Message forum of the Feldgrau.com research community
Well that 'information'may or may not be from Halder's diary,but the quote is not.Which book did you get it from?It would be from one of the revisionists like Clark or Fugate or Glantz."On 24th August,for example,Halder estimated that the combat strength of the German infantry divisions averaged 60% of full capacity and the Panzer divisions only 50%."
By that do you mean he uses good english and accurate punctuation?I am afraid that that is all you can mean,because it is so full of errors of fact that it painful to read.'poorly cited'??You mean not cited at all don't you?As far as Gary Komar's article is concerned,it's well written and poorly cited...
Not indicative??Are you serious?Saying that Kluge met with Guderian on July1st when they actually met on july3rd is not 'sloppy research'?Falsely claiming that Guderian asked to be relieved[twice],is not because of a variation between sources,it is a simply a BASELESS fabrication!It did not happen.If there is a discrepancy between his dates and your dates,I think its safe to say its because of a genuine variation between sources and is not indicative of sloppy research
Absolute BS!This change was made BEFORE the campaign even began and it was only for the purpose of speeding the assault on Brest-Litovsk.Gary goes on to sayTo further the illusion of panzer restraint,Halder sudordinated the panzer group to 4th Army's commander...
Rubbish!It was Guderian who SUGGESTED these changes.Guderian objected to serving under an officer[Kluge]....
I wonder where the germans got all those millions of prisoners from then?Behind the panzers,surrounded soviet troops refused to surrender
This did not happen.It was the other way round.[Panzer Leader page 193]Guderian continually pleaded for assistance from German Second Army
So you have said,but I would still like to know which book you got it out of.It is not Clark,so it's got to be either Glantz or Fugate.What is the citation in regard to Halder's diary?The information regarding strength and dates is Halder's
Are you suggesting that the numbers for AUGUST 24th[if they are correct]proveKomar's claim?If that is what you consider to be a correction,then again I would question what your idea of 'evidence' is.veneered over being corrected on a point....
This is the whole point Osterhase!You have not demonstrated that Komar's claim about mid-july combat capability is sustainable.I say that he is wrong,and I have data from July 16th[and November 6th] that strongly suggests that he is wrong.You think data from August 24th 'proves'Komar's point.Well I invite you;please logically explain how this data makes Komar's claim sustainable.concede when you are clearly wrong
Yes.The whole logistical argument against Taifun in august 1941 is based on wrong assumptions about levels of supplies supposedly needed to sustain an offensive. There is no level of supply you would miniminally need to sustain an offensive. There are only average consumption levels according to different types of combat and not being able to deliver these amounts would only mean having to consume less and/or supply reserves diminishing. It would not automatically prevent an offensive of being successfull.timobrienwells wrote:Hi Osterhase, in reply to your post.OK,I have looked again at chapter 11 again,and unless you can show exactly which facts you are unhappy with,I will continue to question your dismissal of it.You have talked about the use of captured motor transport.Yes they used a lot of it,but to suggest that it broke down because of a lack of spares is just another broad brush stroke.If they germans used french trucks captured in the west,then they also would have used captured spare parts.Plus French industry did not stop producing after the battle of France,so germany would have been able to procure spares from both occupied and Vichy france.The idea that foreign transport,be it french,czech or whatever, broke down and was left on the side of the road because of a lack of fan belts or spark plugs is rediculous.Moreover,that assertion needs to be backed up with either hard or atleast anecdotal data.I am of course not saying that there was not attrition,there was,but how much?Halder in his diary on Nov 30th,stated that motor transport was reduced to 50%.Now that was 4 months AFTER the period of time we are discussing[ie early august],and this was at the height of the transportation crisis caused by the rasputitsa.I have not seen anything which points to a large scale logistics problem due to defiencies in motor transport for AGC in August. <...>As for the railways,well the numbers you give are accurate,but the conclusions you draw from them are simply wrong. The number of trains arriving at AGC was increasing:24 on aug 4th,26 on aug 5th,27 on aug 15th.But the real question is how much supply was needed??You assertion that AGC needed 24 trains[10,000 tons]daily JUST to survive is clearly wrong. TWO facts demonstrate this.<..>1]On july 15th,the quatermaster of AGC gave a report on the supply status.In the report he stated that AGC had the logistical capacity to support an amoured drive to Moscow of 4 panzer divisions,3 motorised divisions,and 10 infantry divisions WHILE mantaining the rest of AGC at Smolensk.This was when the railhead at minsk was recieving only 14 trains[6300 tons] daily.Therefore if by the middle of august AGC was recieving an average of 24 trians per day[Halder Diaries page 26,27]which equates to 10,000 tons daily,then AGC did have the logistical capacity to move the entire army to Moscow.2]The second fact is a comparitive analysis of the requirements for 6th army during stalingrad.Paulus had his quatermaster prepare a report on the requirements of 6th army for both replenishment,and for restoration of offensive capacity.This was to give the Luftwaffe an idea of the size of the airlift needed.The tonnage required according to the report was 750 tons per day.6th army at this time was a force of around 280,000 odd men.So lets say we add a third to 6th army requirements and round it out at 1,000 tons per day.Now AGC in Aug 41 was about 1.15 million strong[approx],so roughly 4 times the strenght of 6th army.It stands to reason then that AGC would therefore need say 4 times the tonnage;ie 4,000 tons daily.However lets add another 25% for stockpiling,and so we arrive at 5,000 daily.If my assumptions in this analysis are correct,then it tends to strongly suggest that AGC had the logistics situation well in hand.Even for the low point of 18th Aug of 18 trains,it still equates to 9,000 tons delivered. In any case,Guderian informed Bock that he would be ready to resume the offensive towards Moscow on aug 15[Panzer Leader],and Hoth gave his ready date as aug 20th.[Hoth would have ready earlier had it not been for Hitler sending a panzer corps north on a wild goose chase]No commander will say he is ready to attack without adequate logistical support,and so it can be inferred that both PG2 and PG3 were combat ready. So if you have done a more accurate analysis of AGC's logistical situation of aug 41 then please present your data.<........> The super-imposed map of France on russia is simply meant to compare distances travelled,and to suggest that spatially atleast the two campaigns had parallels.The reality of the matter is the germans went far further AND far faster in barbarossa than they ever did in France!!So given the primitive roads you talk about,it actually validates the his contention about the offensive power of the wehrmacht.
No minimal level? Lets start at zero supply at all as an extreme case to highlight the point; keep moving forward from zero supplies at all until you reach a point where you can actually conduct an operation with even a slighlty reasonable chance of success, now you have your minimum requirement. There is doctrinal guidance as to minimum requirements and ultimately it's the commander's call based on his judgement (which is obviously completely dependant on WHAT HE ACTUALLY KNOWS). In the case of the August timeframe and also Taifun we KNOW FOR A FACT that German assumptions were wrong and therefore invalid for use as anything other than a footnote.julian wrote:Yes.The whole logistical argument against Taifun in august 1941 is based on wrong assumptions about levels of supplies supposedly needed to sustain an offensive. There is no level of supply you would miniminally need to sustain an offensive. There are only average consumption levels according to different types of combat and not being able to deliver these amounts would only mean having to consume less and/or supply reserves diminishing. It would not automatically prevent an offensive of being successfull..timobrienwells wrote:Hi Osterhase,
Agreed, they had sufficient assets to -start- an offensive. This says nothing about a successful offensive which is the point of Stolfi's catastrophically flawed chap 11. A September 1 offensive was not sustainable to the point of capturing Moscow.The supplies levels present at PGR 3 and 2 in august were certainly sufficient to start an offensive. Actually, PGR 3 was much better off than PGR 2, and still the latter succeeded in executing a successfull offensive to the south in spite of supply problems.
So the same PGR 2 could certainly have attacked east with a better supply road behind it. It is therefore easy to understand that PGR 3 and PGR 2 considered themselves ready for an offensive to the east
The issue is that there are only average levels of ammo usage according to the type of operation, based on previous experience.Osterhase wrote:
No minimal level? Lets start at zero supply at all as an extreme case to highlight the point; keep moving forward from zero supplies at all until you reach a point where you can actually conduct an operation with even a slighlty reasonable chance of success, now you have your minimum requirement. There is doctrinal guidance as to minimum requirements and ultimately it's the commander's call based on his judgement (which is obviously completely dependant on WHAT HE ACTUALLY KNOWS). In the case of the August timeframe and also Taifun we KNOW FOR A FACT that German assumptions were wrong and therefore invalid for use as anything other than a footnote.
The Soviets had assumptions that were proven invalid as well, should we take them at face value also in the way you as using German assumptions?
The logistical issues faced by PGR 2 in its advance south are a perfect illustration of the fact that sometimes suffering ammo and fuel shortages do not prevent success. And it would have been better off logistically attacking east.Osterhase wrote:
Agreed, they had sufficient assets to -start- an offensive. This says nothing about a successful offensive which is the point of Stolfi's catastrophically flawed chap 11. A September 1 offensive was not sustainable to the point of capturing Moscow.
That does not invalidate the definition of minimum requirement, which is subjective and completely dependant upon the current tactical and operational situation.julian wrote: The issue is that there are only average levels of ammo usage according to the type of operation, based on previous experience.
These are not minimum levels and can be more a reflection of what was available than what was supposedly objectively necessary .
Logistics goes far beyond ammunition consumption obviously. So in the pursuit phase what happens to fuel consumption, POL, food/water, casualty extraction/personnel replacement, equipment replacement/maintenance, etc???During offensive operations the highest usage will be in the breakthrough phase. In the pursuit phase ammo usage is much lower.
.The attacker has the advantage of pausing an operation if that is necessary for logistical reasons. As a defender, the opponent will not do you the courtesy of pausing while you refill your ammo dumps
.There is actually not a massive difference between ammo usage in high intensity attack and defense operations.
Thinking that one is automatically better off by staying on the defensive is therefore wrong
Wagner's report does not account for tranportation issues effecting how much ammunition was available to the actual weapons in the heat of the moment, does it? Ammunition next to the gun is useful, not so much if it is in the Corps depot 30 miles to the rear but still showing in Wagner's report as 'delivered'.And it is a matter of fact that the german high command had overestimated ammo usage during Barbarossa(report by general Wagner of 24.03.1942).
Fuel, lack of adequate transport capacity, spare parts, maintenance assets, etc.There were no prohibitive logistical issues which made it absolutely impossible to achieve success at the end of august 1941
.Given what was actually achieved in october, it is perfectly possible that Moscow would have been taken if an attack was made a month earlier