Contemporary Soviet accounts place much emphasis on the Soviet Artillery Prep prior to the German offensive at Kursk.
Reportedly Rokossovsky's Central Front launched a heavy Artillery barrage on the German 9th Army forming up positions prior to the jump off for the Kursk Northern pincer assault.
Did this have any noticeable impact on the German intentions? Does anyone have any casualty figures or details of significant alterations forced upon the German offensive plans after the barrage?
Was there a similar barrage on the southern side of the salient and did this have any significant impact?
Thanks in advance
Regards
David
"Whoever wishes to master the art of war must study it continuously. I....am of the opinion that one lifetime is not enough to attain this goal." - Frederick II
I understand Steven Newton demonstrated rather thoroughly in his Kursk book that the pre-attack bombardment largely failed to have any very noticeable impact. Perhaps someone who owns it might have something more to say about this.
I recall offhand that Soviet sources claimed the bombardment of the assembly areas was assisted by a steady flow of deserters prior to the attack.
Something similar happened at Anzio; results were definitely significant there as the German offensive was on a very narrow front given the Allies' preponderance in aircraft and supplies.
According to Geman authors as Klink or Toeppel it did not have any notable effect, with the one exception it destroyed a bridge over the Donets in Armeeabteilung Kempf's sector and so disrupted its attack somewhat.
In any case the attacks started according to scheduled time, they were not delayed as is claimed by Soviet sources.
German casualties were certainly highest among the first day, but actually this is quite common for a breakthrough operation, nor were they particularly excessive (7,000 - 8,000 KIA + WIA + MIA in the Northern attack sector IIRC, and a similar figure in the southern sector?).
IIRC, Newton says Soviet artillery fire added difficulties to Großdeutschland's artillery deployment which was however mainly caused by the need to switch guns to new positions after some ground hat been gained by the preparatory attacks on 4 July.
Having looked out my copy of The Soviet General Staff Study on Kursk it seems I erred in my original post.
It appears that in the north, Central Front's preparation was largely concerned with targeting German Artillery Formations in Counter battery fire and forming up areas where of secondary importance.
However in the South, Voronezh Front's preparation was the complete opposite. It primarily targeted forming up points and likely avenues of attack with German Artillery formations of secondary importance only.
It would be interesting if anyone could shed some light on the effect each of these Artillery barrages had on the German plans to mount their attack in the initial phase of the operation. Did it force any changes at all?
Regards
David
"Whoever wishes to master the art of war must study it continuously. I....am of the opinion that one lifetime is not enough to attain this goal." - Frederick II
So Soviet accounts are over-exagerated. The German forces where not significantly hindered in launching their attack.
Regards
David
"Whoever wishes to master the art of war must study it continuously. I....am of the opinion that one lifetime is not enough to attain this goal." - Frederick II
Hello, all.
Germans have not changed the plans, the only excluding 19 Pz.D 3 Pz.K, engineers (engineers have had the big losses from fire soviet artillery) which because of influence soviet counter artillery prep could not construct the 60-ton bridge for Tigers, therefore attack II./ Pz.Gren.Rgt. 74 without Tigers support has ended with failure.
IIRC Pz Gren Reg 74 from 19th Pz Div attacked between Dalni Peski and Dorogobuzhino in the vicinity of the 78th Guards Rifle Div. They were unsupported by Tiger tanks and used the organic element of the Div the 27th Pz Reg for the breakthrough.
The attack was held up on the 19th's Northern flank around Dalni Peski during the 05/07/05 but the front was ruptured much further south at Dorogobuzhino. The offensive was resumed around Dalni Peski the next day and the breakthrough achieved by 1200 hours on the 06/07/05.
Regards
David
"Whoever wishes to master the art of war must study it continuously. I....am of the opinion that one lifetime is not enough to attain this goal." - Frederick II
Hi, von Salza.
All the same the question is influence Counter Arty Prep, 19 Pz.D. came 3 battle groups: KG Richter (II/Pz. Gr. Rgt. 74, Tiger kompanie and 3./Pz. Pion. Btl. 19), KG Becker (Pz. Rgt. 27 and I./Pz. Gr. Rgt. 74), KG 73 (Pz. Gr. Rgt. 73, Pz. Pion. Btl. 19 (-1 kompanie) and 1 kompanie Pz. Jg. Abt. 19), and during the July 5 successes have achieved KG Becker and KG 73 whereas attacks KG Richter have been beaten off.
I wasn't aware that KG Richter was supported by a Tiger Company. Can you tell me where this unit came from and the source of your information?
With regards to the attacks on Dalni Peski IIRC it was not the Soviet Artillery barrage that held up the attack but the stubborn defence put up by the 228th Rifle Regiment of the 78th Guards Rifle Division.
The 78th Guards Rifle Division absorbed the impact of the initial German assault and was completely overwhelmed in the first two days of fighting but succeeded in buying time for Shumilov's 7th Army to bring reserves to bear on the German axis of attack thereby preventing the link up of the III Panzer and II SS Panzer corps.
Regards
David
PS I would also be interested in what Newton has said about the Soviet Artillery barrage as mentioned in Qvist's post if anyone has a copy of the book.
"Whoever wishes to master the art of war must study it continuously. I....am of the opinion that one lifetime is not enough to attain this goal." - Frederick II
dduff442 wrote:I recall offhand that Soviet sources claimed the bombardment of the assembly areas was assisted by a steady flow of deserters prior to the attack.
Something similar happened at Anzio; results were definitely significant there as the German offensive was on a very narrow front given the Allies' preponderance in aircraft and supplies.
dduff
The germans were not surrendering in 43 at all. It was mainly captured pows. I beleive one or more of the pows gave a time of the att which turned out to be wrong. The real att wasnt delayed by art it just started later then the ger pows told the soviets.
Having looked out my copy of The Soviet General Staff Study on Kursk it seems I erred in my original post.
It appears that in the north, Central Front's preparation was largely concerned with targeting German Artillery Formations in Counter battery fire and forming up areas where of secondary importance.
However in the South, Voronezh Front's preparation was the complete opposite. It primarily targeted forming up points and likely avenues of attack with German Artillery formations of secondary importance only.
It would be interesting if anyone could shed some light on the effect each of these Artillery barrages had on the German plans to mount their attack in the initial phase of the operation. Did it force any changes at all?
Regards
David
The ger AGN had more arty then the south and more SPGUNs. It att with predominantly inf and achived less.
AGS had more tanks and att with more panzer divs. It had more succes.
Targeting the ger arty conc in the north certainbly paid off with the sov formation in the north. Afterall arty cases roughly 70% of all losses. With the ger arty off tempo the rus army was able to hold back the mainly soft inf to a tiny adv.
Targeting the forming up points of the ger army in the south did not lead to success. It actually lead to ger victories although the exact reason for these victories remains elusive.
