NigelF
The Germans were aiming at a percieved weak spot. Paul Carell blamed the fiasco on Itlalian treachery but as it turned out the problem was ULTRA.
The fact that a failed attack (Medennine, Goodwood) is a fiasco only proves that doctrine was correct - attack weakness, not strength.
The trick in breaking a square is to catch them while forming or before they can get out of line or column. Think Quatre Bras - 69th - the French got inside their C3 -just as the Germans did to the French with their tanks subsequently at Sedan.
cheers
Reb
most feared tank of ww2
Moderator: sniper1shot
In WW2 the primary means of defeating tanks was anti-tank guns (and of course Stalin ordered that it was the duty of every gun to destroy tanks, so the Red Army deployed its field arty accordingly to provide atk defence in depth). Whether own tanks could 'handle' enemy tanks may have been important to the relatively small number of men in tank crews but was irrelevant to the rest of the army.
The original subject of the post was fear; therefore we are forced to speak of intangible aspects of tanks. What your trying to do now is provide a simplified pseudo-scientific analysis of how tanks are dealt with in the abstract without addressing the original subject. "Irrelevant to the rest of the army" is completely inaccurate when considering the fear that a few Tigers will create, setting off a ripple effect in an entire area of operations just by word of mouth (morale being the greatest issue). Tigers are just one example, but T34's could certainly have a smiliar effect in their own right. In the eyes of ground forces, tanks are the first and foremost embodiment of a nations ability to design, build and field quality technology on the battlefield and have a huge effect on morale. If your anywhere near the front in any capacity, it WILL concern you if your army has more effective equipment than the enemy. Its not as comforting to know their's is better, but we have more. WWII was very large and the battlefield was very small for the individual soldier, local superiority happened frequently for the Germans. To know that German tanks were better and might show up in force is something to fear, irrelevant to what part of the army your in.
I'm somewhat puzzled how either 'Italian treachery' or Brit signals intelligence can be the reason for 3 GE pz divs (+ 90 Lt Div and a couple of IT divs) launching a frontal attack on 30 Corps (2 inf divs, 1 armd div, 1 armd bde, 1 lt armd bde) at Medinnine. I also have trouble believing that GE intelligence was totally incompetant (I don't think it was ever very good but it wasn't bad either). To me it is blatantly obvious that GE was still trusting in shock action against what they hoped were ill prepared defences. In the end blitzkrieg was shock action at the operational and hopefully strategic levels with GE forces moving fast enough to permanently wrong foot their opponents. The Red Army dulled it by trading space for time, the Brits mastered it by effecting well integrated defence, based on recognition that tanks were defeated by mutually supporting anti tank guns, preferably integrated with well planned minefields. This was not new, the Brits had known it all along, but it took time to respond to the improved protection of post 1940 GE tanks and to get their training, at all levels, right. Minefields were a problem because of the time it took to lay them and it's possible that at Medennine GE thought that without time to lay extensive minefields the Brit defences could be 'bounced' by shock action.
Military power has three primary components: morale & training; ideas, doctrine, etc; and equipment. Equipment does not win wars, if the enemy has some better equipment then it is offset by other material strengths and improving the other two components (if you're unsure about this ask Giap). Tiger tanks were paper tigers, as I've previously pointed out the first ones the Brits destroyed were by 6-pdr atk gun. 17-pdr merely enabled them to kill Tigers at much longer range. Of course the Brits had to wait until the 1970s before they got the real tank killer that could be fairly quickly deployed, the Barmine.
In about 1944 the UK Chief Scientist did a study of fear of enemy weapons, my understanding is that tanks didn't figure, not really surprising because few soldiers ever came across a 'live' one. The most feared was the 88-mm in ground role, which could affect a lot of soldiers (indirect fire influences a far wider area than tanks). I think mortars and mines were next.
Military power has three primary components: morale & training; ideas, doctrine, etc; and equipment. Equipment does not win wars, if the enemy has some better equipment then it is offset by other material strengths and improving the other two components (if you're unsure about this ask Giap). Tiger tanks were paper tigers, as I've previously pointed out the first ones the Brits destroyed were by 6-pdr atk gun. 17-pdr merely enabled them to kill Tigers at much longer range. Of course the Brits had to wait until the 1970s before they got the real tank killer that could be fairly quickly deployed, the Barmine.
In about 1944 the UK Chief Scientist did a study of fear of enemy weapons, my understanding is that tanks didn't figure, not really surprising because few soldiers ever came across a 'live' one. The most feared was the 88-mm in ground role, which could affect a lot of soldiers (indirect fire influences a far wider area than tanks). I think mortars and mines were next.
It is my understanding things were a bit different in the German army, at least after the first encounter with the T34.In WW2 the primary means of defeating tanks was anti-tank guns (and of course Stalin ordered that it was the duty of every gun to destroy tanks, so the Red Army deployed its field arty accordingly to provide atk defence in depth). Whether own tanks could 'handle' enemy tanks may have been important to the relatively small number of men in tank crews but was irrelevant to the rest of the army.
Mueller-Hillebrand states that after the shock the T34 caused the first requirement for any German tank was to be able to hold its own against enemy tanks.
- Additionally the doctrinal role for the German heavy breakthrough tank rated combat against counterattacking enemy tanks very important.
- Many German reports from 1944-45 as well as writing from officers after the war mention lack of heavy anti-tank weapons and the resulting "tankophobia" of the infantry as the biggest problem of German infantry divisions at the time.
The Germans were obviously anyway convinced there would never be enough towed anti-tank guns at a given sector of the frontline to defeat a concentrated tank attack, and that rapidly moving in tactical reserves to build an anti-tank concentration of effort was key, that is why self-propelled anti-tank guns and later "tank hunters" with their superior battlefield mobility became so important during the second phase of the war.
The Austrian army's compilation of WW2 short tactical case studies has one interesting example about the difference the presence of a few self-propelled anti-tank gun companies could make against a Soviet tank attack as well as the proper doctrinal role for different weapons in anti-tank combat.
- Additionally according to Niepold many "counterattacks" of German tank forces in 1944 were actually rather ambushing advancing Soviet tanks than actually counterattacking.
If for the absence of better figures one looks at German kill claims on the Eastern front, IIRC tanks were respnsible for roughly half of the kills in the period January - April 1944 (for which I do have figures). Probably all weapon crews did overclaim, but whether tank crews are prone to even more overclaiming than others I cannot say.
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Epaminondas
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In general German tank kill numbers seem pretty accurate in general.
In Panzer Battles, Gen. Black mentions when questioned by high command about his division's (11th Pz) kill claims, that he personally walked through the village and noticed T34s knocked out by aircraft and 88s... that the tank crews did NOT claim.
Granted it is only on instance; but the sledgehamme thesis talks about kill claims as well and indicates considered reliable for the Germans.
I really haven't seen much to indicate that the Germans rountinue inflated claims. [unlike the soviets :) ]
In Panzer Battles, Gen. Black mentions when questioned by high command about his division's (11th Pz) kill claims, that he personally walked through the village and noticed T34s knocked out by aircraft and 88s... that the tank crews did NOT claim.
Granted it is only on instance; but the sledgehamme thesis talks about kill claims as well and indicates considered reliable for the Germans.
I really haven't seen much to indicate that the Germans rountinue inflated claims. [unlike the soviets :) ]
NigelF
"I'm somewhat puzzled how either 'Italian treachery' or Brit signals intelligence can be the reason for 3 GE pz divs (+ 90 Lt Div and a couple of IT divs) launching a frontal attack on 30 Corps (2 inf divs, 1 armd div, 1 armd bde, 1 lt armd bde) at Medinnine. "
I don't see why you're puzzled. Why else would they attack a prepared position head on?
"I also have trouble believing that GE intelligence was totally incompetant"
I don't. Ultra was usccessful for the whole of the war. Patton's imaginary army group kept 15th Army pinned down for the whole of the battle of Normandy. (Foreign Armies West was demonstrably incompetant)
Not to mention that primary intelligence is gathered by air recon and the allies controlled the air by the time of Medinine. The fact that the Germans considered themselves to have been betrayed should be a giveaway on this one. Monty liked to play it up for more than it was - as Radly Waters the Cnd Tank Ace put it - "good tank country is where there are few anti-tank guns!"
I'd also note that knocking out Tiger tanks with 6 pounder guns may have happened on very rare occasions - but only became predictable after the introduction of discarding sabot ammunition. Even the formidable 17 pounder had initial problems with poor ammo.
The worth of the tank is no where better proven than by the Allied insistance upon having thousands of them.
cheers
Reb
"I'm somewhat puzzled how either 'Italian treachery' or Brit signals intelligence can be the reason for 3 GE pz divs (+ 90 Lt Div and a couple of IT divs) launching a frontal attack on 30 Corps (2 inf divs, 1 armd div, 1 armd bde, 1 lt armd bde) at Medinnine. "
I don't see why you're puzzled. Why else would they attack a prepared position head on?
"I also have trouble believing that GE intelligence was totally incompetant"
I don't. Ultra was usccessful for the whole of the war. Patton's imaginary army group kept 15th Army pinned down for the whole of the battle of Normandy. (Foreign Armies West was demonstrably incompetant)
Not to mention that primary intelligence is gathered by air recon and the allies controlled the air by the time of Medinine. The fact that the Germans considered themselves to have been betrayed should be a giveaway on this one. Monty liked to play it up for more than it was - as Radly Waters the Cnd Tank Ace put it - "good tank country is where there are few anti-tank guns!"
I'd also note that knocking out Tiger tanks with 6 pounder guns may have happened on very rare occasions - but only became predictable after the introduction of discarding sabot ammunition. Even the formidable 17 pounder had initial problems with poor ammo.
The worth of the tank is no where better proven than by the Allied insistance upon having thousands of them.
cheers
Reb
Careful cbt recce by GE would have revealed a lot about the forward positions at Medennine. It's not unusual, I think, for GE to blame everyone but themselves for their failures, shades of 1918. Suggesting that the treacherous IT somehow persuaded GE to attack at particular convenient points stretches credulity beyond breaking point. 30 Corps planned its defence by the usual methods, starting with consideration of the ground and the likely routes for tk attacks, in other words standard Brit practices which were inherently sound when they bothered to follow them! There's nothing to suggest any significant adjustment at the last moment that might indicate new int, and GE plans wouldn't have been finalised and distributed by radio days in advance (they too had rules about that sort of thing).
Even in about 1970 there was a letter written to an international magazine by an ex Werhmarcht OKW signals officer responsible for comsec denying that Enigma had been broken, basically because it was technically impossible (ie missing the point entirely). They didn't wan't to believe anything else.
Even in about 1970 there was a letter written to an international magazine by an ex Werhmarcht OKW signals officer responsible for comsec denying that Enigma had been broken, basically because it was technically impossible (ie missing the point entirely). They didn't wan't to believe anything else.
A point on anti tank gunnery, Brit, I can't comment on anyone else's. 6-pdr was lethal, not a matter of luck. Of course like any KE weapon range was an issue and related to where it hit. Point is, only idiots positioned atk guns to engage the front of tanks, Brit tactics, by the book, were ambush type attack tanks with surprise from the side.
Not sure how reliable this stuff about dodgy 17-pdr ammo is. 17-pdr atk guns were only used by RA. Therefore if they had ammo problems it would have been noted somewhere in the arty publications. If it happened it was short lived and possibly even fairly local (a local storage problem?). There's nothing in RATMs and no mention in Pemberton that would suggest a notable problem. However, I have come across a reference to using 17-pdr APDS at longer ranges only because at shorter it basically went straight thru!
Not sure how reliable this stuff about dodgy 17-pdr ammo is. 17-pdr atk guns were only used by RA. Therefore if they had ammo problems it would have been noted somewhere in the arty publications. If it happened it was short lived and possibly even fairly local (a local storage problem?). There's nothing in RATMs and no mention in Pemberton that would suggest a notable problem. However, I have come across a reference to using 17-pdr APDS at longer ranges only because at shorter it basically went straight thru!
Nigelf
only idiots positioned atk guns to engage the front of tanks" True. But only German AT guns (on the West Front) could actually penetrate a tank (any tank) from the front. 6 Pounder, and its American cousin (57mm) were of scant use by '44.
The 17 pounder ammo issue of spoke of occurred in '44 - was corrected by (IRRC) mid Normandy campaign. Even the bad ammo wasn't all THAT bad but the fixed up stuff made it probably the best of all allied AT - including the US 90 mm AA and the Ruski stuff. (and 17 Pounder wasn't all RA - remember the Firefly Shermans mounted it too)
cheers
Reb
only idiots positioned atk guns to engage the front of tanks" True. But only German AT guns (on the West Front) could actually penetrate a tank (any tank) from the front. 6 Pounder, and its American cousin (57mm) were of scant use by '44.
The 17 pounder ammo issue of spoke of occurred in '44 - was corrected by (IRRC) mid Normandy campaign. Even the bad ammo wasn't all THAT bad but the fixed up stuff made it probably the best of all allied AT - including the US 90 mm AA and the Ruski stuff. (and 17 Pounder wasn't all RA - remember the Firefly Shermans mounted it too)
cheers
Reb
As all around AFV's the T34 and the Pzkpfw V Panther were probably the best in the war. However the Pzkpfw VI Tiger inspired a fear in its opponents that no vehicle on either side ever did. Allied troops used to see Tigers and 88s when there weren't any, and this has been borne out in more than one campaign and engagement. Although the M36 Pershing and the SU122 were enormously powerful weapons, they simply did not elicit the "tank terror" that the Tiger and Konigstiger did, possibly because they weren't around that long.
Imad
Imad
Cry 'havoc' and let slip... the dogs of war
6-pr remained a useful atk gun in 1944, providing you weren't led by idiots who deployed it to engage tanks front on.
Having just checked the indexes for RA Notes (classified Secret and issued monthly) no mention of any problems with 17-pdr atk ammo, although there was a problem, nature and extent unknown (need to read Para 1169, which I don't have) notified in Sep 44 about prematures with the newly issued 6 and 17 pdr HE. If RA Notes didn't mention then it sounds to me as if its was something of no signifcance to the atk gunners. Looking more like one of those invented history episodes or something very local. There's a ref to Para 1276 (Nov 44) to 17 pr APSV(DS) 'Design of tracer', and in Para 1269 to 'overhead cover for SP 3" and 17-pr Valentine'.
Having just checked the indexes for RA Notes (classified Secret and issued monthly) no mention of any problems with 17-pdr atk ammo, although there was a problem, nature and extent unknown (need to read Para 1169, which I don't have) notified in Sep 44 about prematures with the newly issued 6 and 17 pdr HE. If RA Notes didn't mention then it sounds to me as if its was something of no signifcance to the atk gunners. Looking more like one of those invented history episodes or something very local. There's a ref to Para 1276 (Nov 44) to 17 pr APSV(DS) 'Design of tracer', and in Para 1269 to 'overhead cover for SP 3" and 17-pr Valentine'.