julian wrote:lwd wrote:
Not in every case. But if the above is accurate why didn't the Germans try to break out of Stalingrad or succeed in the Battle of the Bulge? Certainly doesn't help to be out of ammo, or fuel, of food for that matter. Even worse to be out of all of them.
Fortunately , that was not the situation in 1941.
Which is irrelevant to the valididity of your original satement, i.e.:
julian wrote: ... Logistics serve operations, not the inverse.
Logistical issues are an inhibitive factor but do not stop commanders from doing what they want. ....
and
julian wrote: ... Logistical issues will not stop an operation from being done. ...
Of course they didn't prevent the above operations they just guaranteed that they would fail. Clearly inadequate logistics shoud preclude some operations. Rommel's adventures in Africa are a nother mark on the wall. It boils down to two qeustions actully.
1) was the German log network adequate to support a drive that could capture Moscow?
2) If not did the Germans realize it?
There would not be more than the normal problems caused by an advance in depth. ....
That seems an awfully bold statement to make given the existing log network at the time.
julian wrote: lwd wrote:.... It's not "normal" to start and advance in depth with your railheads as few and as far away as they were at the time is it? Nor when the rail ines themselves are being converted and it's necessary to tranship all the loads from one guage rail to another.
Nothing abnormal about it as long as it does this does not cause prohibitive problems.
???? Can you point out another example that closely paralles this? If you can't it clearly was not normal. Whether it would cause prohibitive problems or not is another matter. It's difficult to prove that but given what I've read it seems likely.
Waiting until weather causes prohibitive problems would have been the really bad move. Nobody in his right mind would have waited to start Taifun in october if there had not been the diversions.
That's a different issue. If one option looks bad choosing another one that isn't much if any better doesn't make sense.
julian wrote:lwd wrote:
Actually you are the proponent of there being no supply problem. As the proponent the burden of proof is on you. That's the way it works on reasonable forums. ...
PGR 2 and PGR 3 had declared themselves ready to go in the second half of august which is not surprising as mobile divisions had had some rest and refit in the beginning of august. Those that fault that judgment must do so with data about ammo and fuel available at the level of divisions and armies in the area of AGC.
If I was the proponent you would be correct but I'm simply calling your assumption that they are adequate to question. Certainly there are numerous references to their being supply issues at that point in the campaign though.
The only ones coming up with logistical problems are the ones that are unwilling to accept a higher probability of getting to Moscow in another scenario.
Another assumption of yours that is incorrect.
.... Coming up with weather is a good joke as that is exactly the reason why an operation towards Moscow had to start early enough.
Hardly a joke but it certainly was a factor and could have been whenever the assault was launched.
And flank threats are inevitable in any deep advance. The advance to the south in september also had a very long eastern flank.
But were there forces massing on it already? Ones that likely would be commited to an offensive against said flank?
julian wrote:lwd wrote:
No it doesn't, not unless PGR 2 was the only force that would be drawing suppl from that line for the duration of the campaign.
The Panzergroups are the main striking force and it is their ability to attack which is decisive. ....
A spearhead doesn't do much good without a spear shaft. If the Panzergroups reach Moscow with inadequate support what does it acomplish other than the destruction of said Panzergroups?