Hitler's Moscow order

German campaigns and battles 1919-1945.

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Post by Osterhase » Fri May 25, 2007 6:56 am

"By mid-July, the combat capability of the German infantry was 80% of its June 22 strength"

"On 24 August, for example, Halder estimated that the combat strength of the German infantry divisions averaged 60 percent of full capacity and the panzer divisions only 50 percent."

This information is not Komar's or Wray's, it's Halder's and is taken directly from his diary.

:? Combat capability refers to a unit's ability to conduct combat operations (and is usually calculated by and for staff planning). If a unit is below a given supply level-it is taken from the order of battle. If a unit suffers catastrophic losses-it is taken from the order of battle (at any level from squad to corps). So a simple accounting for losses will never equate equally to combat capability.
Units that are attritted of personnel, equipment, vehicles and have a fraction of their necessary supply will be given a combat capability based on those criteria (and a few others).

As far as Gary Komar's article is concerned, it's well written and poorly cited (no other way to put it). If there is a discrepency between his dates and your dates, I think its safe to say its because of a genuine variation between sources and is not indicative of sloppy research.

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Halder's Diary

Post by timobrienwells » Sun May 27, 2007 11:07 am

Hi Osterhase.In reply to your post.
"On 24th August,for example,Halder estimated that the combat strength of the German infantry divisions averaged 60% of full capacity and the Panzer divisions only 50%."
Well that 'information'may or may not be from Halder's diary,but the quote is not.Which book did you get it from?It would be from one of the revisionists like Clark or Fugate or Glantz.

I strongly doubt the authenticity of these numbers.The data that Qvist provided from OrgAbt/OKH for November 6th shows that infantry combat was 65% at that date[Nov 6th],and 50% for the panzer divisions[including 2nd and 5th reserve divisions].
Added to that,aug 24th is 5 and a half weeks AFTER the 'mid-july' that Komar talks about,so it is hard to see how this adds any weight to his assertion.Bear in mind that Komar claims that it was 80% of their JUNE 22 strength by mid July.He is therefore saying that the combat capability of ALL the Ostheer infantry divisions was reduced by 20% by mid-July.
As far as Gary Komar's article is concerned,it's well written and poorly cited...
By that do you mean he uses good english and accurate punctuation?I am afraid that that is all you can mean,because it is so full of errors of fact that it painful to read.'poorly cited'??You mean not cited at all don't you?
If there is a discrepancy between his dates and your dates,I think its safe to say its because of a genuine variation between sources and is not indicative of sloppy research
Not indicative??Are you serious?Saying that Kluge met with Guderian on July1st when they actually met on july3rd is not 'sloppy research'?Falsely claiming that Guderian asked to be relieved[twice],is not because of a variation between sources,it is a simply a BASELESS fabrication!It did not happen.

Here are a few more gems from Gary's scholarly article.

To further the illusion of panzer restraint,Halder sudordinated the panzer group to 4th Army's commander...
Absolute BS!This change was made BEFORE the campaign even began and it was only for the purpose of speeding the assault on Brest-Litovsk.Gary goes on to say
Guderian objected to serving under an officer[Kluge]....
Rubbish!It was Guderian who SUGGESTED these changes.
Behind the panzers,surrounded soviet troops refused to surrender
I wonder where the germans got all those millions of prisoners from then?
Guderian continually pleaded for assistance from German Second Army
This did not happen.It was the other way round.[Panzer Leader page 193]
Regards Tim Wells
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Post by Osterhase » Mon May 28, 2007 4:36 pm

I strongly recommend you read Bock's diary and compare it to Guderian's before speaking in absolutes as to who said what, when, etc.
The information regarding strength and dates is Halder's. Since when are Glantz and co. revisionists? If they were, who in your opinion is the authority??? :shock:

Now again you have veneered over being corrected on a point after a diatribe to prove your position. Do you ever concede when your clearly wrong? (combat capability)

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Tagesbuch notizen

Post by timobrienwells » Tue May 29, 2007 12:22 am

So does Bock's diary shed any light on this subject?If,as you seem to suggest,it does then please give us the benefit by posting the info.Or is it that Bock's diary tells a different story to Guderian?If so,then lets us compare notes.You start with Bock and I can reply with Guderian,and if there is a discrepancy,then we can go to other sources to clarify.Go ahead,it's your serve.
The information regarding strength and dates is Halder's
So you have said,but I would still like to know which book you got it out of.It is not Clark,so it's got to be either Glantz or Fugate.What is the citation in regard to Halder's diary?

Who is the authority? Stolfi of course!

veneered over being corrected on a point....
Are you suggesting that the numbers for AUGUST 24th[if they are correct]proveKomar's claim?If that is what you consider to be a correction,then again I would question what your idea of 'evidence' is.
concede when you are clearly wrong
This is the whole point Osterhase!You have not demonstrated that Komar's claim about mid-july combat capability is sustainable.I say that he is wrong,and I have data from July 16th[and November 6th] that strongly suggests that he is wrong.You think data from August 24th 'proves'Komar's point.Well I invite you;please logically explain how this data makes Komar's claim sustainable.
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Post by Osterhase » Fri Jun 01, 2007 11:34 am

"For example, by July 19 Army Group South’s motor park stood at only 50% serviceable vehicles after only 27 days of the campaign -23. “After one month of fighting, the effective strength of the German infantry divisions had been reduced by approximately 20 percent and that of the panzer and motorized infantry divisions by 50 percent” -24. "

23 - Schuler Klaus A. 1987. Logistik im Russlandfeldzug. Pg 313-314

24 - Department of the Army, Washington D.C. Center of Military History United States Army. 1983 reprint. DA PAM 20-261a The German Campaign in Russia-Planning and Operations (1940-1942). Pg 51

Please understand that "effective strength" and "combat capability" are as directly related to logistics as they are casualties.

The thesis of Komar's article remains rock solid and is proved so by the facts presented in the underlying information (identified on your own time), regardless of errors that pertain to detail irrelevant to the overall picture. Your obsessing on distinctions of minor consequence (dates off by a day or two, who said what in their memoir...)that do not detract from the main point of the article.

"This is the whole point Osterhase!You have not demonstrated that Komar's claim about mid-july combat capability is sustainable (I have done so in clear and in no uncertain terms) .I say that he is wrong,and I have data from July 16th[and November 6th] that strongly suggests that he is wrong"

Based on casualties alone??? Can you make the distinction finally? So far, "Komar's claim" is unsustainable because YOU don't understand the term he used (read thread for evidence and subsequent definition).

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Komar

Post by timobrienwells » Sun Jun 03, 2007 3:53 am

Well I dont accept one piece of information from a US army pamphlet in any case.I can't find this pamphlet anywhere[not even on the Dept of Army website],and what source information is it based on?This so-called asessment of effective combat strength must have come from somewhere.So what is the source information?If you cant find that then, then how is anyone to take this pamphlet as accurate?As for Schuler,well again this is not relevant to the infantry situation,but if you like you can send me the exact german sentence of this quote,and if it is correct,then we can look at it's implications.
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Komar

Post by timobrienwells » Sun Jun 03, 2007 9:05 am

These 2 quotes 23 and 24 ....WHERE did you get them from????I KNOW that they are NOT yours[the italics]-so where did they come from?Which site?which article?Are you plagiarizing again?Just like so many times before you will not confirm where you get all this wrong information from.

You keep on talking about Komar's "thesis".He does not HAVE a thesis!!ALL he has is a load of dis-connected rubbish that is trying to prove some pre-conceived idea.He does not analyse AGC's combat power in any comprehensive way,neither does he make a fact based statement about AGC logistics,nor does he give a SOUND,FACTUAL reason why AGC could not advance on Moscow in Mid-August 1941.

You seem to ignore the 30 or so factual errors I have found in his article.And the more I look the more I find!
Finally,why is it that you refuse to verify the sources of your highly dubious 'information'?
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Komar

Post by timobrienwells » Sun Jun 03, 2007 10:23 am

Just a couple more gems from Gary.

"Halder asked Hitler on july 13 to delay a direct advance on Moscow..."

Absolute BS again!! Halder was to report to Hitler on July 13,and it was Hitlers INSTRUCTION to delay the advance eastwards.

"Guderian.....agreed to move on Roslavl,some 60 miles southeast of Smolensk,only if supplies arrived to allow the refitting and repair of his tanks."

Once again,complete BS!!Guderian was the one who PROPOSED the attack on Roslavl,and he did not put any conditions on it whatsoever.Gary is simply inventing history.

"Only 263 of the original 953 tanks in Second Panzer Group remained in battle worthy condition."
Complete crap again!
Given that Gary is talking about the battle of Roslavl,which started on August 1st,and servicable numbers for PG2 were 50% on August 4th[!!],this just shows what a historical charlatan Komar is.
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Post by Osterhase » Sun Jun 03, 2007 8:15 pm

"Well I dont accept one piece of information from a US army pamphlet in any case."

Well, I really don't care. A "pamphlet" is merely a US Army term for what anyone else would call a book. This one has 187 pages and numerous campaign maps.

"I can't find this pamphlet anywhere[not even on the Dept of Army website],and what source information is it based on?"

http://www.abebooks.com/servlet/BookDet ... D0%26x%3D0

It was written during the height of the Cold War for military professionals (implies little bias and is devoid of motivation to sell books).
Buy it, read it, and check the bibliography(appendix C-pg 187 explains) for original source material and let us know if its acceptable for you.

"You keep on talking about Komar's "thesis".He does not HAVE a thesis!!"
(Well Tim, apparently he does).

-A thesis statement is an assertion, not a statement of fact or an observation.-

Komar's thesis-
"Since 1945 proponents of the single thrust on Moscow have focused on best-case scenarios, or on isolated components, rather than "...justify a cautious and disappointing reality." The elements of this reality go far beyond military operations, and mitigate the probability that the German army could have won the war in 1941."

"These 2 quotes 23 and 24 ....WHERE did you get them from????I KNOW that they are NOT yours[the italics]-so where did they come from?Which site?which article?Are you plagiarizing again"?

Where did I get them? They're cited RIGHT BELOW :shock:
Plagiarizing again? Never happened a first time, I guess you don't like inconvenient truth.

As far as Combat capability, etc. is concerned, the definition isn't in DA Pam 20-261a. It's a very basic and well known measure of a given unit's ability to perform its mission, nothing more.

Do not ask me for quotes, sources, etc. beyond what is already here. I have provided a wealth of info (as did Jason and Qvist) other than Komar's article. I am not taking my spare time to look up anything specifically for you. The sources I have quoted and used are listed in these last several pages. If you wish to check ANYTHING, do what I have done and buy the damn book(s).

"-That is just typical.You can't verify where you got your information from,and you won't.-"

I did verify it VERY CLEARLY, re-read what I wrote above very carefully..... You are not worthy of my personal time, look it up yourself on your time if you question my accuracy. If you want to discuss a source I have used, then you had better possess it yourself in order to do this. Clearly you feel that others are obligated to convince you of the authenticity of their source material if you disagree with it. Myself and several others here are completely fed up with this juvenile apporoach to research and are done with it. It is so simple... If you question a source, then get a copy of it and CHECK IT FOR YOURSELF, DO NOT ASK SOMEONE ELSE TO DO IT FOR YOU (see this and other forums for examples of this type of unwritten "nettiquette").



Final post (amended)
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Komar

Post by timobrienwells » Mon Jun 04, 2007 12:57 am

That is just typical.You can't verify where you got your information from,and you won't.
You don't have the Pamphlet because you got the quotes from somewhere else.You won't verify schuler either.I would be happy to concede a point if the facts are straight,but every time I ask,you just can't produce the goods.
Why is it that I can verify MY information and you can't??
You were the one who mentioned Bock's diary,as if you knew what it said on this subject.When I ask what it says,you never mention it again.The same is for your 2 quotes this time.Why don't you just admit the truth,that you got them from somewhere else?

Komar's Thesis. "justify a cautious and disappopinting reality"
If this is Komar's thesis then why does he use a quote directly out of Allan Clark? A thesis is supposed to sum up his argument in one paragraph-he neither does this here or anywhere else.
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Re: Logistics

Post by julian » Fri Jun 28, 2013 5:03 am

timobrienwells wrote:Hi Osterhase, in reply to your post.OK,I have looked again at chapter 11 again,and unless you can show exactly which facts you are unhappy with,I will continue to question your dismissal of it.You have talked about the use of captured motor transport.Yes they used a lot of it,but to suggest that it broke down because of a lack of spares is just another broad brush stroke.If they germans used french trucks captured in the west,then they also would have used captured spare parts.Plus French industry did not stop producing after the battle of France,so germany would have been able to procure spares from both occupied and Vichy france.The idea that foreign transport,be it french,czech or whatever, broke down and was left on the side of the road because of a lack of fan belts or spark plugs is rediculous.Moreover,that assertion needs to be backed up with either hard or atleast anecdotal data.I am of course not saying that there was not attrition,there was,but how much?Halder in his diary on Nov 30th,stated that motor transport was reduced to 50%.Now that was 4 months AFTER the period of time we are discussing[ie early august],and this was at the height of the transportation crisis caused by the rasputitsa.I have not seen anything which points to a large scale logistics problem due to defiencies in motor transport for AGC in August. <...>As for the railways,well the numbers you give are accurate,but the conclusions you draw from them are simply wrong. The number of trains arriving at AGC was increasing:24 on aug 4th,26 on aug 5th,27 on aug 15th.But the real question is how much supply was needed??You assertion that AGC needed 24 trains[10,000 tons]daily JUST to survive is clearly wrong. TWO facts demonstrate this.<..>1]On july 15th,the quatermaster of AGC gave a report on the supply status.In the report he stated that AGC had the logistical capacity to support an amoured drive to Moscow of 4 panzer divisions,3 motorised divisions,and 10 infantry divisions WHILE mantaining the rest of AGC at Smolensk.This was when the railhead at minsk was recieving only 14 trains[6300 tons] daily.Therefore if by the middle of august AGC was recieving an average of 24 trians per day[Halder Diaries page 26,27]which equates to 10,000 tons daily,then AGC did have the logistical capacity to move the entire army to Moscow.2]The second fact is a comparitive analysis of the requirements for 6th army during stalingrad.Paulus had his quatermaster prepare a report on the requirements of 6th army for both replenishment,and for restoration of offensive capacity.This was to give the Luftwaffe an idea of the size of the airlift needed.The tonnage required according to the report was 750 tons per day.6th army at this time was a force of around 280,000 odd men.So lets say we add a third to 6th army requirements and round it out at 1,000 tons per day.Now AGC in Aug 41 was about 1.15 million strong[approx],so roughly 4 times the strenght of 6th army.It stands to reason then that AGC would therefore need say 4 times the tonnage;ie 4,000 tons daily.However lets add another 25% for stockpiling,and so we arrive at 5,000 daily.If my assumptions in this analysis are correct,then it tends to strongly suggest that AGC had the logistics situation well in hand.Even for the low point of 18th Aug of 18 trains,it still equates to 9,000 tons delivered. In any case,Guderian informed Bock that he would be ready to resume the offensive towards Moscow on aug 15[Panzer Leader],and Hoth gave his ready date as aug 20th.[Hoth would have ready earlier had it not been for Hitler sending a panzer corps north on a wild goose chase]No commander will say he is ready to attack without adequate logistical support,and so it can be inferred that both PG2 and PG3 were combat ready. So if you have done a more accurate analysis of AGC's logistical situation of aug 41 then please present your data.<........> The super-imposed map of France on russia is simply meant to compare distances travelled,and to suggest that spatially atleast the two campaigns had parallels.The reality of the matter is the germans went far further AND far faster in barbarossa than they ever did in France!!So given the primitive roads you talk about,it actually validates the his contention about the offensive power of the wehrmacht.
Yes.The whole logistical argument against Taifun in august 1941 is based on wrong assumptions about levels of supplies supposedly needed to sustain an offensive. There is no level of supply you would miniminally need to sustain an offensive. There are only average consumption levels according to different types of combat and not being able to deliver these amounts would only mean having to consume less and/or supply reserves diminishing. It would not automatically prevent an offensive of being successfull.
The supplies levels present at PGR 3 and 2 in august were certainly sufficient to start an offensive. Actually, PGR 3 was much better off than PGR 2, and still the latter succeeded in executing a successfull offensive to the south in spite of supply problems.
So the same PGR 2 could certainly have attacked east with a better supply road behind it. It is therefore easy to understand that PGR 3 and PGR 2 considered themselves ready for an offensive to the east.

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Re: Logistics

Post by Osterhase » Wed Jul 03, 2013 7:32 am

julian wrote:
timobrienwells wrote:Hi Osterhase,
-snip-
.
Yes.The whole logistical argument against Taifun in august 1941 is based on wrong assumptions about levels of supplies supposedly needed to sustain an offensive. There is no level of supply you would miniminally need to sustain an offensive. There are only average consumption levels according to different types of combat and not being able to deliver these amounts would only mean having to consume less and/or supply reserves diminishing. It would not automatically prevent an offensive of being successfull..
No minimal level? Lets start at zero supply at all as an extreme case to highlight the point; keep moving forward from zero supplies at all until you reach a point where you can actually conduct an operation with even a slighlty reasonable chance of success, now you have your minimum requirement. There is doctrinal guidance as to minimum requirements and ultimately it's the commander's call based on his judgement (which is obviously completely dependant on WHAT HE ACTUALLY KNOWS). In the case of the August timeframe and also Taifun we KNOW FOR A FACT that German assumptions were wrong and therefore invalid for use as anything other than a footnote.
The Soviets had assumptions that were proven invalid as well, should we take them at face value also in the way you as using German assumptions?
The supplies levels present at PGR 3 and 2 in august were certainly sufficient to start an offensive. Actually, PGR 3 was much better off than PGR 2, and still the latter succeeded in executing a successfull offensive to the south in spite of supply problems.
So the same PGR 2 could certainly have attacked east with a better supply road behind it. It is therefore easy to understand that PGR 3 and PGR 2 considered themselves ready for an offensive to the east
Agreed, they had sufficient assets to -start- an offensive. This says nothing about a successful offensive which is the point of Stolfi's catastrophically flawed chap 11. A September 1 offensive was not sustainable to the point of capturing Moscow.

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Re: Logistics

Post by julian » Thu Jul 04, 2013 5:16 am

Osterhase wrote:
No minimal level? Lets start at zero supply at all as an extreme case to highlight the point; keep moving forward from zero supplies at all until you reach a point where you can actually conduct an operation with even a slighlty reasonable chance of success, now you have your minimum requirement. There is doctrinal guidance as to minimum requirements and ultimately it's the commander's call based on his judgement (which is obviously completely dependant on WHAT HE ACTUALLY KNOWS). In the case of the August timeframe and also Taifun we KNOW FOR A FACT that German assumptions were wrong and therefore invalid for use as anything other than a footnote.
The Soviets had assumptions that were proven invalid as well, should we take them at face value also in the way you as using German assumptions?
The issue is that there are only average levels of ammo usage according to the type of operation, based on previous experience.
These are not minimum levels and can be more a reflection of what was available than what was supposedly objectively necessary .
During offensive operations the highest usage will be in the breakthrough phase. In the pursuit phase ammo usage is much lower.
The attacker has the advantage of pausing an operation if that is necessary for logistical reasons. As a defender, the opponent will not do you the courtesy of pausing while you refill your ammo dumps. There is actually not a massive difference between ammo usage in high intensity attack and defense operations.
Thinking that one is automatically better off by staying on the defensive is therefore wrong.
And it is a matter of fact that the german high command had overestimated ammo usage during Barbarossa(report by general Wagner of 24.03.1942).
There were no prohibitive logistical issues which made it absolutely impossible to achieve success at the end of august 1941. Given what was actually achieved in october, it is perfectly possible that Moscow would have been taken if an attack was made a month earlier.
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Re: Logistics

Post by julian » Thu Jul 04, 2013 5:20 am

Osterhase wrote:
Agreed, they had sufficient assets to -start- an offensive. This says nothing about a successful offensive which is the point of Stolfi's catastrophically flawed chap 11. A September 1 offensive was not sustainable to the point of capturing Moscow.
The logistical issues faced by PGR 2 in its advance south are a perfect illustration of the fact that sometimes suffering ammo and fuel shortages do not prevent success. And it would have been better off logistically attacking east.

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Re: Logistics

Post by Osterhase » Fri Jul 05, 2013 6:58 am

julian wrote: The issue is that there are only average levels of ammo usage according to the type of operation, based on previous experience.
These are not minimum levels and can be more a reflection of what was available than what was supposedly objectively necessary .
That does not invalidate the definition of minimum requirement, which is subjective and completely dependant upon the current tactical and operational situation.

For example- At Yelnia the Germans did not have their minimum requirements met for food, ammunition or personnel and were forced out by Soviet pressure. They willingly withdrew, but the decision was entirely based upon very unfavorable conditions dictated to them by the Soviets because they lacked the resources to counter. aka-lacked the minimum requirements to complete the mission assigned. To maintain the Yelnia position the Germans would have had to commit mobile reserves, which would be sacrificing units required for the proposed Typhoon operation.
During offensive operations the highest usage will be in the breakthrough phase. In the pursuit phase ammo usage is much lower.
Logistics goes far beyond ammunition consumption obviously. So in the pursuit phase what happens to fuel consumption, POL, food/water, casualty extraction/personnel replacement, equipment replacement/maintenance, etc???
Beyond the point of departure the logistical requirement does not ease, it merely changes and in many cases becomes more difficult.
The key issue for the Germans at this point is motorized transport for logistical sustainment beyond the point of departure. The Wehrmacht did not possess the requisite number of tactical cargo trucks to sustain the necessary combat mass to overcome Soviet resistance at long distance. In modern terminology it's called power projection. The Wehrmacht's Achilles heal was motorized transport capacity and fuel, there simply was not enough to project enough combat power to successfully complete the proposed Moscow operation.
The attacker has the advantage of pausing an operation if that is necessary for logistical reasons. As a defender, the opponent will not do you the courtesy of pausing while you refill your ammo dumps
.

AGC paused at Smolensk and was promptly counter-attacked by the Soviets for over a month in which it's combat capability was permanently eroded (4th and 9th Armies Infantry divisions specifically) and had direct consequences later in the campaign. Even in the proposed timeframe of a 1 Sep version of Typhoon this would be the case in addition to the fact that the vast majority of replacements recieved by AGC happend before Typhoon in the OTL, but would not happen before the proposed 1 Sep attack. How do you propose these replacements reach their new units and become integrated during a major offensive?
There is actually not a massive difference between ammo usage in high intensity attack and defense operations.
Thinking that one is automatically better off by staying on the defensive is therefore wrong
.

Considering the issues I brought up above I think not, the main consideration is actually enemy capabilities.
And it is a matter of fact that the german high command had overestimated ammo usage during Barbarossa(report by general Wagner of 24.03.1942).
Wagner's report does not account for tranportation issues effecting how much ammunition was available to the actual weapons in the heat of the moment, does it? Ammunition next to the gun is useful, not so much if it is in the Corps depot 30 miles to the rear but still showing in Wagner's report as 'delivered'.
There were no prohibitive logistical issues which made it absolutely impossible to achieve success at the end of august 1941
Fuel, lack of adequate transport capacity, spare parts, maintenance assets, etc.
Given what was actually achieved in october, it is perfectly possible that Moscow would have been taken if an attack was made a month earlier
.

Definately NOT PERFECT. The possibility was remote and even if the Wehrmacht did take Moscow the effort would have been entirely and obviously exhausting, the Soviets would have done very well in the North and at Kiev therefore encouraging further resistance against a diminished enemy.

In regard to the Typhoon in the OTL as opposed to a 1 Sep attack, consider:

"From this point on, Guderian's mobile forces, despite heavy casualties, started making substantial gains. On 10 September, they captured Romny, 140 miles east of Kiev, and 130 miles south of Starodub, and Guderian started anticipating a junction of his XXIV Corps with armored divisions of Army Group South. This move would effectively cut off large numbers of Red Army troops I .in a pocket that was forming east of Kiev. On the evening of 14 September, the trap closed near Lochvica, 30 miles south of Romny. While hard fighting continued, during the ensuing week nearly 400,000 prisoners were taken, and Kiev itself fell on the 19th. Three days later Panzer Group 2's depleted divisions (as well as Weichs' infantry formations) were directed to return north to prepare for Typhoon. During the month of action, Guderian's 7'/2 divisions had advanced
south as far as 160 miles. Their casualties had totaled 12,239, an average of more than 3,000 per week. (During the first week of Typhoon, casualties for Guderian's mobile forces numbered approximately 2,000 troops.) Tank casualties had also been high, and Panzer Group 2 had only 33 percent of its armored vehicles in commission (260 out of 782) in late September. Moreover, the gasoline situation throughout the southern push had been precarious, seldom rising above two days' supply on hand."

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3 ... 0.CO%3B2-B

An attack to successfully encircle Moscow required a move East about twice as far as the Kiev operation against much stronger and deeper enemy resistance. Clearly Pz Gruppe 2's forces and support are inadequate considering the logistical assets, length of advance, enemy resistance, operational dispositions of Soviet forces as opposed to the OTL and the diminished state of 4th and 9th Armies as it regards their ability to advance in the center to effect the full envelopment and relieve the mobile wings at Moscow. The Soviet strategic and operational defensive alignment on the central axis was perpared for an operation against Moscow on 1 Sep, that is specifically why Pz Gruppe 2 had such success in the Kiev operation. The success of the Kiev operation is specifically why Typhoon in the OTL had such initial success. This Sep 1 scenario is therefore in no way comparable to the OTL, the dynamic of the OTL is completely different for obvious and related reasons that are not relevant to the 1 Sep ATL.

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