donwhite wrote:I'm wondering if France & the UK were a bit more aggressive at the out set, that is when Germany first invaded Poland, whether this may have a bearing on the initial outcome. Apparently French forces made a token advance against Germany's West wall defenses while the bulk of the latter's army was tied up in Poland but they did not force the issue. I'm assuming the time taken for full mobilisation could be a factor here.
Cheers
May I put some lines into the discussion ...
The first problem is that Belgium holded it's Neutrality. The French didn't place many forces at the first stage of the attack in the rear of Belgium because they was sure that Germany would never goes trough Belgium without the autorisation.
In the mean time, the Brittish were (Mr Chamberlain) trying to sign some papers with Mister Adolf to be keept out the War ...
The third ... the belgian army on may 10 1940 was over 800.000 men but conduted by a group of "idiots" that were teached on 1914-1918 basis wich mean ... we (the doughboys) are there and we (the doughboys again) stay were we are ...
The attak from Germany could only be a succes because they were simply facing the most stupid defenses ever created ...
some exemple .... (historical)
Battice 120 MM battery :
Battery to Command : We have a whole german armored bataillon in sight, can we blow them away ..... ?
Answer : No idea ! I don't know ...
Battery to Command : We have several hundred germans running on the top of the Bunker, can we use schrapnel projectils and erase them ?
Answer : are they fighthing on you ?
Another sport ... Radio Message in the whole Belgian combat force .... we are trowing handgrenades (mills) at the german and they don't explode ...
Answer ... it's not our fault if the OD under officer is home for holliday and have the keys of the detonators place .....
How do you want to win a war that way ....
Beside .... in the Vielsam Area the whole German Army was stopped and almost ready to withdraw because of a pair dozen Belgian Ardennes Jager that was using 75 and 47 AT guns and blowing away anything that looked like a panzer ...
War is like Politic .... it a way far to much important subject to let Officers take control over it ...
Last .... this is a salute to Caporal Foch ! Garde Frontière and first Soldier killed during World War Two on may 5th 1940 !!!!
Proud Little Belgium
Oooops typo ----> May 10th 1940
sorry
In the Sedan area the German soldier were so scared that 50% of the german troops that crosses the river falled out of the dinkies .... They were tol that on the other side the french army was made of arabian troops (senegal) and that these soldier was known as "ears cutter" when they make prisonners ... it was trough in 1914-1918 ...
The best book I've found that deals with this subject is Alistair Horne's "To Lose a Battle". Part of his trilogy of Franco-German conflicts (also covered are the war of 1870 and the battle of Verdun), it begins with the Paris Victory Parade in 1919, and continues through the capitulation of the French at Compiegne in 1940. I would highly recommend this book to anyone interested in learning more about the subject, as Horne is an entertaining as well as informative author. It is out of print, I believe, but it is well worth looking for.
Scarred by the terrible losses incurred in the first war, France was simply unable economically, politically, and perhaps most importantly, morally to match the German army of 1940. The French military command structure in 1940 was disastrously organized - Gamelin, as commander of the French army was also responsible for French forces in (among other places) Syria. He also lacked radio equipment at his headquarters.
The German "Sichselschnitt" plan was extremely effective - its strongpoint struck at the hinge between two French armies, and the greatest blows fell upon second- and third-wave French divisions, made up of older reservists, who simply did not stand up to the dive bombing attacks and artillery barrages. What mobile forces France did have had been rushed north into Belgium to meet the threat of a German invasion of the Low Countries. Once the breakthrough had been achieved at Sedan, France had no "mass de maneuver" of reserves to contain the German attack.
In spite of all this, however, there is nothing "inevitable" about France's defeat in 1940. Had a few things gone differently - a stronger French CIC; better divisions in the critical Sedan sector; a swifter Allied aerial attack on the Meuse river crossings; Rommel's motorcyclists not finding a weir unguarded - the battle for France could have come to a very different conclusion.
sid guttridge wrote:Certainly an offensive by the French couldn't have saved Poland, but it might have dictated the terms on which the Germans first committed their forces returning from the east. I would guess that the Germans were probably not in a position to over run France in the winter of 1939-40, but they could very probably have driven the French back on the Maginot line
Misleading.
On Sep 12, the French had 66 divisions already deployed and in combat positions, the Germans had just 30. On the central sector of the frontline (between Luxembourg and the Rhine), the French numerical superiority was even bigger (36 vs 12 divisons). But this comparison does not tell it all. All French divisions were first-call units, the creme of the army. The Germans have thrown their best against Poland, and what was left in the West were reserve or skeleton divisions. If you compare the combat strength, I guess I would not be erring very much when estimating that the French superiority was like 4:1.
If the French had sticked to their committments and had mounted a full-blown offensive mid-September, there would be no point discussing what the Germans could have achieved in the winter of 1939-1940. The French units would have captured Karlsruhe on day 2, Mannheim on day 3, Darmstadt on day 4 and Frankfurt a/M on day 5. My guess is that there would have been no day 6. Hitler would have been toppled, one of the Nazi cronies (the Fat Hermann?) would have taken over, and Germany would have asked for cease-fire.
Could the French offensive have saved Poland? Well, maybe yes and maybe no. Could it have saved France? I believe it could have saved not just France, but Europe.
Only about thirty French divisions were first line Active divisions (equivalent to the German Welle 1). A similar number were Series-A (equivalent to German Welle 2, I think), which consisted of younger reservists.
Your timetable for "Karlsruhe on day 2 etc." is complete fantasy. French Plan E did not envisage anything like that speed of advance. Indeed, it seems not to have designated a crossing point over the Rhine at all, let alone the capture of Karlsruhe, which lies on the east bank of the Rhine. In fact, the French appear to have intended to clear the western Rhine bank in a northerly direction towards the Ruhr, not force it in the Karlsruhe-Frankfurt region.
I doubt the French were even capable of sustaining the rate of advance you propose, especially since they had no fully formed armoured divisions and few DLMs or motorised infantry division.
But let us concede your timetable for a moment. The French launch 66 divisions on 12 September and take an extremely unlikely six days to take Frankfurt. What is the situation in Poland on 18 September? Warsaw is surrounded, the Polish government has already fled to Romania and the Ruussians are occupying Eastern Poland and rounding up the remnants of the Polish Army.
Thus, even if Hitler was overthrown on 18 September, Poland was already finished.
However, if the French did manage to capture the entire west bank of the Rhine, it could have had major consequences. The Germans would have found it a far more demanding natural obstacle than any they actually faced in May-June 1940. In fact, the French were planning on a war of at least two years, during which a blockade of Germany and the build up of the British Army was intended to shift the ballance of power in Allied favour.
sid guttridge wrote:Only about thirty French divisions were first line Active divisions (equivalent to the German Welle 1)
a source please?
sid guttridge wrote:Your timetable for "Karlsruhe on day 2 etc." is complete fantasy
of course it is. This is the point.
sid guttridge wrote:French Plan E did not envisage anything like that speed of advance....
as above. The French plans were rubbish. Having spoken with them in August, I believe, Churchill noted they had no offensive plan at all.
sid guttridge wrote:I doubt the French were even capable of sustaining the rate of advance you propose, especially since they had no fully formed armoured divisions and few DLMs or motorised infantry division
most of the cities quoted are separated by 30-50 km distance. German refugees in OstPreussen were covering this distance daily on horsecarts, in snow blizzard, bombed by Soviet aircraft, pushed out of the road by own troops, and being mostly women, children and the elderly.
sid guttridge wrote:But let us concede your timetable for a moment. The French launch 66 divisions on 12 September and take an extremely unlikely six days to take Frankfurt. What is the situation in Poland on 18 September? Warsaw is surrounded, the Polish government has already fled to Romania and the Ruussians are occupying Eastern Poland and rounding up the remnants of the Polish Army Thus, even if Hitler was overthrown on 18 September, Poland was already finished
This is totally irrelevant for the topic of this discussion. The French onslaught would have proven decisive regardless of what was going on in the East. And still, aren't you a bit too quick to declare finished an army of 0.7m people, still in combat?
sid guttridge wrote:However, if the French did manage to capture the entire west bank of the Rhine, it could have had major consequences. The Germans would have found it a far more demanding natural obstacle than any they actually faced in May-June 1940. In fact, the French were planning on a war of at least two years, during which a blockade of Germany and the build up of the British Army was intended to shift the ballance of power in Allied favour
why did they comit to full-scale offensive then?
**
In a nutshell: are you saying that all France was capable to do in September 1939 was heroically defend the country against 30 German reserve divisions?
I will get back to you on a source for the active divisions of the French Army. In essence, the French infantry divisions came in three varieties: Active, Series A and Series B. The Active divisions were those kept at near wartime strength during peactime. They contained most of the annual conscript class. Series A were, I think, similarly equipped, but they had only a small professional cadre in peacetime and were brought up to strength in wartime with the most recently trained reservists. (If I remember rightly the numbering of the Active and Series A divisions was intermixed). The Series B divisions consisted of older reservists with obsolete equipment. (If I remember rightly, they were numbered from 60 up). It was against one of these that the Germans made their decisive breakthrough at Sedan.
The speed of German refugees in 1945 is irrelevant (and I very much doubt they could sustain a daily average of 30-50 kilometres and they were not, presumably, facing resistance). A more appropriate (although still imperfect) analogy would be with the advance of American forces over the same ground in 1944-45. This took months.
The fate of the Poles is highly relevant. If they had been decisively defeated by 18 September, which was the case, then German forces would have been released for service in the West and the favourable ratio of divisions in favour of the French wuld not have lasted long. And yes, it is perfectly possible to write off Polish prospects by 18 September. Their captal was surrounded, many of their best units had been destroyed, the remainder in were flight, Russia was attacking them from behind, their last port had fallen and their fleet had fled to the UK, their air force had flown its last effective missions on 15 September. By 18 September the Polish campaign was essentially a mopping up operation. The Red Army, for instance, captured over 400,000 Poles for the loss of only a few thousand of its own men.
Nope. France wasn't merely capable of defending itself against 30 German reserve divisions (although not all German divisions in the West were actually reserve, if you check). France was capable of mounting a major offensive and had clear plans for such an operation up to the Rhine at least. However, it was not mentally or physically equipped to launch a far-ranging, decisive offensive deep into Germany in the little time Poland managed to hold out. To have done so, it would have had to have grasped the Blitzkrieg concept several years earlier and built equipment and military organisations appropriate to this form of fast moving warfare. As we all know from the events of 1940, this was not the case.
When germany attacked France the french forces there or a regiment wild geese would have done exactly the make thing.
Germany was well trained - training in war stage for more than 6 years - germany was using a brand new tactic - panzer march - and germany was perfekt equiped and commanded because the 2 best german officers where commanding.
The french were on may 10th 1940 still trying to find out what happened in Verdun during WW1 ... as well as the Belgian ....
many thanks for the source on the French divisions, which seems to explain the difference between their different types. I presume this is also the source of your claim that “Only about thirty French divisions were first line Active divisions”. If your claim is correct (and I have no reason to doubt it), it would mean that a half of the French divisions deployed were those kept at a wartime strength during the peace time, and another half were divisions with first-rate, young and freshly trained conscripts. I think your post is a decisive confirmation that the French had a creme of their army deployed against the Germans in September 1939.
I think you are pretty much right when saying that a comparison of the American task of November 1944 at the gates of the Western Wall to the task the French faced the same place in September 1939 is “still imperfect”. I would say even more, it is nothing but a pathetic joke. In September 1939 the elite French troops, enjoying a threefold numerical superiority and great weather conditions, were facing 3rd rate German reserve units, while Western Wall existed mostly on papers of the OKW planners. Apart from the fact that it was same place and the same opponent, nothing else justifies your comparison and nothing supports your claim that the French would have struggled for months in this almost undefended area.
You are maybe 10% right and 90% wrong when saying that the fate of Poland did matter for success of the would-have-been French offensive. The German divisions fighting in Poland were separated from the French border by a distance of some 1.500 km. I vaguely recollect that it took a few hundred trains (200?) to transport a single German division. Even assuming that mid-September OKW has started to shuttle to France say, 20 of their divisions engaged in Poland, they would not have been ready for deployment before mid-October (by the way, why did you originally write about a German counter-offensive in the winter of 1939-1940?). By that time, the French would have been in Franfurt already (if you do not like the day 5 idea). Which demonstrates that there was something like a month the French had at their disposal regardless of the progress of Fall Weiss.
Next, I think you are doing an honour to the French Staff by saying that the French army “was not mentally or physically equipped to launch a far-ranging, decisive offensive deep into Germany in the little time Poland managed to hold out”. I would say that the French were not mentally equipped to launch a far-ranging offensive deep into Germany at all. In line witht the earlier Franco-British agreements, Paris was focused on the Mediterranean as their key interest area, with passive approach towards Western Europe. I am not aware of any French plan or even a draft scenario for an onslaught on Germany, which France was using to fool Warshaw around. Which, by the way, has nothing to do with our speculations. We are not speculating whether the French were or were not willing to launch a decisive offensive – I think most agree they were not. We are speculating what impact such a hypothetical decisive offensice would have had.
Last but not least, you seem very biased towards one of the many scenarios when saying that even in case of the French decisive offensive kicked off mid-Sep Poland was finished and Polish prospects were to be written off (not to mention that statements like “their captal was surrounded” or “their last port had fallen” are pure fantasy). I would agree that the fate of Poland was militarily decided on Sep 6-9, when the Wehrmacht cut the Poles in two pieces and opened the way to Warshaw. But this is all given we are playing the Germany vs Poland scenario. No-one in the Polish command did believe they were fighting a one-to-one war, and tailored their strategy according to the expected French offensive. Until mid-Septemer the Germans have failed to complete their plan of destroying the Polish army; though suffering losses, it was still some 0.7m people strong and capable of offensive actions. Now let us take Russia: Stalin was so cautious he has waited until the very last moment before turning his knob; he was desperate to make sure the Germans have done the job. There is no reason to believe that following the French onslaught and the subsequent withdrawal of many German units from Poland, he would have not reconsidered.
There is nothing you wrote which sustains a thesis that the Germans were capable of stopping a full-scale French offensive in September 1939.
I don't think that there has ever been any doubt that the cream of the French Army was deployed against Germany in 1939. It was, after all, the only country with which France was at war.
What I actually wrote was that Active divisions were kept NEAR their wartime strength in peacetime. (For comparison, the German active divisions (Welle 1) were kept at about 80% of their wartime strength during peacetime.)
Nor did I write anything about "first rate, young and freshly trained conscripts" making up the Series A infantry divisions. That is your editorialising. I actually wrote that they were "brought up to strength in wartime by the MOST RECENTLY trained reservists". Before 1935 French conscripts had only one year of training. The French were desperately short of manpower born in the low birth years of WWI, who were called up over 1935-39, and these, like the Germans, got two years of training in order to keep the active divisions up to reasonable strength during these years. Furthermore, during these years the French sent some of their best manpower to new fortress units in the Maginot Line. As a result it is to be questioned whether the manpower of the Series A divisions was quite as first rate, young and recently trained as you suggest.
Yup. We are, indeed, discussing the impact an all out French offensive is likely to have had. We know they had long standing plans (Plans C, D and E) for the reoccupation of the Rhineland up to the River Rhine. However, I know of no specific plan to cross it. The only long term intention I know of was essentially to refight WWI futher forward on German soil and to await significant British intervention and a close blockade to strangle Germany before finishing it off. If I remember rightly, the time frame for this was a couple of years. This area seems to be a bit vague in the literature, so any hard information you have on French plans would be appreciated.
The fate of Poland was self evidently important to the success of any French offensive in the West. As you have pointed out, the largest number of the best divisions in the German Army were facing Poland. The longer the Poles tied them down, the better the prospects for a French offensive. Moreover, you have also stated that "The fate of Poland was militarily decided on 6-9 September", well before your French offensive was due to be launched.
I also doubt that it would take a month to get a division from one side of Germany to the other. It took less than that to get some divisions from France to near Stalingrad in November-December 1942.
So, some of my statements about Poland's dire situation by 18 September are "pure fantasy"? If so, when WAS Warsaw surrounded and when DID Poland's last port, Gdynia, fall into German hands?
Oh yes, and one other thing, perhaps you would care to check the date the Polish Government and High Command gave up the fight and fled into Romania? You might also care to check the orders they left behind for their armed forces.
"There is NO reason to believe that following the French onslaught and the subsequent withdrawal of many German units from Poland, he would have NOT reconsidered" is a convoluted double negative. I presume it means "There is reason to believe that following the French onslaught and the subsequent withdrawal of many German units from Poland he would have reconsidered". If this is the case, what is your evidence that Stalin would have reconsidered?
first, please let me start with the basics. You ask “when WAS Warsaw surrounded”. Certainly not on Sep 18, as you falsely allege. As late as Sep 19 the Warsaw garrison was still in contact with the troops fleeing from the Bzura pocket. I would point to Sep 20 as the day that the capital was finally encircled. Another of your false allegations is that “their last port had fallen” by Sep 18, and when challenged, you ask “when DID Poland's last port, Gdynia, fall into German hands”. The answer to this question is that the city fell on Sep 12, while the military area surrendered on Sep 19. And by the way, what makes you believe that Gdynia was the last Polish port to surrender?
2.
Having explaned this, now please let me move to more complex issues.
I am somewhat perplexed to watch the evolution of your stance on the quality of the French troops deployed in Sep 1939. You have countered my statement that that these were the creme of the French army by saying that “Only about thirty French divisions were first line Active divisions” and “A similar number were Series-A”. When going into details, you have kindly provided information which proves that these were indeed the best units France could have fielded – the youngest, those who were most recently trained, and those who received 2-year-long instead of a 1-year-long training. Of course I am “editorialising” – if drawing conclusions from raw info you have provided can be called “editorialising” – please excuse the shortages of my English. And eventually, you agree that “I don't think that there has ever been any doubt that the cream of the French Army was deployed against Germany in 1939”. So, what was that all about?
I am afaid you have failed to provide a single argument why “the fate of Poland was self evidently important to the success of any French offensive in the West”. I understand we are not considering a French offensive of November 1939 – we are considering the French offensive as promised to the Poles, in mid-September 1939. At that point of time, logistics prevented the Germans from shuttling their divisions effectively and even if all Polish army had surrendered to the Germans on Sep 17, OKW would not have been able to deploy their units from Poland in the West by early October. Yes, if the French decisive offensive launched mid-Sep had stalled somewhere by the Rhine 2-3 weeks later, than yes, its further progress would have depended upon the Polish performance. But I see no reason why the French decisive offensive (if really planned and really executed) would have stalled anywhere.
You have also allowed yourself lots of “editorialising” myself to your liking. I will be grateful if when referring to my posts, at least you try to “editorialise” my statements in line with mine, not your line of argument. I have clearly said that Poland was done on Sep 6-9 in a Poland vs Germany, not an Allies vs Germany scenario. I have also said it would have taken around a month before OKW was able to shuttle a material fraction of their troops (I said 20 divisions) from Poland to France, and NOT that it would have taken a month before moving one divison. And as to your “editorialising” of my double negative syntax – have I missed a Feldgrau rule which says double negative is forbidden here, and if not, could I please ask by what token do you rewrite my posts according to your linguistic preferences?
Now, back to Poland (just for the sake of this issue itself, as the Polish fate had no material impact on the outcome of the French offensive if launched mid-Sep). My point is that mid-Sep the Polish armed forces have evaded destruction, counted 0.7m people, controlled two largest Polish cities, were in relatively good order, by no means disintegrating, capable of commencing two large counter-offensive battles, and still in position to wipe out entirely the elite German units (see fate of the SS “Germania” regiment, annihilated totally on Sep 16). True, in case of a Poland vs Germany war, it meant only that the Germans would still need some time to finish the Poles off. But in case of an Allies vs Germany war, and especially in case of a French decisive offensive, it could have meant that the Poles were capable of achieving a stalemate. You ask me to check the orders the Polish High Command left before they have fled to Romania. No need to. The orders were to form a defence fortress in the South-Eastern Poland (“Romanian Bridgehead”) and await the French offensive.
Finally, here comes my favourite historical figure, the beloved Uncle Joe. I have argued that being extremely cautious, he was prepared to move only when sure Poland was already over, and before Sep 17 Schulenburg was banging on Molotov’s door begging that the USSR steps in. And you ask me to provide evidence that he would have reconsidered. May I please remind you we are discussing alternative history? This is about things which have never happened. Now, you want me to provide evidence of things which have never happened. Don’t you think this is a bit too challenging?
3.
All the above is tangential to the key question of this thread and the key point of my challenge: if the French had sticked to their committments and had mounted a full-blown offensive mid-September, there would be no point discussing what the Germans could have achieved in the winter of 1939-1940. There was no force which could have stopped a decisive French offensive in mid-Sep.
We can be absolutely sure that Gdynia was Poland's last port to fall because it was Poland's ONLY port. Poland had to build Gdynia almost from scratch between the wars into a city of 125,000 people in order to avoid having to export through German ports, particularly Danzig.
The Bzura pocket was to the WEST of Warsaw. The flight of the survivors of another pocket into Warsaw wouldn't break its own isolation. To be surrounded German forces had to meet EAST of Warsaw. Now when did that occur?
Who has ever disputed that the cream of the French Army was on the German border in September 1939? I have never, ever seen that at issue anywhere. Have you?
However, it is the consistency of this "cream" that is at issue. Most of the French Army was on the German border. Much of it was not cream.
I have had a look at the metropolitan French Army in September 1939.
Active motorised infantry divisions: 7
Active infantry divisions: 9
Series A infantry divisions: 19
Series B infantry divisions: 18
Active cavalry divisions: 3
Active light mechanised divisions: 2
There were also the fortified regions of the Maginot line, some of which were reorganised into fortress divisions in 1940. However, their offensive potential was non-existent, so we can count them out of a September 1939 attack.
In addition there were potentially eight Active North African, Moroccan, Colonial and African divisions. How many of these were in North-East France by 12 September I do not know, but the fact that at least six metropolitan French divisions were kept on the Italian border probably roughly cancels out their contribution.
Assuming that every Active and every Series A division was ready on the German border on 12 September, this would give only about 40 French divisions with significant offensive potential, not one of which was an armoured division of the type the Germans used to spearhead their rapid advances. The Series B divisions proved of limited value even in defence in 1940, so we discopunt their offensive value in 1939.
If you are looking for obstacles to a decisive early success by these ±40 French divisions one can advance the West Wall, about 30 German infantry divisions, some of which were WELLE 1 and the Rhine.
I should point out that your contention that "the fate of Poland was militarily decided on 6-9 September" indicates that Poland was doomed well before the date of your French offensive - 12 September.
You do need to check the last orders of the Polish Government before it fled into Poland. These were for Warsaw to hold out for as long as possible and for every other formation to head for neutral borders. If the Germans were met, they should be fought, but if the Russians were met they she only be fought if they obstructed the flight. Have you got a date for the flight into Romania of the Polish Government and High Command yet?
The "Romanian Bridgehead" was untenable. Almost no organised Polish field formations ever reached it. Furthermore, the area's Ukrainian population was not well disposed towards the Poles and some were already sniping at them and putting up road blocks. The Romanian Bridgehead is an illusion.
This whole discussion only has any value if we provide evidence that things which never happened were likely to have happened. So yes, I would like some evidence to support your propositions.
Now, what IS your evidence that the French were in a position to launch a decisive offensive in September 1939, given that Poland was already, by your own account, militarily already beaten before the French could have launched a full scale offensive on 12 September? And why do you think that German defences in the West would have crumbled so fast?
I am amazed to see how much nonsence one can put in a single paragraph, namely “We can be absolutely sure that Gdynia was Poland's last port to fall because it was Poland's ONLY port. Poland had to build Gdynia almost from scratch between the wars into a city of 125,000 people in order to avoid having to export through German ports, particularly Danzig”. Now, this fantastic statement contains at least 4 nonsensical allegations. Danzig was not a German port but a separate state named Free City of Danzig (placed within the Polish customs area, by the way). Gdynia was not build to avoid export through German ports – there was no Polish traffic at all going through Konigsberg or Kolberg – it was build to check just one port, namely Danzig. Gdynia was not Poland’s only port – there were at least 4 of them. And finally, Gdynia was not Poland’s last port to fall. I would be pleased to tell you which port it was and when it actually fell to the Germans, but I know you are fond of discovering the truth yourself, so I will not take this pleasure away from you, unless you really want me to. You may now check what your “being absolutely sure” is worth.
Now please let me move from Gotenhafen to Warshaw. You have falsely alleged that the city was surrounded by Sep 18. I have dismissed this allegation by pointing that the garrison of the capital was in touch with remnants of the two best Polish armies withdrawing from the Bzura battlefield. When proven wrong, you are now trying to invent a definition of “surrounded” which would make your blunder look fit (and by the way, I am looking forward to seeing how you will refine your definition in case of “the last port”). If you are so desperate to be admitted correct, I am more than happy to please you: Warshaw was surrounded on Sep 1, as Poland was totally cut off from its Western Allies and surrounded by the enemy forces.
2.
For some reason and despite having been asked not to, you keep “editorialising” (I really like the word) my posts. On Nov 26 I wrote Poland was done on Sep 6-9 in case of the Poland vs. Germany war. Since you have then misrepresented my statement, I have repeated it on Nov 27. Now I see that over and over again, you keep sticking to my comment as an argument in case of a hypothetical Allies vs Germany war. Please let me suggest there is a bit of a difference between Germany fighting Poland alone and Germany fighting an all-out war against Poland and France at the same time. The same applies to your, otherwise correct, comments on the “Romanian Bridgehead”. Of course it was untenable in the September 1939 reality. The point is we are not talking the September 1939 reality, but a hypothethical full-scale French offensive, and this is a whole lot of a difference, I would humbly suggest.
And you still want me to provide evidence of things which have never happened. I admit being flattered by such a confidence in my potential, but I am afraid I must disappoint you. If something had not happened, there is no evidence of it. The best you can expect is an argument why something might have happened. And I have provided such when pointing to extreme caution of Uncle Joe and his desire to make sure there was no real combat to be expected when the RKKA steps in. I would add one more argument: please compare the timing of the Soviet action against the Baltics and the fate of France in 1940. I mean – daily timing. It was not earlier than Stalin was sure Marianne was on her knees and nothing more could be expected of her than he started his friendly chat with the Estonians, the Latvians and the Lithuanians.
3.
I am more than happy to see you are in perfect agreement with me that the French units deployed on the German border in Sep 1939 were the cream of the Army. For some reason I have initially believed you wanted to question this, but I am glad there is now one less issue obscuring the view. Unfortunately, you have then embarked on a long and windy lecture on consistency of the French “cream”, and I am entirely not sure what you are trying to demonstrate. As I understand it, you are trying to prove that the country ranked the second miltary power in Europe and perhaps also in the world had an army whose “cream” was nothing but a fermented milk, and that this army was incapable of rolling over 30 reserve and incomplete German divisons. To facilitate your – admittedly, impossible – task, you are using tricks like counting out the SFs and Series B (while you have no clue how many Series B were actually at the German border – and there was none, if indeed Series B were 60. and up). I am really sorry, but I must dismiss this out of hand. It is obvious to anyone with any military knowledge that you do not carry an offensive with 100% of your troops available and there is always some fraction needed to secure your back – and this is where the SFs count. And if you want to count out Series B than fine, I will deduct 0 (no such divions present) on the French side and I will deduct 20 similar divisions on the German side, thus bringing down the total number of German divisions to something like 10.
Now please let me correct at least some of your errors. Your listing of metropolitan French units is wrong., France maintained in the metropoly 30 infantry divisions (incl. 4 colonial and 4 North African ones), 7 motorised divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 2 light mechanised divisons and 15 so-called SFs (Secteur Fortifie), each equivallent of 1 light division. Apart from this, there were 9 infantry divisons in North Africa and in the Middle East. The mobilisation added to this 19 Series A infantry divisons and 18 Series B infantry divisions. Since the numbers you quoted were wrong to start with, all the subsequent maths you perform is also, I am afraid, rather useless.
Having said the above I am glad to inform you there is no need to perform any maths at all in order to ascertain which units were deployed in the German border. This information is readily available, and I have no reason at all not to (please mind the double negative!) share it with you.
1. Army Group (Bilotte): 1. Army (de la Laurencie: 51., 53. InfDiv, 1. MotDiv, 5. MotDiv, 2. InfDiv, 1. ColDiv, SF de Mauberge + many others below a divison status); “Ardennes” Group (Boris; 4., 5 InfDiv, 3. MotDiv, 19., 52. InfDiv, 1. CavDiv, SF de Ardennes + many others below a division status); 2. Army (Huntziger: 10. InfDiv, 71. InfDiv, 7. ColDiv, 20. InfDiv, SF de Montmedy + many others below a divison status).
2. Army Group (Pretelat): 3. Army (Conde: 42., 22., 26., 36., 56. InfDiv, 12. MotDiv, 2., 3., 5. AfrDiv, 3. CavDiv, 5. ColDiv, SF de Boulay, SF de Faulquemont, SF de la Crusnes, SF de Thionvillle + many others below a divison status), 4. Army (Requin: 11., 21., 23., 18., 41., 45. InfDiv, 4. AfrDiv, 9., 25. MotDiv, 6. ColDiv, SF de Rohrbach + many others below a divison status), 5. Army (Bourret: 16., 70., 43. InfDiv, 15. MotDiv, 3., 4. ColDiv, SF des Vosges, SF de Hagenau, SF du Bas Rhin + many others below a divison status), 8. Army (Carchery: 13., 14., 31., 47., 58 InfDiv, 2. CavDiv, SF de Millhouse, SF de Colmar + many others below a divison status).
Unassigned (reserve): 2 light mechanised divisions (do not know their numbers)
Alltogether, in mid-Sep the French had at the German border: 51 infantry divisions, 7 motorised divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 2 light mechanised divisions, 8 infantry brigades, 2 cavalry brigades and 38 tank battallions. There were 10 infantry divisions (6., 24., 32., 35., 54., 55., 60., 61., 62. and 67) either during transport to the German front or fully mobilised and waiting in the barracks for transport to the German front.
At the Italian border the French had 12 divisions deployed, plus some minor forces (amounting to around 1 division) watching the Spanish border.
4.
I asked you what could have stopped the French army, and your answer is: the West Wall, 30 German infantry divisions, and the Rhine. Please let me start with these 30 divisons. In line with your suggestion, I will deduct all equivallent of the French Series B divisions (200. and up?), so we are now with just 10 (do not worry, just kidding). Please let me inform you that out of these 30 (actually, out of these 28 nominal divisions plus loose units amounting to 2 more divisions), there were only 11 at their full combat strength; the rest were incomplete, in some cases with more than a half of troops still in transport. I think I will be only trivial when saying that 11 complete German divisions plus a handful of others were definitely no match at all for 6 French armies, consisting of the best troops that Paris could have fielded. As to the Rhine, I do not believe the French would have had to reach the Rhine to cause earthquake in the Nazi administration. If yes, I doubt there was anyone capable of blowing up the Rhine bridges, and even if, the French army had enough pionieers, spare time and liberty to build their own crossings. Western Wall: yes, it is true that since 1937 Herr Todt was pouring hectolitres of concrete in the area and claimed 22.000 bunkers operational. It is also true the Wall was around one third of what it became in 1944, and one is better not misled into extrapolating the 1944 American inferno into 1939. Finally, it is also true that gen. Westphal reported to OKW that his reserves of ammunition allowed fire for 3 days only, and that gen. Witzleben (heading the key 1. Army, between the Rhine and the Mosel) reported his forces were so weak that any French offensive would inevitably lead to the immediate breakthrough.
If the Western Wall had been what it was in 1944, if Lorelei and her sisters had been ready to use all their magic to make sure the French are drown in the Rhine, and if 30 partly incomplete, partly 3rd rate German divisons had all been full-strength Panzer Waffen SS divisons, I might consider your point. Because they were not, I must dismiss it as a fascinating demonstration of how people got convinced the German military might was performing miracles at will.
5.
Finally, you ask me to prove that the French were in position to launch a decisive offensive in September 1939. The comparison of French and German troops as actually deployed proves beyond any reasonable doubt if the French had sticked to their committments and had prepared a full-blown offensive mid-September, there would be no point discussing what the Germans could have achieved in the winter of 1939-1940.
