Battle of Kharkov, 1943

[Freiritter]

Hello,

The German offensive in Kharkov during 1943, was it the major German operation during that year? Also, was it intended to produce a breakthrough or was it intended only to reduce the Soviet salient and recapture Kharkov?

Cordially,

Freiritter

[corderex]

Hello Freiritter

Perhaps you meant Kursk rather than Kharkov?

[Freiritter]

Hello,

Whoops, you're right. Kharkov was 1942?

Cordially,

Freiritter

[corderex]

There was an offensive aimed at Kharkov in May 1942, but it was launched by the Red Army to liberate it, not by the Germans to conquer it (it was in German hands since 24.oct.41). The operation ended in a complete catastrophe for the Russians.

The Russians did manage to recapture the city in February, 1943, during one of the several winter offensives they launched in the aftemath of Stalingrad, but the liberation turned out to be short lived. It was retaken by the SS division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler on March 15, 1943.

The Germans were finally expeled from Kharkov by the Red Army at the end of August 1943, never to return again.

[Epaminondas]

Kharkov was the site of a major COUNTER offensive by AG South (or was it still Don then?).

Kursk was the major summer offensive by the Germans.

Battle of Kursk by Glantz;
Last Victory in Russia and Decision in the Ukraine by Nipe

are three decent books covering that time period from both points of view.

Glantz is definely soviet biased; Nipe is about equally German biased though...

[corderex]

Hi

I wouldn't say it's biased towards the Soviets.
Glantz is certainly more interested in the Soviet side of the battle, but that does not make him biased (at least in my opinion).

Anyway, the book is not reader-friendly. The narrative is very drab, page after page of XYZ regiment from XYZ division belonging to XYZ Army putting up a fierce resistance against the xyz Panzergrenadier Regiment advance on XYZ hill. After a couple of pages you can't stand it anymore. I guess that is what they call real military history.

The only thing that saves the book is the excellent bibliography and its very good "conclusions" chapter. One of the few historians that give the lie to all that Guderian, Manstein and Mellenthin wanted people to hear and believe about who's to blame for the Zitadelle fiasco.

[Epaminondas]

Glantz does suffer from ignoring the German archival material, and perhaps believing the soviet line a bit to much.

I'll readily grant that up to about the mid to late 1990s most authors relied far to much on German memiors; and some German Archival material.... and absolutely no reliable soviet material.

From that perspective Glantz is invalueable for the english translations and summaries of much of the "real" analysis of WWII from the Red Army's point of view [v. the propaganda ie 1,000+ SS tigers and panthers destroyed at Kursk on 12/14 July. The entire II SS panzer Korps had what less then 400 tanks and assualt guns of all kinds BEFORE Kursk? And German tank return information indicates less then 50 tanks knocked out during Provaka [so my Russian spelling is bad :) ]; granted you need to figure out that some tanks were repaired, hiding some of the losses.... but 50-100 is alot smaller then 1000+ :)... and one of the divisions wasn't even in the area... ]

I think Glantz falls into the trap that the soviets won therefore they could have not lost... and it shades his work. I full admit most writers biases to german fall into the same trap... if only Hitler didn't do X; where X was intregral to Hitler's personality.

I think Nipe doesn't adequately deal Soviet sources... but he is attempting to tell the history from a German Point of View; Glantz is trying to write the definitive account of Kursk.

Reading them together, you gain a much better perspective then reading one in isolation.

[corderex]

Hi Epaminondas

I agree with most of what you say. Glantz's work is not the definitive account, but an important step in the right direction. His real contribution lies in the fact that he puts at our disposal -and in English- hitherto unavailable Soviet works and documents. Gone are the days when we had to take everything that Guderian, Manstein, and co. said in their memories as "historical truths"; gone are the days when everything coming out of the Soviet side was worthless propaganda.

I think Glantz falls into the trap that the soviets won therefore they could have not lost...

I am afraid I will have to disagree with you on that one.
Besides throwing aside the often cited theory which says that Zitadelle would have succeeded had it been launched in the spring, Glantz also challenges the almost universal belief which says that when the operation was finally launched it was destined to fail. Both are interpretations emanating from German accounts of the events, whose main purpose is to put the blame of the defeat (and of all German defeats) at the feet of Adolf Hitler and his advisers at OKW.

Take a look at what Glantz writes on page 262:

"The nearly universal postwar judgment that Citadel was destined to fail uttely ignores 1943 realities and is also the product of hindsight."

best regards,

corderex

[Michate]

I agree with most of what you say. Glantz's work is not the definitive account, but an important step in the right direction. His real contribution lies in the fact that he puts at our disposal -and in English- hitherto unavailable Soviet works and documents. Gone are the days when we had to take everything that Guderian, Manstein, and co. said in their memories as "historical truths"; gone are the days when everything coming out of the Soviet side was worthless propaganda.

Well, actually when the battle of Kursk is taken, even in the pre-Glantz era the Soviet story dominated most English language works of the battle and seems to have been taken as "historic truth" while serious German works about the battle were mostly ignored - ever heard of the so far still best work on German operational planning and conduct at Zitadelle - Ernst Klink: "Das Gesetz des Handelns", published in the 1960's?

And what Manstein wrote about Zitadelle is atually less off the mark than what e.g. Rotmistrov wrote or Konev's famous "swan song of the Panzers".[/quote]

[Freiritter]

Hello,

Didn't the Germans initially have to give up Kharkov to the Soviets in order to prevent the Soviets from really hammering a German Armee and that Manstein was sacked because of his refusal to obey the famous stand fast order?

Cordially,

Freiritter

[corderex]

Hi Michael

Well, actually when the battle of Kursk is taken, even in the pre-Glantz era the Soviet story dominated most English language works of the battle and seems to have been taken as "historic truth" while serious German works about the battle were mostly ignored

Really? Could you produce the list of Soviet books about Citadel that dominated English accounts of the battle in the "pre-Glantz era"?

Klink's book has not been translated into English, has it? His audience is therefore limited to the German-speaking world.

And what Manstein wrote about Zitadelle is atually less off the mark than what e.g. Rotmistrov wrote or Konev's famous "swan song of the Panzers".

Well, that's your personal opinion. If you think Manstein was being truthful and sincere to his readers (especially to his countrymen) when he was writing his memoirs, by all means, you have every right to.
By the way, Churchill and Ike also distorted the truth in their memoirs, so no big deal. My opinion on the matter is: when reading those memoirs, we have to put them in its adequate context.

As for Rotmistrov and other Soviet sources inflated claims, Paul Carell had no compunction about repeating those claims when he wrote about the 1,500 tanks around Prokhorovka.

corderex

ps: was Kursk not the "swan song" of the German armor in WWII?

[Jan-Hendrik]

Not really , dear corderex !

German armor units were able to severly annoy its enemies until the final days

Jan-Hendrik

[Qvist]

Corderex:

Michate is entirely right. Virtually all English-language works dealing with Kursk prior to Glantz, Zetterling/Franksson and partially Cross have basically relied for the basic view of the battle on Soviet accounts, especially Rotmistrov, and have as a result generally quoted wildly exaggerated figures and completely untenable analysis. The basic conception of the battle as one long death ride of the Panzers culminating in a colossal clash at Prokhorovka that left prior German hopes smouldering in the ashes of hundreds of irreplacable German tanks is fundamentally a product of this essentially fabricated version of events emenating from such published Soviet sources. It is not just restricted to works like The tigers are burning, but perhaps even more seriously, is faithfully reproduced in a large number of more general works. John Keegan's The second world war, Richard Overy's Why the alies won, Calvocoresci/Wint/Protchard's Global war, Erickson's The road to Berlin and Perrett's Knights of the black cross are just some examples of works who base their analysis and desription of events fundamentally on such sources, and who consequently provide accounts that are not worth the paper they are printed on. This may also be one reason why these notions are proving so hard to eradicate despite a considerable number of publications who have decisively dispelled them, as every forum discussion touching on the subject vividly brings out.

Michate is also correct that several (untranslated) German works providing at least accurate information on such things as the German losses and actions have been in existence for many decades, but have for some reason not been utilised. Consequently, as often as not, what you read about this super-mythified battle might as well have been science fiction. Among the limited number of generally tolerably reliable works in english I would name Zetterling/Franksson, Newton, Nipe and Glantz. That's about it. Additionally, Klink and Roman Töppel's fairly recent thesis are good German accounts.

Klink's book has not been translated into English, has it? His audience is therefore limited to the German-speaking world.

Yes, but you'd think English and american authors who write books about Kursk should be a part of that world.

Well, that's your personal opinion. If you think Manstein was being truthful and sincere to his readers (especially to his countrymen) when he was writing his memoirs, by all means, you have every right to.

As far as I can see, michate does not claim that Manstein is generally being truthful and sincere to his readers, he claims that in this case, his version of events is more accurate than Rotmistrov's. This is rather more than a personal opinion, and the reason is less any extraordinary honesty in Manstein than the fact that it would in fact be difficult to be a great deal less reliable than Rotmistrov, whose account here is spectacularly contradicted by both German and Soviet documentation.

If you think a little ahead, you will also realise that the point Michate makes here does not entail using Manstein as an important source for the battle, but rather using good sources to assess the reliability of Manstein and Rotmistrov respectively. The Kursk battle is perhaps more thoroughly documented than any other EF battle in the newer accounts listed above, therefore anyone who is acquainted with them is in a position to judge the extent to which these memoirs can be reconciled with the documentary records.

By the way, Churchill and Ike also distorted the truth in their memoirs, so no big deal. My opinion on the matter is: when reading those memoirs, we have to put them in its adequate context.

Certainly. Nobody is questioning this. But that is exactly what authors who have quoted Rotmistrov's figures as if they were objectively reliable have failed to do.

As for Rotmistrov and other Soviet sources inflated claims, Paul Carell had no compunction about repeating those claims when he wrote about the 1,500 tanks around Prokhorovka.

No, he didn't. Which is another reason why we can add him to the list of works that are esssentially worthless on this topic.

ps: was Kursk not the "swan song" of the German armor in WWII?

Considering that they lost less than 300 tanks during the whole operation, I would say that it clearly was not, no. Every single statistical aspect of the battle bluntly contradict any notion of the supposedly gigantic scale and losses of the battle having a decisive, or even very important, impact on the war as a whole. But the legio accounts who claim otherwise have of course had in common exactly that they start from vastly exaggerated figures.

cheers

[Michate]

Well, Qvist has addressed most points as good, if not better, than I could have.

I would just like to add a couple of additional remarks:

Really? Could you produce the list of Soviet books about Citadel that dominated English accounts of the battle in the "pre-Glantz era"?

I wrote that the Soviet story dominated English accounts, not any particular book, but as a starting point I would check for Rotmistrov's memoirs, Koltunov/Solovev's "Kurskaja bitva" and Ilya Markin's book (sorry for bad spelling) as well as the Soviet books on the use of tanks in the war.

As for Rotmistrov and other Soviet sources inflated claims, Paul Carell had no compunction about repeating those claims when he wrote about the 1,500 tanks around Prokhorovka.

You are probably correct that Carell's quotes of Rotmistrov's memoirs in his Scorched Earth may have been very influential in spreading the Prokhorovka story. Carell has a masterly way to make the story very dramatic (IIRC a repitition of the "world minute at Waterloo"), he just did not check it against dry archival sources (he relied on the "Historical division" studies at first, and also - contrary to public belief - quite heavily on Soviet literature, just check the sources list on the German edition).

Well, that's your personal opinion. If you think Manstein was being truthful and sincere to his readers (especially to his countrymen) when he was writing his memoirs, by all means, you have every right to.
By the way, Churchill and Ike also distorted the truth in their memoirs, so no big deal. My opinion on the matter is: when reading those memoirs, we have to put them in its adequate context.

And, as Qvist has already pointed out, you have put too much into my words, I referred not to the whole of von Manstein's memoirs, but only to what he wrote on Zitdelle, and I assessed Manstein's memoirs in this point as "less off the mark than e.g. those of Rotmistrov", which is not exactly the same as "truthful and sincere to his readers".

As generally to von Manstein, from what I have read, the English language edition of his "Lost Victories" seems to have been much reduced against the German version.

Perhaps I should point out, that I have very great respect for Mr Glantz's work, I have read several of his books with great interest and I often refer to them for a special question I like to study.

It is just not that the the Germans just spread the distorted version while the Soviets told the truth. And most of the people of the who held that attitude obviously did not know the "German version" except the popular writings of Manstein, Guderian and von Mellenthin, while ignoring the more serious, scholar works, which BTW use Soviet works as far as possible to factor in their view.

And correct me if I am wrong, but to me it seems the later Glantz attends the Soviet published sources much more critcal than he did in his earlier days.

[corderex]

Hello Jan-Hendrik!

I couldn't have chosen a better word to describe it: annoy.

regards,

corderex