I just want to know, what do fellow forum members think about Hitler's cancellation of the Moscow attack and diversion towards the Caucasus? Most historians I have read consider this a major blunder - but is it really?
I personally think Hitler was right when he said that his generals did not understand the economic aspects of warfare. Just consider this - by Autumn of 1942 Russia's economic losses were 38 percent in foodstuffs, 50 percent in coal and manganese, 60 percent in iron and steel, and 33 percent in chemical industries. All these figures are taken from J.F.C Fuller's account of the Second World War. It does seem that Hitler's idea of striking at the Soviets' economic power had been right.
Hitler's Moscow order
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Hitler's Moscow order
Cry 'havoc' and let slip... the dogs of war
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phylo_roadking
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Yes, but with major production moved to the Urals and beyond - it meant the Russians could make much better use of what they had remaining for war production, and totally uninterrupted. Even the percentages remaining still meant she outproduced Germany and all its satellite nations' production combined by an incredible amount. If Moscow had fallen - and central authority and control of the USSR with it....would the subsequent chaos have been the "force multiplier" necessary to give Hitler an easy victory after that?
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds
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phylo_roadking
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They had plans - and some minor ministries were evacuated - then Stalin changed his own mind and remained in the city. It wasn't clear then that the Germans wouldn't break through in very late 1941, but then again - the Germans didn't know Zhukov's plans!
The USSR would have gone into a period of chaos at any time in its history in the event of the violent removal of central authority - no matter what lip service given to grass-roots' democracy all authority devolved down from the top. But this was particularly the case under Stalin. You only have to look at the history of how that central authority was achieved and consolidated to realise how bloody it would have been to do it all again - and quickly, this time with the added factor of political generals commanding the armed forces, politcal in the sense that they might have to leap into the contest to stop themselves being "removed" from it.
Look at the events following Stalin's later death in a time of peace; now imagine that in-fighting going on with the Germans at the gates of Moscow. Imagine Beria following Stalin's death THEN, and the NKVD being purged - and the political officers, and commissars. So what would have happened to the fanatical defence of the Motherland then at that precise moment in history? Like their "motivational" system then or not - fear of what's behind you DOES keep your eyes facing forward towards the hated enemy...
The USSR would have gone into a period of chaos at any time in its history in the event of the violent removal of central authority - no matter what lip service given to grass-roots' democracy all authority devolved down from the top. But this was particularly the case under Stalin. You only have to look at the history of how that central authority was achieved and consolidated to realise how bloody it would have been to do it all again - and quickly, this time with the added factor of political generals commanding the armed forces, politcal in the sense that they might have to leap into the contest to stop themselves being "removed" from it.
Look at the events following Stalin's later death in a time of peace; now imagine that in-fighting going on with the Germans at the gates of Moscow. Imagine Beria following Stalin's death THEN, and the NKVD being purged - and the political officers, and commissars. So what would have happened to the fanatical defence of the Motherland then at that precise moment in history? Like their "motivational" system then or not - fear of what's behind you DOES keep your eyes facing forward towards the hated enemy...
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds
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timobrienwells
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Economics 101
The central problem with going into the caucasus in 1942[apart from strategic considerations]was that it was NOT a plan to defeat the Soviet Union militarily!It was an idiotic idea that Hilter had about denying the russians certain economic assets and procuring them for Germany.But as Manstein said,deriving an economic benefit from conquered territory can only be considered AFTER the military defeat of the enemy.All the losses suffered by the russians from OP Blue were made good from other sources,though there were shortages at times.Oil,manganese,coal were all obtained from other domestic or foreign supplies.The Lend-Lease program saw to a lot of that.And the germans were not in great need of coal or manganese,as they had other ways to procure them.The best way to have secured their oil supply would have been by beefing-up the air defences in and around the Ploesti fields in Romania,not by going all the way to Maikop which never produced any oil for the germans anyway.The most important thing about Moscow was that it was the centre of the rail,water,and road communications for all of the SU.Especially railways,with the biggest marshalling yards and storage facilities.All traffic from the production areas of the east went through Moscow,and was then dispatched to the various fronts.That was a more important target short term,as Moscow was critical to the deployment and logistical support of the Red army.
tim wells
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Sean Oliver
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Hitler's decision to focus on long-term 'economic' objectives instead of the immediate concerns of paralyzing and destroying the Red Army at Moscow in July/Aug 41 probably (but not certainly) cost Germany the war. To put it more accurately, a determined thrust to Moscow by AG Center in the summer/autumn of 41 (as opposed to Hitlers 'flank' and 'economic' strategy) would most likely have captured the city. This event would've gone a long way to more-or-less win the war for Germany west for of the Urals.
Moscow was not only the capitol city, it was also the central hub of the USSR's logistics and lines of communication. Every major military, economic and governmental facility was located there. But more importantly, it was the physical infrastructure of these facilities which made the Moscow area so valuable and important.
Rail: Moscow was by far the largest RR hub in the western USSR. Military trains from east of the Urals carrying troops, equipment or supplies would require Moscow's huge railroad marshaling facilities to re-distribute the goods to the correct locations near the front. The loss of these facilities in the summer of 41 would disrupt the USSR's ability to distribute its troops and supplies to a great degree, making it much more difficult to organize military operations in a timely manner.
One reason the Soviets defended Moscow so sucessfully against enormous odds in Oct/Nov 41 was because they had those railroad stations right in their backyard. Zhukov could quickly shift troops and supplies from one area of the vast Moscow Front to another as needed to ward off German attacks as they occurred. By extension, the Germans did not have an extensive logistical infrastructure, and were always short on everything.
Continued possesion of the Moscow area's rail facilities also made moving Russian factories to the east much faster and easier.
Factories: Moscow was the largest industrial zone in the western USSR. The Soviets were able to move many of these factories to the east, but not all of them, and many of them remained in Moscow. Moving them took time, and with the loss of the RR facilites it would've made that task much more difficult and slow.
Communications: This was handled by the NKVD, and all military telegraph and telephone communications were apparently routed through a central facility in Moscow (at least that's what I've read somewhere). The Soviet military at first didn't like using radio for security reasons, so at the beginning of the war, virtually all communications were by land-line.
Operations: To capture Moscow requires the destruction of (most of) the Red Army. Because Moscow was such a vital area, Stalin would require its defence to be priority number one. This of course means that the bulk of the Red Army would be deployed to the Moscow area once it was clear to Stavka that the city would be the Wehrmacht's objective.
Thus, the battle for Moscow in Aug 41 becomes the battle for the bulk of the Red Army. Based on the Wehrmacht's performance in June-October 41, we can guess what the outcome of such a climactic battle would be. A fairly large percentage of the Red Army's forces would be engaged and presumably destroyed.
Loss of the Moscow area would place the north and south wings of the Red Army in Ukraine and Leningrad in a very dangerous position. They would be cut off from Moscow's logistical hub, and they would have Germans in their front and rear.
Some have argued that a Moscow thrust by AG Center in Aug 41 would not have suceeded because of Soviet counter attacks from the N and S flanks. This is a valid point obviously, but during Barbarossa, the Red Army was in such disarray that they were never able to launch a successful counterattack anywhere except at places where the Germans (because of Hitler's disastrous Southern Turn) were forced to defend using positional warfare tactics-Yelnia for instance. But these Soviet successes were fleeting and in reality no more that tactical victories. It was Hitler's panicky overreaction to these Russian attacks in July which caused more problems for the Wehrmacht and which caused even more bad decisions on Hitler's part that cost Germany the campaign, and thus any chance of winning the war. (Also keep in mind Hitler did the same thing a year earlier in France. He repeatedly attemted to slow or stop the panzers because of his constant fear of enemy flank attacks. It almost cost Germany the campaign, and Hitler was directly responsible for Dunkirk.)
Some have also argued that winning on the eastern front was not possible in one single campaign season, and that a second summer, 1942, would've been required for the Wehrmacht to win. I disagree, because by then the USSR would've mobilized its millions to a degree not possible in 1941, and would've made German victory even more remote.
Germany had to win against Stalin in one single campaign season. They didn't have the economic strength to wage a long war against the USSR, Great Britain and eventually the USA.
The fastest way to conquer the western USSR would be a quick strike at Moscow, supported by secondary flank operations. Taking Moscow first makes the job of taking Leningrad and the Ukraine/Caucuses much easier. But the other way around (Hitler's strategy) leads nowhere, as it did historically.
Once Moscow was taken, the 'economic' goals would fall into Germany's hands. The Ukraine and Leningrad Fronts could not carry on fighting without Moscow linking them together. They would wither and die eventually.
Furthermore, even if Hitler got his economic goals of the Ukraine and the Caucuses what good will it do Germany when they are still fighting the Red Army? The answer is of course 'nothing'. This is precisely what happened historically; Hitler got the Ukraine, but having it didn't prevent the Russians from winning, nor did its possesion help the Wehrmacht to any great degree.
Despite what historians have written about him, Hitler was no strategic 'blitzkrieg' genius. Hitler liked tanks and planes the way a 8-year-old boy does; because they are big and loud and "cool" looking. Hitler promoted the development of the Luftwaffe and the Panzers mainly for pre-war propaganda value, not because he understood modern mobile operations. It was generals like Guderian, and theorists like Fuller, Hart, Tukhachevsky, and Triandafilov and many others who were the geniuses.
Instead, Hitler was a near idiot; He was inflexible, he was incapable of deep analysis, He refused to consider the actual reality of the situation, he was convinced he was right all the time, and refused to admit his mistakes and correct them. His advisors and satraps kept him in a sort of bubble, unwilling to explain ugly truths to him; He thought he was destined for eternal greatness, but in reality made so many blunders it's a mystery how he became so powerful. (He was a lot like US President George W. Bush is today
)
It has been fashionable to bash Halder, Guderian, Mellinthin, Manstein and other Wehrmacht generals for blaming everything on Hitler, but all you have to do is look at the historical evidence; it shows overwhelmingly that Hitler's operational decisions were almost always bad, if not catastrophic, and (thankfully!) resulted in all kinds of military problems for Germany. The generals' diaries show this long before they were losing the war, and long before they "needed a scapegoat to deflect blame away from themselves for losing the war".
Moscow was not only the capitol city, it was also the central hub of the USSR's logistics and lines of communication. Every major military, economic and governmental facility was located there. But more importantly, it was the physical infrastructure of these facilities which made the Moscow area so valuable and important.
Rail: Moscow was by far the largest RR hub in the western USSR. Military trains from east of the Urals carrying troops, equipment or supplies would require Moscow's huge railroad marshaling facilities to re-distribute the goods to the correct locations near the front. The loss of these facilities in the summer of 41 would disrupt the USSR's ability to distribute its troops and supplies to a great degree, making it much more difficult to organize military operations in a timely manner.
One reason the Soviets defended Moscow so sucessfully against enormous odds in Oct/Nov 41 was because they had those railroad stations right in their backyard. Zhukov could quickly shift troops and supplies from one area of the vast Moscow Front to another as needed to ward off German attacks as they occurred. By extension, the Germans did not have an extensive logistical infrastructure, and were always short on everything.
Continued possesion of the Moscow area's rail facilities also made moving Russian factories to the east much faster and easier.
Factories: Moscow was the largest industrial zone in the western USSR. The Soviets were able to move many of these factories to the east, but not all of them, and many of them remained in Moscow. Moving them took time, and with the loss of the RR facilites it would've made that task much more difficult and slow.
Communications: This was handled by the NKVD, and all military telegraph and telephone communications were apparently routed through a central facility in Moscow (at least that's what I've read somewhere). The Soviet military at first didn't like using radio for security reasons, so at the beginning of the war, virtually all communications were by land-line.
Operations: To capture Moscow requires the destruction of (most of) the Red Army. Because Moscow was such a vital area, Stalin would require its defence to be priority number one. This of course means that the bulk of the Red Army would be deployed to the Moscow area once it was clear to Stavka that the city would be the Wehrmacht's objective.
Thus, the battle for Moscow in Aug 41 becomes the battle for the bulk of the Red Army. Based on the Wehrmacht's performance in June-October 41, we can guess what the outcome of such a climactic battle would be. A fairly large percentage of the Red Army's forces would be engaged and presumably destroyed.
Loss of the Moscow area would place the north and south wings of the Red Army in Ukraine and Leningrad in a very dangerous position. They would be cut off from Moscow's logistical hub, and they would have Germans in their front and rear.
Some have argued that a Moscow thrust by AG Center in Aug 41 would not have suceeded because of Soviet counter attacks from the N and S flanks. This is a valid point obviously, but during Barbarossa, the Red Army was in such disarray that they were never able to launch a successful counterattack anywhere except at places where the Germans (because of Hitler's disastrous Southern Turn) were forced to defend using positional warfare tactics-Yelnia for instance. But these Soviet successes were fleeting and in reality no more that tactical victories. It was Hitler's panicky overreaction to these Russian attacks in July which caused more problems for the Wehrmacht and which caused even more bad decisions on Hitler's part that cost Germany the campaign, and thus any chance of winning the war. (Also keep in mind Hitler did the same thing a year earlier in France. He repeatedly attemted to slow or stop the panzers because of his constant fear of enemy flank attacks. It almost cost Germany the campaign, and Hitler was directly responsible for Dunkirk.)
Some have also argued that winning on the eastern front was not possible in one single campaign season, and that a second summer, 1942, would've been required for the Wehrmacht to win. I disagree, because by then the USSR would've mobilized its millions to a degree not possible in 1941, and would've made German victory even more remote.
Germany had to win against Stalin in one single campaign season. They didn't have the economic strength to wage a long war against the USSR, Great Britain and eventually the USA.
The fastest way to conquer the western USSR would be a quick strike at Moscow, supported by secondary flank operations. Taking Moscow first makes the job of taking Leningrad and the Ukraine/Caucuses much easier. But the other way around (Hitler's strategy) leads nowhere, as it did historically.
Once Moscow was taken, the 'economic' goals would fall into Germany's hands. The Ukraine and Leningrad Fronts could not carry on fighting without Moscow linking them together. They would wither and die eventually.
Furthermore, even if Hitler got his economic goals of the Ukraine and the Caucuses what good will it do Germany when they are still fighting the Red Army? The answer is of course 'nothing'. This is precisely what happened historically; Hitler got the Ukraine, but having it didn't prevent the Russians from winning, nor did its possesion help the Wehrmacht to any great degree.
Despite what historians have written about him, Hitler was no strategic 'blitzkrieg' genius. Hitler liked tanks and planes the way a 8-year-old boy does; because they are big and loud and "cool" looking. Hitler promoted the development of the Luftwaffe and the Panzers mainly for pre-war propaganda value, not because he understood modern mobile operations. It was generals like Guderian, and theorists like Fuller, Hart, Tukhachevsky, and Triandafilov and many others who were the geniuses.
Instead, Hitler was a near idiot; He was inflexible, he was incapable of deep analysis, He refused to consider the actual reality of the situation, he was convinced he was right all the time, and refused to admit his mistakes and correct them. His advisors and satraps kept him in a sort of bubble, unwilling to explain ugly truths to him; He thought he was destined for eternal greatness, but in reality made so many blunders it's a mystery how he became so powerful. (He was a lot like US President George W. Bush is today
)It has been fashionable to bash Halder, Guderian, Mellinthin, Manstein and other Wehrmacht generals for blaming everything on Hitler, but all you have to do is look at the historical evidence; it shows overwhelmingly that Hitler's operational decisions were almost always bad, if not catastrophic, and (thankfully!) resulted in all kinds of military problems for Germany. The generals' diaries show this long before they were losing the war, and long before they "needed a scapegoat to deflect blame away from themselves for losing the war".
That is probably one of the most excellent and in depth analyses of the Blau campaign that I've read so far. I believe J.F.C Fuller offers the same rationale for attacking Moscow instead of the Caucusus that you and Timowr lay out.
On the whole I do agree with your analysis of Hitler as a strategist, although this is a little off topic. I think what the Fuhrer did have was a crafty wolf like appreciation of his enemies' weaknesses - and that too not all the time. That type of mindset can only get you so far in a global conflict like WW2.
The one question I do have is - although I find it hard to bellieve Hitler was not aware of Moscow's importance as a central railway hub I wonder if any of his generals actually pointed that out as a rebuttal to his obsession with the Caucusus campaign? In other words is it conceivable that someone could not have explained to him that the economic gains of the Blau campaign would not benefit in the long run without possession of Moscow RR hub because of the disruption of troop and supply distribution?
On the whole I do agree with your analysis of Hitler as a strategist, although this is a little off topic. I think what the Fuhrer did have was a crafty wolf like appreciation of his enemies' weaknesses - and that too not all the time. That type of mindset can only get you so far in a global conflict like WW2.
The one question I do have is - although I find it hard to bellieve Hitler was not aware of Moscow's importance as a central railway hub I wonder if any of his generals actually pointed that out as a rebuttal to his obsession with the Caucusus campaign? In other words is it conceivable that someone could not have explained to him that the economic gains of the Blau campaign would not benefit in the long run without possession of Moscow RR hub because of the disruption of troop and supply distribution?
Cry 'havoc' and let slip... the dogs of war
Hi Sean
(* Son of an important theorist of WW I. Typically of German generals' pow-wows, the junior von Schweppenberg did nearly all the talking at the conference. He was the brains trust, as it were, while Leeb was the final decision maker)
Hitler certainly made many fatal and basic errors, errors his subordinates would have avoided. He was not responsible for the biggest error of all, however, bigger even than Stalingrad: the failure to realise that German logistical preparations for Barbarossa were grossly inadequate. The assumption was that if the Red Army was defeated at the border, then the Germans need only drive to the Kremlin and declare victory. 100 extra tons per division per day would have swung it Hitler's way. Instead, the Germans were reduced to robbing chickens and ransacking peasant's houses for caches of grain, all to allow a few more litres of diesel be shipped.
It always works out like that, regardless of the skill or competence of the participants: a Desert Storm always leads to an Enduring Freedom in the end. Individuals may be wiser, but institutions get caught up in the group-think.
My preference would have been for the original Barbarossa plan: a concerted drive to Leningrad followed by an advance on Moscow, with Ukraine being left until the peace negotiations or a Soviet collapse.
Regards,
dduff
I'd say he was fairly clever and certainly had great insights on occasions, but the character defects you outline above made him do some very stupid things.Sean Oliver wrote:Instead, Hitler was a near idiot; He was inflexible, he was incapable of deep analysis, He refused to consider the actual reality of the situation, he was convinced he was right all the time, and refused to admit his mistakes and correct them. His advisors and satraps kept him in a sort of bubble, unwilling to explain ugly truths to him
Maybe so, but still Leeb, Guderian and Geyr von Schweppenberg (*) were caught on tape explicitly formulating just such a strategy for winning the peace while in allied captivity.Sean Oliver wrote:It has been fashionable to bash Halder, Guderian, Mellinthin, Manstein and other Wehrmacht generals for blaming everything on Hitler, but all you have to do is look at the historical evidence; it shows overwhelmingly that Hitler's operational decisions were almost always bad, if not catastrophic, and (thankfully!) resulted in all kinds of military problems for Germany. The generals' diaries show this long before they were losing the war, and long before they "needed a scapegoat to deflect blame away from themselves for losing the war".
(* Son of an important theorist of WW I. Typically of German generals' pow-wows, the junior von Schweppenberg did nearly all the talking at the conference. He was the brains trust, as it were, while Leeb was the final decision maker)
Hitler certainly made many fatal and basic errors, errors his subordinates would have avoided. He was not responsible for the biggest error of all, however, bigger even than Stalingrad: the failure to realise that German logistical preparations for Barbarossa were grossly inadequate. The assumption was that if the Red Army was defeated at the border, then the Germans need only drive to the Kremlin and declare victory. 100 extra tons per division per day would have swung it Hitler's way. Instead, the Germans were reduced to robbing chickens and ransacking peasant's houses for caches of grain, all to allow a few more litres of diesel be shipped.
It always works out like that, regardless of the skill or competence of the participants: a Desert Storm always leads to an Enduring Freedom in the end. Individuals may be wiser, but institutions get caught up in the group-think.
My preference would have been for the original Barbarossa plan: a concerted drive to Leningrad followed by an advance on Moscow, with Ukraine being left until the peace negotiations or a Soviet collapse.
Regards,
dduff
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Jason Long
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Frankly what I would have done in '42 was to finish off Leningrad and to threaten Moscow from both the North and South with the priority going to the first objective.
I'd attack northward from the Rzhev salient and points west to pin the Soviets against the Demyansk pocket, then turn NE to cut the Leningrad-Moscow RR and then cut the Leningrad-Vologda RR at or near Tikhvin.
In the meantime 4th Panzer Army takes Voronezh and turns N to threaten Ryazan. I'd let Sevastopol starve and send all those artillery, engineer and Luftwaffe assets to AGC.
The terrain to the east of the Volkhov River is bad, but not as bad as that south of Leningrad. Plus, once you reduce the Valdai Pocket and clear the RR to Bologoye you can thrust NW to begin to roll up the Volkhov River defenses and due East to drive on Yaroslavl and threaten Moscow from the North. I'd prefer to starve Leningrad out rather than commit troops to reducing it. If the Germans can keep the Leningrad-Vologda RR cut then the Soviets have no way to reach Lake Ladoga to supply Leningrad itself.
In this scheme it's key to keep the Soviet forces facing the German 4th and 9th Armies contained so they cannot cut 3rd Panzer Army off at the base as it attacks northwards. My idea is not to attack the Soviets head on where they're expecting it, but to hit them on their flanks in unexpected directions and force them to disperse their troops to contain the German attacks. It does have the primary virtue of shortening the line by eliminating the Valdai Bulge rather than lengthening them by driving on the Caucasus. And the great possibility of taking Leningrad would remove a huge committment of troops that can be used elsewhere to better effect since follow-on operations east of Leningrad and north of Yaroslavl would require far fewer troops.
Jason
I'd attack northward from the Rzhev salient and points west to pin the Soviets against the Demyansk pocket, then turn NE to cut the Leningrad-Moscow RR and then cut the Leningrad-Vologda RR at or near Tikhvin.
In the meantime 4th Panzer Army takes Voronezh and turns N to threaten Ryazan. I'd let Sevastopol starve and send all those artillery, engineer and Luftwaffe assets to AGC.
The terrain to the east of the Volkhov River is bad, but not as bad as that south of Leningrad. Plus, once you reduce the Valdai Pocket and clear the RR to Bologoye you can thrust NW to begin to roll up the Volkhov River defenses and due East to drive on Yaroslavl and threaten Moscow from the North. I'd prefer to starve Leningrad out rather than commit troops to reducing it. If the Germans can keep the Leningrad-Vologda RR cut then the Soviets have no way to reach Lake Ladoga to supply Leningrad itself.
In this scheme it's key to keep the Soviet forces facing the German 4th and 9th Armies contained so they cannot cut 3rd Panzer Army off at the base as it attacks northwards. My idea is not to attack the Soviets head on where they're expecting it, but to hit them on their flanks in unexpected directions and force them to disperse their troops to contain the German attacks. It does have the primary virtue of shortening the line by eliminating the Valdai Bulge rather than lengthening them by driving on the Caucasus. And the great possibility of taking Leningrad would remove a huge committment of troops that can be used elsewhere to better effect since follow-on operations east of Leningrad and north of Yaroslavl would require far fewer troops.
Jason
Hello Jason
I'm not convinced Moscow would not have fallen if it wasn't for the unnecessary diversion of a part of AGC to the Caucusus. In that situation I think it would have been unnecessary for Leningrad to have been the primary objective. AGC would have probably taken Moscow on its own steam.
I'm not convinced Moscow would not have fallen if it wasn't for the unnecessary diversion of a part of AGC to the Caucusus. In that situation I think it would have been unnecessary for Leningrad to have been the primary objective. AGC would have probably taken Moscow on its own steam.
Cry 'havoc' and let slip... the dogs of war
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Jason Long
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Having looked at the masses of Soviet forces in front of Moscow I disagree. There's almost no way that the Germans could have taken Moscow in a frontal attack. I think it was imperative to stretch the Soviets to cover their most valuable areas by working the flanks of Moscow. Taking Leningrad would allow the bulk of AGN to pressure Moscow from the North while AGC works up from the south.
I have a horror of city-fighting unless you can bounce it on the run like 4th Panzer Army took Voronezh. Always better, IMO to surround and starve them out. Might take some time, but far, far easier on your troops.
One main reason that Fall Blau worked as well as it did was that the Germans faced a far lower density of troops there than they would have if they'd attacked Moscow frontally.
Jason
I have a horror of city-fighting unless you can bounce it on the run like 4th Panzer Army took Voronezh. Always better, IMO to surround and starve them out. Might take some time, but far, far easier on your troops.
One main reason that Fall Blau worked as well as it did was that the Germans faced a far lower density of troops there than they would have if they'd attacked Moscow frontally.
Jason
Hello!
For all Hitler's 'gambler' mentality and recklessness, I think he also displayed a strong streak of timidity. He was well up for it where he thought he couldn't lose, but otherwise over-cautious in many respects. I think the multi-sided importance of Moscow was as clear to him as to many of his generals but the thought of "a life and death struggle with Bolshevism before the gates of Moscow" scared him. It was as if he thought an all-out assault on Moscow was the one thing that would induce an all-out defence by the Red Army and Soviet state. He wanted to win more easily than that. Napoleon took Moscow and it didn't do him any good. I think Hitler saw that as the mistake not to be repeated.
Regards
Jake
For all Hitler's 'gambler' mentality and recklessness, I think he also displayed a strong streak of timidity. He was well up for it where he thought he couldn't lose, but otherwise over-cautious in many respects. I think the multi-sided importance of Moscow was as clear to him as to many of his generals but the thought of "a life and death struggle with Bolshevism before the gates of Moscow" scared him. It was as if he thought an all-out assault on Moscow was the one thing that would induce an all-out defence by the Red Army and Soviet state. He wanted to win more easily than that. Napoleon took Moscow and it didn't do him any good. I think Hitler saw that as the mistake not to be repeated.
Regards
Jake
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Jason Long
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Jake,
You may well right, especially after the disasters in front of Moscow during the Winter Counter-Offensive. I think that Moscow has to be taken indirectly to avoid any city-fighting and in this I fully support Hitler who'd earlier ordered that no fighting should occur in Leningrad. Unfortunately for him he changed his mind about Stalingrad.
Jason
You may well right, especially after the disasters in front of Moscow during the Winter Counter-Offensive. I think that Moscow has to be taken indirectly to avoid any city-fighting and in this I fully support Hitler who'd earlier ordered that no fighting should occur in Leningrad. Unfortunately for him he changed his mind about Stalingrad.
Jason
Hello Sean
Some points to your post.
1. I agree generally that it was most likely a mistake of strategic logic to focus on economic objectives in the fall of 1941, to say nothing of in 1942. The whole Barbarossa undertaking was based fundamentally around the central premiss of destroying the Red Army in the field, and this was the only way in which a decsive victory could be won in a single campaigning season - something on which again the Barbarossa plan rested entirely. Whether this could actually be achieved, or if more would have been achieved in this regard by moving on Moscow in September, is a different matter.
2. The Red Army did not defend Moscow successfully at all in October/November 41 - they were cataclysmically defeated on the approaches. They did defend Moscow successfully in December, and more than that, successfully counterattacked. But they did not do so against enormous odds. On the contrary, they enjoyed a not insignificant numerical superiority in the central sector.
3. The force destruction argument does not entirely hold good. The forces on the Moscow axis in September were annihilated - during Typhoon in October. Also, the Kiev operation did bring enormous gains in this regard, more than 700,000 Red Army casualties. I do not see that it can be taken for granted that a push on Moscow in September would have resulted in greater Soviet losses than the Kiev operation followed by a later Moscow push.
4. The Yelnia battles was not a result of the decision to turn South, but rather of the general operational pause to recouop a minimum of logistical balance while the decision of where to turn next was being threshed out. Also, a more relevant scary image would be the position of HG Mitte if it had to contend not only with the situation it was historically facing in December-January 1941, but also with strong and intact Soviet forces in its deep flank.
5. With a southern flank running all the way to Gomel, this would inevitably have siphoned off major German forces from active operations towards Moscow, simply to cover that flank. Almost certainly, the Kiev operation permitted considerably stronger German forces to move on Moscow in October than would have been possible without that prelude.
6.
7.
cheers
Some points to your post.
1. I agree generally that it was most likely a mistake of strategic logic to focus on economic objectives in the fall of 1941, to say nothing of in 1942. The whole Barbarossa undertaking was based fundamentally around the central premiss of destroying the Red Army in the field, and this was the only way in which a decsive victory could be won in a single campaigning season - something on which again the Barbarossa plan rested entirely. Whether this could actually be achieved, or if more would have been achieved in this regard by moving on Moscow in September, is a different matter.
2. The Red Army did not defend Moscow successfully at all in October/November 41 - they were cataclysmically defeated on the approaches. They did defend Moscow successfully in December, and more than that, successfully counterattacked. But they did not do so against enormous odds. On the contrary, they enjoyed a not insignificant numerical superiority in the central sector.
3. The force destruction argument does not entirely hold good. The forces on the Moscow axis in September were annihilated - during Typhoon in October. Also, the Kiev operation did bring enormous gains in this regard, more than 700,000 Red Army casualties. I do not see that it can be taken for granted that a push on Moscow in September would have resulted in greater Soviet losses than the Kiev operation followed by a later Moscow push.
4. The Yelnia battles was not a result of the decision to turn South, but rather of the general operational pause to recouop a minimum of logistical balance while the decision of where to turn next was being threshed out. Also, a more relevant scary image would be the position of HG Mitte if it had to contend not only with the situation it was historically facing in December-January 1941, but also with strong and intact Soviet forces in its deep flank.
5. With a southern flank running all the way to Gomel, this would inevitably have siphoned off major German forces from active operations towards Moscow, simply to cover that flank. Almost certainly, the Kiev operation permitted considerably stronger German forces to move on Moscow in October than would have been possible without that prelude.
6.
This is not really a very relevant argument - no one would question that to finish the campaign would be preferable in 1941 compared to doing so in 1942, the point is whether it was within German capabilities to achieve that. I for one severely doubt that.Some have also argued that winning on the eastern front was not possible in one single campaign season, and that a second summer, 1942, would've been required for the Wehrmacht to win. I disagree, because by then the USSR would've mobilized its millions to a degree not possible in 1941, and would've made German victory even more remote.
7.
I agree generally that there seems to be a tendency to an exaggerated countermovement towards what we might call the traditional generals view of Hitler. Certainly, no one can base a reasoned view of that issue entirely on the views found in these memoirs. But in my opinion it appears obvious that Hitler's influence on almost every aspect of the German conduct of the war was pervasive and almost exclusively negative, and that the view of this expressed by f.e. Guderian or Manstein is essentially far more correct than misleading.It has been fashionable to bash Halder, Guderian, Mellinthin, Manstein and other Wehrmacht generals for blaming everything on Hitler, but all you have to do is look at the historical evidence; it shows overwhelmingly that Hitler's operational decisions were almost always bad, if not catastrophic, and (thankfully!) resulted in all kinds of military problems for Germany. The generals' diaries show this long before they were losing the war, and long before they "needed a scapegoat to deflect blame away from themselves for losing the war".
cheers
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Sean Oliver
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Hi Qvist:
Another problem is the definition of "destroying the Red Army": Does this mean killing or capturing 3-5 million men? I don't think it does at all. The capture or isolation of Moscow by Oct 41 (before winter) would cause so many logistical and C3 problems for the Red Army that it would begin to crumble soon after as an effective fighting force everywhere along the front from L'Grad to the Crimea. Moscow's loss deprives the Red Army of it's heart and soul, not to mention it's stomach and nervous system.
That's why I think the "Kiev Turn" was such a pointless waste of time and energy. Why bother with 600,000 Russians way down south around Kiev, when the USSR's capitol is in right front of you - yours for the taking - if all you need to do is drive straight to it. The 600K Russians down south aren't capable of causing AGC any flank problems, and Briansk and Central Front may be a nuisance but they won't be able to stop AGC's panzers.
I would say that they did indeed successfully defend Moscow! Did the Germans take the city?
The Red Army in front of Moscow in late Oct/Nov was very weak. You yourself just said they had been cataclysmically defeated. If so, then why didn't the Germans take it? Because of the presence of a large industrial city with millions of people and a vast RR net reaching all over the Soviet Union right in the Red Army's backyard. Zhukov was able to shift scarce troops and tanks around from threatened sector to threatened sector, and stop the panzers until large-scale reinforcements arriving by RR in Dec could be brought from the other areas of the country.
By logical extention, if the Germans had taken the city in Sept, they would've deprived the Red Army of those resources and would've had the city for themselves during the upcoming winter.
Also, the capture of Moscow might've persuaded the Japanese to join in the attack of the USSR, instead of attacking the US at Pearl Harbor, but that's another story.
Why should the Germans keep trying to kill all of them over and over when a better and easier alternative is to isolate and deprive the centrally-planned Red Army military infrastructure (and national economy) located in the Moscow area from the rest of the Red Army?
The Moscow strategy is an attept to not only render the Red Army ineffective and place it in a strategically untenable position, but also to undermine Stalin's power and bring about the collapse of the Soviet government in the western regions of the USSR.
Taking L'Grad and Ukraine accomplishes neither of these. In fact, the Germans did take Ukraine and did at least isolate L'Grad and it didn't do them any good in the end. So much for that strategy!
Initially, yes. By mid-late July, AGC needed a 2-3 week period to rotate/refit/replenish their armor and allow the logistic and marching infantry tail to catch up, while the Smolensk pocket was reduced.
On the Soviet side, Timoshenko/Stavka saw the Yelnia area as a weak spot in the German lines SE of the Smolensk pocket and wanted to launch a relief operation to free the Soviet forces there. But despite heavy German casualties (caused mostly by logistic problems-a lack of artillery ammo to counter the Russian assaults) the Soviet attacks got nowhere. So the Russians tried another offensive at Roslavl, and again were defeated. They continued this pattern up and down AGC front, especially along the N and S flanks, until Hitler became so worried about them that he put the thrust to Moscow on hold until those Russian flank attacks were cleared up. That's why Guderian's turn south to Kiev (and Hoth's smaller turn north) came about.
Hitler's intention (not OKH's) all along was to clear the N and S flanks first before taking Moscow, but during the first 2-3 weeks of Barbarossa, it looked like the Germans might be able to do all three simultaneously, so Hitler allowed AGC to run straight east. Then the Soviet attacks in July started. That's when Hitler became worried (as he did in France a year earlier) and decided to abandon Moscow and clear the flanks, as he originally envisioned in Directive 21. This decision forced AGC into positional warfare at Yelnia and along the Vop River, and allowed the Soviets the chance to launch their attacks.
What Hitler failed to see was how truly ineffective and near-paralyzed the Soviet Army's offensive capabilities were during the summer-fall of 1941. Yes, they could inflict mass assaults on the German lines and cause all sorts of tactical problems for the Wehrmacht, but none of these Red Army operations had any real long term negative effects on the Germans. The Red Army was incapable of following through on their attacks in any way whatsoever. They might overrun the first 2-3 German trench lines, but that's about all they ever achieved offensively until December.
So when historians talk about the "ominous threat to AGC's flank" from the south or north, they are grossly exaggerating the power of the Red Army to actually do anything dangerous.
Hitler too was apparently terrified of enemy flank attacks. He repeatedly indicated this during France and almost lost the campaign for Germany.
The "generals" on the other hand, were certain they could keep the Russians off balance by constantly pushing for the single most important objective: Moscow. They believed (and I agree) that the threat to Moscow would override any other military consideration on Stavka's part, and the Red Army in the central area would be ordered to defend the city to the death. Since this would occur in Aug-Sept, the best panzer/Luftwaffe weather of the year, the Germans would have little problem overcoming the Russian defences. The Moscow area would either fall or become isolated, and as a result, the Red Army would suffer a crisis of leadership and confidence, not to mention logistical and C3 problems which would require years to overcome.
But historically this didn't happen, and the Red Army was able to regroup around Moscow in Dec (this again demonstrates the city's significance) and eventually defeat Hitler.
Well, that's what it was originally based on, but somewhere along the way, Hitler decided economic objectives were more important. The whole story of Barbarossa's planning is a complex mess. On the one hand there was Hitler's conception, then there was the Lossberg Study and The Marcks Plan, and the Halder Plan etc etc. Ultimately, Directive 21 was so vague that it could be interpereted in any way possible!The whole Barbarossa undertaking was based fundamentally around the central premiss of destroying the Red Army in the field, and this was the only way in which a decsive victory could be won in a single campaigning season - something on which again the Barbarossa plan rested entirely.
Another problem is the definition of "destroying the Red Army": Does this mean killing or capturing 3-5 million men? I don't think it does at all. The capture or isolation of Moscow by Oct 41 (before winter) would cause so many logistical and C3 problems for the Red Army that it would begin to crumble soon after as an effective fighting force everywhere along the front from L'Grad to the Crimea. Moscow's loss deprives the Red Army of it's heart and soul, not to mention it's stomach and nervous system.
That's why I think the "Kiev Turn" was such a pointless waste of time and energy. Why bother with 600,000 Russians way down south around Kiev, when the USSR's capitol is in right front of you - yours for the taking - if all you need to do is drive straight to it. The 600K Russians down south aren't capable of causing AGC any flank problems, and Briansk and Central Front may be a nuisance but they won't be able to stop AGC's panzers.
The Red Army did not defend Moscow successfully at all in October/November 41 - they were cataclysmically defeated on the approaches. They did defend Moscow successfully in December, and more than that, successfully counterattacked. But they did not do so against enormous odds. On the contrary, they enjoyed a not insignificant numerical superiority in the central sector.
I would say that they did indeed successfully defend Moscow! Did the Germans take the city?
The Red Army in front of Moscow in late Oct/Nov was very weak. You yourself just said they had been cataclysmically defeated. If so, then why didn't the Germans take it? Because of the presence of a large industrial city with millions of people and a vast RR net reaching all over the Soviet Union right in the Red Army's backyard. Zhukov was able to shift scarce troops and tanks around from threatened sector to threatened sector, and stop the panzers until large-scale reinforcements arriving by RR in Dec could be brought from the other areas of the country.
By logical extention, if the Germans had taken the city in Sept, they would've deprived the Red Army of those resources and would've had the city for themselves during the upcoming winter.
Also, the capture of Moscow might've persuaded the Japanese to join in the attack of the USSR, instead of attacking the US at Pearl Harbor, but that's another story.
The loss of the Moscow geographic area causes more damage to the Red Army's fighting ability than 6 or 7 hundred thousand Russians here or there. The USSR had virtually inexhaustable supplies of manpower. Again, the objective is to render the Red Army impotent by undermining its logistical and c3 capabilities by isolating Moscow, not kill or capture as many Russians as possible. Of course, many thousands of Red Army troops will become casualties along the way, but basing German victory on body counts will not win the war for them. 12 million Russian soldiers were killed and the Germans still lost.The force destruction argument does not entirely hold good. The forces on the Moscow axis in September were annihilated - during Typhoon in October. Also, the Kiev operation did bring enormous gains in this regard, more than 700,000 Red Army casualties. I do not see that it can be taken for granted that a push on Moscow in September would have resulted in greater Soviet losses than the Kiev operation followed by a later Moscow push.
Why should the Germans keep trying to kill all of them over and over when a better and easier alternative is to isolate and deprive the centrally-planned Red Army military infrastructure (and national economy) located in the Moscow area from the rest of the Red Army?
The Moscow strategy is an attept to not only render the Red Army ineffective and place it in a strategically untenable position, but also to undermine Stalin's power and bring about the collapse of the Soviet government in the western regions of the USSR.
Taking L'Grad and Ukraine accomplishes neither of these. In fact, the Germans did take Ukraine and did at least isolate L'Grad and it didn't do them any good in the end. So much for that strategy!
The Yelnia battles was not a result of the decision to turn South, but rather of the general operational pause to recouop a minimum of logistical balance while the decision of where to turn next was being threshed out.
Initially, yes. By mid-late July, AGC needed a 2-3 week period to rotate/refit/replenish their armor and allow the logistic and marching infantry tail to catch up, while the Smolensk pocket was reduced.
On the Soviet side, Timoshenko/Stavka saw the Yelnia area as a weak spot in the German lines SE of the Smolensk pocket and wanted to launch a relief operation to free the Soviet forces there. But despite heavy German casualties (caused mostly by logistic problems-a lack of artillery ammo to counter the Russian assaults) the Soviet attacks got nowhere. So the Russians tried another offensive at Roslavl, and again were defeated. They continued this pattern up and down AGC front, especially along the N and S flanks, until Hitler became so worried about them that he put the thrust to Moscow on hold until those Russian flank attacks were cleared up. That's why Guderian's turn south to Kiev (and Hoth's smaller turn north) came about.
Hitler's intention (not OKH's) all along was to clear the N and S flanks first before taking Moscow, but during the first 2-3 weeks of Barbarossa, it looked like the Germans might be able to do all three simultaneously, so Hitler allowed AGC to run straight east. Then the Soviet attacks in July started. That's when Hitler became worried (as he did in France a year earlier) and decided to abandon Moscow and clear the flanks, as he originally envisioned in Directive 21. This decision forced AGC into positional warfare at Yelnia and along the Vop River, and allowed the Soviets the chance to launch their attacks.
What Hitler failed to see was how truly ineffective and near-paralyzed the Soviet Army's offensive capabilities were during the summer-fall of 1941. Yes, they could inflict mass assaults on the German lines and cause all sorts of tactical problems for the Wehrmacht, but none of these Red Army operations had any real long term negative effects on the Germans. The Red Army was incapable of following through on their attacks in any way whatsoever. They might overrun the first 2-3 German trench lines, but that's about all they ever achieved offensively until December.
So when historians talk about the "ominous threat to AGC's flank" from the south or north, they are grossly exaggerating the power of the Red Army to actually do anything dangerous.
Hitler too was apparently terrified of enemy flank attacks. He repeatedly indicated this during France and almost lost the campaign for Germany.
The "generals" on the other hand, were certain they could keep the Russians off balance by constantly pushing for the single most important objective: Moscow. They believed (and I agree) that the threat to Moscow would override any other military consideration on Stavka's part, and the Red Army in the central area would be ordered to defend the city to the death. Since this would occur in Aug-Sept, the best panzer/Luftwaffe weather of the year, the Germans would have little problem overcoming the Russian defences. The Moscow area would either fall or become isolated, and as a result, the Red Army would suffer a crisis of leadership and confidence, not to mention logistical and C3 problems which would require years to overcome.
But historically this didn't happen, and the Red Army was able to regroup around Moscow in Dec (this again demonstrates the city's significance) and eventually defeat Hitler.