Evaluation of German troops - September 1939

[Njorl]

Hello all,

Some time ago the information I'm about to post here showed up on one Polish forum primarily dealing with military archeology and Polish Army of 1918-1939 period.

I'd like to share an evaluation of the enemy written down by Captain Klemens Hubert Feliks, an intelligence officer (counterpart of German Ic) of Polish 33rd Infantry Division. The document in question was found in Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London.

Quite interesting to read. I'm going to post it in parts, so please be patient.

ad 1 Reconaissance
a/ infantry
Activities very careful. Activites based on reports from airforce and saboteurs. Obsevers very well placed. Wrong passing through forests. They by-passed them, while doing that spotters were sent too far. Generally they avoided forestes, came round them.
b/cavalry
Cavalry used only in small squads and only in close foreground. Reconaissance was mainly conducted by motorcyclists. They rode on every kind of road and in very heavy terrain.
c/airforce
Operated from dawn till dusk. Recon aircraft flew singly on various altitude, even 50 meters, bombers and interceptors in pairs, 4-8. Altitude was dependand on active anti-air defence. Where there was no active AA defense, as was in majority, bombers flew at 50 meters dropping bombs on marching columns and supply columns. Anything that was on the road was fired at, be it carts with fleeing civilians or even grazing cattle. Villages with no troops in were bombed. Several incendiary bombs were dropped, civilians that were trying to save their belongings were attacked with XXXXXX bombs or were shot at with MGs, this was generally done before evening. Large % of incendiary bombs waned if bomb fell on plowed soil or in sand. Holes in XXXXX got filled with sand and owing to lack of air bomb waned. Burning bombs smelled of burning carbide.

ad 2 Assault
a/ infantry
Does not attack frontally, generally on flanks and after heavy artillery and airfroce preparations. Armour sent in waves attakced on the front. Weapons cooperation very good. Colorful flares were used in vast amounts as a means of communication. Infantry was used at day and generally in large units, at least battalion. Infantry did not distinguished itself with offensive actions. It stopped if encountered stronger resistance. At night activities were narrowed down to setting up security outposts. Foreground was lit up by means of setting buildings, forests, etc. placed on it on fire.
b/ Artillery.
Motorised. I saw battalion of horse-drawn artillery at Urle. Generally motorised artillery could be seen. Highly manouverable. Several battalions were used, frequently in front line. Massive artillery barrages were used; ammunition wasn't saved. Fire was directed at 1st line and its back. Artillery fairly quickly detected targets /our artillery/ generally owing to airforce, and it quickly discovered MG nests.
c/ armour
Used en-masse 40-60 tanks in 1000 meters sector. Very demoralizing influence on our troops because of insufficient number of AT weapons.
d/ airforce.
Bombing aircrafts operated basing on information about enemy provided by recon aircrafts. The latter worked well /since bombing aircrafts bombed even well hidden targets/.
6-12 planes in units, attacks were repeated one by one. Bombs were dropped even on single XXXXXX or cars.
About 20% of duds.
Effectivity of MG fire from supply columns very low.

More to follow.

Those 'XXXXXXX' are apparently in original. I tried to stick to original where it was possible.

Regards,

M

[Njorl]

Part 2. - last. Last paragraph is particularly interesting - even if subjective.

Ad 3
Weapons. Units are very well equipped with light and heavy rapid firing weapons; ammunition wasn’t saved so they must have plenty of it. Snipers equipped with precision weapons with special sights. Rapid firing weapons are air cooled, very light, with high rate of fire, transported on cars, motorcycles, even horse-drawn small carts. MG ammunition only armour-piercing, high percentage of tracers.

Ad 4
Uniforms and gear. Very good.
Comfortable and practical, new – German troops went into attack without encumbrance /rucksacks/.
Companies had special wagons for weapons transport. Many infantry soldiers armed with pistols and equipped with optical gear. A lot of cars, all painted in protective colour. Mobilized civilian vehicles repainted as well, with letter-signs of formations they belong to. Military cars, especially trucks are suited for every terrain /all-wheels drive/
Communications/liaison units, apart from multi-fibre, multiple use, well isolated cable, used light, thin, single-use cable.

Ad 5
Supply. Wagons and field kitchens new in very good shape, well equipped, functional and XXXXXX.
They always move with a few days supply. Even here plenty of rifle and MG cartridges. Ammunition can be seen everywhere. Wounded were immediately evacuated in cars. Artillery used shrapnels and HE rounds. Approximately 20% of rounds are duds.

Ad 10
Information data. Value of German infantryman without comparison lower than value of one of world war I had taken part in and had seen German infantry in combat. As I’ve already written in my other remarks infantry attacked only with armour support. Without this support they fight badly, are inclined to flee. There were 10-15% reservists in their units. German prisoners of war complained about them that they are not willing to fight.
Fire efficiency low. They have trained snipers whose fire distinguishes.
Artillery accuracy high. Very good coordination of airforce and artillery – spotting of targets by air and land observers quick and effective.

Regards,

M

[Qvist]

The Polish campaign is not something I have done much on, but I have talked to people who have researched it seriously who state much the same impression. It appears that the general performance and aggressiveness of the infantry left much to be desired compared to later, and overall the German war machine seems to have been somewhat creaky during the Polish campaign.

cheers

[Joe Cleere]

For more information on the subject of the quality of German infantry in the Polish Campaign, see Williamson Murray's article The German Response to Victory in Poland. He describes how von Brauchitsch and Halder ordered a top to bottom evaluation of the German Army's performance in the Polish campaign. The reserve infantry divisions did not fight well in Poland because of a lack of good leadership and insufficient training. They also tired quickly in long force marches.
Von Brauchitsch felt strongly that the reserve infantry divisions and any divisions created after the Polish campaign must be brought up to the standards of the first-wave active duty divisions.

The first wave divisions (all Panzer, motorized infantry, mountain, and infantry divisions numbered 1-46) fought well, but the officers tended to be cautious, seeking to avoid unnecessary losses. Ammunition expenditure was a problem, as it was deemed far too high. The first wave divisions also had problems when fighting at night and in difficult terrain. The main criticism of the first wave divisions, though, was that officers needed to be up front leading their units and they needed to be more aggressive and exploit opportunities.

As a result of these evaluations, von Brauchitsch and Halder put the entire Army through a very intensive training program to get ready for the 1940 offensive. All officers, including reservists, were cycled through training programs to ensure they had a firm grasp of doctrine and would lead from the front and be more aggressive. The troops were put through very long force marches to toughen them, and training in general was made more realistic and tough. The training proved to be effective as shown in the results of the 1940 campaign, though it was the first wave divisions that did the heavy lifting, as they had also done in Poland.

[Domen123]

As I’ve already written in my other remarks infantry attacked only with armour support.

Must be Panzerdivision "Kempf" then (it was the only division in 3. Army with tanks available).

And many sources claim that Waffen SS infantry didn't perform very well in France, Poland and early Russia.

So this would explain much (SS Standarte "Deutschland" was part of Pz.Div."Kempf" in 1939).

I'd like to share an evaluation of the enemy written down by Captain Klemens Hubert Feliks, an intelligence officer (counterpart of German Ic) of Polish 33rd Infantry Division. The document in question was found in Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London.

Interesting read, but we should remember that this is only one division. And we should establish which German divisions confronted this Polish division. These were divisions of 3. Army - which had got many III Welle IDs. This would explain much, since III Welle IDs were not of best quality (they compensated this fact by bigger number of LMGs and SMGs than in IDs of other waves - 559 LMG + 150 SMG). But this doesn't refer to the entire Wehrmacht or even to its major part.

In spite of lack of real combat experience before 01.09.1939, in the German ground army that invaded Poland, 74% of all soldiers were active service soldiers while the remaining 26% were Reserve I, Landwehr or Reserve II. In the Polish army that defended Poland 20% were active service soldiers while the remaining 80% were reservists of different quality (however, in cavalry and Border Defense Corps active service were ca. 70% - in regular infantry divisions, especially those early mobilized, this percentage was of course also higher than in reserve divisions). This data shows that what is often said about "green" German soldiers in the Polish campaign is a myth. German Heer in general was indeed "green" (just 1,31 million active service soldiers, 0,65 million fully trained Reserve I after 12 months long military training, 1,2 million Landwehr - veterans of First World War after 2-3 months long supplementary training with modern equipment and armament and finally 0,8 million Reserve II after 3-2 months long basic military training), but what fought in Poland was only the delegation and it consisted of best trained soldiers - as many as 1,1 million aktives Personal (out of 1,31 in total) fought in Poland. In the Polish Campaign professional officers constituted 15% more of all officers than one year later in France.

If it comes to training Polish active service troops were not worse trained than German active service troops and Polish reservists were not worse trained than German reservists (if not better). But proportions were different.

Average German soldier in Poland was after 18 months of intensive military training and 7 years of schooling. Moreover, 31% of all soldiers of average division served in different Nazi paramilitary organizations before entering the army (ca. 1/5 in Hitlerjugend, ca. 1/7 in SA, ca. 1/3 in RAD). They were influenced by the Nazi ideology.

Polish active service lasted in infantry 18 months, in Navy 27 months, in cavalry and Border Defense Corps (KOP) 23 months, in artillery 19 months, in commissariat 15 months. Training of an infantryman lasted for 18 months in three stages - first stage was individual training of a private and selection of candidates for NCOs. Second stage involved improving training as part of units. Third stage was fixing and improving what they learned previously. Recruits were beginning their training in so called recruit schools (8 weeks). During the recruit training accent was put on: skill of evaluation, observation, hiding and orienting in terrain, moving on the battlefield, firing, acting as feelers, knowledge of communication and signal means, rules of using anti-gas and anti-tank equipment, using grenades and bayonet combat, overcoming water obstacles, taughing rules of cooperation, behaviour in the place of stop and during marches, combat against tanks and against cavalry, leaving and occupying combat posts, behaviour in case of death of the commander, behaviour in captivity. In rifle companies combat training and marches was 40% of the time of training, on shooting training 15%, on bayonet and grenade combat 2%, on drill 3% (1% = 8 hours). In HMG companies on combat training and marches 20% time of training, on shooting training 33%, on bayonet and grenade 1%. Proper bayonet and grenade training was carried out during the recruit training, later it was only controlled and recalled.

In German army aktives Personal was either from Reichswehr or after 24 - 12 months long (depending on branch, like in the Polish army where there was 15 - 27 months long training, as provided above) intensive military training.

Sources:

B. R. Kroener, "Die personellen Ressourcen des Dritten Reiches im Spannungsfeld zwischen Wehrmacht, Buerokratie und Kriegswirtschaft 1939-42" in: "Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs", volume I: "Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen 1939-45"

+ some other sources (PM me if you are interested).

But what counted more than training, was the firepower superiority. And also very high ammunition expenditure (mentioned one post above by Joe Cleere) was strictly connected with this firepower superiority as well as with this cautiousness, seeking to avoid unnecessary losses (which was not so common in further campaigns - especially when the Germans started to loose) - they rather prefered to force the enemy to abandon his positions with firepower than with large-scale manpower attacks. Polish sources especially confirm the terrible firepower of German artillery, mortars, IGs, etc. Also MG-34s.

I made such an illustration showing the "firepower saturation" of the Wehrmacht in Poland in 1939. It shows how many weapons of different kinds were at Wehrmacht's disposal on average per each 2500 (25 x 100) soldiers involved in the invasion (I accepted the number of soldiers participating as 1,500,000, of course this includes not only frontline units - divisional and support - but also rear units, communication units, supply units, headquarters, services, etc.). Of course in some cases I had to round these figures up or down (for example in case of tanks there were 4,5 tanks not 5 tanks). On the other hand in case of GW 8cm the number is rounded down (because in fact it was almost 5,5).

If it comes to MG-34 the number should be multiplied by approximately 120 (in case of MP by 20). Below is a similar diagram for the Polish army - we can see why comparing "bare" numbers of men is useless. If you want to get the total amount of equipment on both sides, then numbers from the German diagram should be multiplied by approximately 600, while numbers from the Polish by around 400 (since Germany sent ca. 1,5 million troops against Poland in its ground forces, while Poland mobilized ca. 1 million troops in her ground forces).

Polish 100mm art. is rounded down (from ca. 1,25), while 75mm is rounded up (ca. 3,75). Polish tanks are rounded up.

Diagrams mean that theoretically (on average) each 2500 German soldiers could count on fire support of...
While theoretically each (on average) 2500 Polish soldiers could count on fire support of...

German diagram:

http://forum.axishistory.com/download/f ... 217730.jpg



I'm not sure if I'm correct about MP numbers (numbers vary from 6,000 to 12,000 - mainly in armoured units).

Polish diagram:

http://forum.axishistory.com/download/f ... 217729.jpg



German inferiority in terms of light mortars (5cm) results from the fact that only I Welle divisions had got them.

[Domen123]

Link to a very similar discussion: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5#p1467696

By the way:

As I’ve already written in my other remarks infantry attacked only with armour support. Without this support they fight badly, are inclined to flee. There were 10-15% reservists in their units. German prisoners of war complained about them that they are not willing to fight. Fire efficiency low. They have trained snipers whose fire distinguishes. Artillery accuracy high. Very good coordination of airforce and artillery – spotting of targets by air and land observers quick and effective.

This reminds me of what Germans were writing about American soldiers in Normandy (and later).

As well as of what American General James M. Gavin wrote about American infantry:

If our infantry would fight, this war would be over by now. On our present front, there are two very weak German regiments holding the XVIII Corps of four divisions. We all know it and admit it, and yet nothing is done about it. American infantry just simply will not fight. No one wants to get killed... Our artillery is wonderful and our air corps not bad. But the regular infantry - terrible. Everybody wants to live to a ripe old age. The sight of a few Germans drives them to their holes. Instead of being imbued with an overwhelming desire to get close to the German and get him by the throat, they want to avoid him if the artillery has not already knocked him flat.

Source: "Armageddon. The battle for Germany 1944-45", Max Hastings, page 267

[Domen123]

This reminds me of what Germans were writing about American soldiers in Normandy (and later).

Precisely - about American infantry.

As well as of what American General James M. Gavin wrote about American infantry:

As well as about American artillery and Air Force.

[Domen123]

When it comes to infantry tactics - interesting:

September 14 1939, Gdynia. Informative communique of the commander of the Land Coastal Defence about the character of combats in the Coastline and situation of both sides

CHARACTERISTICS OF COMBATS.

The enemy is preceding their offensive actions by rapid shelling of our positions with artillery fire, under the cover of which they are moving forward numerous machine weapons to the far outskirts in order to enable to move forward their own infantry and to suppress our Infantry to the ground by heavy fire.

So it is quite different from my "picture" of a "classic" infantry assault.

Further fragment:

As it appears from testimonies of POWs, the enemy is reluctantly moving to the offensive, they are especially afraid of hand-to-hand clashes. At nights they are very vulnerable to escapades from our side, during which they abandon [heavy] equipment while escaping, barricade themselves inside buildings and compact settlements, defending for long time with use of their numerous machine weapons and hand grenades. At daytime they fill windows, trees, etc. with heavy MGs, from which they are shelling our units.

When it comes to infantry tactics - another interesting document (apart from this one):

September 14 1939, Gdynia. Informative communique of the commander of the Land Coastal Defence about the character of combats in the Coastline and situation of both sides

CHARACTERISTICS OF COMBATS.

The enemy is preceding their offensive actions by rapid shelling of our positions with artillery fire, under the cover of which they are moving forward numerous machine weapons to the far outskirts in order to enable to move forward their own infantry and to suppress our Infantry to the ground by heavy fire.

So it is quite different from my "picture" of a "classic" infantry assault.

Further fragment:

As it appears from testimonies of POWs, the enemy is reluctantly moving to the offensive, they are especially afraid of hand-to-hand clashes. At nights they are very vulnerable to escapades from our side, during which they abandon [heavy] equipment while escaping, barricade themselves inside buildings and compact settlements, defending for long time with use of their numerous machine weapons and hand grenades. At daytime they fill windows, trees, etc. with heavy MGs, from which they are shelling our units.

German forces fighting at the Coastline were:

Grenzwacht Rgt. (32. and 42. - in total 11 battalions) - ca. 7350 men, 378 LMG, 144 HMG, 18 Pak
207 Inf.Div. - ca. 17911 men, 559 LMG, 150 HMG, 26 leIG, 75 Pak, 36 leFH, 12 sFH
II./48 IR, III./89 IR, II./12 AR (12 ID) - ca. 2300 men, 60 LMG, 28 HMG, 18 leGW, 12 sGW, 12 leFH
SS Heimwehr-Danzig - ca. 1550 men, 85 LMG, 36 HMG, 5 MP, 13 leGW, 6 sGW, 10 leIG, 2 M 17cm, 24 Pak, 5 Pz.Spwg.
Brigade Danzig - ca. 9000 men, 202 LMG, 86 HMG, 57 leGW, 36 sGW, 12 leIG, 4 sIG, 24 Pak, 12 leFH
Stab Art.Regt.z.b.V.-609 - ca. 130 men
s.A.A.611 (gem.) - ca. 560 men, 6 LMG, 4 leFH, 8 sFH
* s.A.A.536 (gem.)- ca. 560 men, 6 LMG, 4 Kanone 10,5cm, 8 sFH (* only from 3 to 4 September)

Also at least several more armoured cars Sd Kfz 222 (4x4) - probably from 5. Kav.Rgt. - fought there.

As well as some paramilitary units from 6. SA-Brigade:

6 SA Brigade (commander: Heinrich Hacker):
- 5. SA-Standarte (at least 400 men)
- 14. SA-Standarte
- 128. SA-Standarte
- 6. SA-Reiter Standarte
- VGAD (Verstarker Grenzaufsichsichstdienst Bataillon) - 600 men
- SA-Grenzwacht Btl. "Hacker" *
- SA-Marinesturmbann Kustenschutz Danzig (270 ludzi + 2 działka 20mm)

* Fought in Danzig and later on Kepa Oksywska.

And probably also:

Some elements of 5. Kav.Rgt. (Panzerspahzug with armoured cars Sd.Kfz.222 ?)
1. Kompanie Inf.Rgt.2
Aufklarungsschwadron "Neuss"
SA-Polizeihilfdienst (250 men)
Harbor protection battalion
SA assault group under command of Sturmkampffuhrer Kriewald (65 men)

[Domen123]

The superiority in numbers of German regular forces (without those paramilitary units) over Polish forces was:

In command = two generals vs one colonel
In men = around 2,6 to 1
In machine weapons = 4 - 3,5 to 1 (and qualitative superiority - rate of fire, etc.)
In artillery for direct fire calibre 37mm = 8 - 9 to 1
In field and infantry artillery = 7 to 1 (and heavier calibres)
In grenade launchers 5cm = 5 to 1
In infantry mortars 8cm = 3 to 1
In navy support = large superiority
In air support = absolute superiority
In armour = a dozen or so armoured cars vs one improvised armoured train

In available ammunition and means of combat (so called material superiority) = large superiority

[Jan-Hendrik]

probably from 5. Kav.Rgt. - fought there.

Some elements of 5. Kav.Rgt. (Panzerspahzug with armoured cars Sd.Kfz.222 ?)

Nope

Jan-Hendrik