Southern wing of Army Group Center 1943-44.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; an interesting article.............................

Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

I. Part. From Orel to the Dnieper.

The German-Russian positions between Belgorod and Kirov were in the form of a question mark in the summer of 1943; in the lower half the Russians were on the inner line and in an arc around Kursk that projected deep into the German lines; in the upper half the ratio was reversed. Here the German formation extended far to the east in the arc around Orel.

The geographical area of the question mark became the scene of the last major offensive of the German Eastern Army in July 1943. The South and Center Army Groups took part in it with forces that were considered considerable given the German strength at the time, but small in relation to the task and the enemy. The attack was based neither on a political-strategic, war-decisive idea nor on a broad operational goal. Rather, it was an operation with a limited purpose. The German side expected another major Russian attack in the summer of 1943. The German military leadership did not want to face it passively, but rather anticipated it through its own active undertaking in order to secure the advantage in action.

In order to realize their intention, the possibility seemed to be to carry out a devastating blow against the armies in the Kursk area. The offensive battle was intended to straighten the exhausting, extensive front arc (Belgorod Sevsk-Maloarchangelsk) and to move the German positions forward to the shortest line between Belgorod and Maloarchangelsk. Ultimately, it was hoped that the act of attack would improve the situation of the own starting position before the expected Russian summer offensive - by destroying considerable parts of the Russian army, gaining a shortened, force-saving formation process and saving divisions from the battle line in order to form operational army reserves.

A pincer-like attack against the thighs without a simultaneous thrust against the forehead of the enemy's front arc around Kursk was intended to ensure success. For this purpose, the attack divisions of Army Group South had to move from Belgorod to the north, and those of Army Group Center (9th Army) from Orel to the south - both with the unification point at Kursk.

The shadow that hung over this operation from the beginning was the threat to the eastern flank and rear of the German 9th Army, which was attacking south from Orel under Colonel General Model. Only if the German 2nd Panzer Army, which was also under Model's command, was able to keep clear the 9th Army's back by maintaining its positions on both sides of Bolchow, could the risk of the attack against Kursk be justified.

However, it is very likely that the intention of leaving the battle in a better position and stronger than before could have been achieved with less risk and fewer casualties if a voluntary withdrawal from the northern arc of the front (Orel), had been preferred to an attack on the southern one (Kursk). By self-chosen giving up the area around Orel and withdrawing one's own forces to the bowstring on both sides of Briansk, one part of the goal of straightening the front and removing forces from the battle line as reserves for the highest leadership would probably have been made easier. However, the other, more questionable part of the goal of destroying large parts of the Russian army should have been dispensed with.

However, the German military leadership stuck to the pursuit of the overall goal. They preferred the offensive solution, even though the prerequisites for success were becoming increasingly unfavorable. The enemy's surprise was called into question by the fact that the German top leadership pushed back the date of the attack from week to week and inevitably jeopardized the preservation of the secrecy and camouflage of the attack preparations. In addition, the Russians brought reinforcements into the area around Kursk, so that the balance of strength on both sides shifted further to the attacker's disadvantage. The behavior of the Russian troops in the forward positions and the measures taken by the enemy leadership in the rear gave no indication that the defender could have any intention of evading the German attack threatening him by voluntarily evacuating the Kursk arc. On the contrary - all signs pointed to the fact that the German breakthrough attack on Kursk would at least be met with a determined defense and perhaps even with an enemy who would strike back.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more.............................

Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

I. Part. From Orel to the Dnieper.

This assessment of the situation before the start of the offensive was available to AOK 9 and could not have been alien to the higher command of Army Group Center and the O.K.H. If desire nevertheless triumphed over insight and the decision to take the offensive was maintained when it already exceeded the permissible level of risk, the explanation for this lay in the characters of the men who made the final decision. They were unable to muster the mental agility to let go of the idea they had once conceived.

This led to the double battle of Kursk and Orel, which began on July 5, 1943, and the outcome of which had a decisive impact on the further course of the war in the East. The three corps of the 9th Army that attacked to the south had initial tactical successes. The enemy lost ground, but not significantly in resistance. Break-ins, but no breakthroughs, were achieved at considerable German sacrifice.

Since there were no major reserves, the impact weakened after a few days. The attack came to a halt. The German divisions now laboriously defended themselves against the enemy counterattacks, which began on July 10th with increasing superiority in men, material and in plan. The arms deliveries from the Anglo-Saxon powers to Russia were clearly noticeable in ground and air combat. The initiative passed to the enemy. The 9th Army was initially forced to defend itself by the strength of the enemy's frontal resistance.

It then had to give up the conquered territory when her backroom was lost due to the Russian counteroffensive against Orel and Karachev. After ten days of battle, the withdrawal of the 9th Army first to the north and then to the west, pivoting around the previous right wing of the attack, became inevitable in mid-July. Four weeks of difficult, protracted warfare followed for the 9th Army and 2nd Panzer Army until mid-August 1943, when the enemy's advance in the general Sevsk-Briansk-Kirov line was temporarily halted.

The front arc around Kursk had not been conquered, the enemy forces within it had not been destroyed, but the front arc around Briansk was lost and the straightening of the front by the detour of offensive and retreat was too late, with heavy losses in men and material and in one other than the desired line. In front of the prepared - albeit unfinished - field positions on both sides of Briansk, which were occupied by the troops of the 9th Army and 2nd Panzer Army (both of which later formed the 9th Army), the exhausted enemy stopped the attack in mid-August 1943.

The Russian leadership now shifted the offensive to the pivotal points of the new German position, to the areas of Kirov (4th Army of Army Group Center) and Sevsk (1st Panzer Army and 2nd Army of Army Group South). During the fortnightly fighting near Kirov that began on August 9, 1943, the enemy only achieved limited tactical success through a frontal pushback of the LVI. Panzer Corps. On August 25, 1943, he launched a large-scale breakthrough offensive to the west near Sevsk and south of it from the arc of the front near Kursk.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more.............................

Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

I. Part. From Orel to the Dnieper.

The effects of the Russian countermeasures triggered suddenly and at various points by the German attack against Kursk on July 5, 1943 were extremely great. The Russian breakthrough at Rylsk and Sevsk unsettled the fronts of Army Groups South and Center and forced the evacuation of the entire area east of the Dnieper after the attempt to finally hold the Desna failed after a fortnight's battle in mid-September.

The connection between the two army groups was already lost at the end of August because the evasive movements on their inner wings were not carried out in coordination. During the entire month of September, the southern part of the German Eastern Army was in retreat.

Its expansion across time and space, which was actually accepted on the southern wing of Army Group Center, and which only ended at the Dnieper, was not based on a single, far-reaching decision by the army leadership with the purpose of regaining operational freedom of action, but was a consequence of numerous partial decisions with which the coercion of the The situation was generally only reluctantly taken into account by the highest authorities.

In the classical sense, it was therefore neither a retreat, in which the main force marched and covered the rear guards, nor a stalling resistance, in which the enemy was held back at the highest possible losses without without the resistant force engaging in a serious combat that could hold it.

The operational management of section-by-section evasion from one line to the other on a broad front and over an area several hundred kilometers deep meant that the troops were in any case defending themselves in view of their increasingly depleting strength. It was forced to use every last man to hold the overstretched positions, which it had never found in a finished state, but had to be completed or newly created.

The main burden of this fighting method was borne by the infantry, even if, due to the loss of grenadiers, they were only able to provide defense with heavy weapons, artillery and tanks.

The northern wing of Army Group South retreated at a faster pace than the southern wing of Army Group Center, whose forces were not only exposed to the enemy's fiercest frontal pursuit, but also to constant danger from their free southern flank. Both army groups were to form a defensive front behind the Dnieper and restore the connection of their inner wings in the Pripyat estuary. However, the German highest leadership had not taken any precautionary measures for a defensive decisive battle on the Dnieper.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .