Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

[lwd]

Of course they didn't prevent the above operations they just guaranteed that they would fail. Clearly inadequate logistics shoud preclude some operations. Rommel's adventures in Africa are a nother mark on the wall. It boils down to two qeustions actully.
1) was the German log network adequate to support a drive that could capture Moscow?
2) If not did the Germans realize it?

Making logisitcs the determining factor in these campaigns is wrong.

Of course it is. Making any one factor the "determing factor" is wrong.

If german logistics could not support a drive on Moscow, they could not support the drive as far as it got in july either.

That is an absurd statement.

Supply issues there certainly where but not to the extent of preventing a succesful offensive. In spite of supply issues PGR 2 did achieve success in its drive south.

But the drive on Moscow would have had to cover more ground and involve more troops would it not? So the fact that one offensive was adequately supported doesn't mean that the other could have been.

... The issue is that in the fall there is a high probability of bad weather which would cause serious problems, particularly in a country with a lack of hardened roads.

No that is not "the issue" it is one issue among many.
[qoute] That is why nobody in his right mind would have intentionally let the summer pass and attack in october.[/quote]
So now you are saying the Germans were insane? If so nothing they said or wrote can be trusted can it?

But were there forces massing on it already? Ones that likely would be commited to an offensive against said flank?

If an opponent has reserves, he can threaten the lengthening flank during a deep advance. There are ways to deal with that.

But those ways require troops and muntions do they not? And if you have one fragile rail line supporting your thrust they only need a temporary success to put you in a world of hurt.

A spearhead doesn't do much good without a spear shaft. If the Panzergroups reach Moscow with inadequate support what does it acomplish other than the destruction of said Panzergroups?

It is the breakthrough by the mobile formations which forces the enemy back which makes the job of the infantry much easier.
The panzergroups are never on their own. The infantry follows.

Exactly. Which means it's not just the readiness of the armored units it's the readiness of the entire force. The mobility of the German infantry was also an issue was it not? Wasn't that also part of the reason for the August hault?

[lwd]

???? Can you point out another example that closely paralles this? If you can't it clearly was not normal. Whether it would cause prohibitive problems or not is another matter. It's difficult to prove that but given what I've read it seems likely.

From your response below I take it that the answer to my question is no you can't. That issue settled

Being able to move supplies all the way up to the divisonal distribution points by rail is ideal but an army cannot rely on that. So there is the capability to shift supplies by truck from the army dumps at the railheads up to the divisions.

But that capacity is limited. From what I recall it became cost prohibitive around 300km if the organization even had the trucks to do it. Remember the Germans rellied a lot on horses and they were much less efficient.

Once an advance pauses there is always the possibilty to beef up the supplies available at the divisions again to the nominal level.

The possibilty but not the certainty. Many factors can affect this.

... If restocking would have been such an imossible issue, even during a pause in the advance then you would have seen ammo usage sharply drop in august but that was not the case .

Not necessarily. Ammo could have been given priority during that period and the fact that the army wasn't advancing lowered some of the other logistical demands. It also allowed the network to catch up with the advanced formations.

... There were never prohibitive issues before october.

That's certainly not what I've read. Indeed you might take a look at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... p_0001.htm
Where it states:

... Toward the end of July only 30 or 40 trains were arriving daily for all fronts. On 7 August Halder noted that the number should be increased to 58. By 11 September it was up to an average 59. At this point it apparently ceased to be a source of worry; there are no further diary tabulations until the time of the last desperate effort to take Moscow. On 29 November a six-day tabulation showed the Center getting an average of 2 more trains than in September, 31 instead of 29.20 But on 3 December it was observed that of the total 122 trains daily in the east 67 would after 15 December be used by the Quartermaster General 21 and another 13 for troop movements, leaving only 42 to supply the army groups. ...

So in early August they were getting about half the supplies they needed. This was fixed by late August/September but that didn't help in August.

[julian]

That is an absurd statement.

No, because the fast, deep advance in july did move german forces far from their railheads beyond the distance within which you can supposedly be fully supported.

[julian]

But the drive on Moscow would have had to cover more ground and involve more troops would it not? So the fact that one offensive was adequately supported doesn't mean that the other could have been.

That one offensive even succeeded with logistical issues created by the limited capacity of the railway which supported it. In a movement east PGR 2 Could have been supported much better.
And there was much more going on at the same. The divisions of PGR 3 that moved north were supported too. And you are conveniently igroring that the mobile divisions had had their refit and rest in the beginning of august.

[julian]

No that is not "the issue" it is one issue among many.

It is THE issue because it litterally bogs down any advance and creates massive logistical problems.

[julian]

But those ways require troops and muntions do they not? And if you have one fragile rail line supporting your thrust they only need a temporary success to put you in a world of hurt.

Nothing to do with more forces. It is partialy about echeloning in depth and the infantry armies also have a role to play. And mobile divisions will always get far beyond the railheads. The prospect of temporary successes by enemy forces on the rear is something that wil not inhibit a bold commander. Mobile forces can get themselves out of trouble as was shown more than once.

[julian]

Exactly. Which means it's not just the readiness of the armored units it's the readiness of the entire force. The mobility of the German infantry was also an issue was it not? Wasn't that also part of the reason for the August hault?

You clearly do not understand. It is the advance of the mobile forces that makes life much easier for the infantry armies. Their situation is better in a mobile advance compared with a heavy defensive battle. The august halt had certainly nothing to do with alleged unreadiness of the infantry armies.

[julian]

From your response below I take it that the answer to my question is no you can't. That issue settled

Very daring statement given your lack of reading on this subject.

[julian]

Not necessarily. Ammo could have been given priority during that period and the fact that the army wasn't advancing lowered some of the other logistical demands. It also allowed the network to catch up with the advanced formations.

I earlier gave the numbers about average ammo usage in the first month(1 1/2 basic load which was less than estimated)and ammo available in the AGN area after a month(two basic loads at army level and more at the AG and on board trains). The divisions started with their basic load and at the level of army and army group you have more stocks . Having not enough arriving by rail would take a long time to effect the divisions because it would mean in the first place the running down of reserves at army level.

[julian]

So in early August they were getting about half the supplies they needed. This was fixed by late August/September but that didn't help in August.

Bad answer as that would only cause the diminishing of reserves at army and army group level. If you have two basic loads present at army level and 1 1/2 basic load is consumed in a month by the divisions, fully restocking of the divisions while only half of the consumption level is received at the army dumps would cause the dumps at army level to drop by around a third. Not enough to cause a problem after a month.
Would therefore not prevent an advance at the end of august ,even more so as you state yourself that in september the problem was fixed.

[julian]

Some searching turned up the Foreign military studies 1945 -1954 P 190 study by Alfred Toppe concerning the AGC logistics during Barbarossa.
Contains a lot of interesting information.

A first excerpt follows.

"Assuming an organic truck-transport capacity of 2200 tons per army composed of 7 infantry, 2 armored and one motorised infantrydivision(with a total of some 250.000 men and 50.000 horses), of which all except 3 infantry divions were engaged in combat,the following distances were recorded as maximum for normal operations:
1.Ammunition
From detraining or non-organic detrucking(the point or area were supplies by trucks of the Supply Field Agency were offloaded)point to army depot 25 miles
From army depot to division dump(by division trucks) 31 miles

2.POL
From detraining or non-organic trucking point to division dump 81 miles(25 miles by army trucks plus 56 miles by division trucks)

3.Rations

From detraining or non-organic trucking point to division dump 69 miles(25 miles by army trucks plus 44 miles by diivision trucks)

Accordingly,priority for proximity to the front of detraining or non-organic detrucking points was established in the following order:ammunition, rations,fuel.
This priority was adhered to to but the maximum distance figures had to be revised.During the first weeks of the campagn they were occasionally doubled and, during the catastrophic winter of 1941-1942, when the performance of the railroads reached an unexpected low,they were even tripled.
It was the armies responsability to establish their depots (mainly for ammo,POL and rations)as close to the front as possible so that the division supply routes would be kept realtively short.The army depots were established in leapfrog fashion at distances of from 60 to 90 miles from each other. The road and rail network was of decisive importance in determining their location which was usually as near the center of the army area as possible.
In order to insure an uninterrupted advance by the panzer groups(armored armies)additional truck columns loaded with ammunition, POL and rations were assigned to the panzer group headquarters prior to the start of an offensive. These truck columns were referred to by the term overnight bag, being a sort of depot on wheels. Their number and the type of their supply load depended on the mission of the respective panzer group. In many instances the supplies carried in such an 'overnight bag'(1000 to 3000 tons)were used to establish an army depot immediately behind the combat troop of the Panzer group , thus extending the operational radius by virtue of the additional hauls (haul- a complete "transport cycle" ,i.e. the round trip including the loading and offloading)that could be performed. By this procedure the advance elements of the infantry corps following behind the panzer groups found ready supplies along their line of advance.
It was the reponsability of the Supply Field Agency to bridge the growing distances between the supply districts and the advancing combat forces by replenishing the army depots.This was carried out by rail and heavy truck transport(colums of heavy trucks(with or without trailer)organised into regiments or independent units that were used almost exclusively for hauls between the supply district and the army depots), being limited to travel on hard- surfaced roads.Since the capacity of the latter as well as that of organic truck units of the armies was limited the base section (suplly district)was occasionally advanced , and whenever necessary,new base depots were established."

[lwd]

That is an absurd statement.

No, because the fast, deep advance in july did move german forces far from their railheads beyond the distance within which you can supposedly be fully supported.

And the pause at the end of July and early August was so that the infantry and railheads could catch up with the spear heads.

But the drive on Moscow would have had to cover more ground and involve more troops would it not? So the fact that one offensive was adequately supported doesn't mean that the other could have been.

That one offensive even succeeded with logistical issues created by the limited capacity of the railway which supported it. In a movement east PGR 2 Could have been supported much better.

Really? I think it's going to take more than your hand waving to convince me.

And there was much more going on at the same. The divisions of PGR 3 that moved north were supported too. And you are conveniently igroring that the mobile divisions had had their refit and rest in the beginning of august.

Not at all. The problem doesn't occur in August the problems will start occuring later on.

No that is not "the issue" it is one issue among many.

It is THE issue because it litterally bogs down any advance and creates massive logistical problems.

By that logic as long as the mud stays away there should be no problem. That explains El Alamein very well doesn't it? Rommel just couldn't deal with the mud ... oh wait there wasn't any mud.

But those ways require troops and muntions do they not? And if you have one fragile rail line supporting your thrust they only need a temporary success to put you in a world of hurt.

Nothing to do with more forces. It is partialy about echeloning in depth and the infantry armies also have a role to play. And mobile divisions will always get far beyond the railheads. The prospect of temporary successes by enemy forces on the rear is something that wil not inhibit a bold commander. Mobile forces can get themselves out of trouble as was shown more than once.

Of course it has to do with more forces. If the opposition has little or nothing to threaten your flanks then you don't need to commit much force to secruing them. If they have massive forces on your flank then you need to commit more forces there. As the flank lengthens so does the area that the opposition can attack thus requireing even more forces. A temporary success that takes down the main log channel for a month or two can be critical. As for getting themselves out of trouble indeed sometimes they can but there are a number of well known examples where they failed to do so as well.

Exactly. Which means it's not just the readiness of the armored units it's the readiness of the entire force. The mobility of the German infantry was also an issue was it not? Wasn't that also part of the reason for the August hault?

You clearly do not understand. It is the advance of the mobile forces that makes life much easier for the infantry armies. Their situation is better in a mobile advance compared with a heavy defensive battle. The august halt had certainly nothing to do with alleged unreadiness of the infantry armies.

The infantry needs to keep up with the mobile forces. If they advance to quickly then gaps open up or they have to slow down. Again my reading was that this was happening in July. The Infantry also needs more time to recover as the German infantry was for the most part not motorized and there certainly weren't enough horses to transport everyone. Could they have gone on the offensive in August certainly. The question is what shape would they be in by the time the armored units got to Moscow (if they did) then consider that they needed to do more than just get to Moscow. From what I've read the plan was to encircule it at some distance and then the infantry is going to have to assault it.

From your response below I take it that the answer to my question is no you can't. That issue settled

Very daring statement given your lack of reading on this subject.

Not really. You were asked a very direct question that based on your posts todate should have been trivial to answer and answering it would have made your point. Instead you tried to ignore it and indeed are still doing so. The implication is clear. It has nothing to do with my knowledge of the subject by the way.

So in early August they were getting about half the supplies they needed. This was fixed by late August/September but that didn't help in August.

Bad answer

Not really.

as that would only cause the diminishing of reserves at army and army group level. If you have two basic loads present at army level and 1 1/2 basic load is consumed in a month by the divisions, fully restocking of the divisions while only half of the consumption level is received at the army dumps would cause the dumps at army level to drop by around a third. Not enough to cause a problem after a month.

That really depends on what the stocks are and where they are. Are the Army and group level stocks in supply dumps? If so then moving stuff to the divisions becomes more of a problem as the divisions advance. Once they get far enough you also have to move those dumps and the division supply dumps as well do the various units have the log capability to do this with their own assets? Esspecially when you consider the readiness rates of the various assets after the advances in June and July.

Would therefore not prevent an advance at the end of august ,even more so as you state yourself that in september the problem was fixed.

But would it be fixed if the offense starts in August? or would the problem get worse?

[julian]

And the pause at the end of July and early August was so that the infantry and railheads could catch up with the spear heads.

Pushing forward the raiheads had nothing to do with it.
And the issue is that there was no necessity for a pause all the way to the beginning of october as certain individuals state.

[julian]

Really? I think it's going to take more than your hand waving to convince me.

I did much more than that with one quote about PGR 2's advance to the south and the logistical problemes caused by the limited capcaity of the railroad behind it. Advancing east along a good raod and with a much higher capacity railroad behind it is easier.

[julian]

By that logic as long as the mud stays away there should be no problem. That explains El Alamein very well doesn't it? Rommel just couldn't deal with the mud ... oh wait there wasn't any mud.

Mud in a country with not many hardened roads is a major problem because it slows your advance to a crawl which allows your opponent to rally and it causes serious logistical problems as it is rather a nuisance when supply trucks get stuck in the mud.