Stalingrad question
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Rodger Herbst
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Stalingrad question
How much time do you think the German's had to breakout before it came hopeless?How long could outside help before it was hopeless?Am only talking from a military point of view.
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Dackel Staffel
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Rodger Herbst
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Paulus seems to have lacked the cojones of a man like Hausser. Bad luck for the soldaten. As I said - after Manstein's (winter storm?) the break out options were gone. They were never good but after that zilch.
His best time would probably have been just after the Rumanians were smashed and before Ivan had time to consolidate and bring up all his guns.
Reb
His best time would probably have been just after the Rumanians were smashed and before Ivan had time to consolidate and bring up all his guns.
Reb
Paulus was not a man of fast action...if he wouldn't have waited so long in august to encircle the 62nd army he would never have to go through stalingrad...
6th army had every chance to make it out...
6th army had every chance to make it out...
There are no desperate situations, there are only desperate people. - Heinz Guderian
-- Sine doctrina vita est quasi mortis imago. --
-- Sine doctrina vita est quasi mortis imago. --
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sid guttridge
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Very good point Sid.sid guttridge wrote:Hi Guiys,
Before criticising Paulus compared with Hausser, it is as well to remember that Paulus had the happy example of the relief of Demyansk before him, whereas Hausser had the awful warning of Stalingrad before him.
Cheers,
Sid.
Also, from what I understand, von Paulus was very much a "yes man". Although a fairly decent general (he did get AOK 6 as far as Stalingrad, even if he didn't take it) it was reported last week, in a History Channel documentary on Stalingrad, that von Paulus was one of the "post winter 1941" commanders specifically promoted because of his devotion to "following orders", whatever the results.
Unless specifically ordered by Hitler, or von Manstein as OB HGrp.Don, to "break out" there was no chance Friedrich was going to take the initiative and order it on his own. And, correct me if I'm wrong, neither one of them specifically gave that order, and AOK 6 was doomed.
Just my 2cents worth.
Best regards -
Signed: "The Shadow"
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Rodger Herbst
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I guess we all know that Hitler made vPaulus a FM and German FM's don't surrender,so the story goes,was that the death knell of the 6th Army?
We always hear of the blitz and the German Armor,but i think people forget the German army was more than tanks,the largest part was infantry divisons who did most of the fighting and suffered the most casualties,any thoughts?
We always hear of the blitz and the German Armor,but i think people forget the German army was more than tanks,the largest part was infantry divisons who did most of the fighting and suffered the most casualties,any thoughts?
I think the "death knell" of the 6th Army was when Hitler became fixated with STALIN-grad in the first place.Rodger Herbst wrote:,was that the death knell of the 6th Army?
He wouldn't give up the battle for "Stalin's" city under any circumstances, and that sealed their fate.
FWIW.
Signed: "The Shadow"
I doubt that there ever would have been a time after the Soviets linked up that 6th Army could have made a succesful break-out.
For one thing, by the time the Soviets launched Operation Saturn virtually all German combat troops were heavily engaged inside the city. It would have difficult, if not impossible for them to have disengaged and assembled into any sort of mobile formations. They simply would have been cut down along the way.
Secondly, the German commanders made a serious miscalculation by bringing the limited armored forces that they did have up to the city itself. Tanks are of limited usefulness in an urban environment (we are still learning this lesson). More to the point, once the Army was surrounded, there as no longer sufficient fuel to sustain any sort of mobile operation in support of a breakout.
It is conceivably possible that if all the German troops inside the pocket had made an immediate flight to the west as soon as word came that Soviet pincers were closing, more of them might ultimately have survived. But such an action would have been totally contrary to their training and traditions - it would (rightly) have been called cowardice in the face of the enemy. No - 6th Army's fate was settled long before it became surrounded.
For one thing, by the time the Soviets launched Operation Saturn virtually all German combat troops were heavily engaged inside the city. It would have difficult, if not impossible for them to have disengaged and assembled into any sort of mobile formations. They simply would have been cut down along the way.
Secondly, the German commanders made a serious miscalculation by bringing the limited armored forces that they did have up to the city itself. Tanks are of limited usefulness in an urban environment (we are still learning this lesson). More to the point, once the Army was surrounded, there as no longer sufficient fuel to sustain any sort of mobile operation in support of a breakout.
It is conceivably possible that if all the German troops inside the pocket had made an immediate flight to the west as soon as word came that Soviet pincers were closing, more of them might ultimately have survived. But such an action would have been totally contrary to their training and traditions - it would (rightly) have been called cowardice in the face of the enemy. No - 6th Army's fate was settled long before it became surrounded.
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Dackel Staffel
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Hi,
Agree with vroddrew. Morever to make a quick breakthrough for avoiding a surrounding, one needs to be mechanized, al least motorized. I don't think the 6th was like that.
If the German commanders made a serious miscalculation about the russian strengh, the russians did it too because they were surprised by the number of troops trapped in Stalingrad. So, the russians had to reinforce their troops encircling the "kessel". The russian reinforcements to Stalingrad helped a little the germans to rebuild their front after the russian breaktrough. The Stalingrad sacrifice was not so vain by holding during 2 months a lot of russian troops.
Just my two cents.....( don't know in what currency dollar or euro
)
So long.
Agree with vroddrew. Morever to make a quick breakthrough for avoiding a surrounding, one needs to be mechanized, al least motorized. I don't think the 6th was like that.
If the German commanders made a serious miscalculation about the russian strengh, the russians did it too because they were surprised by the number of troops trapped in Stalingrad. So, the russians had to reinforce their troops encircling the "kessel". The russian reinforcements to Stalingrad helped a little the germans to rebuild their front after the russian breaktrough. The Stalingrad sacrifice was not so vain by holding during 2 months a lot of russian troops.
Just my two cents.....( don't know in what currency dollar or euro
) So long.
All we need it's a Dackel in each pocket
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sid guttridge
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Hi Guys,
I would suggest that defeat at Stalingrad might have been avoided in several ways. In particular, if the Romanian 3rd Army north of Stalingrad had been better supported by the Germans, it seems unlikely that Stalingrad would have been surrounded only by the weaker southern arm of the Soviet offensive, half of which received quite a drubbing from a German panzer grenadier division (29th?)
In August-September 1942 General Dumitrescu, commander of Romanian 3rd Army, asked permission to mount attacks on two Soviet bridgeheads south of the River Don. His army was then arriving and he had the necessary divisions available. However, the Germans refused because they did not want any diversion of resources from their own operations against Stalingrad. As a result the Romanians had to dig in opposite these bridgeheads, which were later to be the launch pads for the northern arm of the Soviet counter-offensive on 19 November. It is often forgotten that throughout October the Red Army launched repeated local attacks from these bridgeheads in order to widen them. The Romanians fought well and all were repulsed without German support. Had Dumitrescu had his way, there might have been no bridgeheads from which the Red Army could have launched the northern arm of their counter-offensive in November.
If all German panzer and motorised divisions near Stalingrad had been better positioned to counter Soviet attacks on the Romanians quickly, there was still a chance to prevent encirclerment even in November 1942. North of Stalingrad the Romanian 3rd Army fought with considerable determination and the initial Red Army breakthroughs were only on the fronts of three infantry regiments. Even after four days much of the Romanian front was intact, including all their positions actually on the River Don. With the whole of 14th and 22nd Panzer Divisions and 1st Romanian Armoured Division in position behind both Red Army breakthroughs of 3rd Army on 19 November, there was a reasonable prospect of preventing the decisive Soviet exploitation that eventually encircled Stalingrad from the north. As it was the Soviet armoured spearheads almost came to a halt because of the fear of leaving 22nd Panzer Division and 1st Armoured Division to their rear and had to be kept moving by heavy pressure from senior commanders.
Cheers,
Sid.
I would suggest that defeat at Stalingrad might have been avoided in several ways. In particular, if the Romanian 3rd Army north of Stalingrad had been better supported by the Germans, it seems unlikely that Stalingrad would have been surrounded only by the weaker southern arm of the Soviet offensive, half of which received quite a drubbing from a German panzer grenadier division (29th?)
In August-September 1942 General Dumitrescu, commander of Romanian 3rd Army, asked permission to mount attacks on two Soviet bridgeheads south of the River Don. His army was then arriving and he had the necessary divisions available. However, the Germans refused because they did not want any diversion of resources from their own operations against Stalingrad. As a result the Romanians had to dig in opposite these bridgeheads, which were later to be the launch pads for the northern arm of the Soviet counter-offensive on 19 November. It is often forgotten that throughout October the Red Army launched repeated local attacks from these bridgeheads in order to widen them. The Romanians fought well and all were repulsed without German support. Had Dumitrescu had his way, there might have been no bridgeheads from which the Red Army could have launched the northern arm of their counter-offensive in November.
If all German panzer and motorised divisions near Stalingrad had been better positioned to counter Soviet attacks on the Romanians quickly, there was still a chance to prevent encirclerment even in November 1942. North of Stalingrad the Romanian 3rd Army fought with considerable determination and the initial Red Army breakthroughs were only on the fronts of three infantry regiments. Even after four days much of the Romanian front was intact, including all their positions actually on the River Don. With the whole of 14th and 22nd Panzer Divisions and 1st Romanian Armoured Division in position behind both Red Army breakthroughs of 3rd Army on 19 November, there was a reasonable prospect of preventing the decisive Soviet exploitation that eventually encircled Stalingrad from the north. As it was the Soviet armoured spearheads almost came to a halt because of the fear of leaving 22nd Panzer Division and 1st Armoured Division to their rear and had to be kept moving by heavy pressure from senior commanders.
Cheers,
Sid.