Paul
Mortain proved the Germans could move some panzer divisions despite allied air superiority. What it didn't prove was that they could beat the allies by attacking them. The attack made the local gains that almost any attack with armour will make - and then failed utterly.
The way to really understand how badly out classed the Germans were is to consider the 34 allied divisions as 34 armoured divisions because in the context of how Germans viewed their panzer force that is exactly what they were.
Only the Allied airborne divs were anything like as poorly equipped as the average German infantry division in france - and there was usually enough extra transport to make them into mechanized divs when needed (in the Ardennes both US A/B divs were carried to battle in trucks and had tanks and tank destroyers under command)
Now consider what ten panzer divs could do against 34 armoured divs and you get a true picture of the strategic (and tactical) situation the Germans really faced. Plus - unless they could somehow bog the allies down on a static front their own infantry were of little use to them - just how much use can you get out of horse drawn infantry in a modern mechanized battle? Hitler knew all this and it was behind his desire to keep the allies bottled up in Normandy.
In Russia - the panzers had staked out claims and the infantry followed behind and mopped up. This is the manouvre war you say was the Germans forte and they certainly did it well. But when the tide turned the infantry were often overrun or encircled because of their lack of mobility. The western allied army was a triumph of mechanization, far better than what the Germans (or Russians) could put together.
In the battle of manouvre you propose it would be a question of how long could those ten panzer divisions stand up against the 34 allied panzer / panzer grenadier divisions - who happened to have complete air superiority. (See an earlier thread on Normandy for an idea of how many tanks and sp guns the allied forces could field - roughly nine thousand!
http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=11051)
The key is to understand that the nomenclature is very misleading - what the Germans called an infantry division was very different from say, an American infantry division. Every Allied division tended to go into battle with fully motorised artillery supported by tanks and sp anti-tank guns plus a weath of towed AT guns. The German infantry were lucky to have a couple companies of Marders and some PAK 40s. Their artillery was largely horse drawn. How exactly were they to manouvre?
Ten panzer divs, several of them barely battle ready and none of them at full strength - against the equivilent of 34 full strength counterparts? And the allies had loads of tanks, guns, halftracks, trucks and planes in the replacement pipeline - Germany did not.
In my opinion - a manouvre battle would have been very interesting for a couple weeks - and then catastrophic for the Germans.
The bottom line is that Germany started a world war, perhaps inadvertantly in some respects, and they failed to plan for such a war and their industry was never strong enough to sustain such a war. And worse for them - they taught their enemies the secret of mechanized warfare - and their enemies created armies of which the Germans could only dream.
No -Germany could not win in Normandy. They fought a marvelous fight there and exceeded what anyone had a right to expect of them - but I see no way they could have won.
cheers
Reb
Any chance for the 12 SS Panzer division to beat the Allies
Moderator: sniper1shot
But there weren't 34 Allied divisions ashore on D+3 or 4.Reb wrote:Now consider what ten panzer divs could do against 34 armoured divs and you get a true picture of the strategic (and tactical) situation the Germans really faced.
(Chuckling) Quite so. But the fun of this little exercise is to look rather more narrowly at the opening stages of the OVERLORD campaign. The interesting thing is that until those 34 (and more) Allied divisions could be gotten ashore and fully operational things really did hang in the balance. Hung in the balance more so than an accounting exercise in toting up the eventual AFV totals on each side (yes, I saw that thread) would suggest.Reb wrote:The bottom line is that Germany started a world war, perhaps inadvertantly in some respects, and they failed to plan for such a war and their industry was never strong enough to sustain such a war. And worse for them - they taught their enemies the secret of mechanized warfare - and their enemies created armies of which the Germans could only dream.
And I take all of your points about German vs Allied "infantry divisions", but don't write off the value of relatively static forces in a manoeuvre campaign. They can be used to delay and canalize the other side as the mobile forces maneuvre around them. The Germans were quite explicit about this in their doctrine. For instance, for the longest time in North Africa the British armoured corps was convinced that "Rommel's panzers" were shooting up all of their tanks. Only slowly did they realize that the panzers which so transfixed them were not what was really killing all of their tanks. It was the relatively static anti-tank gun lines which the panzers would use as fixed bases to maneuvre around (or withdraw onto) that was doing the real killing. As I said in my post above, the thing for the Germans to have done would have been to use the inf divs to impose delay and canalize the Allied breakout (which indeed would surely have come, sooner rather than later).
This brings me back to my rhetorical question in my post above, so here it is again: it is D+4 and the Allies do not have 34 divs ashore. They have about a dozen (spread along their whole frontage). Into the left flank of this, Pz Gp West attacks with two strong pz korps. What do you think would happen next?
Paul
What would have happened is what did happen. Only it would have been much rougher for the allies.
For the sake of argument say 1 ss pz k with three divs (12 ss, 21 pz, pz lehr) and oh,LXVII pz k with say 2 pz and 116 pz had hit them on d+4.
They might have actually split the beach head - but to mass that much stuff they would have been extemely vulnerable to carpet bombing and naval gunfire - plus the allies had litterally hundreds and hundreds of guns ashore by then and as many tanks as the Germans could have mustered.
And the Jabos would have been out in force.
Now the attacker has the advantage if they mass against a line - but that mass would have been their undoing. The Allies were playing for keeps. Even piper cub pilots would have been tossing grenades out of the cockpits. For an example of what would have happened look to II ss Pz K at Epsom - they were blasted on their start line and ran into such a rain of gun fire that they actually thought allied heavy bombers had hit them.
The allies had built a war machine that would not be denied.
cheers
Reb
What would have happened is what did happen. Only it would have been much rougher for the allies.
For the sake of argument say 1 ss pz k with three divs (12 ss, 21 pz, pz lehr) and oh,LXVII pz k with say 2 pz and 116 pz had hit them on d+4.
They might have actually split the beach head - but to mass that much stuff they would have been extemely vulnerable to carpet bombing and naval gunfire - plus the allies had litterally hundreds and hundreds of guns ashore by then and as many tanks as the Germans could have mustered.
And the Jabos would have been out in force.
Now the attacker has the advantage if they mass against a line - but that mass would have been their undoing. The Allies were playing for keeps. Even piper cub pilots would have been tossing grenades out of the cockpits. For an example of what would have happened look to II ss Pz K at Epsom - they were blasted on their start line and ran into such a rain of gun fire that they actually thought allied heavy bombers had hit them.
The allies had built a war machine that would not be denied.
cheers
Reb
Nothing, since as of D+4 Panzergruppe-West was incapable of deploying "two strong pz korps." At best, they would have been able to get forward what was already in place then. That is, the elements of 12. SS-Pz, 17. SS-PzG, Lehr, 2., and 21. Pz. that had arrived by then. The other divisions were either effectively non-operational (9., 11., 19., and 116.) or were only partly operational and too far away to reach the operations area by 10 June (1. and 2. SS-PzD).PaulJ wrote:This brings me back to my rhetorical question in my post above, so here it is again: it is D+4 and the Allies do not have 34 divs ashore. They have about a dozen (spread along their whole frontage). Into the left flank of this, Pz Gp West attacks with two strong pz korps. What do you think would happen next?
So in terms of armored forces, that means that there would have been the following operational:
12. SS-PzD: 50-60 Pz-IV, 38 Panthers (or 48, assuming that they did not engage in the attacks of 8 and 9 June, which would cause a whole new set of problems for them)
17. SS-PzGD: zero, only the advance elements of the 17. SS-PzAA and parts of 37. SS-PzGR had arrived to the south of St. Lo. In other words they were completely out of position for an attack on the "left flank." And their sudden absence from in front of US VIII Corps would have completely changed the complexion of the battle in the Cotentin, another set of major problems for the Germans.
Lehr: About 90 Pz-IV and 80 Panther on hand (and probably fewer operational, typically perhaps 75% at this time).
2. Pz: None. Pz.Regt. 3. only began arriving on 19 June. Wheeled elements began arriving on 13 June, three days after the target date for the scheduled attack by "two strong pz korps."
21. Pz: about 60 Pz-IV
So the attack by "two strong pz korps" in reality would be - assuming the various bits can be moved to the "left flank" - by about 210-220 Pz-IV and 120-130 Panthers. In addition, there would be about 14 Panzergrenadier battalions, 4 PzAA, and perhaps 8 or 9 artillery battalions (perhaps 110 pieces with very limited ammunition). In addition, perhaps the equivalent of 4 battalions of grenadiers from 346. and 711. ID may have been available.
Facing them on the left flank would have been:
3 ID: 9 infantry battalions, 4 artillery regiments, 1 AT regiment
51 (HL) ID: 9 infantry battalions, 3 artillery regiments, 1 AT regiment
6 AbnD: 9 infantry battalions (very reduced), 1 abn AT regiment and 1 abn artillery regiment
4 Arm Bde: 3 armoured battalions
27 Arm Bde: 3 armoured battalions
1 and 4 SS Bdes: 7 Commandos
4 AGRA: circa 1 field, 3 medium and 1 heavy regiment, 1 AT regiment
Thus, 34 infantry battalions, 6 armoured battalions (after losses probably about 300 Shermans), circa 272 artillery pieces, and 300+ AT guns (about 230 6-pdr and 72 17-pdr and 3" SP). Oh yes, and supported by the 16" guns of Rodney and Nelson, and the 15" guns of Warspite, Ramillies and Roberts. Not to mention the 7.5" guns of Frobisher and the 6" guns of Mauritius, Scylla, Arethusa, Danae, Dragon, Belfast, and Diadem. Another 80 odd artillery pieces.
Then, look at the terrain. An attack on the "left flank" is perfoce channalized by the Douvres and Dives into an assault from south to north, an attack that actually has no real benefit for the German forces. Even if it is successful, at most it would force the British to withdraw behind the Dives. That would help the situation to the east of Caen somewhat, but would end with the German "strong pz corps' staring across a river line that would be effectively impassable to them. And in the meantime, XXX Corps and the US V and VIII Corps would be unmolested if they chose to drive south, securing St. Lo, Tilly, Villers Bocage and Hill 112 with virtually no opposition (if the movement you suggest had occurred, then the Caumont "gap" would have extended from St. Lo to Caen, with only the broken remanats of 352 and 716 ID to hold it.
Sorry, don't think much changes - at least for the better
- for the Germans. Rich
My own scenario was based upon Paul's supposition that the Germans could have massed their armour centrally and employed it better.
Yours is more realistic since to cover the areas of the channel coast where the allies might land left the Germans little in the way of options to truly 'centralize' their armour.
The more I study that campaign the more impressed I am by the German achievement. And the fact that they had virtually no chance of winning.
I (like Paul) keep trying to formulate a scenario where they could have won or fought to a draw and I just don't see one. The only way to do that is to remove all 'friction' from the German side and give them prophetic powers which no one has.
cheers
Reb
My own scenario was based upon Paul's supposition that the Germans could have massed their armour centrally and employed it better.
Yours is more realistic since to cover the areas of the channel coast where the allies might land left the Germans little in the way of options to truly 'centralize' their armour.
The more I study that campaign the more impressed I am by the German achievement. And the fact that they had virtually no chance of winning.
I (like Paul) keep trying to formulate a scenario where they could have won or fought to a draw and I just don't see one. The only way to do that is to remove all 'friction' from the German side and give them prophetic powers which no one has.
cheers
Reb
Rich, Rich, Rich. You're missing my point. As Reb noted above, I was talking about all of the available pz divs being centralized in strong pz reserve, and then used in mass on D+4 (or so).
I said into the Allies' left flank because that would have been the closest point of the Allied beach-head to the strong central reserve. (see the link to my sketch map just above in the this thread).
I said into the Allies' left flank because that would have been the closest point of the Allied beach-head to the strong central reserve. (see the link to my sketch map just above in the this thread).
Paul, Paul, Paul, you are missing my point as well.PaulJ wrote:Rich, Rich, Rich. You're missing my point. As Reb noted above, I was talking about all of the available pz divs being centralized in strong pz reserve, and then used in mass on D+4 (or so).
I said into the Allies' left flank because that would have been the closest point of the Allied beach-head to the strong central reserve. (see the link to my sketch map just above in the this thread).
Massing 1. and 2. SS-Pz.Div. "around Paris" ignores the simple fact that neither division was capable of an offensive deployment by D+4 (nor for that matter were 9., 11., and 116. Pz). It also ignores the rather simple fact that the divisions, as well as the others, were in the positions they were for very many reasons, including availability of barracks space and training areas. Quite simply, if it was such a "good" idea - and it is, it is simple, elegant and uses the road network efficiently - don't you think the Germans would have thought of it as well? But the practical limitations they had to work with limited their capabilities in deploying forces, as least as much as did the squabbling of the various doctrinnaires over where to place the reserves.Also "ignoring" a potential Allied threat to the Biscay coast was not an option for the Germans because quite simply they had no conception of either the capabilities or the limitations of Allied amphibious capabilities. And, Allied planning focused one aspect of the deception plan on playing just on those fears.
No matter how you do it, the practical limitations the Germans faced meant that such an option wasn't viable, at least in the first 10 days of June....the first 10 days of July though may have been a different matter.
Okay, I've pushed this far enough. I cry "uncle."
To be honest -- I don't really think there was much chance that the ultimate outcome could have been different, either, even if the Germans had followed the plan I proposed in the thread above. Besides, offering "what if" alternative courses is dodgy history at best. So why push the point the way I did? (Aside from as an amusing diversion that wastes far too much of all our time?) Well, two legitimate historical points do emerge from this debate, I think.
First -- it was a near run thing. We don't have to speculate alternate histories to conclude that. I would submit that it is legitimate historical analysis to ask the question: how closely balanced was the outcome? In some cases, such as say the battles in the spring of 1945, the outcome clearly was "fore-ordained" regardless of any what ifs. At the other extreme, such as for example the campaign in France and the Low Countries in 1940, it is not at all clear that it had to turn out the way it did. Deciding where to place any given campaign on that spectrum does tell us something about its nature.
Secondly -- I think the line of argument I've been advancing in this thread raises some legitimate questions about German decision making in the spring of 1944. Whilst I concede that the outcome could not likely have been ultimately altered, I would strongly argue that the Germans could have played their hand better.
This raises the obvious question -- so why didn't they do it that way? As Rich put it:
So lets consider some possible explanations:
To be honest -- I don't really think there was much chance that the ultimate outcome could have been different, either, even if the Germans had followed the plan I proposed in the thread above. Besides, offering "what if" alternative courses is dodgy history at best. So why push the point the way I did? (Aside from as an amusing diversion that wastes far too much of all our time?) Well, two legitimate historical points do emerge from this debate, I think.
First -- it was a near run thing. We don't have to speculate alternate histories to conclude that. I would submit that it is legitimate historical analysis to ask the question: how closely balanced was the outcome? In some cases, such as say the battles in the spring of 1945, the outcome clearly was "fore-ordained" regardless of any what ifs. At the other extreme, such as for example the campaign in France and the Low Countries in 1940, it is not at all clear that it had to turn out the way it did. Deciding where to place any given campaign on that spectrum does tell us something about its nature.
Secondly -- I think the line of argument I've been advancing in this thread raises some legitimate questions about German decision making in the spring of 1944. Whilst I concede that the outcome could not likely have been ultimately altered, I would strongly argue that the Germans could have played their hand better.
This raises the obvious question -- so why didn't they do it that way? As Rich put it:
Precisely. The Germans were nothing if not masters of the operational art, so their sudden failure in this department in the spring of 1944 cries out for explanation. Personally, I consider that the last real mystery of the campaign.Rich wrote:Quite simply, if it was such a "good" idea - and it is, it is simple, elegant and uses the road network efficiently - don't you think the Germans would have thought of it as well?
So lets consider some possible explanations:
This factor is of course the immediate obvious suspicion -- that practical limitations (available infrastructure, supply lines, training areas etc) prescribed and proscribed much of their disposition. But is that true? Firstly, I've never seen this actually demonstrated. And secondly, its not obvious to me that placing (for instance) 2nd SS Pz around TOULOUSE or forming 11 Pz around BORDEAUX was necessary or beneficial from an administrative viewpoint. Thirdly -- and more fundamentally -- even if there would have been some logistical drawbacks to a more rational disposition, the benefits of that would almost certainly have outweighed the administrative inconviences. Being brutally clear-minded about those sorts of cost-benefit command decisions was typically a German forte. Which brings us back to our central mystery -- that being the case why did these German powers of the operational art suddenly fail them in the spring of 1944?Rich wrote:...the practical limitations they had to work with limited their capabilities in deploying forces, as least as much as did the squabbling of the various doctrinnaires over where to place the reserves.
Well, the practical reason for reforming 11 Pz around Bordeaux is that that was where 273.Res.Pz.Div. was at the time. In other words it was simply easier to do it that way. And, considering the amount of rail traffic required to move a panzer division, that simplicity I'm sure had a major appeal.PaulJ wrote:So lets consider some possible explanations:
This factor is of course the immediate obvious suspicion -- that practical limitations (available infrastructure, supply lines, training areas etc) prescribed and proscribed much of their disposition. But is that true? Firstly, I've never seen this actually demonstrated. And secondly, its not obvious to me that placing (for instance) 2nd SS Pz around TOULOUSE or forming 11 Pz around BORDEAUX was necessary or beneficial from an administrative viewpoint. Thirdly -- and more fundamentally -- even if there would have been some logistical drawbacks to a more rational disposition, the benefits of that would almost certainly have outweighed the administrative inconviences. Being brutally clear-minded about those sorts of cost-benefit command decisions was typically a German forte. Which brings us back to our central mystery -- that being the case why did these German powers of the operational art suddenly fail them in the spring of 1944?Rich wrote:...the practical limitations they had to work with limited their capabilities in deploying forces, as least as much as did the squabbling of the various doctrinnaires over where to place the reserves.
But of course, there is a much deeper question here, one that a good friend of mine has caused me to think about a little more recently. And that is, just what - exactly - was the German military high command planning as their "war winning" (or perhaps "war not losing") strategy for 1944?
Rich
" just what - exactly - was the German military high command planning as their "war winning" (or perhaps "war not losing") strategy for 1944?"
That sir, is a question that I've been pondering as well. This thread has forced me to consider it at great length and the more I look at it the more I began to realize that their strategy, if they can even be said to have one, was simply to buy time. And they failed miserably at that.
Question number two of course, is how did such a tactically adept army of magnificant soldiers manage to to be so pathetically bad at strategy? An answer on the cheap is always expressed in one name: Hitler. But was it that simple? Hitler had many generals advising him and he was smart enough to know that some of these guys were pretty sharp. Yet those generals could not themselves agree on strategy.
It reminds me of the time (while overseas) that I decided to teach some guys not to make fun of my American (southern) way of talking. Like Hitler I punched the first guy that offended me. And the second. And while I was going for the third the first two started kicking me and guy number four waded in and well, at that point I couldn't come up with much of a strategy at all so I hit one guy in the boot with my chin and went down swinging.
cheers
Reb
" just what - exactly - was the German military high command planning as their "war winning" (or perhaps "war not losing") strategy for 1944?"
That sir, is a question that I've been pondering as well. This thread has forced me to consider it at great length and the more I look at it the more I began to realize that their strategy, if they can even be said to have one, was simply to buy time. And they failed miserably at that.
Question number two of course, is how did such a tactically adept army of magnificant soldiers manage to to be so pathetically bad at strategy? An answer on the cheap is always expressed in one name: Hitler. But was it that simple? Hitler had many generals advising him and he was smart enough to know that some of these guys were pretty sharp. Yet those generals could not themselves agree on strategy.
It reminds me of the time (while overseas) that I decided to teach some guys not to make fun of my American (southern) way of talking. Like Hitler I punched the first guy that offended me. And the second. And while I was going for the third the first two started kicking me and guy number four waded in and well, at that point I couldn't come up with much of a strategy at all so I hit one guy in the boot with my chin and went down swinging.
cheers
Reb
-
Hans Weber
- Enthusiast
- Posts: 457
- Joined: Wed Oct 09, 2002 11:48 am
Hello
My time schedule doesn't permit me to give a substantial reply to the interesting issues raised after the last time I visited this thread. However, I would like to bring in my point of view on a remark that particulary struck me: The war in the West was a close run thing.
I don't know exactly why this attitude is prominent with people that have an Allied background in terms that they are lets say Angle Saxon in the broad sense. I think it's not even a very conscious thing, but has to do with where we live and how we see certain things. I'm European. A part of me will never ever allow me to adore German military power in the uncritical way I see is common with a lot of people from the Western Hemisphere. I can marvel at the military capabilities of the Germans and the way they could fight, but I'm very reserved in a lot of ways. But I stray here. The point is that I sometimes suspect that the relativly uncritical stance the Western Allies adopted towards the Germans after the War has to do with two reasons (besides the obvious political necessity to make them Allies instead of peasants after the War): Portraying the enemy as strong does a) detract from one's own blunders, b) shares some of the reputiation or "Glory" in the sense that if this guys were though and I bet them, I must be tough, too.
The issue of the War on the Western Front was imho never open. Never. The depth the German Military had sunk by 1944 compared to the Allies can't make this statement a realistic one. What the Western Allies massed simply in terms of material and the quality of it (and here I'not talking about tanks, but the hardware to win a mobile war with, i.e. ships, aircraft and communications) cannot be compared on what the Germans had to offer. The German Generals could argue about operational concepts. Reality was that in 1944 had neither the trained men nor the material to mount a concept that had any chance to stand on leg against the Western Allies, as one prominent German officer once coined a phrase regarding the Ardennes Offensive. Also, the strategical situation on ores, oil and other important resources was desolate. Gasoline reserves by Autumn 44 were dwindling to a point that it was evident the war was lost only for this reason alone. Discussions like the Panzer Controversy lose their importance when compared to the state the Army was in at that time. So I strongly have to object to this, even beeing aware that I stand on the toes of some people beeing told a different story.
Cheers
Hans
My time schedule doesn't permit me to give a substantial reply to the interesting issues raised after the last time I visited this thread. However, I would like to bring in my point of view on a remark that particulary struck me: The war in the West was a close run thing.
I don't know exactly why this attitude is prominent with people that have an Allied background in terms that they are lets say Angle Saxon in the broad sense. I think it's not even a very conscious thing, but has to do with where we live and how we see certain things. I'm European. A part of me will never ever allow me to adore German military power in the uncritical way I see is common with a lot of people from the Western Hemisphere. I can marvel at the military capabilities of the Germans and the way they could fight, but I'm very reserved in a lot of ways. But I stray here. The point is that I sometimes suspect that the relativly uncritical stance the Western Allies adopted towards the Germans after the War has to do with two reasons (besides the obvious political necessity to make them Allies instead of peasants after the War): Portraying the enemy as strong does a) detract from one's own blunders, b) shares some of the reputiation or "Glory" in the sense that if this guys were though and I bet them, I must be tough, too.
The issue of the War on the Western Front was imho never open. Never. The depth the German Military had sunk by 1944 compared to the Allies can't make this statement a realistic one. What the Western Allies massed simply in terms of material and the quality of it (and here I'not talking about tanks, but the hardware to win a mobile war with, i.e. ships, aircraft and communications) cannot be compared on what the Germans had to offer. The German Generals could argue about operational concepts. Reality was that in 1944 had neither the trained men nor the material to mount a concept that had any chance to stand on leg against the Western Allies, as one prominent German officer once coined a phrase regarding the Ardennes Offensive. Also, the strategical situation on ores, oil and other important resources was desolate. Gasoline reserves by Autumn 44 were dwindling to a point that it was evident the war was lost only for this reason alone. Discussions like the Panzer Controversy lose their importance when compared to the state the Army was in at that time. So I strongly have to object to this, even beeing aware that I stand on the toes of some people beeing told a different story.
Cheers
Hans
Hans
I'm with you on that - I've said often that Germany was whipped in 1941 - I know there are opposite opinions and some are based on much thought but no matter how I stack the bricks - I can find no way they could have won. (barring a meteor hitting the earth!)
That of course is what makes the German Army so interesting - so no army has ever made so much of a bad situation. They were doomed from the second day of the Allied beachhead in Normandy (as I've stated earlier in this thread) yet after being stomped into the ground at Falaise got up and threw a flying kick at the allies in the Ardennes.
Like you I get amazed reading nonsense about "full strength German SS Panzers" rampaging across the Ardennes but we must remember how it seemed to those fighting against them. Indeed you can tell when a book is going to be a crock of crap by their use of terms like "Hitler's vaunted panzer divisions" etc ad nauseam.
But - history is recorded by the survivors. If your enemy only has one Panther tank and you have a thousand Shermans you are going to win. Unless you happen to be in the path of that Panther and then if you survive at all - you are going to tell stories of being overrun by giant tanks and soldiers who couldn't be stopped.
Equally - a pilot facing a ME272 might not want to hear how the Luftwaffe was finished! But it was - it just retained some killing power here and there. And telling such a man that he was facing a near dead Luftwaffe does seem to dishonour him (it doesn't but that's not the point) - hence the need for well reasoned history books written by folks who consider all the angles.
To the Canadians in operation Atlantic or Spring the Germans seemed a terrible and dangerous foe - and so they were. But what is forgotten in first person narratives is that so much of what Germany had left by that time was at the very point of contact - that almost nothing remained anywhere else. The Whermact was like a suit of very good armour but with no man in it. (for want of a better metaphor).
Carlo d'Este makes an excellent point in Decision in Normandy. He notes that the Americans were as surprised as anyone else when Cobra took off and the German left collapsed. The only people who really weren't surprised where the Germans in Seventh Army!
What made the German soldier so remarkable was his willingness to fight well no matter what the circumstances were or how high the odds against him. That's why men who study war study the Whermact.
cheers
Reb
I'm with you on that - I've said often that Germany was whipped in 1941 - I know there are opposite opinions and some are based on much thought but no matter how I stack the bricks - I can find no way they could have won. (barring a meteor hitting the earth!)
That of course is what makes the German Army so interesting - so no army has ever made so much of a bad situation. They were doomed from the second day of the Allied beachhead in Normandy (as I've stated earlier in this thread) yet after being stomped into the ground at Falaise got up and threw a flying kick at the allies in the Ardennes.
Like you I get amazed reading nonsense about "full strength German SS Panzers" rampaging across the Ardennes but we must remember how it seemed to those fighting against them. Indeed you can tell when a book is going to be a crock of crap by their use of terms like "Hitler's vaunted panzer divisions" etc ad nauseam.
But - history is recorded by the survivors. If your enemy only has one Panther tank and you have a thousand Shermans you are going to win. Unless you happen to be in the path of that Panther and then if you survive at all - you are going to tell stories of being overrun by giant tanks and soldiers who couldn't be stopped.
Equally - a pilot facing a ME272 might not want to hear how the Luftwaffe was finished! But it was - it just retained some killing power here and there. And telling such a man that he was facing a near dead Luftwaffe does seem to dishonour him (it doesn't but that's not the point) - hence the need for well reasoned history books written by folks who consider all the angles.
To the Canadians in operation Atlantic or Spring the Germans seemed a terrible and dangerous foe - and so they were. But what is forgotten in first person narratives is that so much of what Germany had left by that time was at the very point of contact - that almost nothing remained anywhere else. The Whermact was like a suit of very good armour but with no man in it. (for want of a better metaphor).
Carlo d'Este makes an excellent point in Decision in Normandy. He notes that the Americans were as surprised as anyone else when Cobra took off and the German left collapsed. The only people who really weren't surprised where the Germans in Seventh Army!
What made the German soldier so remarkable was his willingness to fight well no matter what the circumstances were or how high the odds against him. That's why men who study war study the Whermact.
cheers
Reb
Reb wrote:
I would liek to add that this had more to do with the Führers aversion to retreat. Better mechanisation or not, American or British units did not operate faster than the German ones for a variety of reasons (like command structure or basic mentality) and could be outmaneuvered.But when the tide turned the infantry were often overrun or encircled because of their lack of mobility. The western allied army was a triumph of mechanization, far better than what the Germans (or Russians) could put together.
"Tell my mother I died for my country. I did what I thought was best."
John Wilkes Booth
April 12, 1865
John Wilkes Booth
April 12, 1865
But this had to do more with the Führers aversion to retreat. Better mechanisation or not, because of a variety of reasons (mentality, doctrine and command structure mainly) Western allied units did not operate faster than the Germans and could be outmaneuvered.But when the tide turned the infantry were often overrun or encircled because of their lack of mobility. The western allied army was a triumph of mechanization, far better than what the Germans (or Russians) could put together.
"Tell my mother I died for my country. I did what I thought was best."
John Wilkes Booth
April 12, 1865
John Wilkes Booth
April 12, 1865
Sorry, but I think that explanation merely (re)begs the question. Why was 273 Res Pz Div there? And regardless of the answer to that question, letting admin details like this drive fundamental ops questions is absolutely backwards and not the sort of thing usually seen in the German record.Rich wrote:Well, the practical reason for reforming 11 Pz around Bordeaux is that that was where 273.Res.Pz.Div. was at the time.
Excellent point. I would suggest the reasoning (such as it was), was that if at the operational level they could defeat the Allied landing in the West, then they could shift resources East and thus buy time for the special vengence weapons to compell the Western Allies to agree to withdraw from the war. Recall that other than wanting the British to withdraw from the war and let him keep his winnings on the continent, Hitler did not appear to desire an occupation of the British Isles.Rich wrote:But of course, there is a much deeper question here, one that a good friend of mine has caused me to think about a little more recently. And that is, just what - exactly - was the German military high command planning as their "war winning" (or perhaps "war not losing") strategy for 1944?
So the strategic aim in the West was to get the Anglo-Americans to agree to quit and leave the Third Reich in possession of the continent, and free to concentrate upon defeating the USSR.
One might speculate that Hitler thought a "carrot and stick" strategy could achieve this, or actually, a "two sticks" and one carrot strategy. The first stick would have been to defeat the Allied landing. The second stick was pummel them in their island with the V-1 and V-2 until they agreed to cry uncle. The carrot would be the suggestion that they could keep their island, the British their Empire in places around the world not on Hitler's list, and finally that he would rid the world of the Soviets, who afterall (he would argue) were a threat to all Western civilization, including the Anglo-Americans.
Was that a realistic strategy? Well ... assuming that the critical first step could be achieved (defeat of the Allied landing) then it wasn't necessarily off the chart.
Which brings me back to my original question -- if the critical first task (and the primary responsiblity of the theatre commanders in any case) was a defeat of the Allied landings, why were the German preparations for that so uncharateristically maladroit?