julian wrote:
The issue is that there are only average levels of ammo usage according to the type of operation, based on previous experience.
These are not minimum levels and can be more a reflection of what was available than what was supposedly objectively necessary .
That does not invalidate the definition of minimum requirement, which is subjective and completely dependant upon the current tactical and operational situation.
For example- At Yelnia the Germans did not have their minimum requirements met for food, ammunition or personnel and were forced out by Soviet pressure. They willingly withdrew, but the decision was entirely based upon very unfavorable conditions dictated to them by the Soviets because they lacked the resources to counter. aka-lacked the minimum requirements to complete the mission assigned. To maintain the Yelnia position the Germans would have had to commit mobile reserves, which would be sacrificing units required for the proposed Typhoon operation.
During offensive operations the highest usage will be in the breakthrough phase. In the pursuit phase ammo usage is much lower.
Logistics goes far beyond ammunition consumption obviously. So in the pursuit phase what happens to fuel consumption, POL, food/water, casualty extraction/personnel replacement, equipment replacement/maintenance, etc???
Beyond the point of departure the logistical requirement does not ease, it merely changes and in many cases becomes more difficult.
The key issue for the Germans at this point is motorized transport for logistical sustainment beyond the point of departure. The Wehrmacht did not possess the requisite number of tactical cargo trucks to sustain the necessary combat mass to overcome Soviet resistance at long distance. In modern terminology it's called power projection. The Wehrmacht's Achilles heal was motorized transport capacity and fuel, there simply was not enough to project enough combat power to successfully complete the proposed Moscow operation.
The attacker has the advantage of pausing an operation if that is necessary for logistical reasons. As a defender, the opponent will not do you the courtesy of pausing while you refill your ammo dumps
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AGC paused at Smolensk and was promptly counter-attacked by the Soviets for over a month in which it's combat capability was permanently eroded (4th and 9th Armies Infantry divisions specifically) and had direct consequences later in the campaign. Even in the proposed timeframe of a 1 Sep version of Typhoon this would be the case in addition to the fact that the vast majority of replacements recieved by AGC happend before Typhoon in the OTL, but would not happen before the proposed 1 Sep attack. How do you propose these replacements reach their new units and become integrated during a major offensive?
There is actually not a massive difference between ammo usage in high intensity attack and defense operations.
Thinking that one is automatically better off by staying on the defensive is therefore wrong
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Considering the issues I brought up above I think not, the main consideration is actually enemy capabilities.
And it is a matter of fact that the german high command had overestimated ammo usage during Barbarossa(report by general Wagner of 24.03.1942).
Wagner's report does not account for tranportation issues effecting how much ammunition was available to the actual weapons in the heat of the moment, does it? Ammunition next to the gun is useful, not so much if it is in the Corps depot 30 miles to the rear but still showing in Wagner's report as 'delivered'.
There were no prohibitive logistical issues which made it absolutely impossible to achieve success at the end of august 1941
Fuel, lack of adequate transport capacity, spare parts, maintenance assets, etc.
Given what was actually achieved in october, it is perfectly possible that Moscow would have been taken if an attack was made a month earlier
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Definately NOT PERFECT. The possibility was remote and even if the Wehrmacht did take Moscow the effort would have been entirely and obviously exhausting, the Soviets would have done very well in the North and at Kiev therefore encouraging further resistance against a diminished enemy.
In regard to the Typhoon in the OTL as opposed to a 1 Sep attack, consider:
"From this point on, Guderian's mobile forces, despite heavy casualties, started making substantial gains. On 10 September, they captured Romny, 140 miles east of Kiev, and 130 miles south of Starodub, and Guderian started anticipating a junction of his XXIV Corps with armored divisions of Army Group South. This move would effectively cut off large numbers of Red Army troops I .in a pocket that was forming east of Kiev. On the evening of 14 September, the trap closed near Lochvica, 30 miles south of Romny. While hard fighting continued, during the ensuing week nearly 400,000 prisoners were taken, and Kiev itself fell on the 19th. Three days later Panzer Group 2's depleted divisions (as well as Weichs' infantry formations) were directed to return north to prepare for Typhoon. During the month of action, Guderian's 7'/2 divisions had advanced
south as far as 160 miles. Their casualties had totaled 12,239, an average of more than 3,000 per week. (During the first week of Typhoon, casualties for Guderian's mobile forces numbered approximately 2,000 troops.) Tank casualties had also been high, and Panzer Group 2 had only 33 percent of its armored vehicles in commission (260 out of 782) in late September. Moreover, the gasoline situation throughout the southern push had been precarious, seldom rising above two days' supply on hand."
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3 ... 0.CO%3B2-B
An attack to successfully encircle Moscow required a move East about twice as far as the Kiev operation against much stronger and deeper enemy resistance. Clearly Pz Gruppe 2's forces and support are inadequate considering the logistical assets, length of advance, enemy resistance, operational dispositions of Soviet forces as opposed to the OTL and the diminished state of 4th and 9th Armies as it regards their ability to advance in the center to effect the full envelopment and relieve the mobile wings at Moscow. The Soviet strategic and operational defensive alignment on the central axis was perpared for an operation against Moscow on 1 Sep, that is specifically why Pz Gruppe 2 had such success in the Kiev operation. The success of the Kiev operation is specifically why Typhoon in the OTL had such initial success. This Sep 1 scenario is therefore in no way comparable to the OTL, the dynamic of the OTL is completely different for obvious and related reasons that are not relevant to the 1 Sep ATL.
Combat capability refers to a unit's ability to conduct combat operations (and is usually calculated by and for staff planning). If a unit is below a given supply level-it is taken from the order of battle. If a unit suffers catastrophic losses-it is taken from the order of battle (at any level from squad to corps). So a simple accounting for losses will never equate equally to combat capability. 
