Well Sid, at least someone is contributing to the discussion.
I use the term "war winner" because the submarine was the one proven weapon that had a chance to hit the allies at the weak spot in their military structure. That is the Atlantic sea lanes. In 2005 its easy to look back and see the lack of forsight by the German high command. I agree with you that in 1941 & '42 it would be much harder to anticipate the complete collapse of the U-boat fleet. "Even tho by the end of 1941 they should have known". My point being that the sea lanes, and cutting them off, was so important that there was a failure in German leadership to appreciate just how important it was.
I dont think its a surprise that a new U-boat design would take more man hours to build. My point was in general terms 1944 was a pretty lousy time for German production to be shouldering a new design such as the XXl. And not just production but also provisioning, training, and manning the boat adequatly.
We agree the hindsight is easy. But the theoretical question was, and still is, "would the XXl have bee a war winner if built two years ealier"? I'd appreciate any more discussion to be centered around tactics and doctrine instead of production and development nuts and bolts.
The type XXl........A war winner?
Gentlemen: Personally, I think there were a lot of factors that contributed to the shipping situation of 1941-43. Some that come immediately to mind include:
1. Axis submarines
2. Poor turn-around times/congestion in British ports
3. Emphasis on the bomber offensive at the expense of shipping protection
4. Placing Imperial concerns over the needs of the home-front.
English histories like to stress factor #1. That is fine, but simplistic. Had the crisis been as dire as portrayed by Churchill, for example, there was plenty the British could have done to solve the problem of the submarine menace earlier than they did. It was all a question of priorities.
The German were also juggling priorities and Donitz’s assertion that he could have won the war with X number of submarines is likewise self-serving and simplistic.
To turn to the question of whether an improved submarine (a “true” submarine) would have been a “war-winning” weapon if available earlier and in greater numbers, the simple answer is no. Both Enrico and Sid bring out different, but excellent reasons why this is so. I’ll just question the whole premise of the “tonnage” war. My question is whether it was possible for German to drive imports to Britain below a certain level and to win the war by so doing. (Of course, with the Soviet Union crewing up German armies the war was lost in any case but let us pretend this wasn’t so). My simple answer is that if there was a true crisis in Britain, if people were starving, the Allies have given the problem a higher priority than they did. There had plenty of resources available. Maybe the war with Japan would have lasted another year or two, but the submarines could not have closed the Atlantic. The new submarines would have been undoubtedly harder to track and sink, but they were not invulnerable. And besides, all that the Allies needed to accomplish was their neutralization, not their destruction. For example, Allied radar could detect snorkels. Saturating an area with radar equipped night bombers would have made those “chokepoints” very dangerous places indeed for German submarines, even running submerged. Moreover, technology has a habit of growing rapidly during war to meet the threat. If German submarine technology is to be advanced by two years, we should suppose Allied anti-submarine technology will enjoy a similar growth spurt. Finally, if the Germans had attempted to flood the ocean with improved submarines, their war effort would have suffered elsewhere and their resources were considerably less than those of the Allies. They would have cracked first.
Vince
1. Axis submarines
2. Poor turn-around times/congestion in British ports
3. Emphasis on the bomber offensive at the expense of shipping protection
4. Placing Imperial concerns over the needs of the home-front.
English histories like to stress factor #1. That is fine, but simplistic. Had the crisis been as dire as portrayed by Churchill, for example, there was plenty the British could have done to solve the problem of the submarine menace earlier than they did. It was all a question of priorities.
The German were also juggling priorities and Donitz’s assertion that he could have won the war with X number of submarines is likewise self-serving and simplistic.
To turn to the question of whether an improved submarine (a “true” submarine) would have been a “war-winning” weapon if available earlier and in greater numbers, the simple answer is no. Both Enrico and Sid bring out different, but excellent reasons why this is so. I’ll just question the whole premise of the “tonnage” war. My question is whether it was possible for German to drive imports to Britain below a certain level and to win the war by so doing. (Of course, with the Soviet Union crewing up German armies the war was lost in any case but let us pretend this wasn’t so). My simple answer is that if there was a true crisis in Britain, if people were starving, the Allies have given the problem a higher priority than they did. There had plenty of resources available. Maybe the war with Japan would have lasted another year or two, but the submarines could not have closed the Atlantic. The new submarines would have been undoubtedly harder to track and sink, but they were not invulnerable. And besides, all that the Allies needed to accomplish was their neutralization, not their destruction. For example, Allied radar could detect snorkels. Saturating an area with radar equipped night bombers would have made those “chokepoints” very dangerous places indeed for German submarines, even running submerged. Moreover, technology has a habit of growing rapidly during war to meet the threat. If German submarine technology is to be advanced by two years, we should suppose Allied anti-submarine technology will enjoy a similar growth spurt. Finally, if the Germans had attempted to flood the ocean with improved submarines, their war effort would have suffered elsewhere and their resources were considerably less than those of the Allies. They would have cracked first.
Vince
Why would "bombers" have anything to do with shipping?
For that matter what does "congestion at Brit ports" have to do with anything? As to "Imperial concerns" Britain had a lot of troops hung out to dry all over the world. Its not like they had an option to just say "sayonara" to them and leave them on their own. Besides England was dependant on the trade lines the troops were protecting.
Looking at the British naval situation in the first few years of the war and I don't know what else they could have done. There were only so many escorts ship available. Sure, looking back, you could say why did the bloody daft Yanks allow those subs to operate so close to our ports, even giving them background lighting to shoot by. There were plenty of mistakes made by both sides.
I also make my assessments of the submarine as a strategic weapon of war-winning capability not by anything Donitz or Churchill said but by their performance and tonnage sunk. It goes without saying that if you can sink more transport ships then your enemy can build eventually they are going to run out of transport ships. For an example study the impact of Yank long range subs in the Pacific.
As to "war winning"? Maybe the submarine wasn't "war winning" by the true meaning of the term.........but! Had the Germans been able to prevent an invasion of west Europe by the allies, and due to the success of the submarine war, I find it highly likely they could have made a separate peace with Stalin with acceptable territorial gains. In the east they could afford to trade space for time and they could afford to take the long view. Stalin gave the word "suspicion" new meaning and he would have taken Yank/Brit refusal to invade in '44 as a backstab, would have assessed the cost of going into Germany on his own, and would have been open to a deal.
Thats what I believe an effective submarine in '43 & '44 was capable of doing. Its all fine to think making resources available for subs took away from other systems but what "other system" had the strategic impact of the submarine? The answer is none! The submarine was the right weapon, at the right time, that could attack the allies at their weakest link in their military chain. Every other system should have taken a backseat to the XXl.
When you look at the resources the Germans wasted on such military irrelevant systems like the "V" weapons, their surface raiders, those stupid battleships....ect Had they instead gone 100% on development of submarines and an air arm to support them we may be living in a vastly different world today.
Ohara thanks for the input.
For that matter what does "congestion at Brit ports" have to do with anything? As to "Imperial concerns" Britain had a lot of troops hung out to dry all over the world. Its not like they had an option to just say "sayonara" to them and leave them on their own. Besides England was dependant on the trade lines the troops were protecting.
Looking at the British naval situation in the first few years of the war and I don't know what else they could have done. There were only so many escorts ship available. Sure, looking back, you could say why did the bloody daft Yanks allow those subs to operate so close to our ports, even giving them background lighting to shoot by. There were plenty of mistakes made by both sides.
I also make my assessments of the submarine as a strategic weapon of war-winning capability not by anything Donitz or Churchill said but by their performance and tonnage sunk. It goes without saying that if you can sink more transport ships then your enemy can build eventually they are going to run out of transport ships. For an example study the impact of Yank long range subs in the Pacific.
As to "war winning"? Maybe the submarine wasn't "war winning" by the true meaning of the term.........but! Had the Germans been able to prevent an invasion of west Europe by the allies, and due to the success of the submarine war, I find it highly likely they could have made a separate peace with Stalin with acceptable territorial gains. In the east they could afford to trade space for time and they could afford to take the long view. Stalin gave the word "suspicion" new meaning and he would have taken Yank/Brit refusal to invade in '44 as a backstab, would have assessed the cost of going into Germany on his own, and would have been open to a deal.
Thats what I believe an effective submarine in '43 & '44 was capable of doing. Its all fine to think making resources available for subs took away from other systems but what "other system" had the strategic impact of the submarine? The answer is none! The submarine was the right weapon, at the right time, that could attack the allies at their weakest link in their military chain. Every other system should have taken a backseat to the XXl.
When you look at the resources the Germans wasted on such military irrelevant systems like the "V" weapons, their surface raiders, those stupid battleships....ect Had they instead gone 100% on development of submarines and an air arm to support them we may be living in a vastly different world today.
Ohara thanks for the input.
Rich,
you wrote: "Why would "bombers" have anything to do with shipping?"
Long Range bombers were excellent anti-submarine platforms. Regarding Bomber Command's impact on the submarine war check out Correlli Barnett's "Engage the Enemy More Closely" In brief, he believes Bomber Command's refusal to release a small number of very long range bombers delayed victory over the submarines by a year.
As to the XXI, the U.S. Navy successfully tested it's first sonobuoy in March 1942 by detecting a submarine running fully submerged. These buoys were deployed by aircraft. They would have been effective against the XXI. Check out "Sonobuoy" by John Merrill in the February 1994 issue of Naval History for more details.
I'll respond to your other comments in a subsequent post if no one else does.
Vince
you wrote: "Why would "bombers" have anything to do with shipping?"
Long Range bombers were excellent anti-submarine platforms. Regarding Bomber Command's impact on the submarine war check out Correlli Barnett's "Engage the Enemy More Closely" In brief, he believes Bomber Command's refusal to release a small number of very long range bombers delayed victory over the submarines by a year.
As to the XXI, the U.S. Navy successfully tested it's first sonobuoy in March 1942 by detecting a submarine running fully submerged. These buoys were deployed by aircraft. They would have been effective against the XXI. Check out "Sonobuoy" by John Merrill in the February 1994 issue of Naval History for more details.
I'll respond to your other comments in a subsequent post if no one else does.
Vince
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sid guttridge
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Hi Rich,
Why would Stalin have had any incentive to make concessions of territory to Hitler in late 1944, once a Western Allied landing in France had failed to take place? The Red Army was everywhere victorious, Hitler held almost no Soviet territory by then to bargain with and the failure of the Western Allies to land would have held out the carrot of Stalin's forces conquering the whole of Europe.
Cheers,
Sid.
Why would Stalin have had any incentive to make concessions of territory to Hitler in late 1944, once a Western Allied landing in France had failed to take place? The Red Army was everywhere victorious, Hitler held almost no Soviet territory by then to bargain with and the failure of the Western Allies to land would have held out the carrot of Stalin's forces conquering the whole of Europe.
Cheers,
Sid.
Im aware of the develoment of sonobuoys. The early ones however had limited range, were omni-directional, short battery lives, and against a system like XXl would have had very limited success. The thing is XXl was very quiet and could operate at great depths for extended periods. MAD and sonobuoys would probably be more effective but the type of aircraft that could be so equiped would have use only in areas within their range. You couldnt launch a Catalina off an escort carrier in the mid Atlantic.
Even along Americas or Englands coast there are so many shipwrecks I couldnt imagine producing so many buoys to drop on all those MAD hits. The truth is, while promising technologies, they would have had limited success against XXl. If any at all. The same goes for the Yank FIDO.
As to the bombers? Good luck walking into A. Harris's office asking for his bombers to comb the north Atlantic looking for a submarine that never surfaces. Good luck asking him for the planes to look for the ones that did. Harris and bomber command were a law unto themselves and even Churchill dreaded walking into Harris's office hat in hand. Besides, and again, there were great swaths of the Atlantic out of range of shore based aircraft. Most certainly if it included meaningful loiter/patrol times. And besides you just cant take crews and bombers used to attacking area land targets at night and say to them, "well today were going after submarines". Truth is you needed specialized crews and aircraft for what was, and is, a specialized mission. To this day such duties are assigned to specialized aircraft.
The simple fact of the matter was the only real way to provide consistant/relevant air cover was to bring it with you in the convoy. Especially out in the zone the wolves were lurking.
Stalin would have had reasons for concessions had the Germans only had the eastern front to contend with. Also a successful U-boat war would have also strangled Allied re-supply to the Soviets via the ice route.
I will add that XXl would have been atremely dangerous to Allied capitol ship as well. Not only with torpedoes but also as an outstanding minelayer.
Even along Americas or Englands coast there are so many shipwrecks I couldnt imagine producing so many buoys to drop on all those MAD hits. The truth is, while promising technologies, they would have had limited success against XXl. If any at all. The same goes for the Yank FIDO.
As to the bombers? Good luck walking into A. Harris's office asking for his bombers to comb the north Atlantic looking for a submarine that never surfaces. Good luck asking him for the planes to look for the ones that did. Harris and bomber command were a law unto themselves and even Churchill dreaded walking into Harris's office hat in hand. Besides, and again, there were great swaths of the Atlantic out of range of shore based aircraft. Most certainly if it included meaningful loiter/patrol times. And besides you just cant take crews and bombers used to attacking area land targets at night and say to them, "well today were going after submarines". Truth is you needed specialized crews and aircraft for what was, and is, a specialized mission. To this day such duties are assigned to specialized aircraft.
The simple fact of the matter was the only real way to provide consistant/relevant air cover was to bring it with you in the convoy. Especially out in the zone the wolves were lurking.
Stalin would have had reasons for concessions had the Germans only had the eastern front to contend with. Also a successful U-boat war would have also strangled Allied re-supply to the Soviets via the ice route.
I will add that XXl would have been atremely dangerous to Allied capitol ship as well. Not only with torpedoes but also as an outstanding minelayer.
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Enrico Cernuschi
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I believe that by now the mess is absolute.
Rich, you begun asking is the Type XXI was a "war winner", isnt'it?
You are writing, now, that you were meaning not a weapon to win the war, but simply "a proven weapon that had a chance to hit the Allies in a weak spot of their military structure".
A Mauser 98 bullet too is a proven weapon that had such a chance!
You are spaking about a very silent XXI boat which did not exist. Have you got an acoustic scheme of that boat? I don't think so.
You have only a deep, admirable faith in some nostalgic after the war yellow press opinions. The hard truth is that the XXI, even if 22 boats were lost in 1945 by bombing, aircrafts attacks at sea and mines, was not tested at war (XXIII was an other matter, not maybe in the technology field, but in the operative one) and had, of course, all the teeth problems of any new weapon. With ten years of peace and a continuous effort it could become a reliable weapon, not before. We have got plenty of experience with the Guppys, the Porpoises, the Narvals ect.
The dark legend of Britain starving by the U boat war is a ridiculous one. Less than 1% of the convoy tonnage bound for UK was lost at sea.
It's not too much correct, then, to criticize the USA made sonobuoys performances of 1942 with a 1944 submarine (who was not ready for maid voyages before 1945). The buoys too developed in the following three years (but their design was sound and effective in the Fifties too).
let me add, then, that, in spite of your bad temper reactions, the only possible confrontation for the XXI are the Soviet Whiskey and Zulus; almost the same technology an performances against the same potential adversary in the same theatre and in a not too much different number.
Ane they were never considered a trump card, but "only" a menace which had to be fought, in the Fifties, with almost the same weapons of the previous decade (Fido, sonoboys, LR ASW aircrafts - think at the Shakleton, the nephew of the Avro Lancaster- Squid, Limbo, Weapon Alpha ect. -the chippers arrived later-).
I don't agree, anyway, with Sid, about the effects of a failed Overlord. I believe (no proofs, of course, as in any "What if" thread, like your one) that Unca Joe would sign an armistice the day after the last Anglosaxon soldier had surrendered or come back in England, but this is all an other matter.
The original answer was: "Was type XXI a war winner" and the general opinion, with sound argouments, said not, even if it had been available in 1940 and in a yet tested version.
About the minelayer activity if you are going to study the German very effective submarine mine warfare during WWI you could appreciate they did a lot of damages, but - again- nothing more.
Thank you, anyway, for such an interesting thread.
EC
Rich, you begun asking is the Type XXI was a "war winner", isnt'it?
You are writing, now, that you were meaning not a weapon to win the war, but simply "a proven weapon that had a chance to hit the Allies in a weak spot of their military structure".
A Mauser 98 bullet too is a proven weapon that had such a chance!
You are spaking about a very silent XXI boat which did not exist. Have you got an acoustic scheme of that boat? I don't think so.
You have only a deep, admirable faith in some nostalgic after the war yellow press opinions. The hard truth is that the XXI, even if 22 boats were lost in 1945 by bombing, aircrafts attacks at sea and mines, was not tested at war (XXIII was an other matter, not maybe in the technology field, but in the operative one) and had, of course, all the teeth problems of any new weapon. With ten years of peace and a continuous effort it could become a reliable weapon, not before. We have got plenty of experience with the Guppys, the Porpoises, the Narvals ect.
The dark legend of Britain starving by the U boat war is a ridiculous one. Less than 1% of the convoy tonnage bound for UK was lost at sea.
It's not too much correct, then, to criticize the USA made sonobuoys performances of 1942 with a 1944 submarine (who was not ready for maid voyages before 1945). The buoys too developed in the following three years (but their design was sound and effective in the Fifties too).
let me add, then, that, in spite of your bad temper reactions, the only possible confrontation for the XXI are the Soviet Whiskey and Zulus; almost the same technology an performances against the same potential adversary in the same theatre and in a not too much different number.
Ane they were never considered a trump card, but "only" a menace which had to be fought, in the Fifties, with almost the same weapons of the previous decade (Fido, sonoboys, LR ASW aircrafts - think at the Shakleton, the nephew of the Avro Lancaster- Squid, Limbo, Weapon Alpha ect. -the chippers arrived later-).
I don't agree, anyway, with Sid, about the effects of a failed Overlord. I believe (no proofs, of course, as in any "What if" thread, like your one) that Unca Joe would sign an armistice the day after the last Anglosaxon soldier had surrendered or come back in England, but this is all an other matter.
The original answer was: "Was type XXI a war winner" and the general opinion, with sound argouments, said not, even if it had been available in 1940 and in a yet tested version.
About the minelayer activity if you are going to study the German very effective submarine mine warfare during WWI you could appreciate they did a lot of damages, but - again- nothing more.
Thank you, anyway, for such an interesting thread.
EC
Ciàpla adasi, stà léger.
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sid guttridge
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Hi Enrico,
I think Rich's point was that the introduction of the Type XXI would have prevented the trans-Atlantic build-up for Overlord. I was therefore postulating that Overlord was not launched in 1944, not that it was defeated.
Until such time as Overlord had not materialised, Germany would not have had any reason to make significantly different army deployments. Thus I would suggest that until the favourable season for invasion was over in about August 1944, developments on the Eastern Front would be little affected and Stalin would have had little reason to do a deal with
Hitler.
Cheers,
Sid.
I think Rich's point was that the introduction of the Type XXI would have prevented the trans-Atlantic build-up for Overlord. I was therefore postulating that Overlord was not launched in 1944, not that it was defeated.
Until such time as Overlord had not materialised, Germany would not have had any reason to make significantly different army deployments. Thus I would suggest that until the favourable season for invasion was over in about August 1944, developments on the Eastern Front would be little affected and Stalin would have had little reason to do a deal with
Hitler.
Cheers,
Sid.
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sid guttridge
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Hi Rich,
I had a look at van der Vat's book on the Atlantic Campaign.
It seems that the first time the one Type XXI that was used operationally was in a position to attack, it was detected. It got away unscathed, but for an offensive weapon this is a failure.
The second time it was in a position to launch an attack it sailed under the target without being detected. It did not attack because the war was already over.
These incidents seem to demonstrate the superior survivability of the Type XXI, but do not appear to demonstrate that it was capable of delivering attacks with complete impunity.
Cheers,
Sid.
I had a look at van der Vat's book on the Atlantic Campaign.
It seems that the first time the one Type XXI that was used operationally was in a position to attack, it was detected. It got away unscathed, but for an offensive weapon this is a failure.
The second time it was in a position to launch an attack it sailed under the target without being detected. It did not attack because the war was already over.
These incidents seem to demonstrate the superior survivability of the Type XXI, but do not appear to demonstrate that it was capable of delivering attacks with complete impunity.
Cheers,
Sid.
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Enrico Cernuschi
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Hello Sid,
even if I still consider the XXI War Winner subject over I'll try to add some points at the "related" failed Overlord argoument.
According my point of view the aim of the landing in France was to spare the Anglosaxon war a German-Russian separate peace after three years of bloody stealmate in the East.
There were many other motives too, of course, but the most important was this one, only according my opinion, of course.
If an impossible XXI boats campaign of a more probable UFO invasion from mars had hampered the Americans to ferry across the Atlantic ocean, since Autumn 1943, about 30 Divisions of their Army in UK, no landing would materialize as the British Army had not the strenght and, above all, the will to land.
The Italian campaign was a little war in comparison of the next France invasion and a strategic failure as she needed the use of quite alarger total of Allied divisions in front of quite a smaller number of German ones.
Stalin had yet been disappointed in Aug. 1942 and May 1943 by the Anglosaxons who twice had been not as good as their own word about an invasion of France. Even the Kremlin lord could not save his political grasp over his court of toads in front of a third deferred invasion from 1944 to, maybe, 1945 or later.
His excellent intelligence would appreciate, of course, in time the existence of not less than two American armies in UK within Spring 1944 and, lacking such a force in England, the chances for that white peace along the old 1941 border that Mussolini (and the Japanese) was asking since Dec. 1941 would be more and more probable.
A failed invasion too would have the same final effect.
As a matter of fact the Red Army attacked the Central German group of armies only AFTER the landing had been able, after two weeks, to get a sure beachhead repulsing the German counter attacks under the Anglosaxon battleships and cruisers fire, like at Siracusa, Gela, Salerno and Anzio.
This is only theory, of course, but a logic one.
Bye
EC
even if I still consider the XXI War Winner subject over I'll try to add some points at the "related" failed Overlord argoument.
According my point of view the aim of the landing in France was to spare the Anglosaxon war a German-Russian separate peace after three years of bloody stealmate in the East.
There were many other motives too, of course, but the most important was this one, only according my opinion, of course.
If an impossible XXI boats campaign of a more probable UFO invasion from mars had hampered the Americans to ferry across the Atlantic ocean, since Autumn 1943, about 30 Divisions of their Army in UK, no landing would materialize as the British Army had not the strenght and, above all, the will to land.
The Italian campaign was a little war in comparison of the next France invasion and a strategic failure as she needed the use of quite alarger total of Allied divisions in front of quite a smaller number of German ones.
Stalin had yet been disappointed in Aug. 1942 and May 1943 by the Anglosaxons who twice had been not as good as their own word about an invasion of France. Even the Kremlin lord could not save his political grasp over his court of toads in front of a third deferred invasion from 1944 to, maybe, 1945 or later.
His excellent intelligence would appreciate, of course, in time the existence of not less than two American armies in UK within Spring 1944 and, lacking such a force in England, the chances for that white peace along the old 1941 border that Mussolini (and the Japanese) was asking since Dec. 1941 would be more and more probable.
A failed invasion too would have the same final effect.
As a matter of fact the Red Army attacked the Central German group of armies only AFTER the landing had been able, after two weeks, to get a sure beachhead repulsing the German counter attacks under the Anglosaxon battleships and cruisers fire, like at Siracusa, Gela, Salerno and Anzio.
This is only theory, of course, but a logic one.
Bye
EC
Ciàpla adasi, stà léger.
"Complete immunity" has never been a result I predicted. "Effectiveness" is, especially in 1943. I dont think 1945 was a very good time to be a German submarine. Not after the allies had had two years to rule the Atlantic and the German submarine training program had become a shell. By the type XXl actually did appear the war was lost no matter what the Germans did.
Truth is we will never know how effective the XXl would have been. That U-2511 was able to approach a British battle group without detection spoke volumes for its potential. Attacking a convoy would have been far easier. Even the older U-boat designs were considered a great danger to British fleet carriers.
My dream is to go see the one XXl in Bremerhaven some day. The XXl had great influence in post war Yank submarine design and modification of existing classes.
Truth is we will never know how effective the XXl would have been. That U-2511 was able to approach a British battle group without detection spoke volumes for its potential. Attacking a convoy would have been far easier. Even the older U-boat designs were considered a great danger to British fleet carriers.
My dream is to go see the one XXl in Bremerhaven some day. The XXl had great influence in post war Yank submarine design and modification of existing classes.
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sid guttridge
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Im not aware of any "tests" of captured XXls, against our own ships, after the war. Maybe the Soviets did, they captured more of them then we did. I do know that the first production U-boat class after the war, the Tang class, was an almost complete carbon copy of the German XXl and was the original "fast attack submarine" built by America. One could argue that the type XXl was the first of modern submarines and lives on in every sub currently operating.
This philosophy of quiet operation, reduced sonar signature, exceptional underwater performance, and lone wolf tactics are as alive and well today, as they were in 1945 when the XXl first stalked. Other then nuclear propulsion in some classes the biggest difference with modern designs is the tear drop hull, which was found to be a more efficient hull design.
So yes, the XXl weighed in heavily in all post war submarine designs and tactical philosophy. Even to this day it does.
Tang class diesel submarines performed cloak and dagger acts of spying that are "legendary" in submarine circles. Like the XXl she was based on she was able to approach enemy shores undetected and remain so while acquiring intelligence. In the open waters she could approach enemy ships by stealth, successfully attack, and evade using her deep diving capabilities, fast and quiet electric speed, and good electronics package.
Even our WW-ll submarines were converted to XXI standards under the GUPPY program. To this day XXl like diesel submarines are extremely dangerous. Its no secret that the USN considers them the biggest threat to our aircraft carrier battle groups.
Yes......that is how important XXI was.
This philosophy of quiet operation, reduced sonar signature, exceptional underwater performance, and lone wolf tactics are as alive and well today, as they were in 1945 when the XXl first stalked. Other then nuclear propulsion in some classes the biggest difference with modern designs is the tear drop hull, which was found to be a more efficient hull design.
So yes, the XXl weighed in heavily in all post war submarine designs and tactical philosophy. Even to this day it does.
Tang class diesel submarines performed cloak and dagger acts of spying that are "legendary" in submarine circles. Like the XXl she was based on she was able to approach enemy shores undetected and remain so while acquiring intelligence. In the open waters she could approach enemy ships by stealth, successfully attack, and evade using her deep diving capabilities, fast and quiet electric speed, and good electronics package.
Even our WW-ll submarines were converted to XXI standards under the GUPPY program. To this day XXl like diesel submarines are extremely dangerous. Its no secret that the USN considers them the biggest threat to our aircraft carrier battle groups.
Yes......that is how important XXI was.
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Enrico Cernuschi
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U 3008 was used by the USn since 1945 to 1954; U 2518 and U 3017 were tested by the Royal Navy, then U 2518 went to France as Roland Morrilot.
The French Narval were direct sons of the XXI type with some improvments, but the British Porpoises and the USN Tang had in common only the elektroboote concept. Dimensions, design, the bow (by far the most important part of a true submarine), ect. had no resemblance with the XXI, but were totally original (and quite better in acoustic terms).
Bye
EC
The French Narval were direct sons of the XXI type with some improvments, but the British Porpoises and the USN Tang had in common only the elektroboote concept. Dimensions, design, the bow (by far the most important part of a true submarine), ect. had no resemblance with the XXI, but were totally original (and quite better in acoustic terms).
Bye
EC
Ciàpla adasi, stà léger.