Hitler's Moscow order

German campaigns and battles 1919-1945.

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julian
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Re: Hitler's Moscow order

Post by julian »

Osterhase wrote: As you suggested earlier, a lot of rhetoric but no facts. At what date or specific timeframe are you suggesting that the Wehrmacht/AGC was able to launch a full offensive against Moscow with a good chance of success? 15 Aug? 1 Sep?
Be specific in your hypothesis so we can accurately look into troop dispositions/OOB, supply issues, operational opportunities (options and subsequent opportunity costs), overall tactical situation and weather.
I have the Lage Ost maps and at least 40 different books on Barbarossa, so please be specific.
You know pretty well that there was a proposal by made by OKH on 18 august for the advance to Moscow . Given the reasoning of the OKH this operation was certainly not intended to start later than the beginning of september. If a clear decision had been made earlier for the focus on Moscow this operation would have had more forces than the one actually proposed.
If you go for Moscow as the main objective , you start early and AGN and AGS are limited to protecting the flank of AGC. You certainly never wait unitl october.
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Re: Hitler's Moscow order

Post by Osterhase »

julian wrote: You know pretty well that there was a proposal by made by OKH on 18 august for the advance to Moscow . Given the reasoning of the OKH this operation was certainly not intended to start later than the beginning of september. If a clear decision had been made earlier for the focus on Moscow this operation would have had more forces than the one actually proposed.
If you go for Moscow as the main objective , you start early and AGN and AGS are limited to protecting the flank of AGC. You certainly never wait unitl october.
Thats all well and good, have you looked at the lage Ost maps in addition to the Wehrmacht Intel estimate of enemy forces? The lage Ost maps show enemy (Soviet) troop dispositions and the Intel estimate demonstrates what AGC knew and expected to encounter. The problem here as clearly demonstrated by Glantz in several of his books is that the German estimates were wrong and conversely so were their expectations.

You may find it interesting to note that until the Kiev operation the Red Army had actually done it's job of stopping Barbarossa. The enemy was stopped at fortress Kiev and Leningrad, also stopped just east of Smolensk. STAVKA expected the next push would be on the Smolensk-Moscow Axis and had concentrated forces there and on the flanks to create pressure, which is why Guderian had such a relatively easy time in the Kiev operation (Red Army defenses oriented in other directions). The Kiev operation strategically unhinged the Soviet position, so without it the Germans are meeting Soviet expectations by attacking Moscow. The dynamic of Typhoon following the Kiev operation is therefore in no way comparable to an earlier push on Moscow which forgoes the Kiev operation and flank clearing operations on AGC's wings as well. The mobile units need 10-14 days of refit to reach a maximum of 60% strength, which means they need to be fully extracted and in rear areas by 17-18 August. The implication here is that they don't just magically move to the rear, they have to disengage from combat and administratively move prior to the 17th which suggests no mobile combat units engaged in offensive operations from 10 August?
This link provides units, dates, locations for the operations that this effects in the short term:
http://operationbarbarossa.net/Brief-Mi ... tory3.html

Personally, I think Glantz' "Barbarossa Derailed" is the best source of what went wrong with Barbarossa and what the Red Army did right (in a relative way). http://www.amazon.com/books/dp/1906033722
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Re: Hitler's Moscow order

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:up: :up:
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Re: Hitler's Moscow order

Post by Osterhase »

Historical perspective looking backward and based upon facts versus estimates based upon assumptions, not facts and looking forward:

"By August 1941, the motorised supply system was exhausted. Ammunition and fuel, both of which were previously under-estimated were in limited supply. The reason was because the planning requirements were inaccurately based on the transportation capability rather operational consumption. Commanders were unable to exploit tactical advantage because of severe shortages of fuel and ammunition and as such resupply could not keep pace with advances. Tactical operations were curtailed for weeks waiting for resupply from the rear."
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/ ... 24_2/4.htm

Regardless of OKH' estimates, the facts gathered after these events prove those estimates demonstrably false.
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Re: Hitler's Moscow order

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Osterhase wrote:

You may find it interesting to note that until the Kiev operation the Red Army had actually done it's job of stopping Barbarossa. The enemy was stopped at fortress Kiev and Leningrad, also stopped just east of Smolensk. STAVKA expected the next push would be on the Smolensk-Moscow Axis and had concentrated forces there and on the flanks to create pressure, which is why Guderian had such a relatively easy time in the Kiev operation (Red Army defenses oriented in other directions). The Kiev operation strategically unhinged the Soviet position, so without it the Germans are meeting Soviet expectations by attacking Moscow. The dynamic of Typhoon following the Kiev operation is therefore in no way comparable to an earlier push on Moscow which forgoes the Kiev operation and flank clearing operations on AGC's wings as well. The mobile units need 10-14 days of refit to reach a maximum of 60% strength, which means they need to be fully extracted and in rear areas by 17-18 August. The implication here is that they don't just magically move to the rear, they have to disengage from combat and administratively move prior to the 17th which suggests no mobile combat units engaged in offensive operations from 10 August?
This link provides units, dates, locations for the operations that this effects in the short term:
http://operationbarbarossa.net/Brief-Mi ... tory3.html

Personally, I think Glantz' "Barbarossa Derailed" is the best source of what went wrong with Barbarossa and what the Red Army did right (in a relative way). http://www.amazon.com/books/dp/1906033722
Given the beating the red army received and the amount of terrain it lost, the statement that it had done a good job in stopping Barbarossa is extremely funny. Suddenly, it is the red army that stops the german army and not the logisitcal issues which were your former argument.
You ignore that some sort of pause is needed in any offensive, also to clear out the pockets that were formed.
And you seem not to understand that the german high command wanted to go for Moscow, not to take a city, but because it would lead to a battle with the red army main forces which it wanted to destroy. The OKH wanted a decisive battle before winter and going for Moscow is a means to that end.
And the commanders of PGR 2 and PGR 3 gave clear dates for their readiness. You are still in ignorance of the amount of rest particularly PGR 3 had already had.
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Re: Hitler's Moscow order

Post by Osterhase »

julian wrote: Given the beating the red army received and the amount of terrain it lost, the statement that it had done a good job in stopping Barbarossa is extremely funny. Suddenly, it is the red army that stops the german army and not the logisitcal issues which were your former argument.
You ignore that some sort of pause is needed in any offensive, also to clear out the pockets that were formed.
And you seem not to understand that the german high command wanted to go for Moscow, not to take a city, but because it would lead to a battle with the red army main forces which it wanted to destroy. The OKH wanted a decisive battle before winter and going for Moscow is a means to that end.
And the commanders of PGR 2 and PGR 3 gave clear dates for their readiness. You are still in ignorance of the amount of rest particularly PGR 3 had already had.
I didn't say "good" job did I? AGS and AGN had no planned pause, they were stopped no?
My former argument is still current, that the original German Intel estimates led to an insufficient logistical support plan and that no matter what decisions you change in the OTL the Wehrmacht lacked sufficient combat power to defeat the Soviet Union in a single campaign. Your suggestion that an earlier offensive against Moscow would have been successful is dubious and with the almost complete lack of support you've provided is what is truly laughable.

If I am in ignorance of "the amount of rest particularly PGR 3 had already had" then provide it with specific dates and the OOB and dispositions, otherwise you have no point. Oddly enough, I have the lage Ost maps and already have the specific information meaning it isn't difficult to ascertain what needed to happen and when for these units to be available for a 1 Sep attack towards Moscow. From Glantz I can also see the differnce in the German Intel estimate and the actual Soviet OOB and troop dispositions. Hmmmm :roll:
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Re: Hitler's Moscow order

Post by lwd »

I have noted a tendency for some to take the mention of one factor as a problem and make of it the straw man that it was THE problem. In the case of Barbarossa the logistics issues, resistance of the Red Army, and the size of the USSR are all inter related. For instance neither of the first two would have resulted in a German defeat if the Urals had been say 300km from the German border. Likewise if the Red Army had given up in July.
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Re: Hitler's Moscow order

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Agreed.... Personally I believe that it was many factors working in concert and the end result was predictable failure. Generally I start with the Intel estimates, then look at the inadequate logistical and personnel replacement plans based upon them and how over space/time attrition of men and machine it all led to predictable failure.
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Re: Hitler's Moscow order

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Osterhase wrote:
I didn't say "good" job did I? AGS and AGN had no planned pause, they were stopped no?
My former argument is still current, that the original German Intel estimates led to an insufficient logistical support plan and that no matter what decisions you change in the OTL the Wehrmacht lacked sufficient combat power to defeat the Soviet Union in a single campaign. Your suggestion that an earlier offensive against Moscow would have been successful is dubious and with the almost complete lack of support you've provided is what is truly laughable.

If I am in ignorance of "the amount of rest particularly PGR 3 had already had" then provide it with specific dates and the OOB and dispositions, otherwise you have no point. Oddly enough, I have the lage Ost maps and already have the specific information meaning it isn't difficult to ascertain what needed to happen and when for these units to be available for a 1 Sep attack towards Moscow. From Glantz I can also see the differnce in the German Intel estimate and the actual Soviet OOB and troop dispositions. Hmmmm :roll:
No , they were not stopped. A pause was inevitable.
I find it laughable that you continue to come up with logistical issues that did not exist to the extent you allege and never came up in the discussuions at the time. And the issue is that there were good reasons to try to get the victory in one campaign and going for Moscow is a way to try to achieve this. And going for Moscow needed to start in good tlme which is onbviously not in october. So those in the OKH who wanted to go for Moscow at the end of august had a valid case.
And you know pretty well at which dates PGR 2 and PGR 3 declared to be ready. And that the divisions of PGR 3 had had their rest already is something I mentioned before and was based on the unit histories.
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Re: Hitler's Moscow order

Post by Osterhase »

julian wrote:No , they were not stopped. A pause was inevitable.
I find it laughable that you continue to come up with logistical issues that did not exist to the extent you allege and never came up in the discussuions at the time. And the issue is that there were good reasons to try to get the victory in one campaign and going for Moscow is a way to try to achieve this. And going for Moscow needed to start in good tlme which is onbviously not in october. So those in the OKH who wanted to go for Moscow at the end of august had a valid case.
And you know pretty well at which dates PGR 2 and PGR 3 declared to be ready. And that the divisions of PGR 3 had had their rest already is something I mentioned before and was based on the unit histories.
AGN and AGS were basically stopped and there was no pause planned for them, only AGC's PzGrps allowed them to make substantial progress according to the original Barbarossa plan. The planned pause was for AGC and was to happen after the majority of the Red Army was destroyed, but it never was, thus the pause did NOT and could not happen as planned.

So now that leaves the alleged operational freedom and rehab timeframes for the PzGrps of AGC. They NEVER became fully unengaged or fully operationally free as they always had some part of their OOB engaged. Therefore it is only speculation on your part that an OKH estimate can be used to predict much of anything based on the fact that the engaged mobile units would leave a void in active operations if actually withdrawn per a faulty plan never executed. The void left has obvious and detrimental repercussions to AGC's position. AGC's PzGrps not assisting AGN and AGS also have major negative repercussions that effect AGC as well.

I agree that Moscow needed to be the objective and for the reasons stated, what I don't agree with is that such an operation had much if any chance of success and have yet to see requisite evidence to support that it was possible. Yes AGC could begin a major offensive toward Moscow (foregoing Kiev) by 1 Sep, but would come up short of the final objective IMHO. Barbarossa as planned was doomed to failure no matter how you reallocate the available forces or change the decisions (again, IMHO).
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Re: Hitler's Moscow order

Post by julian »

Osterhase wrote:
AGN and AGS were basically stopped and there was no pause planned for them, only AGC's PzGrps allowed them to make substantial progress according to the original Barbarossa plan. The planned pause was for AGC and was to happen after the majority of the Red Army was destroyed, but it never was, thus the pause did NOT and could not happen as planned.

So now that leaves the alleged operational freedom and rehab timeframes for the PzGrps of AGC. They NEVER became fully unengaged or fully operationally free as they always had some part of their OOB engaged. Therefore it is only speculation on your part that an OKH estimate can be used to predict much of anything based on the fact that the engaged mobile units would leave a void in active operations if actually withdrawn per a faulty plan never executed. The void left has obvious and detrimental repercussions to AGC's position. AGC's PzGrps not assisting AGN and AGS also have major negative repercussions that effect AGC as well.

I agree that Moscow needed to be the objective and for the reasons stated, what I don't agree with is that such an operation had much if any chance of success and have yet to see requisite evidence to support that it was possible. Yes AGC could begin a major offensive toward Moscow (foregoing Kiev) by 1 Sep, but would come up short of the final objective IMHO. Barbarossa as planned was doomed to failure no matter how you reallocate the available forces or change the decisions (again, IMHO).
The panzercorps of AGC were not absolutely needed to allow AGS and ABN to advance further. And even if it were the case then that would not really be a compelling reason to use them for that purpose if one considers Moscow more important.
No, if you make Moscow the all important objective then PGR 2 and PGR 3 could be fully used for that purpose as there was no compelling reason to use any of their forces elsewhere. The OKH would not have used their mobile divisions for any other purpose if it had had its way. No diversion to the south and no divisions of PGR 3 sent north.
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