How Much of WW2 Was an Oil War?

[Nebelwerfer]

Was the North Africa campaign in the end an oil war?

Was the thrust through southern Russia to the Caspian Sea an oil war?

How much of Japan's expansionism in Southeast Asia an oil war?

"Plus cela change, plus c'est la meme chose."

[Grunt]

Was the North Africa campaign in the end an oil war?

Not yet, I think. It would have become an oil war if the Axis would have taken Egypt and gone further for the Middle East oil fields. BTW, I think it´s somewhat "funny" how the Afrikakorps ran out of fuel on the Libyan soil, with tons and tons of oil right under their feet, which of course were not discovered before the 1950´s...

Was the thrust through southern Russia to the Caspian Sea an oil war?

I would say "definetely YES".

How much of Japan's expansionism in Southeast Asia an oil war?

The japanese thrust for Malaysia and Indonesia after the american oil embargo and Pearl Harbour was definetely for oil I think.

[Nebelwerfer]

Dear Grunt,

Thanks for your reply.

Regarding your point on North Africa, would you agree that the Afrikakorps' immediate objective was to control Egypt and thereby achieve the following strategic objectives:

a) the Suez canal (probably the primariy strategic objective) AND, not OR

b) the Mideast oil fields? AND

c) the central and eastern Mediterranean?

Thanks,

Nebelwerfer

[Enrico Cernuschi]

Hello Gentlemen,

both WWI and WW II were wars (not single campaigns) for oil.

EC

[PaulJ]

Well ... I for one would argue that neither world war was "really about oil."

Of course, that's not to say that oil wasn't a strategic consideration in the war, once it was underway.

There are various schools of thought about the causes of wars, and one (of the more popular) schools of thought is indeed that they are fought for control of resources. And oil was, of course, one of the most important resources of the Twentieth Century. (Less so in 1914, when coal was more imporant.)

For myself, I am from what one might call the "balance of power" school of thought. This school of thought argues that if one examines the actual decisions that led to wars in detail, it turns out that natural resource considerations (oil or any other), just weren't central to leader's decision making. What was central were considerations of power and relative advantage.

WWI started because an assassination in an obscure part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire provoked some diplomatic brinksmanship that tripped over the edge of the balance of power considerations. (And none of the fighting was to gain control of natural resources per se.)

WWII started because Hitler's next political objective was to absorb the Western half of Poland, and (mis) calculated that the Western powers wouldn't actually go to war over the issue. Barbarossa could be seen as aimed at a natural resource -- but that was lebensraum rather than oil. Once at war Hitler did cite the strategic importance of the Baku oil fields, but that was hardly the reason he launched Barbarossa, and in any event was probably faulty strategic reasoning anyway, to which he was prone. (Germany got all of the oil it needed other sources, primarily Romania.)

Arguably, Hitler only brought up the alleged significance of the Baku oil as an rhetorical device to use to keep the generals in line, as he could argue that it was imporant for "grand strategic reasons", an argument they as military specialists were ill positioned to refute.

And Middle Eastern oil in the 1940s was not nearly as significant as it later became. As Grunt pointed out, the Libyan oil was not even discovered until the 1950s. And it has to be pointed out that the North African was started because Mussolini was looking for easy pickings and the British were concerned to protect not oil but the Suez canal. The DAK's only strategic objective was to prop up a faultering ally and prevent their humiliation. No oil as fundamental in anyone's calculations there.

[Enrico Cernuschi]

I'm afraid we have an other episode of the eternal confrontation between rethoric BBC History channel style and hard facts which are not according the old, comfortable British propaganda scheme.

WWI was had, as her origin, the 1909 British break of the previous, old agreement with Germany, the cause was th ediscover of oil in the Turkish territories become known, after 1918, as Iraq.
This opinion, by the way, is not from meink Kampf but was declared at the House of Commons by Sir Makr Sykes (a Toru M.P. and hardly a fascist or nazi) in 1914 (David Fromkin, A Peace to end All Peace, 1989).

WW II had, as her origin, the Soviet building up menace in M.E. over Iran and Iraq again since 1932 as a consequence of the growing collapse of the old Russians wells. This danger was correctly appreciated by the British governments inducing them, in Oct. 1938, to launch a pre emptive strike against Italy as a monitor to all the "jackals, USSR, USA, Japan and Germany" (F.O. words) rounding around the empire.

WW III could be considered, a day, by the scholars of the future, the third global conflict originated in old Mesopotamia as the French (and their german masters) did not appreciate very much the Anglosaxon retourn in Iraq after the French sponsored 1962 coup there.

Bye EC

[PaulJ]

Enrico, I'm fascinated. How exactly (if I am following you) did the British manage to maneuvre the great powers on the continent into attacking each other in August 1914 so that they could step in? They showed clever restraint, by the way, in going to war on the continent against the Germans first, before eventually sending an expeditionary force off to the Middle East to achieve their real grand strategic aim in Mesopotomia. And I guess Gallipoli was another clever distraction to divert attention from the real fundamental cause of the great war, which lay further east between the Tigris and Euphrates.

And I hadn't realized that actually WWII started the year before Hitler invaded Poland, in the form of a British pre-emptive strike against Italy.

Wanting to correct old nostrums is one thing, but this is far fetched, even for you, Enrico. Actually, in one sense I think you give the British far too much credit. EVERYTHING that everyone else did was actually the result of perfidious Albion cleverly pulling strings to manipulate them?

Cheers,

[Enrico Cernuschi]

Yes, it was.

Of course, like Orson Wells in his devilish Quinlan, both the original programs were ruined by the impredictable nature of war.

In 1914, for example, the British Parliament allow the cabinet to declare the war at the condiction it had to be an happy one, without the presence of a single British soldier on the continent, Navy activitues only 8Alan Clark, The Donkeys). The cabinet, whose purpose was not to sign the 1914 oil agreement over the Mesopotamia fields which reserved Britain (Anglo-Persian TPC) only the 50% with 25% to the Deutsche Bank and 25% to the Royal Dutch-Shell (Joe Stork, Middle East Oila and Energy Crisis, ed. Monthly Review Press, N.y. 1975), granted this condiction to the M.P.
Things, anyway, had a different course.

The same for the 1939 plans as the Danzig crisis arrived almost an year before the scheduled time appreciated by Sir Samuel Hore Belisha on 24 July 1939 (PRO CAB 2/9, Minutes of the 368th meeting held on 24 July 1939 Committee Imperial defence) ruining againn the timetable.

The hard true is that Britain had still too much power then and was ruled by a class the Italian professor Gaetano Salvemini (one of the most praised anti fascist leader and champion of democracy exiled in USA during the Mussolini regime times) labelled as "petty criminals" because they tried to use the old Francis Drake and Hawkins systems in the XX Century.

The problem is: did the British leadership improved since WW I and WW II or is still formed (both conservative and labours) by dangerous amateurs?

Bye EC

[redcoat]

WWI was had, as her origin, the 1909 British break of the previous, old agreement with Germany, the cause was th ediscover of oil in the Turkish territories become known, after 1918, as Iraq.

Odd, in my history books it has the cause of the war as Austria's attack on Serbia

WW II had, as her origin, the Soviet building up menace in M.E. over Iran and Iraq again since 1932 as a consequence of the growing collapse of the old Russians wells. This danger was correctly appreciated by the British governments inducing them, in Oct. 1938, to launch a pre emptive strike against Italy as a monitor to all the "jackals, USSR, USA, Japan and Germany" (F.O. words) rounding around the empire.

Even more odd. So World War II didn't start because Germany invaded Poland then

WW III could be considered, a day, by the scholars of the future, the third global conflict originated in old Mesopotamia as the French (and their german masters) did not appreciate very much the Anglosaxon retourn in Iraq after the French sponsored 1962 coup there.

Bye EC

LOL EC now that is funny

[Grunt]

Nebelwerfer,

Regarding your point on North Africa, would you agree that the Afrikakorps' immediate objective was to control Egypt and thereby achieve the following strategic objectives:

Well I think the first immediate objective was to prevent a british victory over italian Libya. But after the offensive towards Egypt started, the objectives shown by you

a) the Suez canal (probably the primariy strategic objective) AND, not OR

b) the Mideast oil fields? AND

c) the central and eastern Mediterranean?

semm absolutely correct to me.

[Enrico Cernuschi]

It's plain we are speaking according different categories.

EC

[Black Baron]

Hitler did mention the democracies had big empires, & Germany had no oversea bases. So one could derive from that a desire to control landmasses with as part of that, obviously, the resources. I read recently that half of germany's fuel used during the war was synthetic.

Hitler himself mentioned Rommels moving through Egypt with a hook up through Iran to Baku. Controlling resources was but one of Hitlers ambitions as we know, conquering other races motivated him as well.

Hitler was funded by US corporations before the war. Standard oil sold him the synthetic oil manufacturing technical details.

Difficult to determine just how much the war was about oil.

[vroddrew]

Was the North Africa campaign in the end an oil war?

No. And trying to fit this theory into the historical record is disingenuous, to say the very least.

The North African campaign started because Mussolini, believing British power to be fatally weakened by the defeat in Europe, thought it would be a good time to add to his Empire.

The North African campaign continued because Hitler, recognizing that Fascist Italy was Germany's only ally, and a troublesome one at that, and could not allow an Axis defeat to occur.

Britain persevered with the North African campaign, not because of concerns about oil supplies, but because control of the African shoreline would have made the Mediterranean into an Axis lake - threatening their route to the Suez canal. It was also a convenient place for them to take on the Axis - where the strength of the Royal Navy could, and did, prevent any overwhelming buildup of enemy forces.

Its interesting to play theoretical "what-if" scenarios, with Rommel and the Panzerarmee rolling through Iraq and Iran to link up with Army Group South somewhere in the Caucases. But realistically, that was never going to happen. Even if they'd had the fuel, which they didn't, the few tanks and trucks they had would have worn out two thousand miles before they got there.

For most of World War II the biggest single producer of oil in the world was the United States.

[timobrienwells]

Congratulations Paul J.A very concise and historically accurate analysis of this 'oil war thing.Hitlers 'idea' was lebensraum,and his tool to achieve was the wehrmacht,luftwaffe,etc.But being an idiot and an egotist,he thought his genius to be above military realities.The 'resources' thing led to his 2 worst mistakes in russia.That is,[1]the diversion to kiev by army group centre[Guderian],ostensibly to gain the 'wheat basket' of the ukraine, and[2]the campaign into the caucasus which resulted in the disaster at Stalingrad.Hitlers reasons for 'operation blau' was gaining the donets industrial basin,but mainly the oilfields of maikop/baku.His generals knew that in both instances that the strategic imperative was the destruction of the armed forces of the soviet union,but hitler having been a highly decorated corporal thought he knew better.You are right about the Romanian oilfields at ploesti,they had the capacity to supply Germanys needs.Ultimately oil would have become more of an issue[as it did],but I aggree that it was not a primary driver.

[Deiter Hollenstein]

As for the Japanese, most of their campaigns were about natural resources in general, going as far back as the Manchurian operations in the 1930s. For them, it was simply a question of striking north or south. The navy favored the strike south option, and after the drubbing the Japanese army suffered at the hands of the Soviets, as well as the growing quagmire in China, the strike south option was selected as having the best chance of securing resources (including oil, but also things like rubber and other industry basics) that the Empire needed.

Limiting the resource discussion to oil alone is more reflective of a modern mindset than it is the realities of 1930-1945.