Hitler's Moscow order

[julian]

That does not invalidate the definition of minimum requirement, which is subjective and completely dependant upon the current tactical and operational situation.

For example- At Yelnia the Germans did not have their minimum requirements met for food, ammunition or personnel and were forced out by Soviet pressure. They willingly withdrew, but the decision was entirely based upon very unfavorable conditions dictated to them by the Soviets because they lacked the resources to counter. aka-lacked the minimum requirements to complete the mission assigned. To maintain the Yelnia position the Germans would have had to commit mobile reserves, which would be sacrificing units required for the proposed Typhoon operation.

Given up Yelnia had nothing to do with logistics. It was a sensible move as there was no reason to hold this piece of terrain at all costs.

[julian]

Logistics goes far beyond ammunition consumption obviously. So in the pursuit phase what happens to fuel consumption, POL, food/water, casualty extraction/personnel replacement, equipment replacement/maintenance, etc???
Beyond the point of departure the logistical requirement does not ease, it merely changes and in many cases becomes more difficult.
The key issue for the Germans at this point is motorized transport for logistical sustainment beyond the point of departure. The Wehrmacht did not possess the requisite number of tactical cargo trucks to sustain the necessary combat mass to overcome Soviet resistance at long distance. In modern terminology it's called power projection. The Wehrmacht's Achilles heal was motorized transport capacity and fuel, there simply was not enough to project enough combat power to successfully complete the proposed Moscow operation.

A lot of retoric but not fact. The germans seem to have gotten rather far despite of what you allege. And you are still not even beginning to prove that tthere were prohibitive issues that made it impossible to attack before october.

[julian]

AGC paused at Smolensk and was promptly counter-attacked by the Soviets for over a month in which it's combat capability was permanently eroded (4th and 9th Armies Infantry divisions specifically) and had direct consequences later in the campaign. Even in the proposed timeframe of a 1 Sep version of Typhoon this would be the case in addition to the fact that the vast majority of replacements recieved by AGC happend before Typhoon in the OTL, but would not happen before the proposed 1 Sep attack. How do you propose these replacements reach their new units and become integrated during a major offensive?

The replacements were not needed in order to start an offensive. They can certainly be moved up to the units during an offensive.

[julian]

Wagner's report does not account for tranportation issues effecting how much ammunition was available to the actual weapons in the heat of the moment, does it? Ammunition next to the gun is useful, not so much if it is in the Corps depot 30 miles to the rear but still showing in Wagner's report as 'delivered'..

He pointed to the fact units had ordered too much ammo because they had overestimated their needs which led to overtaxing the transport assets and leading to lots of ammo dump being spred all over the place. No question of units having not enough.

[julian]

Fuel, lack of adequate transport capacity, spare parts, maintenance assets, etc.

Existed from the beginning and did not prevent the amount of success achieved.

[julian]

In regard to the Typhoon in the OTL as opposed to a 1 Sep attack, consider:

"From this point on, Guderian's mobile forces, despite heavy casualties, started making substantial gains. On 10 September, they captured Romny, 140 miles east of Kiev, and 130 miles south of Starodub, and Guderian started anticipating a junction of his XXIV Corps with armored divisions of Army Group South. This move would effectively cut off large numbers of Red Army troops I .in a pocket that was forming east of Kiev. On the evening of 14 September, the trap closed near Lochvica, 30 miles south of Romny. While hard fighting continued, during the ensuing week nearly 400,000 prisoners were taken, and Kiev itself fell on the 19th. Three days later Panzer Group 2's depleted divisions (as well as Weichs' infantry formations) were directed to return north to prepare for Typhoon. During the month of action, Guderian's 7'/2 divisions had advanced
south as far as 160 miles. Their casualties had totaled 12,239, an average of more than 3,000 per week. (During the first week of Typhoon, casualties for Guderian's mobile forces numbered approximately 2,000 troops.) Tank casualties had also been high, and Panzer Group 2 had only 33 percent of its armored vehicles in commission (260 out of 782) in late September. Moreover, the gasoline situation throughout the southern push had been precarious, seldom rising above two days' supply on hand."
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3 ... 0.CO%3B2-B

An attack to successfully encircle Moscow required a move East about twice as far as the Kiev operation against much stronger and deeper enemy resistance. Clearly Pz Gruppe 2's forces and support are inadequate considering the logistical assets, length of advance, enemy resistance, operational dispositions of Soviet forces as opposed to the OTL and the diminished state of 4th and 9th Armies as it regards their ability to advance in the center to effect the full envelopment and relieve the mobile wings at Moscow. The Soviet strategic and operational defensive alignment on the central axis was perpared for an operation against Moscow on 1 Sep, that is specifically why Pz Gruppe 2 had such success in the Kiev operation. The success of the Kiev operation is specifically why Typhoon in the OTL had such initial success. This Sep 1 scenario is therefore in no way comparable to the OTL, the dynamic of the OTL is completely different for obvious and related reasons that are not relevant to the 1 Sep ATL.

Again a lot of retorics but factually wrong. It is tather funny that you would pretend that Guderian had success in Typhoon because of the Kiev operation. I think that all those german commanders who think otherwise are probably closer to the truth.
No, they were correct in thinking that any attack towards Moscow needed to start in august because of the limitations to the campaign season and they certainly felt able to attack in august. Alleged prohinitive logistical issues never came up in the discussions at the time in the german high command and that for the simple reason that they did not exist.

[Osterhase]

Logistics goes far beyond ammunition consumption obviously. So in the pursuit phase what happens to fuel consumption, POL, food/water, casualty extraction/personnel replacement, equipment replacement/maintenance, etc???
Beyond the point of departure the logistical requirement does not ease, it merely changes and in many cases becomes more difficult.
The key issue for the Germans at this point is motorized transport for logistical sustainment beyond the point of departure. The Wehrmacht did not possess the requisite number of tactical cargo trucks to sustain the necessary combat mass to overcome Soviet resistance at long distance. In modern terminology it's called power projection. The Wehrmacht's Achilles heal was motorized transport capacity and fuel, there simply was not enough to project enough combat power to successfully complete the proposed Moscow operation.

A lot of retoric but not fact. The germans seem to have gotten rather far despite of what you allege. And you are still not even beginning to prove that tthere were prohibitive issues that made it impossible to attack before october.

It isn't my charge to do so, it is in fact yours to prove that the resources available could actually support what you are suggesting.
Also, I never stated that the Germans could not attack. I clearly stated that they could certainly have attacked, albeit with only the most remote chance of actually taking Moscow.

[Osterhase]

In regard to the Typhoon in the OTL as opposed to a 1 Sep attack, consider:

"From this point on, Guderian's mobile forces, despite heavy casualties, started making substantial gains. On 10 September, they captured Romny, 140 miles east of Kiev, and 130 miles south of Starodub, and Guderian started anticipating a junction of his XXIV Corps with armored divisions of Army Group South. This move would effectively cut off large numbers of Red Army troops I .in a pocket that was forming east of Kiev. On the evening of 14 September, the trap closed near Lochvica, 30 miles south of Romny. While hard fighting continued, during the ensuing week nearly 400,000 prisoners were taken, and Kiev itself fell on the 19th. Three days later Panzer Group 2's depleted divisions (as well as Weichs' infantry formations) were directed to return north to prepare for Typhoon. During the month of action, Guderian's 7'/2 divisions had advanced
south as far as 160 miles. Their casualties had totaled 12,239, an average of more than 3,000 per week. (During the first week of Typhoon, casualties for Guderian's mobile forces numbered approximately 2,000 troops.) Tank casualties had also been high, and Panzer Group 2 had only 33 percent of its armored vehicles in commission (260 out of 782) in late September. Moreover, the gasoline situation throughout the southern push had been precarious, seldom rising above two days' supply on hand."
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3 ... 0.CO%3B2-B

An attack to successfully encircle Moscow required a move East about twice as far as the Kiev operation against much stronger and deeper enemy resistance. Clearly Pz Gruppe 2's forces and support are inadequate considering the logistical assets, length of advance, enemy resistance, operational dispositions of Soviet forces as opposed to the OTL and the diminished state of 4th and 9th Armies as it regards their ability to advance in the center to effect the full envelopment and relieve the mobile wings at Moscow. The Soviet strategic and operational defensive alignment on the central axis was perpared for an operation against Moscow on 1 Sep, that is specifically why Pz Gruppe 2 had such success in the Kiev operation. The success of the Kiev operation is specifically why Typhoon in the OTL had such initial success. This Sep 1 scenario is therefore in no way comparable to the OTL, the dynamic of the OTL is completely different for obvious and related reasons that are not relevant to the 1 Sep ATL.

Again a lot of retorics but factually wrong. It is tather funny that you would pretend that Guderian had success in Typhoon because of the Kiev operation. I think that all those german commanders who think otherwise are probably closer to the truth.
No, they were correct in thinking that any attack towards Moscow needed to start in august because of the limitations to the campaign season and they certainly felt able to attack in august. Alleged prohinitive logistical issues never came up in the discussions at the time in the german high command and that for the simple reason that they did not exist.

In approximately 17 days Pz Gruppe 3 was down to 1/3 of it's tanks and 50% of its motor vehicles while travelling a shorter distance than to Moscow and against much lighter resistance, but you see no issue here?
How long do you feel the Moscow operation would last?

[julian]

It isn't my charge to do so, it is in fact yours to prove that the resources available could actually support what you are suggesting.
Also, I never stated that the Germans could not attack. I clearly stated that they could certainly have attacked, albeit with only the most remote chance of actually taking Moscow.

The data in Toppe's manuscript make it clear that there were no prohibitive supply issues in august. And attacking in august certainly gives you a better chance at taking Moscow as you start earlier which gives you more time to get there. The germans got rather close as they did.

[julian]

In approximately 17 days Pz Gruppe 3 was down to 1/3 of it's tanks and 50% of its motor vehicles while travelling a shorter distance than to Moscow and against much lighter resistance, but you see no issue here?
How long do you feel the Moscow operation would last?

That PZGR 2 got as far as it did, even after the losses and wear and tear sustained during the Kiev operation from which it did not really have time to recuperate, makes clear the flaw in your argument.

[Osterhase]

In approximately 17 days Pz Gruppe 3 was down to 1/3 of it's tanks and 50% of its motor vehicles while travelling a shorter distance than to Moscow and against much lighter resistance, but you see no issue here?
How long do you feel the Moscow operation would last?

That PZGR 2 got as far as it did, even after the losses and wear and tear sustained during the Kiev operation from which it did not really have time to recuperate, makes clear the flaw in your argument.

No, the Pz Gruppe moved in the same time frame you are talking about and the situation in regard to logistics/maintenance is much more comparable to the operation you are suggesting than is Typhoon. In that same exact timeframe the railheads were where they would be for an early drive on Moscow, as is the issue with tank engines. The mud was an issue for the trucks making supply runs, but the heat and dust of July wore out the tank/truck engines and this issue will effect an early drive on Moscow. If you are suggesting that the armored units could get rehabbed before a drive on Moscow then they won't be available in August or at least until very late. Narrow down your timeframe and be specific. Is Gomel part of the logistical support plan of an early drive to Moscow? If so I suggest you look at who took that and when in addition to when supplies to support an offensive actually started to reach it's railhead.

[julian]

No, the Pz Gruppe moved in the same time frame you are talking about and the situation in regard to logistics/maintenance is much more comparable to the operation you are suggesting than is Typhoon. In that same exact timeframe the railheads were where they would be for an early drive on Moscow, as is the issue with tank engines. The mud was an issue for the trucks making supply runs, but the heat and dust of July wore out the tank/truck engines and this issue will effect an early drive on Moscow. If you are suggesting that the armored units could get rehabbed before a drive on Moscow then they won't be available in August or at least until very late. Narrow down your timeframe and be specific. Is Gomel part of the logistical support plan of an early drive to Moscow? If so I suggest you look at who took that and when in addition to when supplies to support an offensive actually started to reach it's railhead.

It is not rocket science to realise that an end august drive for Moscow has more time available to it than one starting in october. You are clearly underplaying the effect of mud on any advance in a country with few hardened roads. Trying to compare that with the effect of the heat of july is not an act of common sense.
And you are ignoring that many mobile units had a cetain amount of rest and refit in the beginning of august. PGR 2 and 3 had both communicated the date at which they would be ready for an advance to Moscow.

[Osterhase]

No, the Pz Gruppe moved in the same time frame you are talking about and the situation in regard to logistics/maintenance is much more comparable to the operation you are suggesting than is Typhoon. In that same exact timeframe the railheads were where they would be for an early drive on Moscow, as is the issue with tank engines. The mud was an issue for the trucks making supply runs, but the heat and dust of July wore out the tank/truck engines and this issue will effect an early drive on Moscow. If you are suggesting that the armored units could get rehabbed before a drive on Moscow then they won't be available in August or at least until very late. Narrow down your timeframe and be specific. Is Gomel part of the logistical support plan of an early drive to Moscow? If so I suggest you look at who took that and when in addition to when supplies to support an offensive actually started to reach it's railhead.

It is not rocket science to realise that an end august drive for Moscow has more time available to it than one starting in october. You are clearly underplaying the effect of mud on any advance in a country with few hardened roads. Trying to compare that with the effect of the heat of july is not an act of common sense.
And you are ignoring that many mobile units had a cetain amount of rest and refit in the beginning of august. PGR 2 and 3 had both communicated the date at which they would be ready for an advance to Moscow.

It's not rocket science to realise that AGC's range of operations in Sep would not be limited by weather but by other factors (logistics comprehensively, personnel losses, etc). You keep comparing Typhoon to an early advance to Moscow as if the same exact results would happen only on an earlier schedule, which is incredibly simplistic and dead wrong. That assumption ignores a massive amount of facts that run counter to that being a possibility. The bottom line is that the Wehrmacht embarcked on Operation Barbarossa with insufficient forces and support to successfully complete it's mission regardless of how you change the OTL's decisions.

[julian]

It's not rocket science to realise that AGC's range of operations in Sep would not be limited by weather but by other factors (logistics comprehensively, personnel losses, etc). You keep comparing Typhoon to an early advance to Moscow as if the same exact results would happen only on an earlier schedule, which is incredibly simplistic and dead wrong. That assumption ignores a massive amount of facts that run counter to that being a possibility. The bottom line is that the Wehrmacht embarcked on Operation Barbarossa with insufficient forces and support to successfully complete it's mission regardless of how you change the OTL's decisions.

It is not credible that something major happened to AGC between end august and beginning of october which took away alleged prohibitive obstacles to an advance on Moscow. They did not exist and that is why this issue never came up in the discusssions in the german high command.
Attacking early was not only possible but a necessity if one wanted to get to Moscow before the winter. And the german army would certainly have had a better chance at achieving this if the operation had started earlier and everything had been focused on this.

[Osterhase]

It is not credible that something major happened to AGC between end august and beginning of october which took away alleged prohibitive obstacles to an advance on Moscow. They did not exist and that is why this issue never came up in the discusssions in the german high command.
Attacking early was not only possible but a necessity if one wanted to get to Moscow before the winter. And the german army would certainly have had a better chance at achieving this if the operation had started earlier and everything had been focused on this.

As you suggested earlier, a lot of rhetoric but no facts. At what date or specific timeframe are you suggesting that the Wehrmacht/AGC was able to launch a full offensive against Moscow with a good chance of success? 15 Aug? 1 Sep?
Be specific in your hypothesis so we can accurately look into troop dispositions/OOB, supply issues, operational opportunities (options and subsequent opportunity costs), overall tactical situation and weather.
I have the Lage Ost maps and at least 40 different books on Barbarossa, so please be specific.