Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

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ljadw
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Re: Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

Post by ljadw » Fri Jan 01, 2010 10:41 am

Domen123 wrote:And here is the total amount of vehicles that the German Feldheer had got in the Summer of 1939:

- 115,140 trucks (+ 9,169 in Ersatz Heer)
- 63,860 personnel cars (+ 9,690 in Ersatz Heer)
- 56,559 motorcycles (+ 7,068 in Ersatz Heer)
- 38,209 motorcycles with trailers (+ 3,591 in Ersatz Heer)
= 273,768 motor vehicles (+ 29,518 in Ersatz Heer)

Additionally there was a number of different transporters and Zugkraftwagen (Zgkw) not included above.

and:

- 119,484 horse-drawn vehicles and 514,305 horses (+ 15,299 and 75,945 in Ersatz Heer)

Which means that 70% of German army vehicles were motor vehicles and only 30% were horse-drawn vehicles.

Above numbers include all Feldheer vehicles - not only those involved in Polenfeldzug. Approximately 2/3 of these vehicles were involved in Poland - including more than 2/3 of motor vehicles (because all fast divisions were in Poland).

Divisions had got:

Motorized infantry division - ca. 1687 trucks, 949 personnel cars, 1323 motorcycles, 0 horse-drawn vehicles
Armoured division - ca. 1402 trucks, 561 personnel cars, 1289 motorcycles*, 0 horse-drawn vehicles
Light division - ca. 1368 trucks, 595 personnel cars, 1098 motorcycles, 0 horse-drawn vehicles
Mountain division - ca. 618 trucks, 253 personnel cars, 529 motorcycles, 659 horse-drawn vehicles
Infantry division I Welle - ca. 615 trucks, 394 personnel cars, 525 motorcycles, 919 horse-drawn vehicles
Infantry division II Welle - ca. 509 trucks, 393 personnel cars, 497 motorcycles, 823 horse-drawn vehicles
Infantry division III Welle - ca. 248 trucks, 330 personnel cars, 415 motorcycles, 1529 horse-drawn vehicles
Infantry division IV Welle - ca. 536 trucks, 359 personnel cars, 529 motorcycles, 926 horse-drawn vehicles
Cavalry brigade - ca. 222 trucks, 205 personnel cars, 318 motorcycles, 409 horse-drawn vehicles

*But one source says that 4. Pz.Div. had got ca. 1300 trucks, 470 personnel cars and 1000 motorcycles
Here you are comparing apples with lemons,oranges and pears 8) :wink: Personnel cars and motor cycles are not the same as trucks,personnel cars are usefull for the transport of lazy generals (staff cars ) and motor cycles for the transport of 1 :idea: or two soldiers,while trucks can transport 10 or more soldiers .
And what about the transport of supplies ? I don't think any army was using personnel cars and motor cycles for that aim .
The same for the transport of wounded . I am sure that a German general would had preferred 20 trucks instead of 20 personnel cars or 20 motor cycles .
About the number of trucks,.........in the different division types ,are those theoretical or real figures ?

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Re: Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

Post by ljadw » Fri Jan 01, 2010 11:00 am

See also :Horses in the Wehrmacht on AHF

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Re: Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

Post by Domen123 » Fri Jan 01, 2010 3:19 pm

personnel cars are usefull for the transport of lazy generals (staff cars)
Oh, come one, don't exaggerate - there were no 394 lazy generals in each German infantry division. :D :wink:
About the number of trucks,.........in the different division types ,are those theoretical or real figures ?
These are theoretical figures.

Real figures were slightly different and I also have got them - they are provided by Dr. Leo Niehorster.

Here are the real figures (from Niehorster) - only for divisions which participated in the Polish Campaign:

1st Wave Infantry Divisions (24 divisions):

3,7,8,10,12,14,17,18,19,23,24,27,28,30,31,32 Inf.Div. - 615 trucks, 394 cars, 527 motorcycles each
1 Inf.Div. – 408 trucks, 400 cars, 498 motorcycles
4 Inf.Div. – 648 trucks, 411 cars, 540 motorcycles
11,21 Inf.Div. – 488 trucks, 301 cars, 493 motorcycles each
44 Inf.Div. – 535 trucks, 404 cars, 507 motorcycles
45 Inf.Div. – 479 trucks, 328 cars, 481 motorcycles
46 Inf.Div. – 554 trucks, 354 cars, 508 motorcycles
50 Inf.Div. - Niehorster doesn't say

2nd Wave Infantry Divisions (6 divisions):

56,62,68,73 Inf.Div. – 509 trucks, 393 cars, 497 motorcycles each
57 Inf.Div. – 483 trucks, 388 cars, 481 motorcycles
61 Inf.Div. – 297 trucks, 396 cars, 467 motorcycles

3rd Wave Infantry Divisions (9 divisions):

207,208,213,218,221,239 Inf.Div. – 248 trucks, 330 cars, 415 motorcycles each
206,217,228 Inf.Div. – 182 trucks, 327 cars, 407 motorcycles each

4th Wave Infantry Divisions (3 divisions)

252,257,258 Inf.Div. - 536 trucks, 359 cars, 529 motorcycles each

Mountain Divisions (3 divisions):

1,2,3 Geb.Div. - Niehorster doesn't say

Armoured-Motorized Divisions (15 divisions):

1 Pz.Div. – 1402 trucks, 561 cars, 1402 motorcycles
2 Pz.Div. – 1399 trucks, 544 cars, 1269 motorcycles
3 Pz.Div. - 1421 trucks, 560 cars, 1286 motorcycles
4 Pz.Div. – 1321 trucks, 466 cars, 916 motorcycles
5 Pz.Div. – 1512 trucks, 612 cars, 1380 motorcycles
10 Pz.Div. - Niehorster doesn't say
Pz.Div.Kempf - Niehorster doesn't say

1 Lei.Div. (without Pz.Rgt.11) – 1296 trucks, 523 cars, 505 motorcycles
2 Lei.Div. (without I./Pz.Rgt.25) – 1442 trucks, 607 cars, 1076 motorcycles
3 Lei.Div. – 1368 trucks, 595 cars, 1098 motorcycles
4 Lei.Div. – 1419 trucks, 594 cars, 1076 motorcycles

2,13,20,29 Inf.Div.(mot.) – 1687 trucks, 989 cars, 1323 motorcycles each

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Re: Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

Post by Domen123 » Fri Jan 01, 2010 4:04 pm

But I think that there is some mistake if it comes to motorcycles in 1. Lei.Div. - 505 seems to be a too low number.
while trucks can transport 10 or more soldiers.
Rather more. I don't have figures how many could Opel Blitz truck transport, but I would say at least ~15 soldiers.

Here there are certainly around 15 or more soldiers in this truck (not including the driver):

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... -Blitz.jpg
and motorcycles for the transport of 1 or two soldiers
I would say that 3 or 2 (especially that most - in some divisions 100% - of these motorcycles had got trailers - Beiwagen).

Normal motorcycles could carry up to 2 soldiers and ones with trailers (which constituted majority) at least 3.

Btw - trailers for motorcycles = Beiwagen and trailers for trucks = Anhänger if I am correct.

Here you can see 3 German soldiers in one motorcycle:

Image

Here you can see Polish motorcycles from 1939 (photos come from the link below):

http://www.weu1918-1939.pl/tabory/motoc ... m_111.html

Image

Image

A column of Polish 10th Motorized Brigade - three soldiers in each motorcycle can be seen:

Image

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Re: Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

Post by ljadw » Fri Jan 01, 2010 11:39 pm

Domen123 wrote:
personnel cars are usefull for the transport of lazy generals (staff cars)
Oh, come one, don't exaggerate - there were no 394 lazy generals in each German infantry division. :D :wink:
About the number of trucks,.........in the different division types ,are those theoretical or real figures ?
These are theoretical figures.

Real figures were slightly different and I also have got them - they are provided by Dr. Leo Niehorster.

Here are the real figures (from Niehorster) - only for divisions which participated in the Polish Campaign:

1st Wave Infantry Divisions (24 divisions):

3,7,8,10,12,14,17,18,19,23,24,27,28,30,31,32 Inf.Div. - 615 trucks, 394 cars, 527 motorcycles each
1 Inf.Div. – 408 trucks, 400 cars, 498 motorcycles
4 Inf.Div. – 648 trucks, 411 cars, 540 motorcycles
11,21 Inf.Div. – 488 trucks, 301 cars, 493 motorcycles each
44 Inf.Div. – 535 trucks, 404 cars, 507 motorcycles
45 Inf.Div. – 479 trucks, 328 cars, 481 motorcycles
46 Inf.Div. – 554 trucks, 354 cars, 508 motorcycles
50 Inf.Div. - Niehorster doesn't say

2nd Wave Infantry Divisions (6 divisions):

56,62,68,73 Inf.Div. – 509 trucks, 393 cars, 497 motorcycles each
57 Inf.Div. – 483 trucks, 388 cars, 481 motorcycles
61 Inf.Div. – 297 trucks, 396 cars, 467 motorcycles

3rd Wave Infantry Divisions (9 divisions):

207,208,213,218,221,239 Inf.Div. – 248 trucks, 330 cars, 415 motorcycles each
206,217,228 Inf.Div. – 182 trucks, 327 cars, 407 motorcycles each

4th Wave Infantry Divisions (3 divisions)

252,257,258 Inf.Div. - 536 trucks, 359 cars, 529 motorcycles each

Mountain Divisions (3 divisions):

1,2,3 Geb.Div. - Niehorster doesn't say

Armoured-Motorized Divisions (15 divisions):

1 Pz.Div. – 1402 trucks, 561 cars, 1402 motorcycles
2 Pz.Div. – 1399 trucks, 544 cars, 1269 motorcycles
3 Pz.Div. - 1421 trucks, 560 cars, 1286 motorcycles
4 Pz.Div. – 1321 trucks, 466 cars, 916 motorcycles
5 Pz.Div. – 1512 trucks, 612 cars, 1380 motorcycles
10 Pz.Div. - Niehorster doesn't say
Pz.Div.Kempf - Niehorster doesn't say

1 Lei.Div. (without Pz.Rgt.11) – 1296 trucks, 523 cars, 505 motorcycles
2 Lei.Div. (without I./Pz.Rgt.25) – 1442 trucks, 607 cars, 1076 motorcycles
3 Lei.Div. – 1368 trucks, 595 cars, 1098 motorcycles
4 Lei.Div. – 1419 trucks, 594 cars, 1076 motorcycles

2,13,20,29 Inf.Div.(mot.) – 1687 trucks, 989 cars, 1323 motorcycles each
of-course it was an exageration (but it was 1 january :wink: ),but the point is :to say that the German army was for 70 % motorised (counting staff cars and motocycles ) is an exageration ,maybe that the use of horses was as efficient as the staff cars and the motocycles ? After all ,we are talking about 1939 and Poland ,I doubt there were that much decent roads in Poland in 1939 ,as well as in the rest of Europe . There is also the point that the more motorised transport you have,the more motorised supplies and fuel you need ,you see the logistic nightmare ?

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Re: Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

Post by Domen123 » Sat Jan 02, 2010 3:55 am

Of course not all trucks in infantry divisions were being used for transporting infantry (many of them were being used for transporting ammunition, food, etc.), but even this was a huge advantage in comparison with Polish infantry division because one truck can transport much more supplies than one horse-drawn vehicle. That's why supply columns of German infantry divisions were much shorter and more flexible than those of Polish divisions - which were ideal targets for Luftwaffe.
I doubt there were that much decent roads in Poland in 1939
Depends in which Poland - "Poland A" (west from the Vistula river) or "Poland B" (east from the Vistula river). Of course Vistula was a collusive border, but in general Russian-occupied areas (don't mix up with the self-independent Kingdom of Poland which was more developed than any part of Russia in 19th century) were the least economically developed.

Anyway - Opel Blitz was a quite capable truck if it comes to difficult terrain conditions.

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Re: Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

Post by Domen123 » Sat Jan 02, 2010 5:59 am

There is also the point that the more motorised transport you have,the more motorised supplies and fuel you need ,you see the logistic nightmare ?
Exactly. And the campaign in Poland was indeed the logistic nightmare for the Germans, with the exception of early stages. Since 12.09.1939 initially successful Blitzkrieg was done. What helped the Germans and ensured their victory was the USSR.

When you look at the map of German advances on 12.09.1939 and on 17.09.1939, you can see that they had got almost no any further territorial gains in this period. Their forces stuck near Lemberg, Fortress Brest, at the Bzura and in other places.

XXII Panzer-Korps was standing for several days between Tomaszow and Zamosc, while having order to advance further (which could not be completed because of lack of fuel and spare parts in the face of heavy casualties suffered to that date and also Polish resistance). Their attempt to cross the Bug river near Wlodzimierz was repulsed by Polish forces. The same with Guderian - his attempt to close the encirclement near Chelm Lubelski was repulsed. The advance of IV. Armee-Korps was stopped by Polish forces during the battle of Krasnystaw. The campaign was no longer that smooth for the Germans. Luftwaffe already had got several divisions which could be supplied only from the air (Guderian's Panzer Korps was among them).

While at the same time Polish forces had transported all of its mobilizational, equipment and supply reserves - all of its back-up facilities - to eastern Poland and basing on these reserves and facilities as well as on so called Spare Units (units organized as casualty replacements for frontline units) were organizing further defences there. When the Soviet Union attacked Poland their attack striked these reserve units which were not yet combat ready (many were still enroute in railway transports) and were preparing to repulse enemy attacks from the west - not from the east. That's why this is called "stab in the back".

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Re: Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

Post by Richard Hargreaves » Sat Apr 24, 2010 2:18 pm

Coming in paperback at last this autumn.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Blitzkrieg-Unle ... 697&sr=1-2

http://www.amazon.com/Blitzkrieg-Unleas ... 697&sr=1-2

Not sure about the circular inset on the cover. Very 1970s design. :shock:
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Re: Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

Post by Marc Rikmenspoel » Sat Apr 24, 2010 7:36 pm

Congratulations, Stackpole titles are found at every one of the hundreds (thousands?) of Barnes & Nobles and Borders around the USA. Not every Stackpole title is in every store, but I've seen their edition of your The Germans in Normandy at many stores in several states. So your work is available to a wide audience in the USA, and that should be the case again with Blitzkrieg Unleashed. That can be gratifying both to your ego as a historian and to your bottom line!

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Re: Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

Post by Richard Hargreaves » Mon Apr 26, 2010 12:48 am

Hi Marc,

Anything to massage my ego! The money helps with further research too! I was hoping Stackpole would take up "BU" - they've done wonders for "GiN" - on my rare forays Stateside I've found their books in most of the larger chains; you can also find them occasionally in the UK (mainly at Foyle's). I know the editions are cheap and cheerful, but if that puts them in the price range of customers, I'm happy. :D
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Re: Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

Post by Jan-Hendrik » Mon Apr 26, 2010 7:25 am

Funny, I just noticed via Google.books (polish edition) Richard mentioned me in his foreword :D :D

Cheers, mon ami :beer:

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Re: Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

Post by Richard Hargreaves » Mon Apr 26, 2010 7:27 am

You are most welcome, my good friend. You are mentioned in the English edition too. :D
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Re: Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

Post by Domen123 » Thu Jun 16, 2011 11:11 am

Richard:
A very fair review from the Polish Times who have approached it with an open mind; I keep reading elsewhere that the book is 'controversial'... :?
They only write that it is "controversial" because you base almost entirely on German sources (including German accounts), and some of these German sources (especially accounts) are controversial, namely - Nazi or Nazi-like. But the fact that you based your book almost entirely on German sources is only the fault of the Polish side. There is simply a very minimal amount of valuable Polish works on the Defensive War of 1939 translated into foreign languages, so far. There is even a nice conclusion somewhere in these links to reviews (Histmag probably): "we should concentrate on promoting Polish works on this aspect abroad [...], otherwise we will only have fairy tales about Spartans near Wizna". I would only add to this that Poles don't even have fairy tales about Spartans near Wizna because it is Swedish.

Moreover to compare the battle of Wizna to the battle of Thermopylae you would have needed to have a Polish Ephialtes - and there was no such a traitor there. :wink:
Hi Domen,

Thanks for the lengthy explanation. Ah yes, "Nazi" sources. There were many books published in 1939-40 by units, by war correspondents, by individuals. Almost all are tainted with Nazi propaganda/stereotypes, some of which I used (particularly in the chapters about combat in Poland and atrocities), but hopefully I weeded out most of the "tubthumping" Nazism. Contemporary accounts are a rich vein, but what's especially interesting is that many of these accounts were not "tweaked" by the authorities, but published in the soldiers' words; I found a lot of source material for the Gebirgsjäger accounts in the Bundesarchiv; they already featured the propagandistic language, the stereotypes, hatred of Poles and so on, showing how much Nazi ideals had permeated German society. The same is equally applicable to the 1941 campaign in Russia.

I would have loved to have included more Polish accounts - I know there's a wealth of material in Polish. Not speaking Polish, that was ruled out, so I had to rely on accounts in English or translated into German. There are masses of books about the Holocaust in Poland or the Polish experience under the Nazis, but hardly anything on the September campaign. I'm surprised the government didn't translate some of them; the Soviets translated many memoirs/books, especially in the DDR, to a lesser extent into English.

The impression I always get is that the September campaign to many Poles has been so lionised, so mythologised that it's a nolite tangere (do not touch!) - the nearest comparison I can think is the mythology surrounding the evacuation of Dunkirk and Battle of Britain here in the UK.
As to the last pharagraph: Well it's a wrong impression. Recently there is an exactly opposite, radical tendency of slandering. You will never experience such a thing in Britain (i.e. slanderning the "soldiers of 1940"), British mentality is different.

It seems that your book induces extreme emotions among some people - I found this comment by a reader who claims he read it below one of reviews (BTW, in that review your book received a good grade: 7/10) - translation from Polish:
st wrote: Good that works demystifying alleged Polish heroism are being published. Here we have a reliable description of how the Polish army collapsed in a matter of a few days. And anything else should not have been (and should not be) expected. When it comes to me, for this scurvy country I would not shed even a drop of urine. I also recommend Robert Michulec.
Don't get me wrong - I'm sure that inducing such radical emotions & impressions was not the goal of your book.

Of course, that on one hand there were those exaggerated "Wizna Thermopylae" legends, etc.

But such slanders are even more false and unjust statements about that campaign and the Polish army. And even an objective and balanced set of Nazi Germany's sources alone (without any Polish sources), is going to lead to this conclusion.

However, I have a strong impression that you ommited many of the numerous existing German accounts which describe the campaign as something more than a Sunday walk and combats as something more than turkey shoot and prisoner taking.

I already quoted some examples of such omissions. One is Werner Flack, from memoirs of whom you "cut" the fragments about heavy combats & fierce resistance, and only quoted parts about shabby villages, overall destruction, etc.

It seems that you started to write your book already with some grounded theories and impressions (i.e. stereotypes) on this campaign, despite yet almost complete lack of knowledge about it at that point in time (as you admitted).

This fact (of accepting some generalizations) later influenced your biased and a priori oriented selection of sources.

Your depreciation of the combat value of the Wehrmacht (especially Panzerwaffe) - based largely on incorrect data and facts (as I already explained in this thread) - also adds to the overall neglection of the Polish war effort in that campaign. Your book says: "they were so badly smashed by just a primitive horse-drawn army of untrained recruits". :roll: The statement that in France and Russia Panzers and Luftwaffe played more important role, also doesn't withstand criticism.

Despite this, a mentally sustainable reader won't come to a conclusion similar to that quoted above after reading this book. Even though not truly objective (also due to one-sided selection of sources - and I'm not talking about the fact that you based only on German sources, I'm talking about the fact that you based only on "certain" German sources) it certainly doesn't provide such a radically unequivocal account of the campaign as it would seem from the comment of that reader.

Sorry for these harsh words. Please know that I didn't mean to insult you or anything like this. Take this as a honest - maybe a bit too emotional and maybe not fully objective (as I'm Polish) - advise for future works and comment from my side.

I really respect your hard work. And I already mentioned also many advantages that your book has.

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Re: Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

Post by Domen123 » Thu Jun 16, 2011 11:45 am

st wrote:(...) I also recommend Robert Michulec.
He is an author of the recently published (only Polish edition available) book, which blames Poland for starting WW2.

"Ku wrześniowi 1939. Zbrojne ramię sanacji" ("Towards September 1939. Armed wing of sanacja"):

Image

In this book he not only claims that "Poland started WW2" (almost completely neglecting the role of Germany).

He also claims, that "Polish army collapsed during the first week", "Polish cavalry charged with lances against tanks or at least machine guns", "Polish infantry attacked tanks with bayonets", "Polish civilians fought against Germans with use of scythes" and explains "why there were so many Volksdeutsche casualties among victims of the campaign", etc., etc. ...

And this is Polish author. :roll: Criticism of his book was crushing (but it still sells quite well).

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Re: Blitzkrieg Unleashed: Poland 1939

Post by Domen123 » Sun Jun 02, 2013 4:23 pm

Richard Hargreaves wrote:I would have loved to have included more Polish accounts - I know there's a wealth of material in Polish. Not speaking Polish, that was ruled out, so I had to rely on accounts in English or translated into German. There are masses of books (...) on the September campaign in Polish. I'm surprised the government didn't translate some of them; the Soviets translated many memoirs/books, especially in the DDR, to a lesser extent into English.

The impression I always get is that the September campaign to many Poles has been so lionised, so mythologised that it's a nolite tangere (do not touch!) - the nearest comparison I can think is the mythology surrounding the evacuation of Dunkirk and Battle of Britain here in the UK.
Translated excerpt from the preface to Part II ("Operations between 1 and 8 September") of Volume I ("September campaign 1939") of "Polish Armed Forces in WW2" study, written by the Historical Commission of the Polish General Staff in London, published by the General Sikorski Historical Institute in London (2nd edition, 1986):*

*This study is, AFAIK, unfortunately also available only in Polish (despite the fact that it was published in London).

"(...) September campaign was most certainly the largest military defeat in our past. During its stormy course individuals often failed and there were also instances of collective breakdowns. There is of course no shortage of episodes painfully harming our national ambition and soldier's pride. History of this campaign must be thus out of necessity an unpleasant, or even painful reading for any Pole. Especially for readers not very acquainted with the history of warfare this reading will be very hard. For this reason at the beginning we want to direct reader's attention to some indispensible things, when it comes to fair evaluation of that sad reality. Namely, that it is a well-established fact that in initial campaigns, in wars fought after long periods of peacetime - and this applies to the September campaign - always many things go incoherently (clumsily) and unskilfully (inefficiently), a large percentage of commanders and units disappoint and generally such kinds of mistakes are commited, which would be simply unthinkable in later stages of the war. The reason of this is undoubtedly the fact, that versatile (broad) and complete preparation of armed forces to war is a very hard thing to achieve during peacetime, or even - as it seems - in some aspects unattainable. For it is impossible in peacetime conditions to provide the armed forces with complete picture of wartime reality and for this reason, in initial campaigns, this reality is always a greater or lesser surprise for a soldier. This refers to both of the opposing sides, but especially vulnerable in this respect (in respect of surprise) is always the weaker side, which after loosing initiative of operations is doomed for defence and for retreat. This was always the case, even if subsequent wars did not differ much from each other. Let alone in the September campaign, which after all had a totally new nature. Everything indicates, that this campaign demarcates between two large epochs in the history of warfare, because during this campaign for the first time, thanks to usage of Schnelle Truppen and Air Force on a vast scale by Germans, an agelong ratio of time to space (1 day and night = at most 25 km), intransgressible until that time when it comes to huge masses of troops, ceased to be in effect. It was a real revolution on the battlefield and in entire theatre of war, and one of its results was the increase in dread of war. This new reality was of course for commanders and soldiers on the Polish side a surprise in a way collateral. (...) It must be said that in military historiography (also in staff studies) there exists a kind of constant tendency to treat defeats and failures as shameful and embarrassing corners. They are being described in the most parsimonious possible way, they are often being sugarcoated, and sometimes - especially if during the course of further combats the tide turned - many things are totally omitted. Already Clausewitz considered this as unreasonable and very harmful. "We must truly ascertain the insane foolishness, when we see, that nearly all armies apply the principle of acknowledging (announcing) as little information (news) about unfortunate war events as possible." In our case this question is solved by the instruction of the Chef of General Staff, who ordered the historical commission to write a study that should be "a document of impartial historical truth". (...) Only in the light of diligently established facts a fair evaluation of the role of the September campaign in totality of WW2 will be possible. From this fact arises the need for as much objectivity as possible, and exclusive Polish point of view can only be marked in striving for not overlooking (not ignoring) brighter aspects of the campaign and for not showing anything in darker light than irrefutably emerges from analysis of sources."

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