Rhineland Occupation

[tigre]

Hello to all ; something more..............

Winterübung - March 1936!

The French General Staff had appreciated the strength of German army troops in about 10 Army Corps with 24 infantry divisions, a mountain brigade, 2 cavalry divisions and a cavalry brigade plus 3 armored divisions. The number of units was approximately correct, but the supposed number of 520,000 soldiers owned by the German Army was not reached until the fall of the autumn of that year after the creation of other units.

It can be seen that the assumptions of the effective force are based on purely mechanical calculations, without knowledge of the missing units in the divisions. The estimated number of 1,800 tanks was also not realistic, because the actual stock at January 1, 1936 was only 720 of the Pz Kw I type.

Incomprehensibly, the French General Staff also included 30,000 men from the state police, 40,000 men from the garrisoned SS and 200,000 men from the RAD (Reichsarbeitsdienst), which led they to consider an unreal total force of 790,000 men. This would have made the German army twice as strong as the continental French (European) army.

But the state police in the Reich had already been fully integrated into the German army since the fall of 1935, the garrisoned SS were made up of 6,000 men who did not constitute a noteworthy number and the Reich Labor Service (RAD) was a strength without any military training.

Sources: DER FALL „GRÜN“: 1938 - Krieg gegen die Tschechoslowakei Kindle Ausgabe von Klaus Michaelis (Autor), Rolf Michaelis (Herausgeber)

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; something more..............

Winterübung - March 1936!

The Wehrmacht was unsure how the French would react to the reoccupation. One author (Shore) claims that AH had learned through the "intelligence service" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the French General Staff would not commit itself. As evidence, he cites a report from the press office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated January 10, 1936, which was based on information from French politicians, whose quality was not unlike that of many others. Neurath, through his press office, knew more about French operational intentions than the French cabinet itself. There were a lot of opinions, assumptions, and rumors with a wide range.

But there was no secure basis for all of them. Had there been one, discussions about the possibility of going to war from the French high command after the reoccupation would have been impossible to determine. And thus, the German political and military leadership was insecure before and throughout the operation, as shown above by AH asking about the possibility of stopping the units.

The French army, at the time of the Rhineland crisis, had in the country more than 20 infantry divisions, 5 cavalry divisions, 2 Senegalese divisions, 2 North African divisions, 1 of the so-called white colonial division, the latter with a number of nominally low staff. In all, Inspector General Gamelin had a nominal force of 425,000 in the country. In the first step of mobilization, the 20 active divisions could be increased with the same number of Type A divisions, so that initially 50 divisions would have been available.

After the occupation the OKH estimated that the forces that could have been used against Germany or were available for use were 10 infantry divisions, 1 light mechanized division, 1 and half cavalry divisions, parts of a North African division, plus troops of fortress and at army level with a total of 200,000 men.

Sources: DER FALL „GRÜN“: 1938 - Krieg gegen die Tschechoslowakei Kindle Ausgabe von Klaus Michaelis (Autor), Rolf Michaelis (Herausgeber)

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; some pictures...................

Winterübung - March 1936!

Source: https://www.aboutww2militaria.com/en/ja ... eeres.html

Cheers. Raúl M .