A small contribution: The cumulative losses 22 June - 1 October of the divisions that were part of HG Mitte on 1 October. The formatting will be screwed up, but hopefully it will be fairly readable. Reference: BA-MA RH19-II/123-171 to 174 „Zahlenmässige Zusammenstellung der Verluste vom 22.6. bis 1.10.41“, HG Mitte.
INFANTRY ARMIES AND HEERESGEBIET
AOK 2 AOK 4 AOK 9 Heeresgeb.
167.ID 1,456 98.ID 3,788 86.ID 2,673 221.Sich.D. 233
31.ID 2,942 34.ID 3,053 162.ID 925 286.Sich.D. 48
56.ID 3,797 197.ID 1,534 255.ID 3,793 403.Sich.D.? 65
131.ID 2,050 23.ID 4,238 87.ID 2,293 K/H Tr 182
112.ID 2,860 7.ID 2,662 8.ID 3,490
17.ID 4,296 267.ID 3,539 28.ID 4,705
260.ID 3,034 78.ID 3,335 106.ID 3,100
52.ID 2,273 15.ID 3,463 5.ID 4,193
K/H Tr 1,289 268.ID 3,818 35.ID 2,824
292.ID 4,260 129.ID 2,168
183.ID 332 6.ID 1,731
263.ID 4,040 26.ID 2,557
137.ID 4,704 110.ID 3,267
K/H Tr 183 161.ID 4,376
206.ID 2,583
256.ID 2,113
102.ID 1,972
251.ID 3,608
253.ID 2,996
K/H Tr 1,746
IN ALL 23,997 IN ALL 42,939 IN ALL 57,113 IN ALL 528
PANZERGRUPPEN
PzGr 2 PzGr 3 PzGr 4
3.Pz 4,534 6.Pz 3,616 10.Pz 2,936
4.Pz 3,275 7.Pz 3,536 258.ID 1,553
10.mot. 3,874 14.mot 3,745 5.Pz 1
17.Pz 5,175 1.Pz 4,180 252.ID 516
18.Pz 3,772 36.mot. 3,437 20.Pz 3,479
29.mot. 5,543 LehrBr. 900 933 3.mot. 4,066
9.Pz 3,085 K/H Tr 1,541 SS-Reich 5,362
16.mot. 2,976 19.Pz 3,752
25.mot. 2,501 K/H Tr 1,031
1.KD 3,005
IR GD 2,217
95.ID 4,173
293.ID 1,700
262.ID 4,533
296.ID 2,038
45.ID 2,820
134.ID 3,661
K/H Tr 1,744
IN ALL 60,599 IN ALL 20,988 IN ALL 22,696
cheers
Hitler's Moscow order
Moderator: sniper1shot
Thanks Qvist, excellent info. I must clarify an issue with losses as it seems there are quite a few people(from past experience beyond this thread, but who may also be reading it) that have a misguided perception of casualties and how they relate to force structure.
Tim Wells wrote a response to a linked article-
]"By mid july the combat capability of the infantry was 80%"
Tim- <...> "Truth]Total casualties july16 were 102,488.IE Less than 3% of Ostheer"
Quite a few people don't make the correlation that the major part of casualties are suffered by the combat arms and most specifically the Infantry (even in the Panzer divisions). The issue here is that the WHOLE force is not in the Infantry and not every member of an Infantry division is an Infantryman.
To properly understand the relevance of the above statement from the linked article, one has to relate it to the "TO&E" (table of organization and equipment) of the type of division (Infantry, Panzer, etc.).
http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt/ ... power.html
From Wray- "These personnel losses permanently diminished the combat power of Army Group Center, and as General Halder had foreseen earlier, German personnel replacements were running out. The chief of the General Staff noted on 26 September that convalescents returning to duty constituted the only remaining short-term source of replacement manpower.87 Although a few replacements trickled down to Bock's tired divisions during September, Army Group Center still reported a net shortage of 80,000 men on I October. Since most of these unreplaced losses were infantrymen, the German ability to seize and hold terrain was seriously eroded.88) "
Tim Wells wrote a response to a linked article-
]"By mid july the combat capability of the infantry was 80%"
Tim- <...> "Truth]Total casualties july16 were 102,488.IE Less than 3% of Ostheer"
Quite a few people don't make the correlation that the major part of casualties are suffered by the combat arms and most specifically the Infantry (even in the Panzer divisions). The issue here is that the WHOLE force is not in the Infantry and not every member of an Infantry division is an Infantryman.
To properly understand the relevance of the above statement from the linked article, one has to relate it to the "TO&E" (table of organization and equipment) of the type of division (Infantry, Panzer, etc.).
http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt/ ... power.html
From Wray- "These personnel losses permanently diminished the combat power of Army Group Center, and as General Halder had foreseen earlier, German personnel replacements were running out. The chief of the General Staff noted on 26 September that convalescents returning to duty constituted the only remaining short-term source of replacement manpower.87 Although a few replacements trickled down to Bock's tired divisions during September, Army Group Center still reported a net shortage of 80,000 men on I October. Since most of these unreplaced losses were infantrymen, the German ability to seize and hold terrain was seriously eroded.88) "
Very true. And of course, the amount of replacements received draw in the other direction, so there's not really any easy way of translating knowledge of how many casualties a division has suffered to a reasonably accurate impression of its state.I must clarify an issue with losses as it seems there are quite a few people(from past experience beyond this thread, but who may also be reading it) that have a misguided perception of casualties and how they relate to force structure.
Tim Wells wrote a response to a linked article-
]"By mid july the combat capability of the infantry was 80%"
Tim- <...> "Truth]Total casualties july16 were 102,488.IE Less than 3% of Ostheer"
Quite a few people don't make the correlation that the major part of casualties are suffered by the combat arms and most specifically the Infantry (even in the Panzer divisions). The issue here is that the WHOLE force is not in the Infantry and not every member of an Infantry division is an Infantryman.
To properly understand the relevance of the above statement from the linked article, one has to relate it to the "TO&E" (table of organization and equipment) of the type of division (Infantry, Panzer, etc.).
The obvious thing to use is of course Fehlstellen figures, if you can find them. But in that regard it is particularly important to bear in mind the point you bring up - 70-90% of the Fehl will normally be in the infantry regiments, depending on the type of Division. And, even Fehl is not neccssarily a straightforward entity, as clear from the below examples.
Let us look at a Zustandsbericht from XXXIV AK of AOK 2, discussing the state of 45. and 134.ID on 1 November in considerable detail . After four months of continual action, the report describes the attitude among the troops as good, and comments favorably on the effects of amalgamating subunits, rest and a better supply situation. However, it also describes the divisions as being not yet ready for major offensive action or unusual march distances. Both divisions were about to leave their heavy transport behind and move on without it, due to the difficult ground conditions.
Personnell-wise, the Fehlstellen figures indicate their increasingly complicated nature due to ad-hoc changes in establishment strength (as a result of divisional units being amalgamated). According to “voller.Div.”, (ie, the Gliederung with which it had started the campaign), 45.ID were short 80 officers and 3,000 men, 134.ID 22 Officers and 2,500 men.
Measured from “umgegl.Div.” (ie, its Gliederung after having dissolved, amalagamated or shortened some of its subunits, which was at this time still regarded as a temporary arrangement), 45.ID (which had 2,820 casualties by 1 October) were short 50 officers and 1,500 men, 134.ID a mere 6 officers but 1,000 other ranks (after 3,661 casualties by 1 October). The average strength of the rifle companies in the divisions is given as around 100 – not too bad. 45.ID had received 450 replacements in late August, 134.ID 471 in early September.
To supplement that: On 6 November, OrgAbt/OKH issued an estimation of the combat power of the Ostheer, based on an analysis of the numerical data. Infantry Divisions had an average Fehl of 2,500 men, 80% of which was in infantry units. This corresponded to a drop in rifle strength (“Infanteristische Kampfkraft”) of almost 1/3. Losses among the artillery had been relatively lighter, and on average resulted in a drop of roughly ¼ of the combat power of that arm. OrgAbt also took into consideration reductions in combat power due to physical exhaustion, shortages of NCOs and high losses in motor vehicles, concluding that the average ID in the East retained only 65% of the combat power it possessed initially. Panzer Divisions (apart from the newly arrived 2. and 5.PzD) had on average similar Fehl in its infantry elements as the ID, meaning in their case a reduction in infantry combat power of about 50% (simnce theuir infantry strength were lower to begin with). Due to personell and materiel losses, the combat strength of the Panzer Regiments had declined by 65-75%. Due to equipment losses, especially motor vehicles, the remaining elements of the PzD were judged to have only 40-50% of their original value. All in all, the average PzD was put at 35% of of its normal combat power. Motorised Infantry Divisions (including special regiments such as Gr.D. and Lehr) closely mirrored the situation of the ID, but being more reliant on motor transport were also harder hit by the high vehicle losses. OrgAbt puts them at 60% of the original combat power.From Wray- "These personnel losses permanently diminished the combat power of Army Group Center, and as General Halder had foreseen earlier, German personnel replacements were running out. The chief of the General Staff noted on 26 September that convalescents returning to duty constituted the only remaining short-term source of replacement manpower.87 Although a few replacements trickled down to Bock's tired divisions during September, Army Group Center still reported a net shortage of 80,000 men on I October. Since most of these unreplaced losses were infantrymen, the German ability to seize and hold terrain was seriously eroded.8Cool "
On this basis, OrgAbt gives the following estimation of German strength in the Eats:
- 101 ID, equivalent to 65 full strength divisions
- 17 PzD, equivalent to 6 full strength divisions – plus 2. and 5.PzD
- 13 (mot.) ID (including SS and 3 regimental sized formations), equivalent to 8 full strength divisions.
In all, 136 Divisions, with an actual combat power equal to just 83.
cheers
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timobrienwells
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Losses
Hi Osterhase.I would like to respond to the post in which my name was mentioned.Before I do however,I would just like to clarify one thing.And that is,Are you still trying to defend that worthless article by Gary Komar on AHF?Are you seriously trying to defend that absurd insinuation about 80% combat capability of the infantry by mid-july?I would like to think that you are a smarter person than that.But given that you were the one who recommended the article to me,and that you are now the one who APPEARS to trying uphold the ludicrous assertion it makes,then I am left with no choice but to respond!
OK now, if I am reading your post correctly,it seems you suggest that as casualties are mostly suffered by infantry in combat,then my '3% of Ostheer' number is misleading.Right?If that is the case,then maybe we should look at what Gary Komar is trying to say in that piece of crap that he wrote.Does his "80%" thing implies 20% LOSSES?I think it does! Yeah?And it appears your exposition about TO&E etc attempts to relate these losses to the INFANTRY as opposed to the ENTIRE OSTHEER.Am I right so far?
Well,If my assumptions are correct ,then lets look at the numbers!
As I am sure you already know,German infantry divisions in 1941 had 3 regiments,each with 3 batallions-9 batallions in all.Each batallion had an establishment strength of around 860 men.So therefore about 7,700 infantry[officers and men]for the 3 regiments.In addition to this must be added the Pioneer batallion and the Aufsklarungs company which oft-times performed the same duties as rifle-men.[For the purpose of our discussion,we will exclude all the Beobachtung,Nachrichten,and Panzer-jager guys.]As such we arrive at a figure of around 9,000 infantry men per division according to establishment.Is that a fair number?
Motorized infantry divisions would be about the same,and Panzer divisions about 4,000.
OK,now for simplicity lets go with 101 infantry,19 Panzer,and 15 motorized divisions for the start of Barbarossa.Can you live with those numbers?If yes,then we should be able to make a rough estimate of INFANTRY strength for the ostheer as of june 22.My calculations suggest around 900,000 for the infantry divisions,80,000 for the panzer divisions and about 120,000 for the motorized divisions.Total-1.1 million men.It is a rough estimate,but if anything,it would probably be on the low-side.
OK,so if casualties on july 16th were of the order of 102,000 for the whole ostheer,then we now have to determine what % OF THESE CASUALTIES WERE INFANTRY MEN.Fortunately,Qvist has given us a very good guide in his latest post,and he seems to suggest 80%.So lets go with that number.
That means that about 80,000 of the casualties on july 16th should have been infantry!Is that right?
If that is true,then that equates to about 7.3% of the infantry strength!!??So,I wonder where or how Gary comes up with 20%???
Maybe Gary was just talking about the infantry DIVISIONS[without motor/panzer divs]?Lets look at it.
80,000 lost from 900,000 gives us 8.8%,so that cant be it.
Maybe Gary was just talking about the infantry REGIMENTS[no pioneers or recons]?Lets look at it.
80,000 lost from 770,000 gives us 10.4%,so that cant be it either!
Maybe Gary was talking about the divisions that only had 90% infantry strength on june22?Lets assume they all had 90%!!
80,000 lost from 700,000 gives us 11.4%.Getting closer,but still not quite there!
Gee,I wonder what Gary meant??Surely he could not have just plucked that number out of the air??What is your explanation?[and I would like to see the numbers!]
Regards Tim Wells
OK now, if I am reading your post correctly,it seems you suggest that as casualties are mostly suffered by infantry in combat,then my '3% of Ostheer' number is misleading.Right?If that is the case,then maybe we should look at what Gary Komar is trying to say in that piece of crap that he wrote.Does his "80%" thing implies 20% LOSSES?I think it does! Yeah?And it appears your exposition about TO&E etc attempts to relate these losses to the INFANTRY as opposed to the ENTIRE OSTHEER.Am I right so far?
Well,If my assumptions are correct ,then lets look at the numbers!
As I am sure you already know,German infantry divisions in 1941 had 3 regiments,each with 3 batallions-9 batallions in all.Each batallion had an establishment strength of around 860 men.So therefore about 7,700 infantry[officers and men]for the 3 regiments.In addition to this must be added the Pioneer batallion and the Aufsklarungs company which oft-times performed the same duties as rifle-men.[For the purpose of our discussion,we will exclude all the Beobachtung,Nachrichten,and Panzer-jager guys.]As such we arrive at a figure of around 9,000 infantry men per division according to establishment.Is that a fair number?
Motorized infantry divisions would be about the same,and Panzer divisions about 4,000.
OK,now for simplicity lets go with 101 infantry,19 Panzer,and 15 motorized divisions for the start of Barbarossa.Can you live with those numbers?If yes,then we should be able to make a rough estimate of INFANTRY strength for the ostheer as of june 22.My calculations suggest around 900,000 for the infantry divisions,80,000 for the panzer divisions and about 120,000 for the motorized divisions.Total-1.1 million men.It is a rough estimate,but if anything,it would probably be on the low-side.
OK,so if casualties on july 16th were of the order of 102,000 for the whole ostheer,then we now have to determine what % OF THESE CASUALTIES WERE INFANTRY MEN.Fortunately,Qvist has given us a very good guide in his latest post,and he seems to suggest 80%.So lets go with that number.
That means that about 80,000 of the casualties on july 16th should have been infantry!Is that right?
If that is true,then that equates to about 7.3% of the infantry strength!!??So,I wonder where or how Gary comes up with 20%???
Maybe Gary was just talking about the infantry DIVISIONS[without motor/panzer divs]?Lets look at it.
80,000 lost from 900,000 gives us 8.8%,so that cant be it.
Maybe Gary was just talking about the infantry REGIMENTS[no pioneers or recons]?Lets look at it.
80,000 lost from 770,000 gives us 10.4%,so that cant be it either!
Maybe Gary was talking about the divisions that only had 90% infantry strength on june22?Lets assume they all had 90%!!
80,000 lost from 700,000 gives us 11.4%.Getting closer,but still not quite there!
Gee,I wonder what Gary meant??Surely he could not have just plucked that number out of the air??What is your explanation?[and I would like to see the numbers!]
Regards Tim Wells
tim wells
What's absurd about it?Are you seriously trying to defend that absurd insinuation about 80% combat capability of the infantry by mid-july?
Well, think again. "Combat capability" is not the same as strength, see above OKH evaluation for example - such assessments could also take into account things like mobility, fatigue, supply situation etc etc. Even if it does relate to strength, it relates to Gefechtsstärken, which is the strength of the combat units. A 20% drop in GefSt to mid-July is quite plausible - I have for example an AOK 18 report giving losses by division until 16 July, and their percentage relative to Iststärke (which is the overall strength of the division), showing that it's 11 divisions had lost the equivalent of almost 8% of its Ist, which would actually work out to something very close to 20% of their Gef.St. Losses in the Panzer Groups were generally significantly higher than this in July, as is plain from previously quoted figures - f.e. , XXIV PzK issued a report on 26 July, In which it is stated that 3.PzD has lost 2,300 men, 4.PzD 1,300 men and 10.ID (mot) 1,800 men. SS-Reich already had 1,700 Fehlstellen.OK now, if I am reading your post correctly,it seems you suggest that as casualties are mostly suffered by infantry in combat,then my '3% of Ostheer' number is misleading.Right?If that is the case,then maybe we should look at what Gary Komar is trying to say in that piece of crap that he wrote.Does his "80%" thing implies 20% LOSSES?I think it does!
No, that is too high - not all elements of Infantry units were included in GefSt.As I am sure you already know,German infantry divisions in 1941 had 3 regiments,each with 3 batallions-9 batallions in all.Each batallion had an establishment strength of around 860 men.So therefore about 7,700 infantry[officers and men]for the 3 regiments.In addition to this must be added the Pioneer batallion and the Aufsklarungs company which oft-times performed the same duties as rifle-men.[For the purpose of our discussion,we will exclude all the Beobachtung,Nachrichten,and Panzer-jager guys.]As such we arrive at a figure of around 9,000 infantry men per division according to establishment.Is that a fair number?
No, Mot.D. had 6 infantry batallions, not 9.Motorized infantry divisions would be about the same,and Panzer divisions about 4,000.
It is more probably on the very unreliable side. The formula for calculating combat strengths were considerably more complex than this. Your divisional count is too high - it includes 14 divisions in the OKH reserve, who had for the most part not yet been comitted yet in mid-July. The 121 divisions who took part in the attack from the beginning would have had less than 2 million men between them, and it was certainly not the case that more than half of them were in infantry regiments.OK,now for simplicity lets go with 101 infantry,19 Panzer,and 15 motorized divisions for the start of Barbarossa.Can you live with those numbers?If yes,then we should be able to make a rough estimate of INFANTRY strength for the ostheer as of june 22.My calculations suggest around 900,000 for the infantry divisions,80,000 for the panzer divisions and about 120,000 for the motorized divisions.Total-1.1 million men.It is a rough estimate,but if anything,it would probably be on the low-side.
Beyond that I would if I were you take it considerably less for granted that you have a precise understanding of just what Gary Komar is referring to here. My immediate interpretation from the wording he uses is that he is referring, possibly from Halder, an assesment of a similar nature as I quoted above from November (note the wording "combat capabilities"). In such a case, we are talking about a qualified judgment, not a strength figure.
Sorry, but here you seem to be illustrating Osterhase's point about mixing up Fehl and losses, because I have suggested no such thing - what I wrote was that 80% of the Fehl was in infantry units. This is not the same thing.OK,so if casualties on july 16th were of the order of 102,000 for the whole ostheer,then we now have to determine what % OF THESE CASUALTIES WERE INFANTRY MEN.Fortunately,Qvist has given us a very good guide in his latest post,and he seems to suggest 80%.So lets go with that number.
cheers
Qvist covered things quite well (thanks Qvist). As far as opinions regarding Gary Komar's article are concerned, only you Tim have issue with it. For the most part you dismissed the central thesis because of disagreements with trivial (yes trivial) details that do not detract from the main points. His thesis is a summation of work done by Glantz, Erickson, Fugate, Wray, etc. and strongly refutes Stolfi.
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timobrienwells
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Cover
Qvist may have attempted to cover things,but it is interesting to see that as usual you have nothing in the way of facts to offer.
[/quote]central thesis
Well Qvist has not read for start!..only you Tim have issue with it.
[/quote]central thesis
strongly refutes StolfiDont refer to concepts that you dont understand Osterhase.Komar does not put forward a 'central thesis',except in the title.If he had have put forward such a thesis,I would have gladly discussed it.
"trivial details" Funny how I seem to find a whole stack of them.And there are a whole lot more which for your benefit I will post.
Ha!! This is laughable!If he "strongly refutes" him,then why does he use one of Stolfi's own[speculative] calculations done on armour strength?
I said it before and I will say it again,if you consider that shipwreck of an article to be scholarship,then you have got problems!
tim wells
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timobrienwells
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Komar
The whole idea!What is absurd about it?
Isn't it?Well it sounds like you are making 'combat capability'mean anything you want it to mean."Combat capability" is not the same as strength.
OK,so lets go with your numbers on that!..it relates to Gefechtsstarken.
AOK18 report:
So,8% of Ist. would be around 1280 men for a normal division.[roughly]And according your guidelines,the Fehlshould be 80%in the infantry.So,that means about 1,000 men.With each divisions having around 9,000 men,that gives us a loss of 11%!..it's 11 divisions had lost the equivalent of almost 8% of it's Ist.
?????
What??How do you make 11% into 20%??Or will you be invoking some nebulous concepts like 'mobility',or 'fatigue' to bridge to required 9%?..which would actually work out to something very closeto 20%
But hold on a second,in your last post you said that "not all elements of the infantry units were included in GefSt." ???By that I can only assume that you mean the Pioneer battalion and the Aufsklarung abteilung.{Surely you are not talking about the regiments themselves}
OK,so lets look at the numbers for the regiments only
Roughly 7,700 per divisions,losses of 1,000 still only gives us 13%
"very close to 20%" ??? If this loss ratio from AOK18 is typical of other Ostheer infantry armies,then it debunks this idea about '80%' on July 16. "24 th PzK issued a report on 26July" What value does this have?Are we supposed to infer something from this in relation to infantry[cc] of July16 ?
1]it is 10 days after the date we are talking about.
2]This is one Guderian's Corps,which had led the way to Minsk,Bobruisk,Krichev etc.Attempting to infer that it's losses are also indicative of the losses in the infantry divisions is ludicrous.
However,in order to play ball,we can look at the numbers.If we stick to the same assumptions,then 3PzD would have lost about 41% of its infantry,4PzD about 22% and 10mot about 20%.For SS Reich about 19%.Now these numbers DO show losses around or greater than 20%.However that is for the 26th of july,not the 16th.Given that 24th Corps had to fend off Timoshenko's attacks of 20 divisions starting on 13July,it can be argued that the majority of it's losses were after this date.Therefore even the loss figures for an advance to contact unit like 24thCorps dont support Komar's assertion.[Why does a report from 24 th Corps include numbers for Das Reich which was part of 46th Corps???]
No,it depended on the division.10th Motor had 8.16th Motor had 8.20th Motor had 10!They had 2 infantry regiments if that is what you mean.But what about the Kradschutzen battalions,and the Pioneer Abteilung? I will hewever concede that infantry strength in the motors[about 8] was not quite the same as a normal I.D.[9]No,Mot.D. had 6 infantry batallions,not 9
Should I even bother to request for you demonstrate this 'unreliability'?It would also be equally fruitless for me to ask you to post this 'formula' you speak of.It is probably more on the veryunreliable side.The formula for calculating combat strengths were considerably more complex than this.
Say what??Von Weichs's 2nd army[9divisions]activated July 3rd,first action July 13th.OKH reserve,who had for the most partnot yet been committed yet in mid-July.
"The 121 divisions that took part........less than 2 million men......certainly not ......more than half of them were in infantry regiments."Attempting to spin the numbers does not change things much Qvist.If there were 1million infantry men then the GefSt. loss is 8% on 16th July.
Too many men for you?OK lets do 800,000!Loss is 10% Lets do 600,000.Loss is 13.3% We just cant seem to quite make it.And If I were you I would take it considerably less for granted that you even know what you are talking about!Try reading the article first,and then you can start pretending to be some sage of wisdom!Until such time,enough of your pretentiousness!Beyond that I would if I were you take it considerably less for granted that you have a precise understanding of just what Gary Komar is referring to here.
Am I reading this right?If losses were 102,000 odd by July 16th,and 80% of the Fehl is in the infantry units,then what FEHL does that reprsent for the infantry units according to you?...what I wrote was that 80% of the Fehl was in infantry units.
tim wells
It is quite clear what an assessment of combat capabilities imply. You have an example of it above.Isn't it?Well it sounds like you are making 'combat capability'mean anything you want it to mean.
Well, the overall strength of the infantry regiments is not the same as the Gefechtsstärke of the Infantry Regiments. The infantry GefSt (soll) of a 6-battalion division was 5,145 men. Fehl appears to have typically been in the 80% area in the infantry yes, but it is fully possible that it was even higher at this particular point. And of course, the overall strength includes such things as wounded expected to return within 4 weeks. So no, there is nothing very absurd about the assessment that the infantry had suffered a 20% drop in combat capabilities by mid-July.So,8% of Ist. would be around 1280 men for a normal division.[roughly]And according your guidelines,the Fehlshould be 80%in the infantry. So,that means about 1,000 men.With each divisions having around 9,000 men,that gives us a loss of 11%! Sad ?????
Geez, I don't know, I thought some people at least might be more interested in some actual data quoted directly from the documentation than in conjuring up loose estimates to use as ammunition against an article you've decided to dislike. You on the other hand seem mainly interested in finding reasons for ignoring them."24 th PzK issued a report on 26July" What value does this have?Are we supposed to infer something from this in relation to infantry[cc] of July16 ?
Yes, provided you are prepared to assume things are the way you need them to be. If not, you'd need some actual data to argue that.Given that 24th Corps had to fend off Timoshenko's attacks of 20 divisions starting on 13July,it can be argued that the majority of it's losses were after this date.
It doesn't - the Reich figure is from another report.Therefore even the loss figures for an advance to contact unit like 24thCorps dont support Komar's assertion.[Why does a report from 24 th Corps include numbers for Das Reich which was part of 46th Corps???]
When I say 6 infantry batallions, I mean 6 infantry batallions - which is what they had.No,it depended on the division.10th Motor had 8.16th Motor had 8.20th Motor had 10!They had 2 infantry regiments if that is what you mean.But what about the Kradschutzen battalions,and the Pioneer Abteilung? I will hewever concede that infantry strength in the motors[about 8] was not quite the same as a normal I.D.[9]
Yep - I'm not going to sit down and write that out just for your benefit. The unreliability resides in the fact that you have no sources for your estimate, and also you apparently don't understand the distinction between "infantry" and "infantry-like". Pioniere and Aufkl.Abt. were indeed used in an infantry role with a fair frequency, but that does not mean that they were considered a part of the infantry.Should I even bother to request for you demonstrate this 'unreliability'?It would also be equally fruitless for me to ask you to post this 'formula' you speak of.
I am not talking of AOK 2, I am talking about the OKH reserves. These encompassed 14 divisions who were already designated and present in the East, but who were gradually released during the summer. They also encompassed a further 12 divisions which arrived in Eastern Europe over the next months, and were, in some cases, committed as late as October.Say what??Von Weichs's 2nd army[9divisions]activated July 3rd,first action July 13th.
I have read the article.And If I were you I would take it considerably less for granted that you even know what you are talking about!Try reading the article first,and then you can start pretending to be some sage of wisdom!Until such time,enough of your pretentiousness! Evil or Very Mad
You still haven't understood this? You don't find Fehl by subtracting combat losses from Sollstärke.Quote:
...what I wrote was that 80% of the Fehl was in infantry units.
Am I reading this right?If losses were 102,000 odd by July 16th,and 80% of the Fehl is in the infantry units,then what FEHL does that reprsent for the infantry units according to you?
The combat losses stood at 92,120 on the 13th, and 130,189 on the 20th. Those are Heeresarzt figures, who are normally in the area 10-15% lower than the losses reported through the II a channel, probably because they are based only on soldiers getting treatment at medical installations. Also, they do not include non-combat losses, of whom there were more than enough to have an impact, and which removed men from the ranks just as much as combat losses did. In June, there were more non-combat than combat losses. Sollstärke is what Fehl is calculated on the basis of, but few divisions had their exact Soll at the start of Barbarossa. Some had more men than their establishment called for, many more had fewer. In other words, they already started the campaign with a certain Fehl. Then there is the nature of Iststärke. Soldiers who were expected to return from injury within 4 weeks were kept on strength, but not actually present. The same goes for men on leave, detached for courses and so on, although there were likely not very many of these in July 1941. On the other side, most divisions carried Feldersatzbtl., which might or might not have been drawn upon already at this point to fill vacancies in any given case. In short - 102,000 combat losses does not turn automatically into 102,000 Fehlstellen.
Interesting...
From Tim- BS 12] Komar-Army Group centre estimated that by AUG13 only 65% of the original 1780 machines would be able to advance on Moscow...<.....>Truth] This Idiotic Ignoramous has Quoted a calculation done by STOLFI in HPE,and here he is attempting to pass it off as a report by AGC!! [See HPE chapter 10]
Ignoramous???? LOL, wow Tim, there you are in a nut shell with that "right on target" assessment. READ CAREFULLY this quote from Stolfi used above and note specifically the citation at the end- OKH data for August show the Germans early in the month had approximately 85 percent of their tank strength available for combat and only 15 percent as total losses. The Germans still had most of the tanks with which they had begun the campaign, but a significant fraction of these could not advance because of needed repairs. Preparing for an advance as important as that on Moscow, the Germans would make a strong effort to effect those repairs and in Army Group Center would have had approximately 65 percent of their original strength in tanks available to advance on 13 August 1941 and some 20 percent in the work shops{21}
So Komar used a quote from HPE that was cited from ANOTHER source, NOT Stolfi. Can you identify where the rest of his information came from? I recognize most of his quotes and know where (author, article, book) they came from, therefore I trust what he has written because I can or have checked the source. The fact that you don't agree with it and WONDER where he got his information is indicative of how much (or little) research you have actually done. You compare his information with memoirs and say he is wrong. Well, simply put, memoirs are not fact but recollections that contain bias and usually an agenda.
Komar's article is well written, but he definately gets an "F" for citations.
From Tim- BS 12] Komar-Army Group centre estimated that by AUG13 only 65% of the original 1780 machines would be able to advance on Moscow...<.....>Truth] This Idiotic Ignoramous has Quoted a calculation done by STOLFI in HPE,and here he is attempting to pass it off as a report by AGC!! [See HPE chapter 10]
Ignoramous???? LOL, wow Tim, there you are in a nut shell with that "right on target" assessment. READ CAREFULLY this quote from Stolfi used above and note specifically the citation at the end- OKH data for August show the Germans early in the month had approximately 85 percent of their tank strength available for combat and only 15 percent as total losses. The Germans still had most of the tanks with which they had begun the campaign, but a significant fraction of these could not advance because of needed repairs. Preparing for an advance as important as that on Moscow, the Germans would make a strong effort to effect those repairs and in Army Group Center would have had approximately 65 percent of their original strength in tanks available to advance on 13 August 1941 and some 20 percent in the work shops{21}
So Komar used a quote from HPE that was cited from ANOTHER source, NOT Stolfi. Can you identify where the rest of his information came from? I recognize most of his quotes and know where (author, article, book) they came from, therefore I trust what he has written because I can or have checked the source. The fact that you don't agree with it and WONDER where he got his information is indicative of how much (or little) research you have actually done. You compare his information with memoirs and say he is wrong. Well, simply put, memoirs are not fact but recollections that contain bias and usually an agenda.
Komar's article is well written, but he definately gets an "F" for citations.
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timobrienwells
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Komar
Osterhase,I really don't know where to begin to explain to you how utterly confused you are about this!This is getting really annoying.Now sit down and read this carefully.<<<Everything that Komar has in that quote is DIRECTLY OUT OF HPE bySTOLFI!!!It is all stolfi information,AND IT IS NOT data fromOKH! Don't you realize that?Let's go through it.
"By early August, the Germans had about 85% their total June tank strength,and a "significant fraction" needed repairs."
This is straight out of Stolfi's HPE!!It is NOT from an OKH report!!The "data" that Stolfi is using for his 'calculation' is the servicable tank numbers submitted by PG2 and PG3 on August 4th.PG2[Guderian] had 50% andPG3[Hoth]had 60%.Stolfi then uses this data to obtain a possible number of servicable vehicles for August 13th.But Komar has then quoted this 'calculation' of Stolfi's as some kind of "fact".Do you understand what he has done or don't you?
"Army Group Centre estimated that by August 13,only 65% of the original 1780 machines would be able to advance on Moscow."
DIRECTLY out of Stolfi's HPE!! Army group centre NEVER did any such estimation.STOLFI DID IT!! Komar is quoting Stolfi's calculation as if it was an AGC report!NO CITATION!! THIS is LUDICROUS!!
"August 13"<<Stolfi chose aug 13 as a possible start date.Komar has just followed him.WHAT A MORON!!
"Guderian and Hoth believed the figure was closer to 55%"
DIRECTLY out of Stolfi's HPE!! It is also another one of STOLFI'S CALCULATIONS!!Guderian and Hoth did not believe any such thing.Their report [august4th]was 50% for PG2 and 60% for PG3.Stolfi came up with 55%,and once again Komar is quoting him directly and trrying to pass it off as "fact".NO CITATION!!
Now to the citation you have spoken of.IE {21} Have you read the citation?What does it refer to?It does not talk about 85% of tanks,or 65% on aug 13,or anything like that.It talks ONLY about the combat strength of 18 PzD of 47th Panzer Corps on 10th September.
"By early August, the Germans had about 85% their total June tank strength,and a "significant fraction" needed repairs."
This is straight out of Stolfi's HPE!!It is NOT from an OKH report!!The "data" that Stolfi is using for his 'calculation' is the servicable tank numbers submitted by PG2 and PG3 on August 4th.PG2[Guderian] had 50% andPG3[Hoth]had 60%.Stolfi then uses this data to obtain a possible number of servicable vehicles for August 13th.But Komar has then quoted this 'calculation' of Stolfi's as some kind of "fact".Do you understand what he has done or don't you?
"Army Group Centre estimated that by August 13,only 65% of the original 1780 machines would be able to advance on Moscow."
DIRECTLY out of Stolfi's HPE!! Army group centre NEVER did any such estimation.STOLFI DID IT!! Komar is quoting Stolfi's calculation as if it was an AGC report!NO CITATION!! THIS is LUDICROUS!!
"August 13"<<Stolfi chose aug 13 as a possible start date.Komar has just followed him.WHAT A MORON!!
"Guderian and Hoth believed the figure was closer to 55%"
DIRECTLY out of Stolfi's HPE!! It is also another one of STOLFI'S CALCULATIONS!!Guderian and Hoth did not believe any such thing.Their report [august4th]was 50% for PG2 and 60% for PG3.Stolfi came up with 55%,and once again Komar is quoting him directly and trrying to pass it off as "fact".NO CITATION!!
Now to the citation you have spoken of.IE {21} Have you read the citation?What does it refer to?It does not talk about 85% of tanks,or 65% on aug 13,or anything like that.It talks ONLY about the combat strength of 18 PzD of 47th Panzer Corps on 10th September.
COMPARE the 3 sentences from Komar with citation 21,and discover for yourself that they have absolutely nothing to do with each other.KOMAR IS QUOTING STOLFI!!So Komar used a quote from HPE that was cited from another source,NOT Stolfi.
Well yes I can.While most of it is uninformed crap,a large chunk of it comes from Guderian's Panzer Leader and from Stolfi.I can also see a bit of Fugate stuff.Can you identify where the rest of his information came from?
tim wells
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timobrienwells
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Komar
Just a few more little gems from Gary Komar's article.
"Reluctantly he[Guderian] moved half the distance to Krichev on August 9th." Funny that Guderian should move to Krichev on August 9,when Krichev had already been taken by 4th Panzer on July 17th!!The attack of 24 th Corps on aug 9 was towards Rodnia.
"On August 19,......a panzer corps was near the end of it's fuel supply.Luftwaffe transport,loaded with fuel and oil,arrived on August 21 just in time to avert another crisis." This one is a classic!There is no record of any such event happening to 24thCorps in august.When and where did this event take place.It happened at Orel on OCTOBER 5th during Typhoon!!Not a big mistake though.It is only 8 weeks AND 100 miles away from the situation of August 19!!
"..to Gomel where,after bitter house to house fighting,the enemy surrendered on August 20." The red army started withdrawing from Gomel on the 17,and 2nd army took the city on August 19th[!] without a fight.
"citing economic reasons and flank threats,he[Hitler]issueda directive on august 21 ordering Guderian and part of 2nd army to help Army Group South destroy the Soviet Fifth Army."The order from OKH was issued on August 23.
"after the surrender of Kiev and the capture of over half a million Soviet troops...." Try 665,000 you dropkick!
More to follow.
"Reluctantly he[Guderian] moved half the distance to Krichev on August 9th." Funny that Guderian should move to Krichev on August 9,when Krichev had already been taken by 4th Panzer on July 17th!!The attack of 24 th Corps on aug 9 was towards Rodnia.
"On August 19,......a panzer corps was near the end of it's fuel supply.Luftwaffe transport,loaded with fuel and oil,arrived on August 21 just in time to avert another crisis." This one is a classic!There is no record of any such event happening to 24thCorps in august.When and where did this event take place.It happened at Orel on OCTOBER 5th during Typhoon!!Not a big mistake though.It is only 8 weeks AND 100 miles away from the situation of August 19!!
"..to Gomel where,after bitter house to house fighting,the enemy surrendered on August 20." The red army started withdrawing from Gomel on the 17,and 2nd army took the city on August 19th[!] without a fight.
"citing economic reasons and flank threats,he[Hitler]issueda directive on august 21 ordering Guderian and part of 2nd army to help Army Group South destroy the Soviet Fifth Army."The order from OKH was issued on August 23.
"after the surrender of Kiev and the capture of over half a million Soviet troops...." Try 665,000 you dropkick!
More to follow.
tim wells
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timobrienwells
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All that
Qvist,in reply to your post of march 30.
3rd Pzd- 25%
4th Pzd- 14%
10th MID-14%
Das Reich-13.6%
[I have used 5,500 infantry for a Pzd and 7,500 infantry for the Mot.I D]
So as such only one of the four supports Komar's claim.
Yes that is right,and for a 9 battalion division about 7,700 odd as I said.The infantry Gefst of a 6 battalion was 5,145 men.
So once again,if losses on July 16 were 102,000,then out of a total Ostheer infantry strength of around 800,000 on June 22[with 80% Fehl in the infantry],we get a 10% loss in KIA,WIA,and MIA.But ifFehl appears to have typically been in the 80% area in the infantry yes,but it is fully possible that it was even higher..
,then to achieve Komar's 20%.....we need to say that there were ANOTHER 10%[80,000 men]wounded,and receiving treatment OUTSIDE of the Heeresarzt!That is an awful of bruised elbows and allergy conditions.overall strength includes such things as wounded expected to return within 4 weeks.
I have no problem with the data,but if you are then going to use that data to support an assertion,then your figures have to stand the test of scrutiny.The data for losses of 24 th Pkz are NOT representative of the losses for the rest of the Ostheer on almost any date you would care to name.Therefore they dont support Komar's claim.Geez,I dont know,I thought some people at least...........
Oops,direct hit! You are absolutely right.I withdraw that assertion.However the point was about what kind of casualties the divisions of 24 Pkz had suffered by July 16.If you take a relatively consistent loss pattern from June 22 to July 16,then using your figures,the gross loss figure have to be adjusted DOWN by 40% due to the 10 extra days to July 26.If that is so,then the loss percentages for the divisions are as follows.Yes provided you are prepared to assume things are the way you need them to be.If not,you'd need some actual data to argue that.
3rd Pzd- 25%
4th Pzd- 14%
10th MID-14%
Das Reich-13.6%
[I have used 5,500 infantry for a Pzd and 7,500 infantry for the Mot.I D]
So as such only one of the four supports Komar's claim.
tim wells