eastern front - may/june 1944

[von_noobie]

i have been looking at a few books and in some of the maps i noticed that around may/june '44 army groups north and south ukrain had pulled back but yet army group centre and north stayed were they were, know what i would like to know is (BE WARNED!!!!, THIS IS A WHAT ID QUESTION) why not pull back army groups centre and north thus shortening the line a lot and making the supply's arrive sooner, surely they could have started a retreat around may, maybe sooner and in the time they are pulling back use civilain labour and all available engineers to build up a defensive line in what could be a 1-2 month retreat, it would be able to then have actual reserves,

Just to see if every thing im talking about could have worked could some one please tell me how many divisions were in army group centre, and there average size and the same with army group north,

And if possible the amountof divisions and troop sizes in army groups north and south Ukrain,

thank you in advance.

[Trigger Happy]

Retreating for hundreds of kilometers would not have been possible, in territory infested with partisans in addition, without it turning into an even more catastrophic rout than what happened in reality.

[von_noobie]

yes and no...An organised gradual retreat at a proper pace could get out of there fairly safe,

[Michate]

Actually during a conference in May Busch (CiC AG Center) proposed a retreat of his armies, e.g. behind the Beresina, but Hitler angrily refused to allow it.

One aspect is of considerable importance here, namly that the German commanders and staffs almost unanimously expected the Soviet summer offense to start either in the Kovel area or in Romania, as well as underestimated its force and scale in general.

[Dan38]

Ostfront June 22, 1944: Army Group Center (Feldmarschall Busch) consisted of the Third Panzer Army, the Fourth Army, the Ninth Army and the Second Army . The Army Group defended an eastward facing semi-circular salient of approximately 660 miles in length. Third Panzer Army was stationed around Polotsk and Vitebsk at the North end of the salient. (The area above the salient was Army Group North’s responsibility.) In the center of the salient was located the Fourth Army. At the South end was assigned to the Ninth Army. At the extreme South end (Pripyat Marshes) was controlled by the Second Army. South of this area was the responsibility of Army Group North Ukraine. The Third Panzer army consisted of the (Ninth , Fifty-Second and Sixth Corps (nine divisions.) The Fourth Army was comprised of the Twenty-Seventh, Thirty-Ninth and Twelfth Corps (also nine divisions.) The Ninth Army consisted of the Thirty-Fifth, Forty-First and the Fifty-Fifth Corps, (ten divisions.) The Twenty-Eight, Twentieth and Eighth Corps made up Second Army. The salient front was consider unstable. Two solution were purposed: The “Small Solution” was to evacuate and draw back across the Dniepr River and abandon the bulge around Vitebsk. The “Big Solution” was to abandon the total 600 mile bulge and pull back behind the Beresina River. The shorter front would provide needed reserves and establish a solid front line on the Beresina’s East banks. Hitler rejected both solutions. One argument being that a shorter front would likewise provide the Soviets with additional reserves.(It worked both ways.) Besides Hitler, (also Feldmarschall Busch) were certain the summer attack would be farther South against Army Group North Ukraine. Most of the Army Group center’s armor was denuded and transferred South to face this possibility.

[von_noobie]

thanks Dan38, what difference could AGN have made as a counter attack force do you think.

[Dan38]

Interesting concept.. However, movement of Army Group North units in a Southernly thrust to relieve pressure on Army Group Center would have been very difficult. Firstly, Army Group North had barely stabilized its front under Model along the Lake Chudskoye, Lake Pskovkoye, Pskov, Ostrov line. It had been beaten up during the Soviet advance through January to March 1944. Secondly, by 1944 the German Army’s transport capability was obsolete. Most German units and equipment was still transported by horse team. The Soviets had received a vast number of tanks and trucks from the United States.(Plus their own production beyond the Urals.) Hence, they were very mobile and were able to outrun retreating or other German unit movements. Almost all Luftwaffe aircraft units had been transferred to the West. Hence, the Soviet air force ruled the sky and could have a very limiting effect of such a counterattack. The Soviets also had pushed North at the seam of the two German Army Groups as flank protection. The best option would have been the “Big Solution,” movement of Army Group Center behind the Beresina River during May of 1944. The Partisans attacks during this phase could have been limited as done in the past.
Previous to this situation, Army Group South (Later Army Group North Ukraine) under Manstein had been badly mauled and resulted in the Hube’s Pocket situation as a result of Hitler’s refusal to allow Manstein and Kleist movement flexibility, (need to retreat) As you know these events led to OKW (Hitler), OKH (Hitler) and staff to believe the Soviets would push North behind the Carpathian, through Lvov, Lublin to the Baltic cutting off both Army Groups Center and North completely, Hence the transfer of about eighty percent of Army Group Center’s Panzer units to the Army Group North Ukraine area of responsibility.

[von_noobie]

so it would be fairly hard but not impossible, just take alot of planning and have most units pulled back before june '44, thus you still have air support.