largest European pockets of WWII

[4444]

I did give you a definition. It's based on the logistical appreciation of each case

Basically, I do appreciate the logic of your defintion. I would agree that from the military theory point of view, it is more logical than mine. They key problem with your definition as I see it is that it is impractical in use; you are down to analysing supply/logistics capacities, often based on nothing but potentiality (Crimea a non-pocket before May 9, a pocket afterwards). My definition beats yours in terms of practicality, I believe. Both are running against common wisdom (Kuban, Courland), but this does not worry me a lot.

Rather than loosing ‘all contact except air’ why not have simply loosing ‘all contact’? You see? For the very same reason you are distinguishing between sea and air contact, I am distinguishing between the land and sea contact

Because you can't supply an army by air alone. Not even today. You can do by sea...indefinitely if you have control of the sea lanes i.e. Britain

Yes you can. What about Demiansk? Fully supplied by Luftwaffe. This was exectly the case which made Hitler thought encircled troops are not pocketed. No pocket?

well, why not, at least after Finland swooped sides? Weren’t the Germans trapped in-between the Soviets and the Finns?

No

??? Please tell me then, which way did they maintain contact with the main forces?

All your three 'sources' utilise the same source, Tessin. The 14 Panzer Division history states that 25,000 - 30,000 men were evacuated from Windau and Libau on 8th May. Most of these men came from 14 Pz Div and 11 ID with major elements of 126 ID. The only unit of 14 Pz Div left behind was II./ Pz Gren Regt 108. Werner Haupt also relays this but gives even more detail about the naval make up of this evacuation force. I also have the 11 ID and 12 Pz Div histories - I will dig them up and see what they say too

thanks, this is getting really interesting. Wonder where did they go – presume Denmark?

Your defintion is simple. Far too simple

Hard to satisfy you. You have challenged me to be simple earlier on and now you say I am too simple...

The Germans didn't regard ther Kuban as a pocket

All right, I will try to be brave and take the risk of running against the German vision.

And neither has any military historian. In fact your the first I have ever known who has regarded it as such

I am not sure about any military historian, since I have not read them all. Of all that I know, no-one is considering Kuban a pocket, and most refer to it as bridgehead/Brückenkopf. However, none of them has spelled out his vision of a pocket either. Proud to be the pioneering one. From now on you may say there is at least one military historian (amateur, this is to say) which does consider Kuban a pocket.

Please don't misquote me. In terms of pockets I was referring to supply by air. The quote you are referring to is obviously talking about air cover from the Crimea

I am not a native speaker, so I have to rely on dictionaries, for instance http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=misquote. Having looked the word up, I do not think I have misquoted anyone. I am not fooling around with distorting what the others have said. I have not even referred you. Not being sure whether what you mean is air supplies or air cover of supplies, I have asked a question.

I assume you mean 1943

sure, apologies. I mean spring 1943.

No, I would not agree about the reason for the Kuban evacuation. It was evacuated in the wake of Army Group South's collapse on the Mius and Donets - to provide units to shore up the front

I am afraid you are a bit too flexible than I can accept without mumbling. Few posts earlier you said about Crimea that “there was no reason it could not have been evacuated between October 1943 and April 1944” apprently ignoring Mansteins’s need to “shore up” the front by the Lower Dnepr. Now you say the need to “shore up” by the Mius was a sufficient reason to evacuate Kuban.

A look at where the Kuban divisions were sent (Melitopol) bears witness to this. The fact the Germans could choose when they wanted to evacuate the Kuban proves to me that it wasn't a pocket

Melitopol was just one of the destinations. Most of the Kuban garrison – some 260.000 peope – were transported via the Kertsch Straits to the Crimea. And at that time, that was the only destination possible.

I do not think enyone thought the Soviets would allow the Kuban men to stay there until the end of the war. There was no doubt whatsoever that after a failed winter offensive, after a failed spring offensive, there will eventually come an autumn offensive as well. And there was an increasing feeling that whatever the reasons to keep Kuban are (Turkey!), they are overweighted by the would-be effects of the fututre Soviet offensive.

As shown above the Germans were capable of moving large numbers of troops out even on the last day of the war. So no, I don't think of Kurland as a pocket in the same way as Kiev. The fact Guderian suggested it's evacuation shows to me it wasn't considered as isolated

Do I sense a slight concession here? Previously you dismissed Courland out of hand, now you are saying “no pocket in the Kiev way”. Sure, no pocket in a Kiev way; never said this.

the fact Kurland remained in existence from October 9144 onwards proves it was being supplied - this is the crux of my argument. It is the logistical appreciation of each situation that should be used to determine whether a pocket exists or not

No, your initial argument was that there is no pocker if you can shift “large units”. Now you are changing this to getting or not getting supplies. If your previous definition excluded almost all beachead encirclements, your current ones excludes almost all encirclements at all. Demiansk? A huge success story, Luftwaffe did a great job, no pocket. Stalingrad? well, success story definitely not, also far away from the 300 tons of daily supplies needed, but were they small enough to qualify for the kessel definition? After all, Hitler has consciously banned breakthrough saying the airbridge makes it a non-pocket.

Another misquote. They evacuated 15,000. They could have evacuated far more given the facilties, time and space to do so. It wasn't a succesful evacuation was it? More men were left behind than were rescued

As to misquoting, please see my earlier comments.

Misinterpretation? In a sense. I tried to argue that the episode you refer to proves exactly the opposite than you wanted to prove. And I still keep trying. The rescue fleet which approached the Crimean beaches on May 9 evening was incomparable in size to the 160-vessels fleet which approached the coast one day later. Unlike on May 10, most vessels were fully booked when heading back to Romania. Moreover, on top of the 15.000 sucessfully evacuated, you should add 9.000 which made it to the decks, but sunk few hours later on “Totila” (5.000) and “Teja” (4.000). 24.000 taken from the coast is not a bad result at all!

We're never going to agree on the weather in the Crimea

why not? we are reasonable people, aren’t we? I would not bother to carry this on if I did not hope there is a chance to get you convinced (and vice versa, I believe). At some stage earlier I was already close to concede on semantics.

Any evacuation that has three days from initial order to operation end cannot blame the weather if it fails

Sure, this is taking chances. Sometimes it works, sometimes it does not. But taking chances is a pretty common decision-making strategy. In case it does not work out, there is a cause. Now what is the reason for failure: taking chances, or this very cause?

Despite all stupid Hitler’s decisions, despite losing the air superiority, despite the Soviet advance, on May 9 there was still a high chance of getting some 30-50.000 out. It was neither Hitler nor Soviet aircaft nor Soviet artillery which has prevented this.

Your comparison of both operations is again too simplistic

On simple vs complex, please see above. Sure, only in a laboratory you may have two cases which have all parameteres but one equal, so that you can measure variances only on this one parameter. Which does not make all historical comparative studies rubbish. Below I am trying to prove that at least mine is not. Just to remind everyone (if there is any) who still bothers to follow: I do not take the point that the Crimean troops were doomed because of the Soviet proximity, which would have prevented any seaborne evacuation attempt, regardless of the weather. By comparing Walpurgisnacht and Crimea I am tying to prove that a close proximity of an enemy did not by default prevent a succesfull seaborne evacuation at all.

The Sevastapol fortifications had been abandoned days before the evacuation was to take place

I am afraid this is rather misleading. Indeed, on May 9, when the evacuation order reached the besieged troops, the city of Sevastopol has already been abandoned by the Germans (not "days before", but on the very same day; last German units left Sevastopol city on 1600,May 9). This is not tantamount to abandoning the “Sevastopol fortifications”. I am not sure whether you have ever been there. A view from the “Panorama” musem or from the Sapun Gor monument shows that the Sevastopol fortifications covered a huge area, going far beyond the city itself (I was looking for a nice picture in the web for you, but failed, apologies). On May 9 the Germans have dugged themselves in the Westernmost section of the fortress on the Kherson penninsula, dubbed “Chersones-Stellung”.

The length of coastline was far greater in the Prussian operation

possibly, but we are not talking any Prussian operation. I have a vague impression you are confusing Walpurgisnacht with Hannibal. For Walpurgisnacht, the Oxhoft coastline hold was only few kilometres, exactly as it was in Kherson.

The Kherson peninsula coastline was cliffs with small or no beaches

well, not true. Have a look at this:

The Prussian coast has wide, gently sloping beaches

true for Frische Nehrung and both Werders, but not for Oxhoft. This is how the Oxhoft coastline really looks like:

Does not look like gently sloping beaches at all. You can see the Oxhoft heights also here, in the background, behind Gustloff:

The Crimean evacuation forces had to travel from Rumania across open sea. The Prussian evacuation was across the bay to Hela

this is irrelevant for the weather discussion. Your point was it was the Soviet proximity in Sevastopol – and not the sea distance to cover - which rendered evacuation unfeasible regardless of the weather.

Still, please let me have a look. I think none of the vessels taking part in Walpurgisnacht could have done more than 6-7 knots, which requires 40 mins to 1 hour to cover the distance from Oxhoft to Hela. In case of Crimea, most rescue ships could have approached the cost much much closer, within a range of 20-30 minutes (at worst) for most small vessels available in Kherson.

The Prussian evacuations had been in operation since February and as a result were well run and organised. The Crimea evacuation was a rush job.

False. As written above, the Crimean evacuation has been planned since October 1943, and the Navy kept the plans being updated; it was by no means a rush job, I think this is a huge injustice to Schulz and his logistics team. The fact that “Prussian evacuations” had been in operation for quite a while (actually, from mid-Jan, not Feb) is also irrelevant here. I do not see how rescue operations carried out for months from Pillau, Memel, Tolkemit, Danzig, Gotenhaven and many others could have helped to get Walpurgisnacht a success. I would rether suspect they had an adverse effect, given lots of the vessels got sunk, naval corridors got littered with wrecks, and civilians were still crying for ships.

[sid guttridge]

Hi Guys,

Could I ask for some consideration of my earlier proposed definition: "Isolated from friendly forces by virtue of enemy domination of surrounding land AND sea."

I have always assumed that a "Kessel" implied total encirclement, which cannot be the case if there is a useable seaway to the rear.

Indeed, I do not recall the word "Kessel" being used to describe any isolated beacheads. Are there any published examples?

Cheers,

Sid.

[sid guttridge]

P.S.

After a quick and possibly incomplete survey I think the following divisions were evacuated from Kurland after it was cut off by land:

4 Panzer Div.
11 SS Div.
32 Inf. Div.
83 Inf. Div.
93 Inf. Div.
215 Inf. Div.
227 Inf. Div.
281 Inf. Div.
389 Inf. Div.

The fact that no attempt was made to withdraw all of them in good time was purely down to Hitler's obstinacy, as it had been in the Kuban and Crimea. In all three cases the means and opportunity existed to withdraw all bar a small reaguard in good time.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Achilles]

Yes you can. What about Demiansk? Fully supplied by Luftwaffe. This was exectly the case which made Hitler thought encircled troops are not pocketed. No pocket?

Hmmm. The forces in the Demyansk pocket were kept at a subsistence level by air supply i.e. food and ammunition. The logistician in me would not claim it was kept in full supply i.e. not replacement equipment - tanks, field guns. The long the siege went on the weaker II Korps got and the less freedom of action it had. Also Demyansk was not an Armee but a Korps. The larger the unit surrounded the harder it is to fully supply.

thanks, this is getting really interesting. Wonder where did they go – presume Denmark?

Apparently the vast majority went to Schleswig-Holstein where they entered British captivity. There was never any consideration given to handing them back to the Soviets.

All right, I will try to be brave and take the risk of running against the German vision.

But I'm not sure the Soviets did either.

I am not sure about any military historian, since I have not read them all. Of all that I know, no-one is considering Kuban a pocket, and most refer to it as bridgehead/Brückenkopf. However, none of them has spelled out his vision of a pocket either. Proud to be the pioneering one. From now on you may say there is at least one military historian (amateur, this is to say) which does consider Kuban a pocket.

Well someone has to be first to break the mould.

I am not a native speaker, so I have to rely on dictionaries, for instance http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=misquote. Having looked the word up, I do not think I have misquoted anyone. I am not fooling around with distorting what the others have said. I have not even referred you. Not being sure whether what you mean is air supplies or air cover of supplies, I have asked a question.

Many apologies. Your English is so good I didn't realise.

I am afraid you are a bit too flexible than I can accept without mumbling. Few posts earlier you said about Crimea that “there was no reason it could not have been evacuated between October 1943 and April 1944” apprently ignoring Mansteins’s need to “shore up” the front by the Lower Dnepr. Now you say the need to “shore up” by the Mius was a sufficient reason to evacuate Kuban.

There were far more divisions in the Kuban than there were on the Crimea. Of the German divisions in the Kuban in September 1943 (101 Jag, 5 LW, 370, 50, 79, 98, 97 Jag, 9, 73, 4 Geb) only 98 and 50 stayed in the Crimea. The other divisions were instrumental in preventing the complete collapse of Army Group South southern flank. This situation was far more pressing than when Manstein was asking for more divisions on the Dneiper. In the former case the problem had already happened, in the latter Manstein was anticpating what would (and did) happen were the Soviets to launch multiple offensives.

The other divisions destroyed in the Crimea in May 1944 (111, 336 and 73) were transported to the Crimea after it was cut off. The fact that the Germans were able to do this unmolested destroys the image of the Crimea being a pocket before May 1944. The

Melitopol was just one of the destinations. Most of the Kuban garrison – some 260.000 peope – were transported via the Kertsch Straits to the Crimea. And at that time, that was the only destination possible.

The divisions at Melitopol went via the Crimea. Parts of 9 ID and 79 ID were transported directly by air from the Kuban from 21 and 27 September respectively.

Do I sense a slight concession here? Previously you dismissed Courland out of hand, now you are saying “no pocket in the Kiev way”. Sure, no pocket in a Kiev way; never said this.

Afraid not. I just don't see Kurland as a pocket.

No, your initial argument was that there is no pocker if you can shift “large units”. Now you are changing this to getting or not getting supplies. If your previous definition excluded almost all beachead encirclements, your current ones excludes almost all encirclements at all. Demiansk? A huge success story, Luftwaffe did a great job, no pocket. Stalingrad? well, success story definitely not, also far away from the 300 tons of daily supplies needed, but were they small enough to qualify for the kessel definition? After all, Hitler has consciously banned breakthrough saying the airbridge makes it a non-pocket.

There is a difference between subsistence supply and full supply. Hence the ability to move large units (with all their equipment obviously) in and out at will. Neither happened at Demyansk or Stalingrad. Look at this another. At Demyansk would the supply level that was being brought in ever have allowed II Korps to breakout on its own? No. It's military strength (and it's men's physical strength) would have weakened with every passing week. In a unit under normal supply the opposite is true.

Sure, this is taking chances. Sometimes it works, sometimes it does not. But taking chances is a pretty common decision-making strategy. In case it does not work out, there is a cause. Now what is the reason for failure: taking chances, or this very cause?

Yes, but it wasn't a case of taking a chance. It was the only option left.

Despite all stupid Hitler’s decisions, despite losing the air superiority, despite the Soviet advance, on May 9 there was still a high chance of getting some 30-50.000 out. It was neither Hitler nor Soviet aircaft nor Soviet artillery which has prevented this.

All decisions and events are open to chance. But Hitlers actions and Soviet artillery greatly reduced these chances.

False. As written above, the Crimean evacuation has been planned since October 1943, and the Navy kept the plans being updated; it was by no means a rush job, I think this is a huge injustice to Schulz and his logistics team. The fact that “Prussian evacuations” had been in operation for quite a while (actually, from mid-Jan, not Feb) is also irrelevant here. I do not see how rescue operations carried out for months from Pillau, Memel, Tolkemit, Danzig, Gotenhaven and many others could have helped to get Walpurgisnacht a success. I would rether suspect they had an adverse effect, given lots of the vessels got sunk, naval corridors got littered with wrecks, and civilians were still crying for ships.

The Crimean evacuation may have been drawn up in October 1943 - but I'd be pretty sure it bore no relation to the evacuation in May 1944. In October 1943 the Germans held all of the Crimea. On the 9th May they held a few square miles. For a start the October 1943 would have taken into account the use of Sevastapol harbour, not some desperate evacuation from the Chersones peninsula. So I would still claim the May 1944 evacuation was a rush job.

I think the Prussian evacuations are very relevant. The more experience that is gained makes future operations run more smoothly. I suppose one could claim the Kuban evacuation may have given the German\Rumanian naval units experience for the May 1944 operation. Unfortunately it was unlike the Crimea operation in terms of distance travelled, time constraints, open sea vs a narrow strait.

[Achilles]

Hi Guys,

Could I ask for some consideration of my earlier proposed definition: "Isolated from friendly forces by virtue of enemy domination of surrounding land AND sea."

I have always assumed that a "Kessel" implied total encirclement, which cannot be the case if there is a useable seaway to the rear.

Indeed, I do not recall the word "Kessel" being used to describe any isolated beacheads. Are there any published examples?

Cheers,

Sid.

Sid,


I agree with your definition. But how would total domination be measured? I think it is related to the cutting of the logistical chain.

[sid guttridge]

Hi Achilles,

In essence I agree.

I would suggest that a "kessel" exists from the moment the means no longer exist to keep the formations concerned up to strength or withdraw them because the enemy dominates the land and sea around them and they therefore have a finite life span.

As a general rule, in WWII the means did not exist to fully supply or completely withdraw major formations by air so I would discount this factor. The nearest got to it was at Demyansk, but this was essentially a conventional land "Kessel" that was propped up by air supply long enough for it to be relieved from outside. There can have been few, if any, conventional land "kessels" or beacheads that did not enjoy some measure of air supply, however limited, but in no case did it do more than extend their resistance.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Jan]

Hi
Wieviele Soldaten kamen aus dem Halbe-Kessel?

Jan

[4444]

...After a quick and possibly incomplete survey I think the following divisions were evacuated from Kurland after it was cut off by land...

thanks, this is quite a lot, I should say... as written earlier, I thought there was no large scale military evacuation from Courland, but this seems to have been rubbish.

What comforts me in my misery is that you are still a bit away from having your claim that “a high proportion of the forces cut off in Courland were evacuated” sustained. I have just read that the Soviets claim they have taken 284.267 (!) POWs when the Courland forces surrendered. If this is not grossly overstated, having added these 9 divisions evacuated, plus WIAs evacuated, plus KIAs, plus MIAs, plus POWs taken before May 9, 1945, I should perhaps conclude that the number of these cut off in October 1944 was approaching 400.000! This elevates Courland to position number 3 on my list. These 9 divisions was probably not more than 60-70.000 people, which is possibly around 16-19% of all troops cut off in Kurzeme.

By the way, could I please ask what is your source? The same as this one so depreciated by Achilles?

Another question. Is anyone aware of any traffic the other way round? Were there any units shuttled to Courland from elsewhere? I think the Ozel and Dago garrisons were transported to Courland, but my question is rather about the West-to-East lane.

[4444]

...Indeed, I do not recall the word "Kessel" being used to describe any isolated beacheads. Are there any published examples?

Well, this very site refers to Courland as to a "pocket", see http://www.feldgrau.com/InfDiv.php?ID=82. On the other hand, it refers to Kuban as to a "bridgehead", see http://www.feldgrau.com/heer13p.html.

[4444]

I would suggest that a "kessel" exists from the moment the means no longer exist to keep the formations concerned up to strength or withdraw them because the enemy dominates the land and sea around them and they therefore have a finite life span

I understand you disqualify not only Kuban and Courland, but also Crimea 1943/44, East Prussia, Vistula Mouth and Nord-Pas-de-Calais.

[sid guttridge]

Hi 4444,

My early point was that beach heads (particularly those held by both sides on the Eastern Front) are usually qualitatively different from inland kessels because the seaways behind them are often sufficiently open to withdraw, sustain or reinforce the bulk of the garrison. In an inland kessel this was not so.

In the cases of the Kuban, Crimea and Kurland the Axis navies were always in a position to withdraw the majority of troops and in the two former cases managed to do so. Had the war not ended they might still have rescued the Kurland garrison as well.

The East Prussian and Vistula Mouth situations I know less about, but in both cases the evacuation of civilians, at least, was still considered viable to the end of the war, so they were clearly not as comprehensively cut off as a contemporary inland kessel like Breslau.

The German Atlantic fortresses and Dunkirk, on the other hand, were as comprehensively cut off as any land kessel because the sea behind them was totally dominated by the enemy. They therefore had a limited life expectancy from the moment communications were lost with the main German front. In my opinion, they and the residual German holdings on Rhodes and Crete, are comparable to inland Kessels by virtue of their total surface isolation. (All received some air supply and some received submarine supply, but this was purely token).

O.K. If "a high proportion" offends, how about "a significant proportion"? In any event, whichever formula is used, it still indicates that Kurland was not a closed kessel.

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. I looked up an OB for the forces cut off in Kurland on the internet and then compared it division by division with another site giving potted divisional histories.

[Achilles]

Evacuated Units\Replacements Kurland

These figures are all culled from a quick scan of Haupt's Army Group North Book

Replacements received between 1/10/44 and 7/11/44 - 28,000. This is quoted for a comparison for casulaties suffered in the same period (44,000) and does not suggest this was the last replacemtn to arrive. The same a paragraph mentions the loss of a steamer ("Schiffbeck") at Libau which had arrived with 12 light howitzers, 3 heavy howitzers, 1 15cm cannon, 6 heavy infantry guns, 12 2cm AA guns and 1800 SMGs onboard. This indicates ignificant supplies as well as men were arriving in Kurland.

Numbers of men evacuated from Army Group Area between 24/9 and 25/11 - 69,409 soldiers, 68,562 wounded, 7,558 Latvian recruits, 3108 Latvian and Estonian soldiers, 5809 OT men, 73,319 Baltics, 1791 Russians, 11,626 horses, 6,432 vehicles and 290 guns. On 25/11 alone (after an order all non-essential vehicles were to return to Germany) four steamers left Libau for Danzig with 91 heavy trucks, 70 light trucks and 39 motorcycles.

End of 1944 - 83 ID was loaded in Libau. In January 4 Pz, 227 ID, 389 ID, 15 SS and III SS Panzer Korps followed.

1/2/45 - 13/2/45 - only 13,000 tonnes of supplies were delivered to Kurland.

March - SS Nordland, SS Nederland and 215 ID were evacuated.

[4444]

Evacuated Units\Replacements Kurland...

thanks, sounds very interesting.

It is worth noting that two key figures quoted (28.000 soldiers transported to Courland and 148.000 soldiers transported from Courland) cover also (if not predominantly) the period when Courland was part of the main frontline. I have now found that the Soviets cut off Courland on Oct 24.

What surprised me was a high number of Baltic civilians evacuated (73.000). To my knowledge, Kriegsmarine was evacuating only families of the Waffen SS or other Axis-allied Baltic units (at least this is what I learnt from a video casette bought once in the War Museum in Riga). Perhaps also money could have bought people their way to the decks.

Still, none of the numbers given suggests there were any significant reinforcements that Courland received after the area has been cut off. Looks the human traffic was only in one direction.

[4444]

My early point was that...

I hope I got your theoretical point earlier. By pointing to its practical implications I tried to demonstrate you are now running against the mainstream vision, which clearly considers Courland or Dunkerque pockets.

The German Atlantic fortresses and Dunkirk...

I am not sure this is what you refer to, but when writing “Nord-Pas-de-Calais” I meant 1940, not 1944/45

I looked up an OB for the forces cut off in Kurland on the internet and then compared it division by division with another site giving potted divisional histories.

oops... I am overwhelmed. Given the number of divisions cut off in Courland, this methodology must have taken you quite some time. If this “another site” is feldgrau, axishistory or wehrmachtlexikon, than I understand there are doubts regarding their credibility, see the earlier Achilles’ comment.

[Endzeit Jan]

Hi
Ich würde auch den Harz im April 1945 als Kessel bezeichnen.
Im Harz stand ja die 11.Armee.

Jan