Karagashinka Bridgehead - June 1943

German campaigns and battles 1919-1945.

Moderator: sniper1shot

Post Reply
User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6622
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Karagashinka Bridgehead - June 1943

Post by tigre » Sun Mar 12, 2006 1:30 pm

Hello to all, greetings from Argentina. This engagement took place during the period of relative calm along the entire enormous Soviet-German Front when the sides were preparing for the engagements on the Orel-Kursk bulge.

Combat Operations to capture the Karagashinka Bridgehead in June 1943 (Taken from MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL No. 6, June 1982)

With the going over to the defensive along the Oka River in March 1943, in the 336th Rifle Division (the 1128th, the 1130th and 1132d Rifle Regiments, the 909th Artillery Regiment, engineer work was being carried out on a broad front. In the 35-km defensive zone of our formation, by the end of May more than 100 km of trenches and communications trenches had been dug, several hundred dugouts and shelters had been built and over 20,000 antitank mines laid. At the same time, the units were preparing for offensive engagements. For these purposes intense active reconnaissance of the enemy was carried out. The personnel in the second echelons of the regiments was trained in the procedures and methods of actions in offensive combat.

It was established that in the zone of the division units of the enemy's 112th Infantry Division were on the defensive. A solid trench ran along its forward edge with many equipped firing pits as well as open and covered areas for machine guns and antitank weapons. In front of it ran two or three lines of wire obstacles and solid antipersonnel minefields. Behind the first trench was a second some 150-200 m away and a third 600-800 m behind. These were inter-connected by communications trenches and alternate positions. Population points and heights had been turned into strongly reinforced strongpoints. The Oka in the defensive zone was 50-60 m wide, more than 2 m deep and only near the vil-lage of Teremtsy (see the diagram) some 1.2-1.5 m deep.

However, in having these data, the command of the division and the units did not sufficiently know the enemy fire plan or the locations of its command and observations posts and also remained uncertain of the reserves and their pur-pose. The main thing was it was essential as quickly as possible to determine how the river could be crossed in the event of going over to the offensive if the opposite bank was defended by troops in engineer-prepared positions. The division's units did not have experience in carrying out such tasks.

In mid-May we were visited by a representative of Hq SHC, Mar SU A. M. Vasilev-skiy. He was interested in the most minute details of the battleworthiness of the units, their logistical support and preparations for coming battles. The marshal approved a proposal by the division's commander, Maj Gen V. S. Kuznetsov, to conduct reconnaissance in force and issued instructions to the army commander, Lt Gen P. A. Belov, to reinforce the formation with army resources and to ready the main forces for broadening and holding the bridgehead which was to be captured by the reconnaissance forces.

For conducting reconnaissance in force. Gen P. A. Belov by 25 May had reinforced the division with the 554th and 397th Light Artillery Regiments and the 348th, 347th and 284th Mortar Regiments, two battalions of guards mortars [rockets], and the 244th, 243d and 151st Army Rifle Companies of 200-250 men each.

With the receiving of reinforcements, the division began preparations for the forthcoming combat operations. For this, 8-12 km behind the forward edge, in the region of the population points of Bolshiye Golubochki and Prilepy on the Ista River, under the leadership of the deputy divisional commander, Col I. I. Petukhov7 a divisional training center was established for training the per-sonnel in the methods and procedures for crossing the water obstacle at night. The water level in the river by means of an earthen dam was raised to 2.5 m and its width in this area increased to 40-50 m. The divisional staff (the chief, Lt Col V. S. Kryukov) began to work out the plan for reconnaissance in force and this was approved by the army commander on 1 June.2 In brief, it came down to the following.

In the first place, the crossing of the river was to be carried out at night, and at dawn, after a 10-minute intense artillery shelling, with a rush attack the first battalion of the 110th infantry regiment was to be wiped out and a line established between Maloye Palchikovo and Bolshaya Karagashinka and Bolvanovka, creating a bridgehead 3.5-4 km along the front and 2.5-3 km in depth. Prisoners were to be taken, the fire plan of enemy defenses and their engineer-design structures would be ascertained along with the position, compo-sition and nature of operations of the reserves and the locations of command and observation posts.

Secondly, for carrying out the task, the following were assigned: the 2d Rifle Battaltion of the 1128th Rifle Regiment reinforced by the 151st and 244th Army Rifle Companies, by the regimental artillery, a combat engineer regiment and the 3d Rifle Battalion of the 1132d Rifle Regiment reinforced by the 243d Army Company, regimental artillery and combat engineers of the regiment. As a whole, this grouping had over 1,600 men and exceeded the number of enemy personnel by 2-2.5^fold in the given area.

Thirdly, for conducting the reconnaissance in force, the section of Maloye Palchikovo and Bolvanovka was designated as this was close to a small bridgehead on the left bank of the Oka in the region of Bedrintsy and Krutogorye which had been captured by our troops even in the course of the winter offensive. The possibility arose of subsequently broadening this and creating a larger one. Moreover, landing and crossing equipment could be secretly and rapidly delivered down the Ista to the Oka in a preassembled form while the presence of fords, although deep ones, in the area of Teremtsy facilitated the crossing of the rifle subunits.

Fourthly, the division's combat engineer subunits under the leadership of the divisional engineer, Maj V. A. Manvel'yan, were given the following tasks: 2 or 3 days before the start of the attack, unbeknownst to the enemy, to make 20 10-m passages through the enemy minefields and obstacles and on the eve of the attack to mark them with unidirectional lights and lime; to deliver 14 DSL-10 boats and two rafts for the 45- and 76-mm weapons to the crossing area, to put up an assault footbridge from difficult-to-sink equipment and stretch two lines in order to support the fording. Bridges were to be built after the capturing of the bridgehead.

Fifthly, the artillery reinforcements and our own under the leadership of the artillery commander, Lt Col P. A. Pichkura, were to destroy and neutralize the enemy firing positions in the zone of the attack and on the flanks, to disrupt command and subsequently neutralize the Nazi artillery and mortars and thwart counterattacks by Nazi reserves. The subunits of the chemical warfare troops were to conceal the crossing areas with smokescreens, by creating 10-12 smoke release areas directly on the bank of the Oka. Tasks were also set for the signals and rear subunits as well as measures to conceal and support the sur-prise of actions.

In the course of preparing for the combat operations at the training center, exercises were conducted with subunits from all the regiments on the subject "Crossing a River and an Offensive Against Heavily Reinforced Enemy Defenses." The final exercises of all the rifle battalions and artillery subunits of the rifle regiments were conducted by the divisional commander during the period from 1 through 5 June.

nd=Infantry Division; nn=Infantry Regiment.
cd=Rifle Division; cn=Rifle Regiment.

The combat operations will follows ASAP. Regards. Tigre.

Image
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6622
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Karagashinka Bridgehead - June 1943 (2º part)

Post by tigre » Fri Mar 17, 2006 12:05 pm

Second part.

The night of 11 June was dark and moonless. Regardless of this, the rifle sub-units along routes which had been reconnoitered in the day and were well marked by 2300 hours had taken up the jump-off position by the river. By this time, the combat engineers had noiselessly brought down the Ista and deployed the boats and rafts along the assault crossing points, they had stretched lines for the fording and built the assault footbridge from difficult-to-sink equipment. A second group of combat engineers had completed removing the mines in the minefields and enemy obstructions and had equipped the passages through them.

The crossing started at 2300 hours. Two and a quarter hours later, some 1,600 men with guns assigned for direct laying had moved to the opposite bank and were by the very water's edge, 50-100 m from the enemy trench. Regardless of the fact that more than 500 men had forded the river and were in wet clothing, complete silence was observed for every man realized that the slightest rustle or coughtwould make it possible for the enemy to easily detect such a mass of men. The subunits remained at the jump-off line for around 2.5 hours. The Nazis under their ordinary procedures periodically illuminated the terrain with illuminating rockets and kept up aimless precautionary firing from the machine guns.

At 0350 hours, the artillery and mortars brought down fire on the German defenses in the crossing area. Nine minutes later, the intense shelling ended with a salvo by two battalions of rocket launchers and this was the signal for the enemy to rise up to the attack and for shifting the artillery fire in depth. The men of the division, keeping close behind the explosions of their shells and mines, rushed the first trench of enemy defenses and initiated stubborn battles which often developed into hand-to-hand clashes. This was confirmed not only by combat documents, but also by the memoirs of participants. Here is what was written a year later about these events by the party organizer of the second battalion in the 1128th Rifle Regiment, MSgt N. I. Afinogenov: "The young communist, Comrade Vagir, commanded the platoon. When the attack on the enemy forward edge started, Comrade Vagir was the first of his troops to burst into the German trench. The Nazis put Up fierce resistance. A hand-to-hand clash ensued. Using his bayonet skillfully, the courageous communist engaged the Nazi officers in a duel. In a brief but fierce hand-to-hand fight, Comrade Vagir stabbed three German officers. The communist, Comrade V. A. Smol'nikov fought the enemy in a bolshevik manner. One of the first to burst into the trench, he destroyed one officer and two soldiers."3

By 0900 hours, the battalions had captured the line of Maloye Palchikovo,_Bolshaya_ Karagashinka and Bolvanoyka. Due to the fact that the subunits had as a whole reached the designated line and carried out the task, the divisional commander gave orders to dig in strongly on the captured bridgehead. In endeavoring to restore the defenses along the eastern edge of the Oka, the enemy command concentrated here the reserves of the 112th Infantry Division and on 13 June had moved up the 208th Infantry Division from the region of Bolkhov and committed it to battle.

The first enemy counterattack started at 0930 hours on 11 June. During the day, three of them were driven off with a force of up to an infantry battalion each. In conducting the defensive engagements, over the next 9 days the Soviet soldiers repelled 40 fierce attacks by enemy infantry and tanks. Here are several excerpts from the combat reports and operational summaries: "During 12 June 1943, three counterattacks were driven off with a strength of up to two battalions each. Prisoners were captured from the 256th Infantry Regiment of the 112th Infantry Division. 13 June 1943, during the day nine counterattacks were driven off with a strength of an infantry battalion and four-six tanks each. The moving up of infantry, artillery and tanks from the direction of Bolkhov was observed."1*

"14 June 1943. According to adjusted data, the enemy on 13 June and the night of 14 June conducted 12 counterattacks. At dawn of 14 June, counterattacks continued. At 1100 hours of 14 June, 17 aircraft bombed Bolvanovka, Bolshaya and Malaya Karagashinka. In 3 days of battle, up to 3,500 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed. A training company from the division (80 men) has been moved from the division's reserve to the bridgehead."5

On the same day, a telegram was received and delivered to all :the men. It was from the commander of the Bryansk Front, Col Gen M. M. Popov and the member of the military council, Lt Gen I. Z. Susaykov, and stated: "To Maj Gen Comrade Kuznetsov. Please extend greetings to the fighters and commanders of the glor-ious 336th Rifle Division which mercilessly has destroyed the Nazi scum. The front's military council is confident that your division will rout the impudent Nazi curs and will not give up a single inch of land to the enemy. Glory to the fighters and commanders of the 336th Rifle Division!.

All the enemy counterattacks were successfully repelled. But for this the troops defending the bridgehead had to be constantly reinforced. During the /night of 17 June, an additional battalion from the 1128th Rifle Regiment and !'all the rifle companies of the 1132th were shifted there, and by 20 June all three rifle regiments of the formation were there (the remaining defensive zone was turned over to the 12th Guards Rifle Division). By this time, the combat engineers of the division and army had built two bridges of 10 tons each, one for 16 tons and two for 60 tons, and one of them was an underwater bridge. In addition, two ferries of 16 and 60 tons were in operation. Thus, the reconnaissance in force developed into a continuous heavy battle for all the units of the division. In it hundreds of soldiers demonstrated examples of bravery, tenacity and true heroism.

As a total, from 11 through 19 June, the enemy lost over 5,000 soldiers and officers killed and wounded and 40 men were taken prisoner. The Soviet troops destroyed 33 tanks and assault guns, 66 guns and mortars, 40 medium machine guns, 73 light machine guns, 128 automatics, 1,365 rifles and 2 radios. The following equipment was captured: 1 food depot, 2 ammunition dumps, 4 guns, 4 tanks, 1 assault gun, 35 mortars, 3 machine guns, several hundred rifles and automatics and 2 radios. Our losses were 572 men killed and 1,420 men wounded.7 On 21 June, the Nazis ceased the counterattacks and during the night of 9 July, the division turned over the defenses of the bridgehead to the 12th Guards Rifle Division and was moved to the army's second echelon.

Please, with regards to this operation, I would like to know the following:

1. Which German Army Corps had responsibility on that area?
2. Commander of the 112 ID and its regiments.
3. Impact with regards to the Orel's offensive on july 1943 if any.
4. 112 ID (or german) point of view.

TIA. Regards. Tigre.
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6622
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: Karagashinka Bridgehead - June 1943

Post by tigre » Tue Dec 13, 2022 5:28 am

Hello to all :D; the lost map again.....................................

Combat Operations to capture the Karagashinka Bridgehead in June 1943 (Taken from MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL No. 6, June 1982)

nd=Infantry Division; nn=Infantry Regiment.
cd=Rifle Division; cn=Rifle Regiment.

Cheers. Raúl M 8).

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt! :up:
Attachments
image018.jpg
image018.jpg (88.34 KiB) Viewed 674 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6622
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: Karagashinka Bridgehead - June 1943

Post by tigre » Tue Dec 27, 2022 5:39 am

Hello to all :D; after a while, a complement (German side)...............................

Combat Operations to capture the Karagashinka Bridgehead in June 1943.

On June 11, 1943 at 4:30 a.m., the General Command received a report that at 3:15 a.m. the enemy had attacked the Oka Bulge and Krutogorje and had penetrated the north-eastern part of Bolvanovka and the northern part of Krutogorje. A counterattack had been initiated. An attack against small and Greater Karagashinka would have been rejected.

At 5:00 a.m. the 112th Infantry Command reported to the Deputy Commanding General that the enemy had taken Bolvanovka, penetrated into Karagashinka and was attacking Palchikovo, in Krutogorje the enemy had pushed through to the south-eastern part of the town. The Gen Kdo. then alerted the GR 337 and deployed the self-propelled gun company of the 25th Pz.Gre.Div. to the 112. ID as corps reserve on the march. The Deputy Commanding General went to the command post of the 112th Infantry Division and stayed there until the crisis was over that day.

At 8:30 a.m. the 208th Infantry Division received the order to gather the GR 337 around Lipowka, at 9:30 a.m. the I./AR 208 were to be deployed for the 112th Infantry Division in the area around Bagrinowo. The Abteilung was then assigned to the 112. ID. At the same time, the Sturmgeschütz-Abt. 270 received the order to be on alert. At 11:15 the GR 337 was brought forward to the Bagrinovo-Miljatino-Kishkino area. At the same time, the 208th ID received orders to deploy the GR 338 and the Div.Btl. 208 ready for departure from midnight. transport space was provided.

At 6:00 p.m., the 208th Infantry Division received the order to prepare itself on both sides of the Nugr by the morning of June 12, 1943 in such a way that, in the event of an enemy breakthrough, it could throw the enemy back via the old HKL. The GR 338 was used starting at 8:00 p.m. in motorized transport. By the evening of June 11, 1943, the HKL had been won back by units of the 112th Infantry Division in a counterattack, except for the section between Small Karagashinka (incl.) and Greater Karagashinka (excl.). The Gen. Kdo. had the impression that the 112th ID would be able to clean up the rest of the HKL with their own resources on June 12, 1943.

Sources: https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... 12ID-R.htm
https://www.forum-der-wehrmacht.de/inde ... /&pageNo=5

Cheers. Raúl M 8).

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!! :beer:
Attachments
image057.jpg
image057.jpg (94.57 KiB) Viewed 546 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6622
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: Karagashinka Bridgehead - June 1943

Post by tigre » Tue Jan 03, 2023 5:51 am

Hello to all :D; more...............................

Combat Operations to capture the Karagashinka Bridgehead in June 1943.

Preparations for the counterattack of the 208. Infantry Division.

On June 13, 1943, the Deputy Chief of the Assault Gun Detachment (StuG Abt) 270 arrived at the CP of the 208. Infantry Division and was informed of the situation by the Ia (Operations Officer) of the Division. He was then tasked with the recce of his unit's possible uses in order to support the recovery attack on Karagashinka and Bolwanowka. After the instructions, the Deputy Chief of the StuG. Abt. 270 led the Commander in charge of the division, accompanied by the Ia and the Ldr of the GR 337, to the area of Palchikovo and Tolkachevo. In the place, the most convenient route for the planned attack of the regiment and the communication to the commanders of the GR 258 ​​and AR 86 were explored.

After inspecting the area, the Commander in charge of the 208th Infantry Division went to the CP of the 112th Infantry Division and in the presence of the Army Commander and the Deputy General Commander (Army Corps), it was discussed the own situation and that of the enemy and the expected counterattack. While the division commander wanted to lead the attack with a regiment-strength main strike group on Greater Karagashinka and with a battalion-strength secondary strike group on Bolvanovka and expresses this plan, the Army Commander stipulates that the attack should be carried out in a pincer fashion, each with a battalion-strength Attack group directed to the right against Bolvanovka and to the left against Karagashinka.

At noon in the CP of the 208. ID a final meeting was held. In this meeting participated:
Generalleutnant von Krischer - Höh.Art.Kdr. 305
Major Wanckel - Fhr.Gren.Rgt.337
Hauptmann Thomas - Art.Rgt. 86
Major Binkenstein - Kdr.Pz.Jg.Abt. 208
Oberleutnant Thürmer - Fhr.StuG.Abt. 270
After the meeting, the order to attack was announced.

Division orders for the counterattack in the Oka Salient

208.ID
It will attack the enemy who broke through the Oka, drive them back across the river, recapture and hold the old main line of resistance.
Gren.Rgt. 337
ready to attack with 2 attack groups north of Tolkachevo and east of Groß- and Klein-Paltschikowo, in such a way that it can advance to attack using the last twilight. After the preparation artillery fire, the regiment will take Bolwanowka with the right strike group (II./GR 337, Hauptmann Laukien) and with the left strike group (I./GR 337, Hauptmann Hillermann) Karagashinka as the first objective.
It will be added to the Gren.Rgt. 337:
StuG. Abt. 270 (minus 1 battery)
2. and 3./Pi.Btl. 208
1 Heavy Platoon of Pz.Jg.Abt. 208
and from the beginning of the attack the Gren.Rgt. 258 with all its additions.
The attack should be carried out on the outer flanks on the trenches by infantry and engineer shock troops in deep formation.
Great Karagashinka will also be simultaneously attacked by infantry and self-propelled guns from the hollow south of the town. After reaching the first objectives of the attack, both groups will continue while parts of these groups are used to defend the Oka front, to take Little Karagashinka and destroy the enemy still holding to the south of the place. It is then important to dig in quickly to withstand the expected enemy heavy artillery and mortar fire without suffering heavy casualties and to defend against any enemy counter-attack that may now be beginning. Every opportunity to destroy the bridges at Bolvanowka and Teremzy must be seized.

Sources: https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... 12ID-R.htm
https://www.forum-der-wehrmacht.de/inde ... /&pageNo=5

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6622
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: Karagashinka Bridgehead - June 1943

Post by tigre » Tue Jan 10, 2023 5:19 am

Hello to all :D; more...............................

Combat Operations to capture the Karagashinka Bridgehead in June 1943.

The counter attack.

(German side) June 14, 1943. Great Karagashinka. After artillery preparation from 02:45 to 02:50, the I. Battalion attacked Greater Karagashinka. At 03:00 the battalion reached the southern part of the Greater Karagashinka, penetrated the village and advanced to the western edge. The 1st Company, which was stationed at the northwest end of the town, came to a halt under defensive enemy fire in front of a deep ravine. The subordinate assault guns also quickly reached the western edge of the Greater Karagashinka. Enemy resistance was still very low when they stormed into the city. As we progressed, it gained more and more strength.

The strength of the enemy defenses lay in the increasingly violent anti-tank and anti-aircraft fire from across the Oka. The heavy own guns fire failed to eliminate these anti-tank and anti-aircraft positions. It took all the energy of the battalion leaders and the company leader (Kompanie-Führer) to hold together the as yet untested replacements, who were weakening under this heavy defensive fire, and drive them forward, while the former members of the company continued to advance. Despite heavy defensive fire and difficulties with replacements, the I. Battalion managed to gradually break through to the northern part of Greater Karagashinka. The casualties of the veteran non-commissioned officers and grenadiers attacking ahead were considerable.

By 07:00, the 2nd Company had reached the northern edge, while the 3rd Company was still trapped off the northeast corner. By this time, the enemy infantry had a large force in the ravine-filled terrain of the north-eastern edge and in the deep hollow on the western edge of the city. The assault guns that accompanied the attack did not produce any effect during the attack on the Greater Karagashinka. The confusing terrain, cut by numerous ditches and gorges, covered with tall brush and weeds, offered no targets for assault guns.

On the other hand, assault guns were excellent targets for enemy anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. As a result, 6 assault guns were hit at night. In the course of the morning the enemy, supported by 5 tanks, counter-attacked Greater Karagashinka from the north. This could be crushed with the help of the own artillery. One tank was set on fire and the others were hit and immobilized. The battalion could no longer advance due to heavy enemy defensive fire and went on the defense. At around 18:00, enemy shock troops, supported by heavy artillery fire and two tanks, managed to break into the northern part of Greater Karagashinka, forcing the battalion to retreat to the southern part of the city.

Sources: https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... 12ID-R.htm
https://www.forum-der-wehrmacht.de/inde ... /&pageNo=5

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

User avatar
tigre
Patron
Posts: 6622
Joined: Sun Apr 10, 2005 5:42 pm
Location: Argentina

Re: Karagashinka Bridgehead - June 1943

Post by tigre » Tue Jan 17, 2023 5:26 am

Hello to all :D; more...............................

Combat Operations to capture the Karagashinka Bridgehead in June 1943.

The counter attack.

(German side) June 14, 1943. Great Karagashinka. At 21:15 hours, after a short but strong preparation of fire, the enemy, supported by 6 tanks, launched a frontal and flank attack against the weak battalion that was in the southern sector. In this attack, the enemy used flamethrowers in addition to reinforced infantry and tanks. The battalion, which was badly battered and had a strength of only 3 officers and some 100 non-commissioned officers and soldiers and was deployed at 1,200 m, could no longer deal with this counter-attack and withdrew further south. The company commander of the bicycle company (the company was 1 km south of Greater Karagashinka) recognized the enemy counterattack and the withdrawal of the I. Battalion and independently counterattacked to the north.

In doing so, he attached three self-propelled guns that were in reserve. As darkness had fallen, the assault guns were again unable to engage direct targets, but provided moral support for the attacking Radfahrkompanie (cyclists). The company managed to advance 300 m to the north and intercept the retreating parts of the I. Battalion and reorganize them to defend themselves, so that the enemy counter-attack could be stopped. However, a further advance into the Great Karagashinka had become impossible because the enemy placed an all-gun barrage on the southern edge of the city. So the Hillermann Battalion went on the defense to resume the attack the next day.

Bolvanowka. The II. Battalion under Hauptmann Laukien also attacked at 02:45. At 03:15 the battalion reached the southern tip of Bolvanowka. The enemy put up strong resistance to the II. Battalion. At noon the battalion was still trapped 400m south of Bolwanowka in a mine barrier and under heavy fire from enemy artillery and heavy infantry weapons east of the Oka. According to the commander of the Pi.Btl. 208 clearing the mines with the sappers deployed there would not be a problem. On the other hand, enemy flanking fire from the other bank of the Oka caused difficulties. In this situation, the battalion could not advance further and stopped the attack.

June 15, 1943. Great Karagashinka. At 02:05, the I. Battalion, with artillery support and self-propelled guns, again attacked the Greater Karagashinka. The first 300m in open ground were quickly overcome, but then the battalion was again caught up in an enemy barrage from all weapons and calibers. Despite the support of the assault guns, further action had become impossible in this situation. Recognizing this fact, at 07:50 the order was given to cease the attack. The battalion had to hold the line it had reached and position itself there for the defense.

Bolvanowka. The Laukien battalion, after prior artillery preparations, advanced on Bolwanowka at 01:45. The company on the right managed to enter the village, after heavy house-to-house fighting, the company advanced 200 m and remained there under enemy defensive fire. The left company of the battalion, on the south western edge of Bolvanowka, was again held up by a mine barricade and flank fire from Great Karagashinka. This company had to defend against an enemy counter-attack from Great Karagashinka around 04:50. Because the Hillermann Battalion failed to take the village of Great Karagaschinka, it was also impossible to hold the position at Bolvanowka. At 09:30 the battalion received the order to stop the attack and withdrew to its starting position halfway between Bolvanowka and Tolkachevo until noon, where it went over to the defense.

Losses on June 14 and 15, 1943. Overall, the I. and II./Gren.Rgt.337 had the following losses in these days of fighting

officers
Dead: -
Wounded: 9
Missing: 1
NCOs and Troop
Dead: 58
Wounded: 235
Missing: 5

Sources: https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... 12ID-R.htm
https://www.forum-der-wehrmacht.de/inde ... /&pageNo=5

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Attachments
image003.jpg
Front line at the bridgehead..........................................
image003.jpg (79.47 KiB) Viewed 159 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.

Post Reply