Here is my question: In some light reading on Crete, German Paras suffered horrific causalities. All because proper intel was not done for sake of time, both to launching the operation and time hack to complete it. Ok, if crete had not happened, (as far as the Para Arm is concerned) or turned out differently, would they have gotten a top spot during Operation Barbarossa? If I am correct the only other op after Crete was by the Waffen SS in trying to capture Tito. Yes?
Was there in any planning circles an option to use paratroops to invade Russia like the U.S and Britian did on D-Day?
Thanks in Advance.
George
CRETE 1941 WHAT IF
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CRETE 1941 WHAT IF
"Devildogs and Leathernecks, Thank God for Ammo Techs!"
Losses grossly overstated
The key quote from Hitler is commonly misrepresented. What Hitler meant was that Crete demonstrated that airborne forces would not SURPRISE anyone again, not that they had lost their effectiveness.
There were more German airborne troops available in June 1941 then there were in May 1940, perhaps 2 or 3 times as many since a Mountain division had not qualified to replace 22nd Airlanding Division.
Remke's Assault Regiment was quickly expanded to a brigade, then a division.
Elements of 7th Flying Division were committed to Russia, but did not jump.
The limitation on airborne troops is ALWAYS the availability of transport AIRCRAFT. Training paratroopers is a MINOR problem, and you can create thousands in a matter of weeks. The English created an airborne division by simply redesignating it.
By 22 June 1941 the Germans had more Ju-52s in service than were used to jump into Crete, but there were no critical targets that could not be more effectively captured by the panzer divisions. So it was more useful to use te transport fleet to haul supplies. In the entire campaign on the Eastern Front it's difficult to see ANY battle that would have been different if the Germans committed an airborne corps (1 parachute/glider division + 1 airlanding, etc.)
The real What If is taking Malta. December 1941 is a good date, but then the Ju-52s were DESPERATELY needed for supplying encircleed troops. Perhaps February or March.
But again, Hitler, wisely, concluded that the Italian Navy would retreat if the English naval forces in the Mediterranean sortied, and so the ship-borne reinforcements would never arrive. Without relief from a conventional landing, the paratroops who landed on Malta would likely be arrested by the local police.
There were more German airborne troops available in June 1941 then there were in May 1940, perhaps 2 or 3 times as many since a Mountain division had not qualified to replace 22nd Airlanding Division.
Remke's Assault Regiment was quickly expanded to a brigade, then a division.
Elements of 7th Flying Division were committed to Russia, but did not jump.
The limitation on airborne troops is ALWAYS the availability of transport AIRCRAFT. Training paratroopers is a MINOR problem, and you can create thousands in a matter of weeks. The English created an airborne division by simply redesignating it.
By 22 June 1941 the Germans had more Ju-52s in service than were used to jump into Crete, but there were no critical targets that could not be more effectively captured by the panzer divisions. So it was more useful to use te transport fleet to haul supplies. In the entire campaign on the Eastern Front it's difficult to see ANY battle that would have been different if the Germans committed an airborne corps (1 parachute/glider division + 1 airlanding, etc.)
The real What If is taking Malta. December 1941 is a good date, but then the Ju-52s were DESPERATELY needed for supplying encircleed troops. Perhaps February or March.
But again, Hitler, wisely, concluded that the Italian Navy would retreat if the English naval forces in the Mediterranean sortied, and so the ship-borne reinforcements would never arrive. Without relief from a conventional landing, the paratroops who landed on Malta would likely be arrested by the local police.
Vinnie O
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Not correct Vinnie O.
Hitler disliked the Malta operation as a whole. Student and Kesserling proposed to use the paratroopers only in April 1942 (D day in May) saying they would be enought - And I think they were right - and Der Fuhrer refused as he said that the supplies by sea would not arrive but this was nonsense and the German general know it well.
There are less than 100 miles from Augusta to Malta while there are 920 from Alexandria to Malta. The invasion convoys could do, at the planned 9 knots, the way in 12 hours. A British force from Alexandria had to spent, at 20 knots, two full days. The Mediterranean Fleet, then had only light cruisers against the Italian battleships. The Second Syrte episode is not a proof but only an exception as the sea would had to be a quiet one for the small barges and landign crafts; do not forget than that with a good weather the same Adm. Vian refused to encounter the Italian fleet in June 1942 coming back to Alexandria.
Hitler said an idiocy and his generals preferred to believe him, also if they know it was a mistake based upon absurdity.
The worste is that the 40.000 t of oil the German refused in June 1942 for the malta invasion were delivered to the Italian Navy in Nov. 1942 for the new Tunisi front. They were stockpiled at Brest since 1941, idle. For lack of wagons they could not be sent in Germany but could only be delievered by river, in direction south, toward the Mediterranean along the current.
No Hitler was wrong and in bad faith.
Bye EC
Hitler disliked the Malta operation as a whole. Student and Kesserling proposed to use the paratroopers only in April 1942 (D day in May) saying they would be enought - And I think they were right - and Der Fuhrer refused as he said that the supplies by sea would not arrive but this was nonsense and the German general know it well.
There are less than 100 miles from Augusta to Malta while there are 920 from Alexandria to Malta. The invasion convoys could do, at the planned 9 knots, the way in 12 hours. A British force from Alexandria had to spent, at 20 knots, two full days. The Mediterranean Fleet, then had only light cruisers against the Italian battleships. The Second Syrte episode is not a proof but only an exception as the sea would had to be a quiet one for the small barges and landign crafts; do not forget than that with a good weather the same Adm. Vian refused to encounter the Italian fleet in June 1942 coming back to Alexandria.
Hitler said an idiocy and his generals preferred to believe him, also if they know it was a mistake based upon absurdity.
The worste is that the 40.000 t of oil the German refused in June 1942 for the malta invasion were delivered to the Italian Navy in Nov. 1942 for the new Tunisi front. They were stockpiled at Brest since 1941, idle. For lack of wagons they could not be sent in Germany but could only be delievered by river, in direction south, toward the Mediterranean along the current.
No Hitler was wrong and in bad faith.
Bye EC
In "Hitler's War" (pages 502-503), David Irving gives this account of the reasons that stopped the attack on Malta:
There, on June 15, Admiral Raeder drove up to the Berghof to press the case for the attack on Malta. In May, parachute general Kurt Student had briefed Hitler on the British fortifications and defences; but to Hitler it seemed that more was known of the probable British tactics than the Italian.
Jodl's naval staff officer had told the admiralty: "The Führer has little
confidence in the operation's success, as the Italians' assault strength is wholly inadequate and the Italians don't have the least idea of secrecy. It seems to be a particularly difficult task, far tougher than Crete, which was difficult enough as it was." Hitler offered a string of specious arguments against invading Malta: even if they succeeded, the Italians could not keep the island garrison supplied (to which the admiralty acidly pointed out that at present the far more difficult supply line to Rommel's army in North Africa was still open). Even more farfetched was Hitler's claim that Malta served their strategy better in British hands, as its supply convoys then offered sitting targets in the anti-shipping war. Hitler had allowed the "theoretical planning" for Malta to continue during May, but now, on June 15, he offered the admiral little hope that the assault would ever take place.
Re: CRETE 1941 WHAT IF
[quote=" If I am correct the only other op after Crete was by the Waffen SS in trying to capture Tito. Yes?
[/quote]
Sorry:- Wrong!
The Germans used their airborne troops also in other smaller operation as well. To much to mention all but forinstance Leros or the Ardennes...
[/quote]
Sorry:- Wrong!
The Germans used their airborne troops also in other smaller operation as well. To much to mention all but forinstance Leros or the Ardennes...
Re: CRETE 1941 WHAT IF
You are right; here there is a list of airborne operations (all on a small scale after Crete) made by the Fallschirmjaeger: http://www.eagle19.freeserve.co.uk/page1.htm.Peter wrote:The Germans used their airborne troops also in other smaller operation as well. To much to mention all but forinstance Leros or the Ardennes...
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barbarossa?
I doubt the Fallschirmjager would have got a top spot during Barabarossa - yes it may not take very long to train paratroopers, but it does take some time to equip them, and there was, what, only six weeks between Crete on May 10th and Barbarossa on June 22nd?
By the time the Crete operation began the plans both strategic and tactical for Barbarossa would have been essentially complete - if they werent used in June/July 1941, then it wasn't intended for them to be used.
Phylo
By the time the Crete operation began the plans both strategic and tactical for Barbarossa would have been essentially complete - if they werent used in June/July 1941, then it wasn't intended for them to be used.
Phylo
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the german paratroops suffered horrific casualties when they fell upon the Anzacs positions, especially to the guns of my fellow kiwis. the casualties suffered there would of been ok if that had been the beginning of paratroop operations in the Meditarean, however it was the end.
Sajer, just a forgotten soldier
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