to take the MAIN responsibility for. Not only was the logistics hopelessly inadequate for staying in the offensive, so close to the allied counteroffensive, but it seems like Rommel never had any strategic vision that matched his tactical role. If his "vision" was to link up with the japanaese in India, that is fine, but his realities on the ground did NOT put him in a position to use his forces in accordance with that.

His failure to capture Tobruk the first time is another thing that leaves his legacy more than questionable, but this goes more into the typical inability of german forces to capture defended cities. He should have shortened his supply lines, held his advance and never crossed the Egyptian border they way his strategic situation was. This was not France-1940 where he led unstoppable Pz-gruppen and his inability to adopt his tactics after the strategic situation makes me question if he even should have commanded much more than a division to begin with.

Just Imagine Rauss, or Von Mannstein in Afrika in 1941 instead of Rommel. They might certainly not have put up as flamboyant offensives, but you can guarantee they would have put up much more tenacious and stratgically sound defenses.
    Making Rommel responsible for strategic decisions is unfounded as these decisions were made at a higher level. It was certainly not Rommels personal decision to be at El Alamein and st stay there.The german and italian high commands wanted him to remain there and advance to the Nile.
    In addition,the position at El Alamein was a very good one. A retreat for logistical readons would have had to be a very deep one and that would never have been contemplated by the high commands.

    There is no basis in fact for stating that the german army had a inherent inability to taking strong defensive positions. A strong defensive position defended by very good soldiers is always difficult to take,even for an above average com
    mander. It is pretty clear that some have difficulty acepting the notion of outstanding commanders and for thet reason want them always to be successfull which is impossible.
    Rommel alledgedly not being able to command more than a division is a funny assertation as he got his successes above that level.
    And at El Alamein and in 1944,he proved that he wad very able to work out strong defenses.
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    Imad
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    Re: Who had the better strategy in Italy?

    Post by Imad »

    Mellenthin brought up some good counter arguments. Made me pause for a while. I would love to see an adequate response as I can't think of any right this moment. A cup of hot tea might help :D
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