I have to say I'm surprised- some of the Soviet claims are accurate... but some are only partly so, some are definitely not true and a bunch I simply have no information on so can neither confirm nor deny them.
The ones that are, or probably are accurate are: 501, 523, 701, 731 and 150061 (333).
The ones that are partially flawed are: 723 (was hit by AP shots, but the mine damage was severe enough to have done it in first), 712 (same as 723), 602 (was probably the first loss to a side hit by the SU152).
The ones that are highly unlikely or flat-out wrong are: II02- no evidence of fire in the photograph, 514- as I wrote Nikolaus Braasch described this loss quite well- disabled by mine and destroyed by crew- definitely NOT 'ignited by "Molotov Cocktail", 524- reported destroyed by crew, not 'ignited by "Molotov Cocktail", 601- definitely hit a mine and there's no evidence of fire in the photograph, and 502- definitely hit a mine, not hit by HE shells.
The ones there is no information about are: I02, II01, II03, 113, 522, 732 and 734. I really don't buy the 'hit by HE shell and fuel exploded' ones- HE shells don't penetrate armor. One photograph of a shot-up Ferdinand shows a number of large-caliber HE shell splashes on the superstructure side- so the armor easily withstood such hits, and the superstructure side was the thinnest armor next to the roof. The large number of losses to 'Molotov Cocktails' smacks of 'tales' too. I already pointed out the ones that this didn't actually happen to- the photographs don't lie- so I'm doubtful of the 'hit by AP shell, burned by 'Molotov Cocktail' ones too. It seems rather more likely that if these vehicles did burn, it was because of design flaws that are already well-known. How would someone examining a destroyed vehicle after a battle be able to tell if it was hit by a 'Molotov Cocktail' anyway? Look for tiny bits of melted glass?
I have a feeling that it's sources like this that started the stories about the Ferdinand being terribly vulnerable during Zitadelle- something official German reports and eyewitnesses say is simply not true.
Elefant in Kursk
Moderator: sniper1shot
Matt,
I wonder what you think about photos of defeated Panthers at Kursk and information given at http://www.battlefield.ru/library/books ... sses6.html
Don't you have any information from German sources to validate this information like you posted for Ferdinands.
Best Regards
I wonder what you think about photos of defeated Panthers at Kursk and information given at http://www.battlefield.ru/library/books ... sses6.html
Don't you have any information from German sources to validate this information like you posted for Ferdinands.
Best Regards
Igor
Hi Igor,
I have a couple of relatively new, detailed books on Untenehmen Zitadelle, so I'll have to go through them and see what information I can find on lost Panthers. For now, I can't comment on the claims without images. For the ones with pictures, when the angle is correct to show the damage claimed, some do seem accurate enough. In some cases the fact that the Panther has burned can be seen by the collapsed suspension- Panther 142, for example.
Panther 535 is odd in that its turret it turned around such as is sometimes done during road-marches.
In at least one case, the very last listing, there isn't the same evidence of fire as I'd expect to see if the tank really burned-out.
I have a little trouble with the image that's supposed to be a Panther completely destroyed by a 100kg aerial bomb- even when a crew blows up their own tank, it is the turret that is displaced, but otherwise the tank is intact. This image doesn't show anything resembling Panther parts anyway.
The photograph of Panther 824 is interesting- I wonder why a destroyed sight would lead to the tank being captured virtually intact...
I don't for a second believe the claim that Panther 634's mantlet was penetrated from the front- certanly not by a 45mm weapon. I can see the hole that is probably why they claim a side penetration, however one cannot penetrate the mantlet from the side- that's the turret side armor, which is far thinner.
Does anyone understand what is meant by 'line of aim'? I find myself wondering about all the 76.2mm penetrations- were these from T34s or Ratsch-bumms? Given how tanks were shot-up in such large numbers, and the penetrations are all to the sides, I'm inclined to believe they're largely anti-tank gun hits; it's far more likely a hidden anti-tank gun would be able to fire on Panthers driving by than a T34 or KVI surviving the move forward to engage the Panthers from the side.
Matt
I have a couple of relatively new, detailed books on Untenehmen Zitadelle, so I'll have to go through them and see what information I can find on lost Panthers. For now, I can't comment on the claims without images. For the ones with pictures, when the angle is correct to show the damage claimed, some do seem accurate enough. In some cases the fact that the Panther has burned can be seen by the collapsed suspension- Panther 142, for example.
Panther 535 is odd in that its turret it turned around such as is sometimes done during road-marches.
In at least one case, the very last listing, there isn't the same evidence of fire as I'd expect to see if the tank really burned-out.
I have a little trouble with the image that's supposed to be a Panther completely destroyed by a 100kg aerial bomb- even when a crew blows up their own tank, it is the turret that is displaced, but otherwise the tank is intact. This image doesn't show anything resembling Panther parts anyway.
The photograph of Panther 824 is interesting- I wonder why a destroyed sight would lead to the tank being captured virtually intact...
I don't for a second believe the claim that Panther 634's mantlet was penetrated from the front- certanly not by a 45mm weapon. I can see the hole that is probably why they claim a side penetration, however one cannot penetrate the mantlet from the side- that's the turret side armor, which is far thinner.
Does anyone understand what is meant by 'line of aim'? I find myself wondering about all the 76.2mm penetrations- were these from T34s or Ratsch-bumms? Given how tanks were shot-up in such large numbers, and the penetrations are all to the sides, I'm inclined to believe they're largely anti-tank gun hits; it's far more likely a hidden anti-tank gun would be able to fire on Panthers driving by than a T34 or KVI surviving the move forward to engage the Panthers from the side.
Matt
Let him who is without sin cast the first stone.
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate- "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily'' William of Ockham
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate- "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily'' William of Ockham
Matt L wrote:
I have a feeling that it's sources like this that started the stories about the Ferdinand being terribly vulnerable during Zitadelle- something official German reports and eyewitnesses say is simply not true.
The elephant suffered unusually high destruction at kursk.
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89 were employed with 9th army.
19 or 21% were des from the 5th till the 14th of jul.
That means 21% over 10 days which is 2.1% des per day.
39 or 44% were des in july in total from the 5th-31st.
Assuming the unit was engaged each and every day till the last which seems unlikly. This means 44% over a 27 days which is 1.6% des per day. If the unit was engaged less than 27 days then the des per day over july and during the second half of july. Then the reaL % des per day would be higher than seen here.
Or 20 from the 15th of july to the end. This second half of july represents 22% of the number of tanks that started the battle.
That means 22% des over 17 days using the same assumption as above. This works out to 1.3% des per day.
If we sub the 19 tanks des from the 5-14 we end up with 20 out of 70 tanks. Which gives us 29%.
That means 29% over 17 days using the same assumption as above. This works out to 1.7% des per day.
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The elepant had similar high loss ratios during the attacking and def phases of the kursk july battles as shown above.
The elephant had a much higher loss % than all other ger vehicles even the panther.
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Even the panther 44 were des out of 200 present which is 22% from the 5th till the 17th jul. This is over 13 days which works out to 1.7% des per day.
Even during the secomd half of july from the 18th till the 31st only 21 panthers were des. This works out to 13% des over 14 days using the same assumption as above for the elepants this works out to 0.93% des per day.
One warning about this data. The panther had very low op % from the second day onwards. Less than 25% committed at the start of the battle were ever op. If less op panthers were on the front then the destrustion numbers and % may be abnormally low.
Unfortunatly I do not have a single bit if evidence concerning the op % of the elephants. Therefore the conclusions above must be taken with caution.
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Exacllly what could des a tank with 200mm of frontal arm and 80mm of side arm is open to discussion. They were des in large numbers according to the ger primary army archive documents. Up till the and of july at least during both att and def.
At that point thier were 50 tanks left on the front and des from aug till the end of the year certainly dried up. 48 returned in dec which implys only 2 more were destroyed during 4+ months. This alone implys the tank was des at such high rates due to early design flaws and employment. If anything as the rus guns were becoming more likly to des the elephant it suffered far fewer destructions.
The side arm could be pen by the uncommon 85mm and 57mm guns at reasonable range. The common 45mm gun could not. The common 76mm also could not EXCEPT at point blank range. The 152mm could as could 122mm guns. The presences of small amounts of APCR ammo may of allowed certain guns to exceed thier normal pen expectations above.
That fact isn't being debated- a simple fielded:loss ratio shows this. It's the details of HOW they were lost that is important- no offense Darrin, but percentages per day and all that mathematical data doesn't really mean anything- averages don't tell a useful story at all. Exact figures for each action/day and the reasons for the losses are the important data- and that's what I've tried to share.Darrin wrote: The elephant suffered unusually high destruction at kursk.
When I said ".. the stories about the Ferdinand being terribly vulnerable during Zitadelle" I'm referring, obviously I thought, to vulnerability to infantry tank-hunters- something the German reports say isn't at all true.
The data don't support the idea that the Ferdinand was any more vulnerable than any other vehicle anyway- in order to prove this, you'd have to factor in deployment density, position, obstacles, and so on. You point out correctly that because even the operational hours/days is different between the Panther and Ferdinand are likely very different, simple loss percentages aren't a reliable comparison. The reports state quite specifically that when deployed in large numbers, the extremely dense Soviet artillery fire was a signficant factor in the loss of many Ferdinande, and yet when deployed in small numbers, they were extremely effective:
"In some cases, the use of the Ferdinande in small Kampfgruppen proved extremely successful, especially in the defense and in local attacks. The use of all the Ferdinande in one place resulted in significant vehicle losses through track damage inflicted by concentrated enemy artillery fire. It is therefore necessary to deploy the battalion wide and deep during operations." (After-Action Report, Hauptmann Henning, II./sPzJägRgt 656).
The minefields seem to be the most signficant factor- something that no other vehicle would be less-vulnerable to- suggesting that if fewer other types were lost to mines, it was recovery of the very heavy Ferdinand was an issue or that the Ferdinande were simply deployed in an area that was particularly densely-mined. Looking at the photographs on the website Igor mentioned, it can clearly be seen that not nearly so many Panthers as Ferdinande were badly damaged by mines. Almost every photograph of a lost Ferdinand shows mine damage.
As for the armor penetration, certainly 'what could and what couldn't' penetrate various thicknesses of armor isn't always a cut-and-dried truth- particularly when it comes to large-caliber rounds. Test data can only tell us so much, and after-action photographs can be quite telling, but even these can be questionable when the calibers of ammunition potentially responsible for the damage differ by as little as 1mm. Rounds of the same caliber are especailly problematic since they can differ quite a lot- look at the 8,8cm Kw.K. 36 L/56 and the 8,8cm Kw.K/Pak 43 L/71. You could never tell just from a hole which gun caused the damage. Answers to questions like this can be very important in determining the performance of a vehicle.
Matt
Let him who is without sin cast the first stone.
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate- "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily'' William of Ockham
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate- "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily'' William of Ockham
Darrin wrote:
At that point thier were 50 tanks left on the front and des from aug till the end of the year certainly dried up. 48 returned in dec which implys only 2 more were destroyed during 4+ months. This alone implys the tank was des at such high rates due to early design flaws and employment. If anything as the rus guns were becoming more likly to des the elephant it suffered far fewer destructions.
In truth the gers lost des ZERO ferdinads in aug and sep. This combined with the extremly small des numbers until dec also point to another possible conclusion. The elephant was not deployed in combat as often as earlier or its contemporys were. Caution again must be emphasised in any conclusions drawn here.
Here's the information I promised from Combat History of schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 653 (Karlheinz Münch, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing, 1997):
Ferdinand Combat Losses- 5. July to 27. July, 1943
1./sPzJägAbt 653 6 Ferdinande (111, 112, 113, 122, 132, 134)
2./sPzJägAbt 653 1 Ferdinand (232)
3./sPzJägAbt 653 4 Ferdinande (311, 323, 331, 333)
Reserve Vehicles 2 Ferdinande
Total: 13
Approximately 320 Soviet tanks, a large number of guns, anti-tank guns and trucks destroyed by the Abteilung during the same time period. (p. 53)
Report from Unteroffizier Böhm to Generalmajor Hartmann:
"We had 6 total losses during the first operation, one of which received a direct hit in the open driver's hatch while halted and caught fire... One caught fire due to unknown reasons (presumably an exhaust leak) and another was burnt out when its generator caught fire from overuse attempting to extract itself from a swamp. Three others were immobilized by mines and had to be destroyed by the crews during an enemy counterattack."
He continues, mentioning losses during subsequent actions: "One had bad luck. It was at the rail embankment when a Panzer III on the other side received a direct hit and flew throught he air, landing on the front part of the Ferdinand, breaking the gun tube, aming device and engine grating. The other battalion had a heavy shell penetrate the roof of a vehicle." Note: the first event was actually a BIV demolition vehicle hit and detonated- that explosion sent the adjacent Panzer III flying over the rail embankment onto the Ferdinand.
The last losses he mentions are two Ferdinande during the operation east of Orel- one of which was destroyed by its crew.
Here's an interesting event Böhm tell of: "Yet another [Ferdinand] was hit in the hull by a T34 at a range of 400 meters (seven T34s surrounded it). The entire shell penetrated without causing any damage."
One more is: "One Ferdinand occupying a forward position at night was damaged and blinded by infantry in close combat and fell into a ditch. A machine gun at the front is needed for such occasions. The side hatches are too small and one cannot aim through them." The thing I don't quite understand about the statement is the mention about how the side hatches- these were certainly ineffective in fighting off infantry at close-
range- but neither then would a hull machine gun. Such MGs have a fairly small lethal zone at close-range. So, I can't imagine too many vehicles would be particularly hard to attack in this fashion at night; however, it does show that on at least one occasion, Soviet infantrymen were successful in attacking a Ferdinand at close range- although the loss was due to driving into a ditch and becoming immobilized.
A report by Oberstleutnant (d.R)von Jungenfeld, commander of sPzJägRgt 656 on 24.7.1943 states that: "Due to the excessive demands placed upon all vehicles by the tactical situation, they all need an immediat 14-20 day overhaul. Their mechanical condition is such that there are more cases every day of newly repaired vehicles breaking down on the way from the maintenance sections to their units with new or different problems." This indeed suggests mechanical problems due to the fast deployment of the Ferdinand- before the design flaws were worked-out.
A 26.7.1943 report by Heinz Gröschl, an advisor from the Porsche company attached to sPzJägAbt 653 states that: "Unfortunately, the majority of the vehicles are always undergoing repairs. ... with the increasing wear on all parts, the already insufficient supply of repair parts has been exhausted. ... There are 17 vehicles missing fro the original total of 44. Seven of these have been transferred to other battalions... The other 10 were complete losses."
He goes on to say: "[The hull] has proved itself almost impervious to shells. Except for one penetrating side hit (76mm) near the rear ventilation motor housing and besides many scars, everything has remained intact. Even the single penetrating shot coincidentally did not have any ill effects. Practical experience has shown that however, that the engine gratings are a weak area. Along with Molotov Cocktails, a direct hit from artillery or a bomber on or near the gratings can set the vehicle ablaze." So, it seems that some attacks by Molotov Cocktails were successful in damaging or destroying Ferdinand(s), and the already-known issue of artillery and bomb fragments is mentioned. Another report (that I can't find at the moment) mentions the Soviet use of phosphorous shells and bombs being a threat- and the ad hoc addition of covers for the engine grating as a defense.
Reading Gröschl's entire report, the lack of spare parts seems to have been a MAJOR problem for the Ferdinande. He constently mentions that repairs cannot be made for lack of replacement parts, and that damaged vehicles are canniblized to repair others.
Finally, there is a report on p. 63 that states:
"The total amount of enemy equipment destroyed by the entire Panzerjäger Regiment [656] from 5. July 1943 to 5. November 1943 consists of: 582 tanks, 344 anti-tank guns, 133 cannon, 103 anti-tank rifles, 3 aircraft, 3 armored cars and 3 assault guns" and "654 tanks and 610 guns by 29.11.1943"
and "Ferdinand Situation for sPzJägAbt 653 and 654 (period 30.6.1943 to 30.11.1943):
5-14.7.1943- sPzJägRgt 656 (both sPzJägAbt 653 and 654) 19 total losses
29.7.1943- sPzJägAbt 653 13 total losses reported
29.7.1943- sPzJägAbt 653 26 total losses reported
20.11.1943 - sPzJägAbt 653 4 further total losses reported
Total Ferdinande lost during Zitadelle: 19; total lost by 20.11.1943: 62. Kill:Loss ratio: 10.55:1
I suspect the losses reported for 29.7.1943 could have been those vehicles lost and left behind during the withdrawl from Orel, not that there were that many destroyed in action on this day, as there are no losses reported for any day between 14.7.1943 and 29.7.1943 or 29.7.1943 and 20.11.1943.
Matt
Ferdinand Combat Losses- 5. July to 27. July, 1943
1./sPzJägAbt 653 6 Ferdinande (111, 112, 113, 122, 132, 134)
2./sPzJägAbt 653 1 Ferdinand (232)
3./sPzJägAbt 653 4 Ferdinande (311, 323, 331, 333)
Reserve Vehicles 2 Ferdinande
Total: 13
Approximately 320 Soviet tanks, a large number of guns, anti-tank guns and trucks destroyed by the Abteilung during the same time period. (p. 53)
Report from Unteroffizier Böhm to Generalmajor Hartmann:
"We had 6 total losses during the first operation, one of which received a direct hit in the open driver's hatch while halted and caught fire... One caught fire due to unknown reasons (presumably an exhaust leak) and another was burnt out when its generator caught fire from overuse attempting to extract itself from a swamp. Three others were immobilized by mines and had to be destroyed by the crews during an enemy counterattack."
He continues, mentioning losses during subsequent actions: "One had bad luck. It was at the rail embankment when a Panzer III on the other side received a direct hit and flew throught he air, landing on the front part of the Ferdinand, breaking the gun tube, aming device and engine grating. The other battalion had a heavy shell penetrate the roof of a vehicle." Note: the first event was actually a BIV demolition vehicle hit and detonated- that explosion sent the adjacent Panzer III flying over the rail embankment onto the Ferdinand.
The last losses he mentions are two Ferdinande during the operation east of Orel- one of which was destroyed by its crew.
Here's an interesting event Böhm tell of: "Yet another [Ferdinand] was hit in the hull by a T34 at a range of 400 meters (seven T34s surrounded it). The entire shell penetrated without causing any damage."
One more is: "One Ferdinand occupying a forward position at night was damaged and blinded by infantry in close combat and fell into a ditch. A machine gun at the front is needed for such occasions. The side hatches are too small and one cannot aim through them." The thing I don't quite understand about the statement is the mention about how the side hatches- these were certainly ineffective in fighting off infantry at close-
range- but neither then would a hull machine gun. Such MGs have a fairly small lethal zone at close-range. So, I can't imagine too many vehicles would be particularly hard to attack in this fashion at night; however, it does show that on at least one occasion, Soviet infantrymen were successful in attacking a Ferdinand at close range- although the loss was due to driving into a ditch and becoming immobilized.
A report by Oberstleutnant (d.R)von Jungenfeld, commander of sPzJägRgt 656 on 24.7.1943 states that: "Due to the excessive demands placed upon all vehicles by the tactical situation, they all need an immediat 14-20 day overhaul. Their mechanical condition is such that there are more cases every day of newly repaired vehicles breaking down on the way from the maintenance sections to their units with new or different problems." This indeed suggests mechanical problems due to the fast deployment of the Ferdinand- before the design flaws were worked-out.
A 26.7.1943 report by Heinz Gröschl, an advisor from the Porsche company attached to sPzJägAbt 653 states that: "Unfortunately, the majority of the vehicles are always undergoing repairs. ... with the increasing wear on all parts, the already insufficient supply of repair parts has been exhausted. ... There are 17 vehicles missing fro the original total of 44. Seven of these have been transferred to other battalions... The other 10 were complete losses."
He goes on to say: "[The hull] has proved itself almost impervious to shells. Except for one penetrating side hit (76mm) near the rear ventilation motor housing and besides many scars, everything has remained intact. Even the single penetrating shot coincidentally did not have any ill effects. Practical experience has shown that however, that the engine gratings are a weak area. Along with Molotov Cocktails, a direct hit from artillery or a bomber on or near the gratings can set the vehicle ablaze." So, it seems that some attacks by Molotov Cocktails were successful in damaging or destroying Ferdinand(s), and the already-known issue of artillery and bomb fragments is mentioned. Another report (that I can't find at the moment) mentions the Soviet use of phosphorous shells and bombs being a threat- and the ad hoc addition of covers for the engine grating as a defense.
Reading Gröschl's entire report, the lack of spare parts seems to have been a MAJOR problem for the Ferdinande. He constently mentions that repairs cannot be made for lack of replacement parts, and that damaged vehicles are canniblized to repair others.
Finally, there is a report on p. 63 that states:
"The total amount of enemy equipment destroyed by the entire Panzerjäger Regiment [656] from 5. July 1943 to 5. November 1943 consists of: 582 tanks, 344 anti-tank guns, 133 cannon, 103 anti-tank rifles, 3 aircraft, 3 armored cars and 3 assault guns" and "654 tanks and 610 guns by 29.11.1943"
and "Ferdinand Situation for sPzJägAbt 653 and 654 (period 30.6.1943 to 30.11.1943):
5-14.7.1943- sPzJägRgt 656 (both sPzJägAbt 653 and 654) 19 total losses
29.7.1943- sPzJägAbt 653 13 total losses reported
29.7.1943- sPzJägAbt 653 26 total losses reported
20.11.1943 - sPzJägAbt 653 4 further total losses reported
Total Ferdinande lost during Zitadelle: 19; total lost by 20.11.1943: 62. Kill:Loss ratio: 10.55:1
I suspect the losses reported for 29.7.1943 could have been those vehicles lost and left behind during the withdrawl from Orel, not that there were that many destroyed in action on this day, as there are no losses reported for any day between 14.7.1943 and 29.7.1943 or 29.7.1943 and 20.11.1943.
Matt
Let him who is without sin cast the first stone.
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate- "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily'' William of Ockham
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate- "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily'' William of Ockham
-
michael kenny
- Associate
- Posts: 812
- Joined: Sat Sep 28, 2002 5:09 am
- Location: Northern England
Quote:
" as there are no losses reported for any day between 14.7.1943 and 29.7.1943 or 29.7.1943 and 20.11.1943"
On page 63/64 of the '653' book it reports 4 Ferdinands lost in this period.
Also the total of all Ferdinands drops from 50 to 46. Thus another 4 have 'gone missing' in addition to the 4 admitted write offs.
" as there are no losses reported for any day between 14.7.1943 and 29.7.1943 or 29.7.1943 and 20.11.1943"
On page 63/64 of the '653' book it reports 4 Ferdinands lost in this period.
Also the total of all Ferdinands drops from 50 to 46. Thus another 4 have 'gone missing' in addition to the 4 admitted write offs.
No Michael, I said that there are no losses REPORTED until 20.11.1943, and that's the date for which the report is 4 total losses. There's nothing to say when these losses were suffered- they could have simply been written-off finally on this day.
What exactly do you mean about 4 going missing?
What exactly do you mean about 4 going missing?
Let him who is without sin cast the first stone.
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate- "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily'' William of Ockham
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate- "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily'' William of Ockham
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michael kenny
- Associate
- Posts: 812
- Joined: Sat Sep 28, 2002 5:09 am
- Location: Northern England
Ah, okay- well one of the reports I quoted mentions vehicle transfers to units other than sPzJägAbt 653 and 654- perhaps that's where they went. I kind of figure that the total losses are most important anyway- if there's no mention of these vehicles being lost, they can be assumed to have still been on strength somewhere.
Let him who is without sin cast the first stone.
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate- "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily'' William of Ockham
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate- "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily'' William of Ockham
Matt L wrote:
Here's the information I promised from Combat History of schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 653 (Karlheinz Münch, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing, 1997):
Ferdinand Combat Losses- 5. July to 27. July, 1943
1./sPzJägAbt 653 6 Ferdinande (111, 112, 113, 122, 132, 134)
2./sPzJägAbt 653 1 Ferdinand (232)
3./sPzJägAbt 653 4 Ferdinande (311, 323, 331, 333)
Reserve Vehicles 2 Ferdinande
Total: 13
Approximately 320 Soviet tanks, a large number of guns, anti-tank guns and trucks destroyed by the Abteilung during the same time period. (p. 53)
Except this total is undoubtably ger CLAIMS and not actual rus des. Over the last 6 months over the entire EF the ger overclimed by about 45%. They thought it was closer to 50% but it was slightly better then they est.
Therefore if we assume the claims to des was as above we get 176 rus tanks des compare to the des of 13 elephants. Now 13.5 rus tanks for each elephant des.
And just where do you get these percentages from? I wasn't aware of any documented comparison between German claims and actual Soviet losses- is there one?
Let him who is without sin cast the first stone.
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate- "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily'' William of Ockham
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate- "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily'' William of Ockham
Combat History of schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 654 (Karlheinz Münch, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing, 2002) p.68, 'After-Action Report, 1. August, 1943, Henning, Hauptmann, Bataillon Commander, II./schweres Panzerjäger-Regiment 656' (for the period from the beginning of Unternehment Zitadelle, 5. July, 1943, to 30. July, 1943):
"The fact that an enemy tank crew sometimes bailed out after a hit indicated that the enemy tank was only damaged and not destroyed. As a rule, therefore, an enemy tank may only be claimed destroyed after it has burned-out. In almost all cases, the number of enemy tanks claimed as destroyed by the companies was too high and did not correspond to the facts. I was able to confirm these claims when the attack was continued the next day and I was able to count the number of enemy tanks actually knocked-out the day before. The numbers claimed were about 30% too high and may be explained by different crews firing at the same tank and each claiming it destroyed after it burned-out. It may be assumed that the same applies to other units and that, as a result, our command is given a false picture of our successes. This also applies to Pak deployed in the same sector; their kills are often claimed by our tanks. As a result, I only claimed a tank as destroyed when I personally saw it burn out."
This actually suggests that the numbers, at least from sPzJägAbt 653, were quite accurate...
"The fact that an enemy tank crew sometimes bailed out after a hit indicated that the enemy tank was only damaged and not destroyed. As a rule, therefore, an enemy tank may only be claimed destroyed after it has burned-out. In almost all cases, the number of enemy tanks claimed as destroyed by the companies was too high and did not correspond to the facts. I was able to confirm these claims when the attack was continued the next day and I was able to count the number of enemy tanks actually knocked-out the day before. The numbers claimed were about 30% too high and may be explained by different crews firing at the same tank and each claiming it destroyed after it burned-out. It may be assumed that the same applies to other units and that, as a result, our command is given a false picture of our successes. This also applies to Pak deployed in the same sector; their kills are often claimed by our tanks. As a result, I only claimed a tank as destroyed when I personally saw it burn out."
This actually suggests that the numbers, at least from sPzJägAbt 653, were quite accurate...
Last edited by Matt L on Sun Oct 10, 2004 6:05 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Let him who is without sin cast the first stone.
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate- "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily'' William of Ockham
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate- "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily'' William of Ockham
Matt L wrote:
Here's an interesting event Böhm tell of: "Yet another [Ferdinand] was hit in the hull by a T34 at a range of 400 meters (seven T34s surrounded it). The entire shell penetrated without causing any damage."
Matt
This statment certainly seems weird. If the entire shell pen the tank then it certainly was damaged. At least a hole in the arm.