Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

German campaigns and battles 1919-1945.

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julian
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Re: Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

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lwd wrote: Not in every case. But if the above is accurate why didn't the Germans try to break out of Stalingrad or succeed in the Battle of the Bulge? Certainly doesn't help to be out of ammo, or fuel, of food for that matter. Even worse to be out of all of them.
Fortunately , that was not the situation in 1941. There would not be more than the normal problems caused by an advance in depth.
And the opponent was in dire straits.
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Re: Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

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lwd wrote:Indeed and you have hardly supported it.
It is those that pretend that there were prohibitive supply problems in august peventing any offensive east that would have to prove these by data about amounts of ammo, fuel etc.. present in the area of AGC.
How strange that these supposedly prohibitive problems never came up at the time in the discussions in the german high command. No, it was all about in which direction the offensive should go and not about whether it was possible at all.
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Re: Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

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lwd wrote: [Weren't the first big drafts of replacements sent to the front in the latter part of August or September? Even a week or two would allow one to service some of the vehicles and allow some of those reparied or replaced to join their units. Perhaps "back up to strength" is something of an over statement but surely they were better off with at least some time to maintian, repair, and refit.
A strange statement as most mobile units had a rest in the beginning of august. Those that then went on further operations north or south, had almost no rest (2-3 days) before Taifun.
The divisions that moved from AGN like 1PD AND 6PD had hundreds of kms to drive which leads to a lot of wear and tear on vehicles .
The divisions of PGR 2 had weeks of fighting behind them and then only 2-3 days of rest before Taifun. Particularly these would have needed a longer refit period but there was no time given the imminence of unfavorable weather.
The whole issue is that an attack towards Moscow should have been started in august .Sending many mobile units on other operations and only after that starting the offensive on Moscow towards the end of the favorable campaign season made Taifun always a gamble.
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Re: Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

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lwd wrote: Not really, at least in and of itself.
But it does , also because PGR 2 was more difficult to supply in an avance south than in an advance east where it could be supported from the Roslavl-Brjansk road and the railroad running from Gomel to Brjansk. The advance south also put PGR2 in a more unfavorable situation from a logistical viewpoint for the Taifun offensive as illustrated by the following excerpt from Foreign Military studies manuscript P 143 a 'Selected army operations on the eastern front" :

" In preparing for the offensive the supply services had to rely entirely on the Gomel-Novgorod-Sversky railroad. This was a single track railroad with a daily capacity of six trains, each with a payload of 350 tons. All supplies not brought forward by rail had to be moved up by the Panzer groups own transportation from Chernigov, 120 miles distant from the assembly area.
No improvement in the supply situation was expected before the Panzer Group seized the paved road Roaslavl-Brjansk and the railroad running from Gomel through Brjansk to Orel.
In order to support operations until these objectives had been taken, the Panzer Group needed a basic load of ammunition, a five day ration supply, and fuel for 300 miles.
Owing to the small volume of supplies moved forward ny rail and Army High command supply colums to Chernigov , it was not possible to bring forward these requirements prior to the commencement of the operation.'
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Re: Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

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julian wrote:Fortunately , that was not the situation in 1941. There would not be more than the normal problems caused by an advance in depth. ...
Hand waving you are good at that I'll admit. It's not "normal" to start and advance in depth with your railheads as few and as far away as they were at the time is it? Nor when the rail ines themselves are being converted and it's necessary to tranship all the loads from one guage rail to another.
julian wrote:
lwd wrote:Indeed and you have hardly supported it.
It is those that pretend that there were prohibitive supply problems in august peventing any offensive east that would have to prove these by data about amounts of ammo, fuel etc.. present in the area of AGC. ...
Actually you are the proponent of there being no supply problem. As the proponent the burden of proof is on you. That's the way it works on reasonable forums. The "supply problems in august preventing any offensive" is a bit of a straw man as well. The problems don't appear to have been at a level that would have prevented it just of a level to make its ultimate success questionable, especially when combined with the flank threat and the potential weather problems.
julian wrote:
lwd wrote: Not really, at least in and of itself.
But it does ,
No it doesn't, not unless PGR 2 was the only force that would be drawing suppl from that line for the duration of the campaign.
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Re: Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

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lwd wrote:
Hand waving you are good at that I'll admit. It's not "normal" to start and advance in depth with your railheads as few and as far away as they were at the time is it? Nor when the rail ines themselves are being converted and it's necessary to tranship all the loads from one guage rail to another.
Nothing abnormal about it as long as it does this does not cause prohibitive problems. Waiting until weather causes prohibitive problems would have been the really bad move. Nobody in his right mind would have waited to start Taifun in october if there had not been the diversions.
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Re: Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

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lwd wrote: Actually you are the proponent of there being no supply problem. As the proponent the burden of proof is on you. That's the way it works on reasonable forums. The "supply problems in august preventing any offensive" is a bit of a straw man as well. The problems don't appear to have been at a level that would have prevented it just of a level to make its ultimate success questionable, especially when combined with the flank threat and the potential weather problems.
PGR 2 and PGR 3 had declared themselves ready to go in the second half of august which is not surprising as mobile divisions had had some rest and refit in the beginning of august. Those that fault that judgment must do so with data about ammo and fuel available at the level of divisions and armies in the area of AGC. It is interesting to note that a report by Generalquatiermeister Wagner of 24.03.1942 concluded that units had overestimated their ammo consumption before the beginning of the operations and had ordered too much resupply which led to overtaxing the transport system and quantities of ammo being spread all over the place.
The only ones coming up with logistical problems are the ones that are unwilling to accept a higher probability of getting to Moscow in another scenario. At the time, there was never any mention of prohibitive supply problems.
Coming up with weather is a good joke as that is exactly the reason why an operation towards Moscow had to start early enough. And flank threats are inevitable in any deep advance. The advance to the south in september also had a very long eastern flank.
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Re: Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

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lwd wrote: No it doesn't, not unless PGR 2 was the only force that would be drawing suppl from that line for the duration of the campaign.
The Panzergroups are the main striking force and it is their ability to attack which is decisive. PGR 2 would have been better off atacking east when it started south. Also as a consequece of that advance south, it found itself in an unfavorable position, even from a logistical viewpoint as it did not have the ammo and fuel required at the start of Taifun.
What can really be questioned is the decision to still start an attack towards Moscow in october.
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Re: Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

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julian wrote:
lwd wrote: Not in every case. But if the above is accurate why didn't the Germans try to break out of Stalingrad or succeed in the Battle of the Bulge? Certainly doesn't help to be out of ammo, or fuel, of food for that matter. Even worse to be out of all of them.
Fortunately , that was not the situation in 1941.
Which is irrelevant to the valididity of your original satement, i.e.:
julian wrote: ... Logistics serve operations, not the inverse.
Logistical issues are an inhibitive factor but do not stop commanders from doing what they want. ....
and
julian wrote: ... Logistical issues will not stop an operation from being done. ...
Of course they didn't prevent the above operations they just guaranteed that they would fail. Clearly inadequate logistics shoud preclude some operations. Rommel's adventures in Africa are a nother mark on the wall. It boils down to two qeustions actully.
1) was the German log network adequate to support a drive that could capture Moscow?
2) If not did the Germans realize it?
There would not be more than the normal problems caused by an advance in depth. ....
That seems an awfully bold statement to make given the existing log network at the time.
julian wrote:
lwd wrote:.... It's not "normal" to start and advance in depth with your railheads as few and as far away as they were at the time is it? Nor when the rail ines themselves are being converted and it's necessary to tranship all the loads from one guage rail to another.
Nothing abnormal about it as long as it does this does not cause prohibitive problems.
???? Can you point out another example that closely paralles this? If you can't it clearly was not normal. Whether it would cause prohibitive problems or not is another matter. It's difficult to prove that but given what I've read it seems likely.
Waiting until weather causes prohibitive problems would have been the really bad move. Nobody in his right mind would have waited to start Taifun in october if there had not been the diversions.
That's a different issue. If one option looks bad choosing another one that isn't much if any better doesn't make sense.
julian wrote:
lwd wrote: Actually you are the proponent of there being no supply problem. As the proponent the burden of proof is on you. That's the way it works on reasonable forums. ...
PGR 2 and PGR 3 had declared themselves ready to go in the second half of august which is not surprising as mobile divisions had had some rest and refit in the beginning of august. Those that fault that judgment must do so with data about ammo and fuel available at the level of divisions and armies in the area of AGC.
If I was the proponent you would be correct but I'm simply calling your assumption that they are adequate to question. Certainly there are numerous references to their being supply issues at that point in the campaign though.
The only ones coming up with logistical problems are the ones that are unwilling to accept a higher probability of getting to Moscow in another scenario.
Another assumption of yours that is incorrect.
.... Coming up with weather is a good joke as that is exactly the reason why an operation towards Moscow had to start early enough.
Hardly a joke but it certainly was a factor and could have been whenever the assault was launched.
And flank threats are inevitable in any deep advance. The advance to the south in september also had a very long eastern flank.
But were there forces massing on it already? Ones that likely would be commited to an offensive against said flank?
julian wrote:
lwd wrote: No it doesn't, not unless PGR 2 was the only force that would be drawing suppl from that line for the duration of the campaign.
The Panzergroups are the main striking force and it is their ability to attack which is decisive. ....
A spearhead doesn't do much good without a spear shaft. If the Panzergroups reach Moscow with inadequate support what does it acomplish other than the destruction of said Panzergroups?
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Re: Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

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lwd wrote: Of course they didn't prevent the above operations they just guaranteed that they would fail. Clearly inadequate logistics shoud preclude some operations. Rommel's adventures in Africa are a nother mark on the wall. It boils down to two qeustions actully.
1) was the German log network adequate to support a drive that could capture Moscow?
2) If not did the Germans realize it?
Making logisitcs the determining factor in these campaigns is wrong.
If german logistics could not support a drive on Moscow, they could not support the drive as far as it got in july either.
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Re: Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

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lwd wrote: If I was the proponent you would be correct but I'm simply calling your assumption that they are adequate to question. Certainly there are numerous references to their being supply issues at that point in the campaign though.
Supply issues there certainly where but not to the extent of preventing a succesful offensive. In spite of supply issues PGR 2 did achieve success in its drive south.
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Re: Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

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lwd wrote: Hardly a joke but it certainly was a factor and could have been whenever the assault was launched.
The issue is that in the fall there is a high probability of bad weather which would cause serious problems, particularly in a country with a lack of hardened roads. That is why nobody in his right mind would have intentionally let the summer pass and attack in october.
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Re: Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

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lwd wrote: But were there forces massing on it already? Ones that likely would be commited to an offensive against said flank?
If an opponent has reserves, he can threaten the lengthening flank during a deep advance. There are ways to deal with that.
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Re: Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

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lwd wrote:
A spearhead doesn't do much good without a spear shaft. If the Panzergroups reach Moscow with inadequate support what does it acomplish other than the destruction of said Panzergroups?
It is the breakthrough by the mobile formations which forces the enemy back which makes the job of the infantry much easier.
The panzergroups are never on their own. The infantry follows.
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Re: Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

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lwd wrote:
???? Can you point out another example that closely paralles this? If you can't it clearly was not normal. Whether it would cause prohibitive problems or not is another matter. It's difficult to prove that but given what I've read it seems likely.
Being able to move supplies all the way up to the divisonal distribution points by rail is ideal but an army cannot rely on that.
So there is the capability to shift supplies by truck from the army dumps at the railheads up to the divisions. Once an advance pauses there is always the possibilty to beef up the supplies available at the divisions again to the nominal level.
In the first month of Barbarossa german divisions used 1 1/2 times their basic load of ammo. Not an extraordinary amount that went beyond what was expected. In Donats study it is mentioned that on 26.07.1941 in the area of AGN , for example, there were two basic loads at the level of the armies plus 5000 tons in the armygroup dumps and 11000 tons loaded on trains.
If restocking would have been such an imossible issue, even during a pause in the advance then you would have seen ammo usage sharply drop in august but that was not the case . Ammo usage only dropped in october. There were never prohibitive issues before october.
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