Best division in the Waffen SS??

[Kelvin]

Hi, Jan-Hendrik, thank for your reply. So it explained why Totenkopf and Wiking halted Soviet thrust in Aug 1944 and destroyed Soviet 3rd Tank Corps near Warsaw. And Hitler also overused his elite division : Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler and Das Reich and have confidence in these two units in Ardennes and Fruhlingserwachen.

[Reb]

As an example: LAH had bee reconstituted several times and lost more men as cadres to HJ, when it got to Belguim in '44 for a refit. It then absorbed thousands of men and much new equipment.

The core of the div was still good and did a remarkable job of pulling the new guys together to form units. The huge problem IMHO is the lack of junior leaders - they were desperately short of the men leaded to lead at the small unit level. They had men of that quality but not with the training. Same deal with armoured vehicle crews - good men, often didn't get their gear to the last minute plus petrol shortages that limited training. They went back into battle prematurely, got beat up badly again, and repeated the whole process in time for the Ardennes.

9 and 10 SS looked pretty good in their 'blooding' at Tarnopol. Then to Normandy where they were hacked up pretty badly. Plus they were made up largely of VolksDeutch but officered by good men who largely had won their spurs with the original SS divs. In '44 they probably were in better shape in some ways than LAH and DR. They hadn't been in battle yet (until UKraine) and hadn't lost their original caddre of junior leaders.

By Dec '44 they were in the same shape as LAH in my example above. Frundsburg never even got their panthers until Jan '45. The trained men and officers weren't there, and while they were still receiving equipment, it ain't about the tank with the man, its about the man in the tank.

But to answer your question about 9 and 10 SS - they were late to the party. LAH and the other 'original' divs had photographic crews with them and participated in key battles, particularly the early victories. The second wave of SS Pz Divs was represented by HJ and you can have only so many media heroes.

Near as I can tell, both divs gave a good accounting of themselves right up the end.

cheers
Reb

[Marc Rikmenspoel]

Reb, you make good points, but to be clear, the 9. and 10. SS-Panzer Divisionen were not mostly Volksdeutsche for their rank and file (when first formed). They also weren't volunteer units, though they were mostly Reichsdeutsche in composition. They were formed from men born in 1925 who were finishing their RAD service, and normally would have become Heer replacements. They were instead encouraged to volunteer for the Waffen-SS, and the vast majority declined to do so. They were then simply assigned to the Waffen-SS, with public statements made to the effect that they had volunteered (the Waffen-SS still pretended to be all-volunteer in 1943, just as the US Marine Corps did).

The 12. SS-PD was formed about the same time, only with volunteers born in 1926, who would otherwise have been considered a year too young for military duty. A year later, by mid-1944, it was normal to take 17 year-olds into service due to the dire straights Germany was in.

Some Volksdeutsche ended up in almost every Waffen-SS formation, but they were concentrated in the 8., 11. (and associated PG Brigade Nederland), 16. 17., 18., 22., and 31. Divisionen. Nordland and Nederland were fortunate to mostly get men who voluntarily left the Romanian Army to join the Waffen-SS. This contributed to the high combat value of those two units. The others mostly got conscripts, and in the case of the 31., it got the older men and leftovers from the final press-ganging of the Batschka and Barnaya, and thus had the lowest combat-value of any of these divisions.

[Kelvin]

Thank, Reb, and Marc, you both make a good point on Waffen SS.
Right now , I know mostly Volksdeutsche were found in some divisions.I have already known before that many Volksdeutsche in 17.SS. Gotz von Berlinchingen and 11.SS. Nordland. As I know before, 18.SS was made of some SA volunteer and 8.SS was formed from SS cavlary brigade, they turned to Volkssdeutsche, was shortage of Reichsdeutsche ?

In combat capability, did Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche really matter ? And Marc, many soldiers from Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg were unwilling to join Waffen SS before, but Waffen SS were pround unit, I suppose many young people eager to join it.
So, regarding Hitlerjugend,were they all volunteer ?

[Charles Trang]

I think Frundsberg's performance during the Tarnopol operation was not that good. Of course, it helped the 1st Panzer Army to get out of the encirclement but many panzerdivisions would have done that considering that the soviet ring was very loose along the western edge of the Kamenets-Podolsk pocket. Von Treuenfeld and a few battalion commanders were sacked after the battle and thus the division was in a much better shape when it went to battle in Normandy ! Though hastily engaged against the XXXth British Corps on the Odon river, it performed outstandingly against massive odds. The battle for hill 112 is the proof of the fighting spirit of the division. The units were very well led during the Normandy campaign. Harmel, Deisenhofer, Schulze (despite his brutality), Lingner and Sander were among the best SS officers in their respective functions. Commanders like Reinhold, Bünning and Richter were very brave. And the individual soldiers of the division were as good as the ones who could be found in elite formations such as Das Reich or Leibstandarte. The main difference between those two and Frundsberg was the quality of the junior officers and of the NCO corps which was far better in the Das Reich and Leibstandarte divisions. The latter were also better equiped.

[Marc Rikmenspoel]

All the Waffen-SS formations were short of NCOs in the second half of the war, but it was especially bad in the later-raised units. LAH and Das Reich could keep most of their NCOs, even if some were reassigned. But a new division had to take what it could get, and also train some recruits to be junior NCOs (as the 12. SS did). But this still wasn't enough, and of course, younger men who served as NCOs lacked the years of service that was normally part of being a good NCO. And, of course, men transferred in from the navy and airforce didn't have knowledge of ground combat, even if they had been an NCO for years.

As the Waffen-SS (and the Heer) expanded, it evolved that junior NCOs led platoons. So a junior sergeant would hold a position that previously was filled by a 2nd Lt., or even by a 1st Lt. It went on up the chain, with 2nd Lts. commanding companies, and captains heading battalions. Majors led regiments, though it was normal to promote them to Lt. Col. if their position was made permanent. A prewar or early war company would be commanded by a captain, with a 1st. Lt. and two 2nd Lts. as platoon commanders, and numerous NCOs assisting them. But, by 1944, the NCOs were having to command, and the vacuum of their secondary form of leadership wasn't being filled.

I've just been reading Rolf Michaelis' book on Waffen-SS Panzergrenadier Divisions, and he shows how these formations were always short of transportation and heavy weapons, along with NCOs. These shortages help support the argument made in various works, that the Wehrmacht would have been better off with fewer powerful elite units, instead of so many weak ones.

[Kelvin]

Hi, Marc, if Hitler cut his number of panzer division by 30-50 % and disbanding divisions were to be absorbed by some elite divisions either Heer or Waffen SS, did it alter the situation ?
When I saw the Vistula Oder opertion, though German had four panzer divisons ( 16,17,19,20. panzer divisions) and two panzergrenadier divisions ( 10 and 20. PanzerGrendier divisions), Soviet broke the German lines without difficulty. Warsaw was recaptured within 5 days. Guderian had spent much more effort in rebuilding those division afther the disastrous summer of 1944, but their performance were worse.
If Guderian , like your proposal, merged some weaker divisions to forme some stronger division with more tanks, SPW and guns and enough time to enhance training of junior officers and the cohesion of unit, something will be altered ?
I think some divisions no need to formed like 16. SS, 18.SS, Brandenburg, Feldherrnhalle, Fuhrer Begleit and Fuhrer Grenadier.
Some more like seven Waffen SS Panzer divisions, Nordland, GroBdeutschland and some old Heer panzer divisions like 3, 4, 5, must be strengthened with all available resources.

[Jan-Hendrik]

The easiest way would have been never to raise armed forces in Form of the waffen-SS.....would have saved much material and personal....and much, much unneccessarsy administration...


Jan-Hendrik

[leib1]

Can you please explain why you call the waffen ss elite Divisions in what way were they elite ?

[Charles Trang]

One great error, in my opinion, was the creation of the Panzerbrigaden during the summer of 1944. Together, they had around 600 PzKpfw.IV and V and 500 SPW. These armoured vehicles should have been given to refill the depleted panzerdivisions. They had experienced crews to man them. Instead, these precious vehicles were handed to unexperienced crews and were quickly lost in numerous small battles. Divisions such as Leibstandarte, Das Reich and Hitlerjugend still had plenty of available crews in their ranks by August and September 1944. To give them a few hundreds of armoured vehicles would have weighed more heavily on the battle development.

[Kelvin]

The easiest way would have been never to raise armed forces in Form of the waffen-SS.....would have saved much material and personal....and much, much unneccessarsy administration...


Jan-Hendrik

Hi, Jan-Hendrik, you always suggest the formation of Waffen SS is waste of resouces. But Hitler prefered building more divisions. Even seven Waffen SS Panzer divisions were not existed, Hitler probably would build another seven Heer panzer division. Given limited resources, the panzer division would become weaker too. Guderian said in his memoir Panzer Leader, he prefered some strong panzer divisions with 400 tanks. Maybe the problem is not Waffen SS Panzer divisions but the number of panzer divisions were too many.

[Charles Trang]

I don't want to argue with Heinz Guderian who was a better panzer specialist than I will ever be but 400 PzKpfw.IV and PzKpfw.V in one Panzerdivision would have been too difficult to handle. Imagine the maintenance problems and the difficulties to move such a big division on the poor roads of Soviet Union. A Panzerdivision with so many tanks would have needed an immense logistics unit within it. I think that the Panzerdivisionen had a good balance between their tanks and their infantry. The main problem was that the theorical number of tanks (180 in a Pz.Rgt. by 1944, i.e. 101 PzKpfw.IV and 79 PzKpfw.V) was never (or very seldom) achieved. I agree with Marc concerning the Waffen-SS : I think it should have been limited to (elite) infantry divisions. Leibstandarte, Reich, Wiking and Totenkopf performed outstandingly in 1941-1942 and should have been maintained as motorized infantry for offensive and defensive purposes.

[Jan-Hendrik]

Well, I WANT to argue with the quick Heinz

Apart from the point that Hitler's need to raise new and new divisions instead of keeping the frontline units on level, this matter is a bit more complex...

- one Pz.Rgt. with 8 fighting Kpn. is more than enough to handle for a battle group leader BUT, for the intense of fighting on Eastern Front, the Pz.Gren.Part was always to week, it had a least to be 2 Rgter wih 3 Btle. for every tank unit!
Especially in from middle of 1942 on the Btle. burnt out to fast. What was the reaction? Yes, the firepower was increased throught out the years, but personal strenght was cut down!
So in 1944 we had the fact, that even elite Heer Divisions did not had the manpower to use tactical wins for operational purposes...just because they were simply not able to "feed" a real breakthrough
In terms when Pz.Divs. were used in line defence it was even worse!

- for the Pz.Brg., well, the idea behind was not bad, institutialsing the battle group for Pz.Korps purposes....but they were never used that way. Mostly quickly thrown into battle and used as 'Feuerwehr' like a weakened Pz.Div...but without its possibilities...lacking severe support (Recce, Arty, Pios, Logistics), and having, comparing tank and Pz.Gren. Strengh not enough not enough Pz.Gren....12 Kps were necceessary in my opnion!

Jan-Hendrik

[Kelvin]

I agree with Jan-Hendrik about only 2 Pz.Gren.Rgts with 3 btl. Infantry was enough for intense fighting on the Eastern Front. Only Waffen SS Panzer divisions had infantry manpower for that purpose.

Also the number of armoured infantry battalions should be increased highly, at least one armored battalion in each regiment. But in 1944, German also faced the shortage of SPW and weapon.
For example : 2.SS. Panzer Division did not have any sd.kfz.251/9 ( main heavy weapon of armored infantry battalion) in its aufklarung abteilung and its armored infantry battalion in (Ardennes)Dec 1944.( I am not sure whether that division was no longer authorized any sd.kfz.251/9 after Nov 1944 as I cannot find any that vehicles on Panzerlage on Dec 30 1944, if I am wrong, someone correct me for that.)

[Charles Trang]

I think the good balance was indeed found in the WSS Panzerdivisions because they had enough infantry to man the terrain which was won by the Panzerkampfgruppe. This is certainly why they performed well in many instances. The additional StuG.-Abteilung, compared to the Heer Panzerdivisions, is another factor which must be pointed out. In fact, the ideal division was certainly the Grossdeutschland during the summer of 1944 : 3 tank battalions, 6 infantry battalions (2 of which were mounted on SPW) and 1 StuG.-Abt. plus outstanding and tactically competent officers. This could led to another thread but I am one of those who think that the Panzer-Lehr-Division was wasted in a defensive battle in Normandy as it was better suited to the Eastern Front type of armoured warfare. Now back to the WSS Panzerdivisions : their structure was certainly the best of the German Army but their main weakness layed in their poor command at divisional level. Battalion and regimental commanders were good enough but their staff officers and divisional commanders were not up to the task, with the notable exception of Felix Steiner (Wiking), Walter Krüger (Das Reich) and Paul Hausser (Verfügungsdivision/Reich). The others were very courageous and very good leaders of men but lacked the tactical knowledge which could have brought even more successes to their divisions.