Interesting but of course the authors might have felt disinclined to state they had messed up might they? And other sources state just the opposite. For instance:
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/ ... 24_2/4.htm
In Strategy For Defeat, William Murray states that the superficial attention that the OKH (German Army General Staff) and OKW (Armed Forces High Command) paid to the logistics of sustaining the Wehrmacht inside Russia was one of the most glaring defects of the pre-invasion strategy.3 The German Army entered into the campaign with full confidence of total victory within months. Because of this falsely engendered belief, there had been no forethought, no proper planning to equip the armed forces with modern strategic weapons, winter clothing, ammunition and therefore they faced a whole host of logistical problems.4
Logistics planning was overly optimistic and totally unrealistic and planning factors were often determined by capability rather than actual requirements. For example, although the number of armoured divisions available for "Operation Barbarossa" had more than doubled from 15 in May 1940 to 32 in June 1941, the number of vehicles had only increased by a third from 2574 to 3332.
Similarly, full wartime production was not in effect before the invasion. For a campaign of such magnitude, German factories were operating on a single shift basis and the under-utilisation of German industrial capacity resulted in shortfalls in essential combat materials. Production consistently lagged behind consumption. The Germans had been involved militarily in Norway, Belgium, France and the Balkans prior to the invasion of Soviet Union, resulting in major equipment shortfalls and damages. For a force which depended on machines for its offensive capability and its survival as none had depended to the same extent before, these were crippling defects. Many of the deficiencies had been foreseen and, as often as not, side-stepped or ignored on grounds of economy or because Hitler and many of his commanders had deluded themselves into believing the war would be won long before winter took its toll.
Transport assets within a theatre are major factors in campaign planning, both tactical and logistical. Being a key element in logistics, it can severely restrict operations. In Sinews of War, James Huston has highlighted that in a theatre of operation, a single authority, identical with the command authority should be responsible for logistics.6 This is again precisely what the German logistics system lacked - unity of command. The transportation responsibilities were split between the Chief of Transport (rail and inland waterways) and the Quartermaster-General (motor transport). This made an already bad situation worse. The German motor vehicle production could replace neither normal wear and tear nor keep up with combat losses.
By August 1941, the motorised supply system was exhausted. Ammunition and fuel, both of which were previously under-estimated were in limited supply. The reason was because the planning requirements were inaccurately based on the transportation capability rather operational consumption. Commanders were unable to exploit tactical advantage because of severe shortages of fuel and ammunition and as such resupply could not keep pace with advances. Tactical operations were curtailed for weeks waiting for resupply from the rear.
Food was another essential commodity that was in critical short supply. It was never an important priority to Hitler. When in late 1941, Hitler was told of the shortage in transport and that the system was only able to supply the armies in the field with one of the most urgent priorities and to choose between warm clothing, food and ammunition, Hitler chose ammunition. Shortfalls in the ration resupply system resulted in 'slaughter' platoons being formed within divisions as an expedient measure. Commanders in the field relied on foraging local livestock to feed the soldiers and this continued until such time when shortages resulted in troops eating their units' horses.
By October 1941, Hitler's lines of communication stretched from 800 km initially to about 1600 km eventually. As the invasion advanced, the lines of communication became unmanageable and unable to satisfy continuing logistics demands. Front line units were soon operating on a hand-to-mouth existence. Stretched to its limit, the state of the German supply lines created a logistical nightmare. Conditions rapidly became sub-human, supply systems failed and it was more a question of surviving than of fighting.
http://books.google.com/books?id=ORrHrP ... cs&f=false
In Barbarossa's opening month, German armies bit deep into Soviet territory; panzer armies encircled large Soviet forces at Minsk and Smolensk, while armored spearheads reached two-thirds of the distance to Moscow and Leningrad. But already German logistics were unraveling, while a series of Soviet counterattacks stalled the advance. In September the Germans got enough supplies forward to renew their drives ...
In the second paragraph of the Conclusion section states: "Logistics were a limiting factor even from its earliest days."
Talking about the end of July it states:
http://junebarbarossa.devhub.com/blog/6 ... logistics/
Even ignoring combat losses and damage, maintaining such a huge operation, particularly in the primitive field conditions in the Soviet Union, meant a lot of wear and tear, and an increasing degree of simple exhaustion. Furthermore, although the original German plan had suggested that supply problems could be reduced by "living off the land", the Soviets were becoming increasingly efficient at ensuring that all that was left on the land were cinders and ashes, increasing ever more strained German logistical requirements and effort.
http://www.stonefortconsulting.com/2012 ... 1941-1945/
... all warnings were ignored that came from the OKH top logistics officer, General Eduard Wagner. He dutifully reported that the supply system could only support a maximum penetration of 500 km, and even then logistical pauses would be required
Very shortly, German operations in Russia were severely constrained by logistical challenges. Strategic, operational and tactical maneuvers were directly and adversely affected by shortfalls in German logistical plans and execution. German supply lines extended nearly 800 miles, and once within Russia, were extremely vulnerable to an active and aggressive Soviet partisan movement that frequently harassed, interfered with and interrupted the German logistical and transportation routes. In large part, German failure in Russia, and German defeat in World War II, can be attributed to a failure of logistics in Operation Barbarossa.
Many of the German generals, including Rundstedt, Kleist, Blumentritt and Manstein, cited factors ranging from logistical/strategic problems, weather and Hitler himself. What is important to remember is that these generals blamed everyone but themselves when stating why the invasion failed.
Note the "logistical problems" and it goes on to state:
Field Marshal Ewald von Kleist pointed to the weather, Russian strategy and the Russian ability to produce reserves. .... Russia also lacked railways, we were unable to bring up supplies to our advancing troops.
General Gunther Blumentritt endorsed Kleist's view, except for the point about the Russians yielding ground. "00 the Moscow route", Blumentritt stated, "the principalJine of advance, they repeatedly held on long enough to be encircled, The badness of the roads became our worst handicap, Faulty intel1igence had underestimated Soviet strength, The restoration of railway traffic became delayed by the change of gauge beyond the Russian frontier. The supply problem in the Russian campaign became a very serious problem, complicated by local conditions.
It goes on to state this gem which may be relevant to the source you listed:
A majority of the testimonies given by these high ranking officers were given for self-serving interests. First hand accounts are not always accurate, especially when there is nobody to contradict these people.
Then there's this:
By the third week of July the combat strength of the Panzer and motorized divisions had fallen to about 60 % of normal in Army Group Center. In some of the Panzer divisions of Army Group South it dropped to 40%. Early in July, Halder calculated that by the end of the month only 431 tanks would be available from the OKH reserve and current production to replace those destroyed or broken down out of the original total of 3350. But to make matters worse, Hitler gave orders that new tanks should be kept in Germany for equipping fresh Panzer divisions for use in the offensives planned for 1942 in the Middle East.
The greatest flaw in the preparations for Barbarossa was logistical in nature. German planners calculated that after an advance of 600 kilometers, movement forward would have to halt for a considerable period of time to allow for resupply and the establishment of new forward supply dumps. However, German troops crossed the frontier with only a basic load of ammunition. Given the rapid advance of German forces, ammunition and fuel were in desperately short supply from Barbarossa's earliest days. German troops had to obtain food and fodder from the Russian and Ukrainian peasants, further damaging relations with conquered popUlation. Finally, the whole resupply effort depended on the repair of Soviet raiJroads, particularly the Smolensk-to-Brest Litovsk Jine. But since railroad tracks were generally secured well after the roads, repair work began only after considerable delays. As a result, railroad troops were given the lowest priority in the German army. 49
By the end of July, German operations came to a grinding halt. The lead elements, the panzer and motorized infantry divisions, ran out of fuel and ammunition. Restrictions had to be put on the number of shells that artillery units could fire. On the primitive roads with their heat, dust, and deep glutinous mud when it rained, the German logistic system began to fall apart. By July 11, after just nineteen days, 25 % of German supply vehicles permanently broke down. The panzer divisions could not repair damaged tanks and other vehicles because parts could not get through. The panzer and motorized infantry divisions became dangerously exposed as a result. Soviet reserve forces arrived in increasing numbers. These counterattacks exacerbated the dangerous German shortage of ammunition. In tum, the need for ammunition placed a further ~1rain on the diminishing number of supply vehicles, which drastically curtailed the Germans' ability to supply fuel to the front.
I could continue but I think the point is made.