Barbarossa and the Preventative War... again

[Richard Hargreaves]

It looks like the preventative war issue has raised its head again, courtesy of this book

http://www.amazon.de/Kampfplatz-Deutsch ... 258&sr=8-1

Musial's a Polish historian with a pretty good reputation, so I'd be interested to see this. Given the subject matter, I'd be surprised if it wasn't translated into English.

[Feldjäger]

Hi Richard....very, very interesting! Thanks for the link! Well, the book is a new release, I am confident they will translate it into English soon or later; if not, we simply must read it in German!
Do you know something more about the author, Musial?
By the way, I am very skeptical about the preventive war theme

Best regards

[Richard Hargreaves]

Hi Feldjäger,

I have his book on the treatment of the Poles during the Soviet occupation 1939-41, which is quite good. He's fairly prolific if you have a look on amazon.de, there's a good half dozen books by him. The fact that one's published by Oldenbourg is a indicator that he's a serious author.

I've never subscribed to the preventative war theory, per se. It was a case of which dictator struck first to expand his empire.

[Uncle Joe]

Bogdan Musial was one of the first, if not first, to note how many falsified photos bolshevik and convicted violent felon Hannes Heer´s Wehrmacht exhibition contained. And Musial has also shown how deeply the Soviet terror campaign (e.g. against Baltic "counterrevolutionary elements") during the initial stages of the Barbarossa. I would note Musial has also published articles in Israeli Yad Vashem studies.
(moderator's edit)

[Feldjäger]

Richard, Joe,
thanks you for the informations! Yes, I've checked Musial's books on amazon.de and they look very interesting, especially THIS http://www.amazon.de/Genesis-Genozids-1 ... 271&sr=1-4

Speaking of which, what do you think of the book "Revolution from Abroad" by Gross? Any good?
Regards

[sid guttridge]

Hi Feldjager,

I agree. We know from their writings, speeches and political affiliations that both Stalin and Hitler had announced generalised intentions of occupying each other's turf going back decades.

However, we also know for a fact that Hitler struck first and this leaves Stalin's exact position and timetable more conjectural. Any book that clarifies Stalin's exact plans is therefore welcome. (One such has been up on the internet for years, in Russian, using Russian sources).

We also know that Hitler's eastwards attack first involved completely destroying Poland, which had hitherto been the main bulwark of Central and Western Europe against the USSR. If pre-empting the USSR was his main aim, then alliance with Poland would better have served this purpose, rather than destroying the country and assisting the Red Army to advance hundreds of miles westwards through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

From March 1938 Hitler was engaged in a proactive, rolling campaign of territorial expansion, in which each new coup was ordered to be planned within weeks of the last being carried out. Stalin's participation in such activities from September 1939, while hardly unwilling, was reactive, not pre-emptive, and approved in writing by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Hitler followed his own timetable right up to and including June 22 1941.

Hitler may have pre-empted Stalin, but his war on the USSR was not pre-emptive. Hitler had his own agenda which involved taking the lands of the Slavs regardless of their political affiliations. Had the USSR been entirely passive, this would not have changed.

Cheers,

Sid.

[phylo_roadking]

You have to also remember that it was RUSSIA which signalled it's willingness to enter into an "agreement of convenience" of whatever nature with Germany, after the debacle of Munich in 1938...

[Paddy Keating]

Was there not an element on both sides of playing for time? Stalin was what he was but he was aware, nevertheless, of how much the Red Army had been weakened by his purges. It was in his interests to placate Hitler. But the Soviets knew it was only a matter of time before Hitler put his neo-imperialist plans into motion and rolled eastwards. As Sid says, Hitler would have instigated the building of a new German Empire in the East come what may, because Africa and Asia were no longer available to Germany. But this does not change the fact that Stalinist Russia was an expansionist entity. Had it not been for Hitler, there would have been Red Army rather than Wehrmacht soldiers standing on the coast, looking across the North Sea towards Britain, perhaps as early as the mid-1940s.

PK

[phylo_roadking]

The USSR's position on Poland and Germany long predates 1938-39 - on four separate occasions after 1920 she had demanded the re-partition of Poland, for example. Up to 1938 the USSR had played its (limited) part in all the international treaties hemming around Germany - such as it's own non-aggression treaties with Poland AND France - but the Soviet view in international treaties is very clearly stated - that they were for short-term gain to the advantage of the USSR - and the USSR would NOT take part in the same type of agreements that the Tsar did prior to WWI. It would only participate in treaties IT wanted to, and for as long as it wanted to - and not a second longer. This means that although, as I said, the Soviets played a part for a time in hemming round Germany - it did so for its OWN reasons and stopped doing so for it's own reasons - thus as a level BELOW the overall expanionism of International Communism the USSR stood for.

The USSR therefore saw the "settlement" at Munich - AND the subsequent dismemberment of the rest of Czechoslovakia - as a FAILURE of the Great Powers' hemming-in policy on Germany, and a lack of interest by them in actually going to war with Germany - as the French had not honoured their 1924 treaty with the Czechs, the Soviets suspected that their 1935 treaty with France was EQUALLY worthless reinforced by the Franco-British general "neutal" stance over Spain - ...and pulled out of the international diplomatic front against Germany, rather than stay in via the Polish and French treaties and get dragged into the war they saw coming Fully in line with Bolshevik policy on international treaties - those two treaties, and the USSR's part in the hemming-in policy, were no longer of any profit or gain to the USSR.

What WAS of gain - and sudden importance in 1939 - was SOME way of stabilisng the USSR's eastern borders in the upcoming war. In March 1939, Hitler's denunciation of the 1934 German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact was taken by the Soviets as a clear signal of Hitler's aggressive intentions. In April, Litvinov outlined a French-British-Soviet alliance, with military options against "Fascist powers", but Chamberlain's government procrastinated - mainly because Chamberlain had already on the 24th of March, along with France, guaranteed the sovereignty of Poland, and subsequently on 25th April signed a Common Defence Pact with Poland...! Meaning that there was an impossible-to-ignore tripwire in place - and the USSR was on NEITHER side of it as it sat on the 24th of March - AND the British had proved unwilling to take on the USSR's suggestions that would have given the Soviet's the protection THEY wanted...

(Remember - the USSR had formerly (as in pre-1933) SUPPORTED the growth of Germany, as a way to pressuring the status quo over Poland it saw as being put in place by Versailles - and it didn't like LOL)

So what we DO have is a history PRIOR to 1933 of the USSR reaching out to grab bits of Poland...and trying at least to keep Poland's position "fluid" But AFTER that - the diferent direction Germany took had required the USSR to participate for its own good in the international hemming-round of Hitler. BUT when THIS fell apart - to Soviet eyes - they were left adrift with all other nations taking sides....and when the British and French fastened on guaranteeing Poland - and NOT with Soviet participation or assitance - then the ONLY option the USSR was left with to get SOMETHING out of the situation was to ally with Germany!

Remember - "Short-term agreements to the profit of the USSR"!!! - as a longterm policy! So you can't say the USSR was doing anything against stated Bolshevik beliefs and intentions...

[Hans Weber]

Hello

and pulled out of the international diplomatic front against Germany, rather than stay in via the Polish and French treaties and get dragged into the war they saw coming

It's even a tick more clever. Stalin declined the urgent pleas of the Entente to join the the Brits and French granting Sovereignity to Poland because he wanted this war. There is no evidence whatsoever that Hitler would have attacked Poland if Stalin would have joined the coalition. Even Hitler would have refrained. But Stalin had no interest to stabilize the situation in Europe with this move and keep the status quo he found unjust. To win Europe for Socialisme, he had not only to deal with Hilter, but also with France and Great Britain, by then just about the most powerful of the world powers. To get all three at their throats while beeing in the position to watch them fight was a masterpiece of politics. He not only gave Hitler green light to go for Poland to trigger the French and Brits, with his pact he actively ensured he did. Thats why Krushchev later could remember him saying:"Hitler thinks he's outsmarted me, but actually it's I who has tricked him (Krushchev, Nikita, in Krushchew Remembers).". A quick glance at the map after 1945 shows how well his game went...

As for the attack that was planned to start south of the Pripjetmarshes to get 1. Strategic Echelon all the way to Budapest, this one was scheduled for the morning of June 23rd 1941, when the red packets containing the attack orders were to be opened. The operational order was drafted by Gen. Wassileweski and outlined by Shukow and Timoshenko in January 1941, after Hitler's Weisung 21 was made known to the Soviets by Rudolf von Scheliha, the Red Army prepared for attack, not defense. The German attack - as as we all know - started on June 21st. In retrospective it was a premptive strike, however I doubt the Germans were aware of this.

Cheers
Hans

[phylo_roadking]

Stalin declined the urgent pleas of the Entente to join the the Brits and French granting Sovereignity to Poland because he wanted this war

Hans - in the Spring of 1939 THEY declined to ask HIM...after Litvinov had put the idea to them in broad terms! Among the many things about Russia's involvement Chamberlain wouldn't consider were...the Soviets demanded too much, just like Franco was later to over Gibraltar; impossible troop commitments (from the other Allies), Soviet annexation of the Baltic states, complete reciprocity, and the right to send troops through Poland. In other words - RIGHT back to 1920-33, the USSR pressuring for in effect a restructuring of Versailles' political solution to their benefit. Despire ALL the direction-changes in the interwar period, that's the one consistent thing about Stalin's policy in the area - POLAND. Either the getting of it back, getting military rights over it...or using it as a pawn to checkmate others (Germany 1933-39)

[Hans Weber]

Hello

Of course they asked him. Drax and Doumenc returned with empty hands in August 1939. The fiasco as viewed later in Soviet propaganda was due to that both didn't have any real power to negotiate at all when the Soviet proposed to get real with concrete attack plans (which - no big surprise - contained also the right of passage through Poland). You just repeated what was the official interpretation of the Entente and what was also the Polish viewpoint: If we let them march through Poland to get a Germany, Poland is gone. Now I suggest you think of a way to ensure that the delegation would go home with nothing and still be able to claim that the rotten Western Nations were not really interested in talks anyway and I'm sure you wouldn't find a better way that easy.

Cheers
Hans

[phylo_roadking]

But that's exactly my point - it wasn't an ad hoc decision; it was policy. Whatever came of the flurry activity of the Spring/Summer 1939...the USSR was EITHER going to get half of Poland...or "half" of Poland But the agreement with Germany, as a "short-term treaty to the benefit of the USSR" meant that the "Polish problem" as seen by Moscow as existing from 1920...was dealt with in a way that was more compatible with expressed Bolshevik principles And THAT makes it less "playing for time"...as - playing with the timing - and very successfully.

And it ALSO,of course feeds back into the "preventative war" argument - for it raises major questionmarks over

leaves Stalin's exact position and timetable more conjectural

...for Stalin GOT what the USSR had been angling for since 1920 - the removal by one way or the other of the Polish Settlement. And if he hadn't got it from the GERMANS...by changing his demands - leaving out the Baltic States, Finland, the "Protective Zone of Influence" over the Balkans, Greece, Turkey etc. - he would have probably got the Polish element from the Allies, by them strongarming Poland into accepting Russia as a "defence partner" with various rights of movement and access. OR SO STALIN WOULD HAVE THOUGHT/EXPECTED...as that's exactly how they had treated Czechoslovakia....

What you have to factor in are THREE sets of views...

1/ What the ALLIES though of Germany's and Russia's two positions over Poland versus theirs;
2/ What Germany thought was the position of the Allies and Russia over Poland;
3/ AND what Stalin THOUGHT was the position of the Allies versus Germany over Poland...
...and they are NOT the same, they are each one a set of partisan views, viewed by each nation from a different perspective.

And in opinion set number three - Stalin could only be guided by what the Allies' action had been before...

He couldn't loose; he gets what he wants from Hitler....or becomes "magnanimous" and "graciously" reduces his demands in the East...slightly...and gets what he wants from the Allies.

The questions THEN arises of how much was 1941 a preemptive strike against Stalin's invasion preparations by Hitler?...or RATHER how much was it the German's preempting that moment when the Russians simply no longer saw the August 1939 Pact as profitable for them?

What you're REALLY looking for then are signs BETWEEN September 1939 and June 1941 of Stalin preparing for that moment when the balance tips out of Russia's favour and that he has been preparing for it consciously and in advance. And these signs must NOT be there before September 1939 - because up to THAT point - Stalin, as I said, is almost guaranteed to get what he wants from treaty-level diplomacy one way or the other. What you can ALSO factor in, however, are processes/signs/preparations that were on hands in Russia before 1st September 1939 - but visibly ACCELERATED after that date.

[pzrmeyer2]

Interesting to examine the layout and disposition of Soviet forces on the morning of June 22nd. Forward deployed...not in garrison...not in or behind defensive fortifications...hmmm....

[phylo_roadking]

Well, I WAS thinking more of the preceeding 21 months....not that last few days before the 22nd of June - when Churchill had been warning him of German intentions anyway...