Hi von noobie,
There would be absolutely no point in the Japanese occupying the Hawaian Islands only to give them up again. Nobody in WWII put damaged captured enemy battleships back into service for themselves - it took too long and was of questionable value in a carrier-dominated erea.
The only use of the Hawaian Islands would be as a base, and a very important base they might be, for reasons I have explained. Aircraft based there could dominate the central Pacific and ships based there could threaten the Panama Canal and the US West Coast. It would set the US counter-attack by years, buying time for other operations against India or the USSR.
Cheers,
Sid.
If Japan invaded Russia instead of attacking Pearl Harbor...
Moderator: sniper1shot
As far as I know every BB except the arizona was refloated by the US and used again. Even if the ships were never used by the japs it would provide a large amount of scrap metal for thier res starved economy. Scarp iron was one of those other embargo items.sid guttridge wrote:Hi von noobie,
There would be absolutely no point in the Japanese occupying the Hawaian Islands only to give them up again. Nobody in WWII put damaged captured enemy battleships back into service for themselves - it took too long and was of questionable value in a carrier-dominated erea.
The only use of the Hawaian Islands would be as a base, and a very important base they might be, for reasons I have explained. Aircraft based there could dominate the central Pacific and ships based there could threaten the Panama Canal and the US West Coast. It would set the US counter-attack by years, buying time for other operations against India or the USSR.
Cheers,
Sid.
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sid guttridge
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Hi Darrin,
Scrap iron, useful as it is, was hardly a good reason for capturing Hawaii on its own.
Putting back into service one's own damaged battleships, for which one already has the appropriate engineers, plans, spares and munitions, is rather easier than trying to recommission a captured damaged battlehip, for which one has none.
Nobody who captured the hulks of battleships in WWII (which essentially means the Germans) put them back into service. The Germans captured in harbour the hulks of Greek, French, Soviet and possibly Italian battleships, but made no attempt to put any of them into service.
The Hawaiian archipelago was the key to the central Pacific. Its occupation would probably delay the USA's counter-attack by a year or more. Attacking and occupying Hawaii was therefore, I would suggest, the right thing to do, because it would have provided a shiled behind which it might have attempted attacks on India or the USSR.
Cheers,
Sid.
Scrap iron, useful as it is, was hardly a good reason for capturing Hawaii on its own.
Putting back into service one's own damaged battleships, for which one already has the appropriate engineers, plans, spares and munitions, is rather easier than trying to recommission a captured damaged battlehip, for which one has none.
Nobody who captured the hulks of battleships in WWII (which essentially means the Germans) put them back into service. The Germans captured in harbour the hulks of Greek, French, Soviet and possibly Italian battleships, but made no attempt to put any of them into service.
The Hawaiian archipelago was the key to the central Pacific. Its occupation would probably delay the USA's counter-attack by a year or more. Attacking and occupying Hawaii was therefore, I would suggest, the right thing to do, because it would have provided a shiled behind which it might have attempted attacks on India or the USSR.
Cheers,
Sid.
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phylo_roadking
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Sid, i didnt post here last light cos any answer wud need a LONG answer LOL.....
Hawaii was the secret for the successful prosecution of an amphibious campaign in the Pacific. We forget now exactly what an incredible undertaking it was prosecuting the war there, with its TWO parallel amphibious campaigns, under MacArthur thru the philippines and under Nimitz to the North. To put a few tens of thousands of Marines on beaches it took hundreds of thousands if not MILLIONS of logistics staff - ALL of which had to be fed, watered, entertained, housed, guarded, asses wiped, EVERYTHING at sea or at recently-occupied islands. Just imagine how this would have stalled if trying to supply JUST by air from the US mainland to the constantly-moving front, or direct from the US Naval bases on the Pacific coast. It couldnt be done. The advance in the Pacific would by necessity been reduced to ONE force, allowing in turn the Japanese to better shuttle around their forces for defence. Look at what they DID do with what they had when fighting agains the Australians and US in New Guinea, the two pronged US naval attack, the Chinese in China, and the British and Commonwealth forces in Burma. If just ONE of these fronts had been removed or pacified.....
Its always been MY opinion that one of the WORST feck-ups made during the war was the loss of the Philippines; or more specifically, the loss of Cavite, which was a US Naval base the size and equivalent of Pearl Harbour for both naval and aviation forces. Just imagine how different the war would have been IF the US could have started its campaign from THERE......
Imagine, guys, what it WOULD have been like IF Hawaii had been occupied; IT would have had to be TOTALLY cleared first, THEN all its facilities rebuilt , before any further steps could have been taken. Safe behind this necessity the Japanese could have stripped the islands of forces and reinforced the assault on Port Moresby and maybe cleared New Guinea totally in 1941/2.
The American retaking of the Pacific islands would have been stalled for several years, and THEN been launched against a completely different Japanese defensive setup. Yes the A-bomb would have been available to the same schedule, but what are you going to use it on? The USAAF couldnt have reached the japanese Home Islands by 1945 given this scenario......
Hawaii was the secret for the successful prosecution of an amphibious campaign in the Pacific. We forget now exactly what an incredible undertaking it was prosecuting the war there, with its TWO parallel amphibious campaigns, under MacArthur thru the philippines and under Nimitz to the North. To put a few tens of thousands of Marines on beaches it took hundreds of thousands if not MILLIONS of logistics staff - ALL of which had to be fed, watered, entertained, housed, guarded, asses wiped, EVERYTHING at sea or at recently-occupied islands. Just imagine how this would have stalled if trying to supply JUST by air from the US mainland to the constantly-moving front, or direct from the US Naval bases on the Pacific coast. It couldnt be done. The advance in the Pacific would by necessity been reduced to ONE force, allowing in turn the Japanese to better shuttle around their forces for defence. Look at what they DID do with what they had when fighting agains the Australians and US in New Guinea, the two pronged US naval attack, the Chinese in China, and the British and Commonwealth forces in Burma. If just ONE of these fronts had been removed or pacified.....
Its always been MY opinion that one of the WORST feck-ups made during the war was the loss of the Philippines; or more specifically, the loss of Cavite, which was a US Naval base the size and equivalent of Pearl Harbour for both naval and aviation forces. Just imagine how different the war would have been IF the US could have started its campaign from THERE......
Imagine, guys, what it WOULD have been like IF Hawaii had been occupied; IT would have had to be TOTALLY cleared first, THEN all its facilities rebuilt , before any further steps could have been taken. Safe behind this necessity the Japanese could have stripped the islands of forces and reinforced the assault on Port Moresby and maybe cleared New Guinea totally in 1941/2.
The American retaking of the Pacific islands would have been stalled for several years, and THEN been launched against a completely different Japanese defensive setup. Yes the A-bomb would have been available to the same schedule, but what are you going to use it on? The USAAF couldnt have reached the japanese Home Islands by 1945 given this scenario......
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phylo_roadking
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Kid, get your head out of the atlas and into the history book, there are some excellent works on the war in the Aleutians and the Kuriles...basically in 24/7 fog and bad weather you DO NOT attempt to take off or land little items like B29 strategic bombers. The barren islands are covered in wrecked and downed aircraft, and not very many of them because of enemy action. The reason for using Tinina for hitting Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not just distance, but the fear of "roll over", the bombs were so heavy that in the event of an aborted landing or bounce on the runway they would roll forward under their own weight, tear free of their drop- gear, and spontaneously explode! Somehow i dont think that was a risk anyone would have taken by launching that raid north of the 49th parallel!
phylo
phylo
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phylo_roadking
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Well, the briskest of walks thru a WWI in the Pacific history would have prompted you to ask why B29s werent flown from there earlier, or even at all......people dont often remember that this really was WAR - if it can be done to hit the enemy - it IS, If it isnt, theres a lifethreatening reason why not.
phylo
phylo
In regard to Khalkhin Gol in 1939;
"Of the 30,000 troops on the Japanese side, 8,440 were killed and 8,766 wounded. The Red Army committed 57,000 infantry, 498 tanks, and 346 armoured cars to the battle, and claimed total losses (killed and wounded) of 9,284 men. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, new documents about the battle changed the numbers considerably. The actual number of losses in the battle was 23,926, of whom 6,831 killed, 1,143 reported missing and 15,952 wounded. While the Red Army did win the battle, it was not as one-sided a battle as previously believed."
The reason so many Soviet divisions were kept in the Far East is that the Red Army victory was hardly a one sided affair. The Soviets held all of the major advantages and came away with a tactical victory. This however does not mean that the Japanese were incapable of coming back better prepared and in much larger numbers. Any large scale operations for the Soviets in the Far East would have lost their mechanized ability after a few weeks and would then take on the character of an Infantry/Cavalry war. Soviet logistics in the early war period relied on planned stockpiles and did not possess the flexibility of the Germans or even Japanese for that matter. The Japanese in 1941 would have been able to fight on even terms with the Red Army in the Far East if properly prepared. 1945 is a completely different story....
"Of the 30,000 troops on the Japanese side, 8,440 were killed and 8,766 wounded. The Red Army committed 57,000 infantry, 498 tanks, and 346 armoured cars to the battle, and claimed total losses (killed and wounded) of 9,284 men. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, new documents about the battle changed the numbers considerably. The actual number of losses in the battle was 23,926, of whom 6,831 killed, 1,143 reported missing and 15,952 wounded. While the Red Army did win the battle, it was not as one-sided a battle as previously believed."
The reason so many Soviet divisions were kept in the Far East is that the Red Army victory was hardly a one sided affair. The Soviets held all of the major advantages and came away with a tactical victory. This however does not mean that the Japanese were incapable of coming back better prepared and in much larger numbers. Any large scale operations for the Soviets in the Far East would have lost their mechanized ability after a few weeks and would then take on the character of an Infantry/Cavalry war. Soviet logistics in the early war period relied on planned stockpiles and did not possess the flexibility of the Germans or even Japanese for that matter. The Japanese in 1941 would have been able to fight on even terms with the Red Army in the Far East if properly prepared. 1945 is a completely different story....
You are underestimating Soviet logics ability -one of the reason why Khalkin-Gol was possible is very well organized logistics that was able to support large armored force –even though the closest railway hub was some 800 km away. Anyway USSR kept about 1500 tanks in 2 tank and 1 motorized division \ several independent brigades and in form of organic infantry support – the force was strong enough for Soviet side to plan for preemptive strike –just in case (I am referring to 1942)Osterhase wrote:In regard to Khalkhin Gol in 1939;
"Of the 30,000 troops on the Japanese side, 8,440 were killed and 8,766 wounded. The Red Army committed 57,000 infantry, 498 tanks, and 346 armoured cars to the battle, and claimed total losses (killed and wounded) of 9,284 men. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, new documents about the battle changed the numbers considerably. The actual number of losses in the battle was 23,926, of whom 6,831 killed, 1,143 reported missing and 15,952 wounded. While the Red Army did win the battle, it was not as one-sided a battle as previously believed."
The reason so many Soviet divisions were kept in the Far East is that the Red Army victory was hardly a one sided affair. The Soviets held all of the major advantages and came away with a tactical victory. This however does not mean that the Japanese were incapable of coming back better prepared and in much larger numbers. Any large scale operations for the Soviets in the Far East would have lost their mechanized ability after a few weeks and would then take on the character of an Infantry/Cavalry war. Soviet logistics in the early war period relied on planned stockpiles and did not possess the flexibility of the Germans or even Japanese for that matter. The Japanese in 1941 would have been able to fight on even terms with the Red Army in the Far East if properly prepared. 1945 is a completely different story....