A motorized division in Barbarroja 1941.

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Hello to all ; a brief story about the 25. ID (Mot) taking advantage of the memories of the First Staff Officer (Ia) ...........................

With the 25. ID (Mot) in Operation Barbarossa.

Origins.

The 25. Infantry Division (25. ID) was established due to the occupation of the Rhineland from 1 April 1936 in Ludwigsburg, in the Military District V, with (to September 1939): Infantry Regiment 13 (IR 13), Infantry Regiment 35 (IR 35), Infantry Regiment 119 (IR 119), Artillery Regiment 25 (AR 25), Reconnaissance Detachment 25 (AA 25), Anti-tank Detachment 25 (Pz Jäg Abt 25) , Battalion of Engineers 25 (Pi Btl 25) and other division formations. After the campaign in France, on November 15, 1940, the division was motorized and then designated as 25. Infantry Division (motorized) (25. ID Mot). The 13th Infantry Regiment was designated as Mountain Hunters Regiment 13 (GJR 13) and detached to the new 4th Mountain Division (4. GD). In addition, the division received the Battalion of Rifle Motorcyclists 25 (Kradschützen Btl 25). This transformation was completed on March 15, 1941. At this time his Commander was Generalleutnant Heinrich Clößner (October 16, 1939 - December 1941) and his First Staff Officer (Ia) was Oberstleutnant i.G. Heinrich (Heinz) Gaedcke (June 4, 1940 - January 31, 1943)

Deployment in occupied Poland (General Governorate)

In the first days of June 1941, the troops of the division learned that they would soon be transported by rail to a new destination, which at the time was unknown. Where we go? It was the current question back then and that of course had no true answer. At that time the concentration of German troops on the western border of Poland occupied by the Soviet Union since the conclusion of the Polish campaign, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, was already remarkable. Thus some 90 infantry divisions and 31 rapid divisions converged to their staging zones within the "North", "Center" and "South" Army Groups. The 25. ID (Mot) reached its waiting areas north, west and south of Lublin, transported in 68 trains, with the mass being transported between June 08 and 10, 1941; by June 15, 1941, the division was fully assembled in Poland.

Thus the Ia recalled that in Lublin received from the III. Army Corps (Mot), to which was attached the division, the first directives regarding the new campaign. In Naleszow (Nałęczów), a small and beautiful Polish spa established its headquarters and recognized the town in view of the future installation of the Command Post. Little by little, the division was coming. Meetings followed, including a simulation game. An infinite amount of paper was spent by the staff and the troops: information, aerial photos, enemy reports, supply arrangements................................

Sources: Wege eines Soldaten. Gerhard Brugmann, Heinz Gaedcke.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... 25ID-R.htm
Erwin Boehm: Geschichte der 25. Division, Hrsg.: Kameradenhilfswerk 25 e.V., Stuttgart 1983
http://www.kavallerie-regiment18.de/aa25.html

Cheers. Raúl M .

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With the 25. ID (Mot) in Operation Barbarossa.

Advance to the border and start the offensive.

One night we received the order to advance towards the border with the Soviet Union, this was the first night march. Next day after dawn broke, the division was in the ordered places. In the vicinity of Krasnystaw we wait two more days until the start of the offensive set for the dawn of June 22, 1941. The mission of our III. AK (Mot) with some infantry divisions was to force the crossing of the Bug River in Uscilug and gain the border and penetrate the fortified positions and then with armored forces continue the breakthrough to the east on both sides of the road Uscilug - Wlodzimierz - Luck. As the employment of the division in the initial break was not foreseen, it had to remain in wait in the second echelon. Only part of the divisional artillery would support the crossing of the Bug River.

In consideration of possible enemy reconnaissance flights, the divisional command post passed the day before the attack began, on June 21, 1941, out of the town in a small grove in the vicinity of Rudka, east of Krasnystaw. For the first time since the western campaign, we were once again in the open. That same day the commanders of regiments and battalions were called for a last meeting with the Commander of the division. The commander's words and the responses of the troop leaders were deeply serious. Nobody was aware of the serious struggles that awaited us and everyone thought in silence about the outcome of the next fight. This vast country scared us with its forests, steppes, swamps, rivers and precarious road network. Where was the end? 500 km on the Dnieper, on the Volga or in the Urals? ............

Were we not going in a hurry to a fight on two fronts, always denied by the Führer? The idea of ​​a war against Russia was so inexplicable for us that we thought of a transfer from Ukraine to Germany. The aggression seemed not to be correct, but if at the last moment there was to be avoided a mortal danger for the German people there was no time for questions or doubts and on this danger Hitler spoke when addressing the troops before the start of operations.

Thus broke the day on June 22, 1941 and as the division was not engaged in the first actions I left the hut where the staff guard was located. At 03:30 am I was on the edge of the forest facing east, where the first rays of the sun showed. Punctually at the appointed minute, a dull thud was heard when the preparation fire began on the front and the artillery batteries of all types and calibers, rocket launchers, mortars and heavy infantry weapons opened up on the defensive positions of the opponent. Shortly after the bombers and dive bombers were added flying towards the east in search of the assigned objectives ..........

Sources: Wege eines Soldaten. Gerhard Brugmann, Heinz Gaedcke.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... 25ID-R.htm
Erwin Boehm: Geschichte der 25. Division, Hrsg.: Kameradenhilfswerk 25 e.V., Stuttgart 1983
http://www.kavallerie-regiment18.de/aa25.html

Cheers. Raúl M .

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With the 25. ID (Mot) in Operation Barbarossa.

Inland Russia - June 1941.

In front of us the infantry divisions had breached, they crossed the Bug and established a bridgehead on the hostile shore. From that bridgehead on June 27, 1941, jumped out the 13. and 14. Pz in the direction of Luzk to win a bridgehead over the Styr. East of Luzk the 14. Pz collided with strong enemy coming from the northwest and went to the defense. To gain the initiative again and continue the advance, the Army Corps ordered the 25. ID (Mot) to relieve the armored division in the defensive position.

The Motorized Division had crossed the Bug River for a war bridge and left behind the burning village of Uscilug. Advancing along sandy roads, with corn field to the right and left. At the height of Wlodzimierz the unit again found a good road and continued east towards Luzk. Halfway between Wlodzimierz and Luzk were the first Soviet tanks destroyed by the German armored divisions. To the west of Luzk came the order to relieve the 14. Pz fighting east of the town on the Luzk - Rowno highway. At full speed we crossed Luzk that was burning ................

Meanwhile the 13. Pz explored to the south towards Dubno and on June 28, 1941 conquered Rowno, therefore the 25. ID (Mot) received new orders, and now it had to relieve that armored division so that it could continue advancing . Rowno (a medium city with 40,000 inhabitants) was reached on June 29, 1941 and the 13. Pz was relieved. By June 30, 1941, the three battalions of IR 119 had their first combat in the new operation.................................

Sources: Wege eines Soldaten. Gerhard Brugmann, Heinz Gaedcke.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... 25ID-R.htm
Erwin Boehm: Geschichte der 25. Division, Hrsg.: Kameradenhilfswerk 25 e.V., Stuttgart 1983
http://www.kavallerie-regiment18.de/aa25.html
TWO Photo Albums & DIARIES - 25 Infanterie Division - France & Russia - TOP!. Historical Media, LLC

Cheers. Raúl M .

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With the 25. ID (Mot) in Operation Barbarossa.

Broniki, the sacrifice of II./ IR 35 (Mot) - July 1941.

The Eastern Front manifested its brutality from the beginning and later was growing up more and more. Here goes the case involved an unlucky german company which was slaughtered after being captured…………

On Jun 29 1941 at 15:00 hours, the 25 ID (Mot) relieved the 13 Pz Div at Rowno (main road hub) securing there against south, east and northeast. The enemy retreating southeastwards to Klewan broke through the road Dubno – Rowno, hence the Division had for the time being a new thread closing in from the west.

On Jun 30 1941, the Army Corps ordered that the security had to be strenghtened to the east so the IR 119 (Mot) was engaged in the direction given. Meanwhile it was ordered also that a reinforced battalion should press to the northwest in order to seize Klewan. The task was given to Hauptmann Dr. Keller’s II./ IR 35 (Mot).

On Jul 01 1941, at 06:00 hours, the battalion jumped off along the road between Klewan and Broniki in Ukraine, in spite of they met strong resistence and heavy hostile artillery fire the attack went under way until reaching a point located 1.5 kilometers east of the fork located northeast of Klewan. But around 09:00 hours, the battalion’s commander gave the withdrawal’s order towards the high ground located northeast of Broniki in order to set a defensive line there. While the Germans were carried out that movement, the Russian counterattacked from the wooded land located northwest of Orzew with two infantry battalions supported by 15 tanks. The thrust knocked the II./ IR 35’s right flank, which was being protected by the 7./ IR 35. The attack continued through Adamkowskie and Grabow onto the main road over the battalion's rear.

After this attack, parts of the german battalion (among them the 7. Company) were encircled and when they spent all their ammunition were taken as prisoners. At that time fell as POWs around 180 soldiers, most of them belonging to the II./ IR 35 ( there were soldiers from the 6./ IR 119 and the 5./ AR 60 also). Nevertheless as the sun was rising on Jul 02 1941, the IR 35 (reinforced) counterattacked and took again the whole ground lost previously.

Hence were found the corpses of 153 german soldiers; in the spot were the Judge Dr. Heinrich and Leutnant Franz Kröning, who helped to identify the bodies. Later another 12 corpses were found 200 meters away (the officers??). It was known later that seven men survived the slaughter, they had saved their lives running away or were left as dead.

From the statements of several soldiers who had escaped after the capture, it was obtained that:

1.) The Russians killed the wounded immediately by means of pistol and rifle shots, blows of butts and shovels and stabbed with bayonets. The corpses show that this has happened in the most cruel way.

2.) The other prisoners were immediately deprived of all equipment, boots, jacket and shirt. Their private property was taken away from them. Those who did not immediately comply with the order were killed or wounded by pistol shots, bayonets and blows with the butt of the rifle. The naked prisoners (around 170 - 200) were taken out of the way to a field of clovers. Some of them, about 20 men who wore rank insignia, were tied and separated from the rest. They were joined by a group of officers or political commissaries. One of them gave a speech to the other Russians and in the end shot down three prisoners with the gun. Then a wild shooting began on the prisoners, who also ws aimed the other larger group. Some of the prisoners managed to escape and, in spite of the fire of machine guns, rifles and pistols-machine guns and artillery fire, managed to reach the German troops. But most were killed on the scene or in the attempt to escape ....................

Sources: Wege eines Soldaten. Gerhard Brugmann, Heinz Gaedcke.
Erwin Boehm: Geschichte der 25. Division, Hrsg.: Kameradenhilfswerk 25 e.V., Stuttgart 1983
http://www.kavallerie-regiment18.de/aa25.html
http://www.ww2incolor.com/dramatic/img507.html

Cheers. Raúl M .

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With the 25. ID (Mot) in Operation Barbarossa.

Broniki, the sacrifice of II./ IR 35 (Mot) - July 1941.

About this, the Schütze (Private) Michael Beer told his history:

“Together with other 150 / 200 comrades without injuries or slightly wounded we were in a hollow some 20 meters away from the road. Suddenly the Russian came and started shooting at us. We ran looking for cover in the ditches beside the road. In spite of the intense fire I could reach the left ditch and managed to escape”

Later Michael Beer went back and on Jul 02 helped to identify his comrades. Together with a little group and the engineers he buried the fallen near the Broniki’s church”.

Another testimony was given by Gefreiter (Corporal) Karl Jäger as follows:

“After being captured together with others comrades on Jul 01 1941, they obliged us and we should take off ours boots, socks and trousers. Also we should empty our pockets and all values were taken by the soviets. Those who were not fast enough in obeying were stabbed with the bayonet. Obergefreite Kurz was slightly wounded in his hand so he could not untie his shoelaces quickly hence was stabbed from behind at the neck so that the bayonet came out through the throat. A seriously wounded but yet alive man was trampled and his skull was smashed with the rifle butts. I went rounded up together with another 12 or 15 men north of the road. From behind the russian started the slaughter while we had our hands up yet. When the first shots rang up I ran.”

The Oberschütze (Private First Class) Wilhelm Metzger told the following:

“The russian took us and then deprived us of all our values (rings, watches, uniform’s patches, jackets, boots and shirts). After that the group was slaughtered with hand granades and machinegun pistols’ fire. This I’m telling wasn’t a legend I was there and could escape in the middle of the confusion.”

The Schütze (Private) Hermann Heiss could not escape but was left as dead in the spot with his hands tied on his back; he was discover by Germans soldiers and taken to the hospital. Later he recalled the following:

“Together with some others comrades we were laying side by side with our hands tied on the back. I was face up when a Russian soldier stabbed me on the chest so I turned to my side just to take seven hits more on my back. They though I was dead so they left me there lying on the ground. Next morning some landsers saw me and I was taken here (hospital). I could see that the comrade next to me had the skull smashed and the most part of the soldiers in my group had been slaughtered.” ....................

Sources: Wege eines Soldaten. Gerhard Brugmann, Heinz Gaedcke.
Erwin Boehm: Geschichte der 25. Division, Hrsg.: Kameradenhilfswerk 25 e.V., Stuttgart 1983
http://www.kavallerie-regiment18.de/aa25.html

Cheers. Raúl M .

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With the 25. ID (Mot) in Operation Barbarossa.

Through the Stalin Line - July 1941.

On July 3, 1941 the 25. ID (Mot) left Rowno and continued behind both armored divisions of the III. AK (Mot) in the direction of Zwiahel (today Novohrad-Volynsky) and during the following days were constantly attacked by Soviet aircraft during the march which caused several casualties to the division. The Army Corps marched against the so-called "Stalin Line", which had been organized to secure the former Russian-Polish border of 1920 along the Slucz River. On July 3, 1941, the German troops occupied Goshch, and towards the night of July 5 - Korets and advanced towards Zwiahel. "We crossed the Polish-Soviet border of 1920," wrote military correspondent Werner Mueller in his report. - The tall guard towers still indicate the length of the old limit. A few kilometers later, there are the first bunkers: huge concrete constructions, which were supposed to block the road to Kiev. - Around Zwiahel in the form of a bastion there is a wide belt of casemates, with adjacent field fortifications. These constructions are complemented by powerful wire fences and anti-tank obstacles. Thus, between 1932-1938, Zwiahel became one of the most powerful and modern Soviet strongholds.........

This powerful defensive line was penetrated by the 13. Pz about 20 kilometers south of Zwiahel (on the right) and by 14. Pz in Zwiahel (on the left), between the two divisions would be engaged the 25. ID (Mot). Thus the Commander of the division was given the task of breaking through the Stalin Line to the southeast of Zwiahel, on July 7, 1941 and forcing the crossing of the Slucz River and penetrating towards the "North" road that ran to the southeast of the town . However, the attack date could not be fulfilled due to a delay of the march column of IR 35 (Mot) that had to occupy positions south of Zwiahel. On July 8, at 03:30 hours, the German artillery opened fire, and after an hour both motorized infantry regiments (IR 35 and IR 119) attacked the Soviet fortifications.

The attacking troops had topographic maps indicating the fortified positions in the area with the designation of certain structures in them. In addition, the Ic of the division (Information Officer) had received valuable information provided by a local electrician who participated in the construction of the casemates. Despite the resistance of most positions, however, through careful exploration and preparation, the assault teams were able to overcome quickly and with very small losses the fortified belt west of the river. Around 08:45, the IR 35 (Mot) went out to an open field of onions. Towards the shore of the river itself, only 300-400 meters remained and the Pi. Btl 25 made ready the inflatable boats for the crossing under cover behind a mound. But due to the continuous fire of the Soviet artillery on the opposite bank, it was not possible to continue the advance.

At this point, the Commander of the IR 35 (Mot), Oberst Schmidt ordered the sapper platoon of the regiment to recognize the situation on the left flank. Moving in the direction of Zwiahel, the fraction reached a place where both banks were equally low and most importantly, it was free of enemies. In an inflatable boat the Germans quickly crossed the river that was about 80 meters wide in that place and informed the Command of the regiment and the command of the engineer battalion. With the reserve of IR 35 (Mot) a bridgehead was established there around 12:00 hours. Meanwhile, the Pi. Btl 25 (Mot) established a crossing point there. When the ferry was almost ready, undetected, six Soviet "I-16" fighter planes appeared. Flying at low altitude along the river from north to south and strafing the area but without success.

At 16:30 hours the IR 35 (Mot) had reached the "North" road at the height of Kol. Romanowka, while at dusk IR 119 (Mot) also reached the road. After breaking in several points of the defensive belt, the destiny of the city was sealed. On July 8, the part of the left bank of the city was captured. The bridges through the Slucz were blown up by the Soviet troops, who continued unleashing an intense fire from the opposite shore. Therefore, the German command postponed the offensive for the next day. On July 9, several points on the right bank continued to resist, but the forces were not equal and they continued the tasks of raking and clearing the fortifications and expanding the bridgehead.......................

Sources: Wege eines Soldaten. Gerhard Brugmann, Heinz Gaedcke.
Erwin Boehm: Geschichte der 25. Division, Hrsg.: Kameradenhilfswerk 25 e.V., Stuttgart 1983
http://www.kavallerie-regiment18.de/aa25.html
http://www.zvyagel.com.ua/?p=3430#more-3430

Cheers. Raúl M .

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With the 25. ID (Mot) in Operation Barbarossa.

Advance towards Shitomir - July 1941.

The two armored divisions continued towards Shitomir. On July 10, 1941. the 25. ID (Mot) was relieved by the 44. ID that followed behind and proceeded in the direction of Shitomir. Although on this day only the Aufkl. Abt. (reconnaissance battalion) and parts of IR 119 (Mot) reached the Shitomir district as traffic congestion and especially flank attacks carried out by the enemy prevented the arrival of the bulk of the division. Indeed the enemy had understood the importance that the road had for the Germans and attacking from the north and from the south had blocked the traffic in some parts of the route of march. So on July 11, 1941, while the command of the 25. ID (Mot) was moving towards Shitomir received fire of Soviet infantry at the height of Ulaszanowka and its members had to take refuge in the ditches on the side of the road. Soon after, with the help of some antitank guns and light armored vehicles, they were able to continue the march. But the situation had to be clarified so that the Ia (Operations Officer) sent its Adjutant (O1), Oberleutnant Reuchlin to the rear with the order to advance the battalions to clear and rake the road, and soon afterwards the motorcyclist returned with the news that Reuchlin had died in action.

Meanwhile, the situation on the front had changed since July 10, 1941, the 22nd, 9th and 19th Mechanized Corps, together with the 31st Rifle Corps of the 5th Soviet Army of General MI Potapov, launched a counter-offensive some 10-20 km from the northeast towards the area of Sergeyevka, Fedorivka, Nesoloni, Varvarovka, Bronik. This action managed to cut the Shitomir road and sought to reach Zwiahel. By July 12, 1941 the position in the rear sector and the left flank of the 14. Pz was critical, forcing the German command to engage in the battle the 25. ID (Mot) and an armored division, then still the SS LAH brigade, and later deployed six infantry divisions to the north, thus breaking the main attack on Kiev. For several days, the Red Army maintained the positions taken, but under pressure from the superior German forces on July 15 they were forced to retreat. The front moved quickly to the east.

Despite the massive Soviet attack from the north the two armored divisions continued their march to the east and engaged in intense combat in the Korostyschow area. The 25. ID (Mot) took charge of the defense of Shitomir (100,000 inhabitants) especially towards the south where armored forces had been reported. The Kradsch. Btl 25 was not available to the division as it was engaged in covering the left flank and fought on July 10 and 11 in the town of Sokolow and there it was attacked and surrounded by strong hostile forces. Part of IR 119 (Mot) attacking from the south freed that unit from this difficult situation, however it was subordinated to the LAH and only returned to the division on July 15, 1941 .............................

Sources: Wege eines Soldaten. Gerhard Brugmann, Heinz Gaedcke.
Erwin Boehm: Geschichte der 25. Division, Hrsg.: Kameradenhilfswerk 25 e.V., Stuttgart 1983
http://www.kavallerie-regiment18.de/aa25.html
http://www.zvyagel.com.ua/?p=3430#more-3430

Cheers. Raúl M .

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With the 25. ID (Mot) in Operation Barbarossa.

Attack to Korosten - July 1941.

The Aufkl. Abt. 25 (Maj. Eicke) had an extensive area north of the city (Shitomir) to recognize and secure, task for which available forces were scarce. Shortly after the division was attached to the LI. AK (General Hans Reinhard), who receiving reports of large enemy forces due north in the area of ​​Korosten (70 km from Shitomir), decided to seize that town by a coup de main. Here there was a contorversia between the Division Command and the Army Corps, since before the aerial reconnaissance received and the knowledge that the city had good fortifications such an enterprise was risky. For this reason the Commander of the 25. ID (Mot) decided to execute a prepared and well planned attack on the part of IR 119 (Mot).

The attack was launched on July 13, 1941 and that day the IR 119 (Mot) conquered the town of Tschernjachow (10 km from Shitomir), on the Shitomir - Korosten route; on July 14, 1941 Toporischtsche (17 km from Shitomir). Then it was noted that the enemy in front of the regiment visibly strengthened and began to counterattack, making the situation critical. Considering the narrow wedge used so far by the division, it was decided to widen it by committing to the left parts of the IR 35 (Mot). Finally on July 17, 1941, a new division (113. ID) arrived on the left flank of the 25. ID (Mot).

The 113. ID relieved the motorized division in position on July 18, 1941 and thus ended the advance towards Korosten. After the annoying episode of Korosten, the 25. ID (Mot) was again subordinated to the III. AK (Mot)...........................

Sources: Wege eines Soldaten. Gerhard Brugmann, Heinz Gaedcke.
Erwin Boehm: Geschichte der 25. Division, Hrsg.: Kameradenhilfswerk 25 e.V., Stuttgart 1983
http://www.kavallerie-regiment18.de/aa25.html
http://www.zvyagel.com.ua/?p=3430#more-3430

Cheers. Raúl M .

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With the 25. ID (Mot) in Operation Barbarossa.

Sector of the Irpen - July 1941.

Meanwhile the troops of III. AK (Mot) had reached the boundaries of the outskirts of Kiew and by a radial message it was ordered that the 25. ID (Mot) was to march towards the Irpen located southwest of the city (Kiew). As the main road towards Kiew was under enemy artillery fire, the division was diverted southwards by Brusilow. Laboriously, with infinite slowness, cursing and scolding the drivers, the column of the 25. ID (Mot) crawled through the mud. However, on the night of July 18-19, 1941, the first strong contingents of the division reached the Irpen. The march route that followed the unit was Shitomir - Kotscherewo - Brusilow - Groskoje - Byschew.

However the enemy had recovered from the terror caused by the armored offensive, whose vanguards were at the gates of Kiew and from positions located south of the city was attacking with fresh forces coming from their reserves. Here it was fighting the 13. Pz that was relieved by the 25. ID (Mot). The Operations Officer recalled: The CP of the division was established in the school of Paschkowka and there we had two quiet days, then the next morning there was a crisis in the Aufkl. Abt. (Recce Detachment) that made us perspire all day long, there the detachment lost its brave commander.

The time of delay suffered during the march had cost the loss of the bridgehead to the other side of the Irpen that had established the 13. Pz and the enemy pressed incessantly with superior forces against the still thin safety chain. In this situation the AA 25 collided with the hostile opposition and in Perewoz, where the adversary had broken, suffered heavy losses including Maj. Eicke. In this regard the history of AA 25 details: On July 20, we had to leave a bridgehead south of Kiew and lost our commander, the brave Hauptmann Eicke. The Hauptmann Neugart and the Lieutenants (Leutnant) Stoll and Faller were wounded. Stoll then succumbed to his injuries. In this difficult battle, our old and respected commander, Oberst Rodt, came to help us with two rifle companies, otherwise, the small recce detachment would have been completely annihilated.

Finally early on the morning of July 21, 1941 was carried out, under enemy fire, the relief of the armored division. The front of the division was of a pleasant 12 kilometers in length in which they took position with, facing the southeast, the IR 119 (Mot) to the right and the IR 35 (Mot) together with the Kradsch. Btl 25 to the left behind the wide and marshy lowlands of the Irpen.

Sources: Wege eines Soldaten. Gerhard Brugmann, Heinz Gaedcke.
Erwin Boehm: Geschichte der 25. Division, Hrsg.: Kameradenhilfswerk 25 e.V., Stuttgart 1983
http://www.kavallerie-regiment18.de/aa25.html
http://www.zvyagel.com.ua/?p=3430#more-3430

Cheers. Raúl M .

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With the 25. ID (Mot) in Operation Barbarossa.

Sector of the Irpen - July 1941.

When crossing the border with the Soviet Union the troops had been assigned a target by a single word: Kiew! Now a month later and after a long march of changing combat situations we had penetrated 500 kilometers into the depths of the enemy territory and we were a short distance from the old and first capital of the Russian lands. Barely 12 kilometers in a straight line separated our left flank from the edges of the city. The question of the troops was when will we assault Kiew? However, the superior leadership kept us here and to the left of the division, another unit with great self-esteem, the Leibstandarte AH, had been deployed, which strengthened our expectations.

But the offensive towards Kiew, although successful, had not managed to reach the city itself, nor the banks of the Dnieper River. However, the High Command had other intentions and there would be no attack against Kiew for us. The 25. ID (Mot) would be displaced towards the southeast. The name Kiew disappeared at first of our thoughts, but later after a month and a half it returned to have a current and relevant meaning. At that time we would not be to the west, but much further east of the city .........

Sources: Wege eines Soldaten. Gerhard Brugmann, Heinz Gaedcke.
Erwin Boehm: Geschichte der 25. Division, Hrsg.: Kameradenhilfswerk 25 e.V., Stuttgart 1983
http://www.kavallerie-regiment18.de/aa25.html

Cheers. Raúl M .

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With the 25. ID (Mot) in Operation Barbarossa.

Advance through the Dnieper bulge over Saporoschje (Zaporiyia) - July / September 1941.

The Armored Group 1, to which the division belonged, ordered it to march southward and to that effect was relieved by an infantry division on July 23, 1941. The following day, July 24, 1941, and under intense rains the 25. ID (Mot) marched through Brusilow, Skwira, Biala Cerkow towards the Taraschtscha area. There it was subordinated to the General Command of the XIV AK (Mot) under General von Wietersheim. Meanwhile, other large units of Army Group South converging in southern Ukraine had managed to surround a large number of Soviet troops in the Uman area. Between the edge of the siege and the Dnieper the situation on the enemy was not clear and could be considered in general no man's land.

Once arrived at the new employment area, the IR 119 (Mot) together with the Aufkl. Abt. 25 remained as reserve of the Army Corps. Meanwhile, the reinforced IR 35 (Mot) had to attack an enemy group blocking the Taraschtscha - Swenigorodka road in Medwin. The attack was postponed several times, because the troops on foot and especially the heavy infantry support weapons could not be brought forward, until a message was received through the radio "Kessel schliessen" (close the encirclement). A Panzer Abteilung (tank battalion) was assigned by the Army Corps to support the attack. In a hard and bitter fight house by house, the I. and II./ IR 35 (Mot) along with the combat teams of the 2. / Pi. Btl. 25 opened the road and also established a shield for Uman's siege to the east and finally closed another smaller siege within the Army Corps area west of Medwin, between the 25. ID (Mot) to the north and east, the SS-Wiking in the northwest and the 9. Pz in the southwest .................

The division was held in the area southeast of Taraschtscha for several days without finding appreciable resistance from the enemy. Aerial reconnaissance reported several times hostile columns moving from east to west, however this was not confirmed. On July 30, 1941, the division was ordered to continue the march....

Sources: Wege eines Soldaten. Gerhard Brugmann, Heinz Gaedcke.
Erwin Boehm: Geschichte der 25. Division, Hrsg.: Kameradenhilfswerk 25 e.V., Stuttgart 1983
http://www.kavallerie-regiment18.de/aa25.html

Cheers. Raúl M .

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With the 25. ID (Mot) in Operation Barbarossa.

Advance through the Dnieper bulge over Saporoschje (Zaporiyia) - July / September 1941.

In the last week of July the rain stopped and the roads dried quickly. Now the drought period of the Ukrainian late summer began. No more rain or mud but heat and clouds of dust. For Lisjanka, Swenigorodka and Chmelewoje, the division quickly moved southward in a column in the direction of Nowo Ukrainka. Some little resistance on the part of some scattered enemy soldiers was eliminated after short combats. On the 1st of August, the 25th ID (Mot) reached an area located to the northwest of Nowo Ukrainka and thus it was deployed to the southeast of Umán, on the outer side of the encirclement that was closed that day. By Nowo Ukrainka ran the railroad from Odessa and the Ukrainian south-west, then by Kirowograd took towards the crossing of the Dnieper by Krementschug and Dniepropetrowsk. The division reached this important communications hub as the first German troop.

The IR 35 (Mot) was kept as reserve of the Army Corps in the area of ​​Lipujaschka and Dobrowelitschkowka. To ensure the eastern flank of the division, almost always open, only the Kradsch. Btl and the Aufkl. Abt. remained available, so for this reason at the beginning it was only possible to stop any train by artillery fire, block the railway line at a convenient point by blasting it and then occupy a blocking position outside the city with parts of IR 119 (Mot). The enemy abandoned the resistance in Nowo Ukrainka quite quickly and as the participation of the division in the siege of Uman seemed dispensable, it ended on August 7, 1941, on August 5 the 25th. ID (Mot) was marching towards the East.

Sources: Wege eines Soldaten. Gerhard Brugmann, Heinz Gaedcke.
Erwin Boehm: Geschichte der 25. Division, Hrsg.: Kameradenhilfswerk 25 e.V., Stuttgart 1983
http://www.kavallerie-regiment18.de/aa25.html

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more ...........................

With the 25. ID (Mot) in Operation Barbarossa.

Advance through the Dnieper bulge over Saporoschje (Zaporiyia) - July / September 1941.

The conquest of Kriwoi-Rog.

On August 6, 1941, advancing through Rownoje, the 25. ID (Mot) reached the area east of Bobrinez. The fruitful black earth was turned into asphalt by the action of the sun. The division was thus in the rear of the Soviet troops surrounded in Uman. There was no link to the west and no German soldier was to the northeast. reason why the unit adopted an all-round position for defense in the 360º. Aerial reconnaissance had detected dispersed enemy of unknown strength on both sides of Kriwoi-Rog over the Ingulez. In the following days the division marched towards the Ingulez. By the aerial photographs the XIV AK (Mot) had determined that in and to the north of Kriwoi-Rog was a strong defensive position that would be impossible to take it with a frontal attack, for that reason the Army Corps decided to execute a double encirclement by the north and south and then destroy the position. Thus it was ordered that the 9. Pz by the southwest and the 25. ID (Mot) to the right and the 14. Pz to the left by the northwest would attack on the line Taraschtschanka (on the Ingulez) - Anowka (between the rivers Ingulez and Saksagan) from north to south in the direction of Kriwoi-Rog.

Following with the execution of this intention the Kradsch. Btl 25, through assault groups, carried out a successful frontal attack west of Losowatka (15 kilometers northwest of Kriwoi-Rog) towards the Ingulez, thereby covering the deployment of the division's mass by Gurowka to the northeast to occupy the jumping out position west of Taraschtschanka. On the morning of August 13, 1941, the IR 35 (Mot) seized the bridge over the Ingulez in Iskrowka, as well as the town itself, by a coup de main. The enemy's counterattacks against the bridgehead were repulsed and IR 35 (Mot) moved southward and by nightfall had occupied the heights south of Nedaj Woda. From here, covering the northern flank, an enemy rifle regiment was annihilated. The link with the 14. Pz to the left was not achieved.

On the morning of August 14, 1941, IR 35 (Mot) on the right and IR 119 (Mot) on the left went to the attack from the bridgehead. Gaining ground the IR 35 (Mot) reached the northern edge of Losowatka and with the help of groups of engineers assault, after a house-by-house struggle reached the southern limit of the town at nightfall. While IR 119 (Mot) with artillery support and after heavy fighting had reached by the evening the Selenij - Glijewatka line. The Soviet 253º Rifle Division had been destroyed. The remains of it were annihilated by the 9. Pz that meanwhile had conquered Kriwoi-Rog and occupied the heights to the north of the city.

Sources: Wege eines Soldaten. Gerhard Brugmann, Heinz Gaedcke.
Erwin Boehm: Geschichte der 25. Division, Hrsg.: Kameradenhilfswerk 25 e.V., Stuttgart 1983
http://www.kavallerie-regiment18.de/aa25.html

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more ...........................

With the 25. ID (Mot) in Operation Barbarossa.

Advance through the Dnieper bulge over Saporoschje (Zaporiyia) - July / September 1941.

In front of Saporoschje (Zaporiyia).

After two days of carrying out security towards the east on the Saksagan river, the division continued its march in wide front and open formation, without contact with the enemy, following the 9. Pz that marched to the right. The advance continued through Ssofijewka - Tschumaki towards the Dniepr in front of Saporoschje. Again intense air attacks were received. To the west of Saporoschje the 25. ID (Mot) met with the preparations of a Soviet bridgehead, where thousands of inhabitants had dug in and defended by approximately a Rifle division and a half. The resistance was broken quickly and the remains of the hostile troops fled across the river.

In this way the division was now on the imposing river of strong current. Shortly before it was reached by the 9. Pz, the great dam of the Dnieprostroj power plant, located there, was blown in the air and a waterfall of water rushed through the breach opened in the destroyed wall. In this way our progress came to an end on August 18, 1941 and as a result we moved to the defense on the river bank. We would have gladly pursued the enemy and taken the nearby city of Saporoschje on the other side, but the High Command did not have such plans.

The days had become even warmer. The sun was shining and the vegetation was exuberant. On the island of Chortiza, on the Dniepr in front of Saporoschje, where our first line ran, the grapes matured in the light of summer and melons proliferated in the surrounding villages. Day and night our grenadiers patrolled the bank, looking for and rejecting the Soviets who were trying to make their way back on the shore crossing with small detachments in inflatable boats. During the day our battalions deployed on the island suffered bombardment and naval fire as well as heavy artillery from the city, which caused casualties and was an unnerving factor.

The CP of the division was established in the village of Schirojoke and we were amazed when the teacher welcomed us in the name of Jesus Christ in German. Yes, everyone here spoke German and they were of German or Dutch ancestry. Their ancestors had arrived from Danzig brought by Zarina Catherine the Great. From this moment Schirokoje would be called Neuendorf (New Town).

Sources: Wege eines Soldaten. Gerhard Brugmann, Heinz Gaedcke.
Erwin Boehm: Geschichte der 25. Division, Hrsg.: Kameradenhilfswerk 25 e.V., Stuttgart 1983
http://www.kavallerie-regiment18.de/aa25.html

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more ...........................

With the 25. ID (Mot) in Operation Barbarossa.

Advance through the Dnieper bulge over Saporoschje (Zaporiyia) - July / September 1941.

In front of Saporoschje (Zaporiyia).

On August 30, surprisingly, a relief arrived for us, a Hungarian motorized brigade. We do not trust our allies much after the first impression and, therefore, we instruct them in all their tasks. Above all we recommend them about the uncomfortable situation on the island. After that the troops of the division retreated to rest in an assembly area located about 35 kilometers inland (from the riverbank) in the vicinity of the great town of Tschumaki. Now at last the men could recover and the motor vehicles with many problems would finally be checked.

One day while we were in Tschumaki came the news that after a Soviet counterattack the Hungarians lost the island of Chortiza; the division had to be prepared to be engaged on the Dniper if the situation required it. The Ia (Operations Officer) prepared in detail the movement of the division. Only the word code was necessary for the unit to move. The Hungarians taking the situation with great concern requested assistance from the Army Corps. Concerned that the German peoples did not fall back into Russian hands, the 25. ID (Mot) agreed to reinforce the Hungarians.

On September 6, 1941, at dusk, illuminated by the moon, and following an established plan of march, the division moved towards the threatened sector and the Hungarians breathed. The villagers in the area were clearly angry with the yellows, as they called the hungarians, as they were robbed of the geese and the chickens. The 25. ID (Mot) remained in position for a couple of days in the sector until the threat on the western bank of the Dnieper had disappeared. On September 12, 1941, we moved on to new tasks.

Sources: Wege eines Soldaten. Gerhard Brugmann, Heinz Gaedcke.
Erwin Boehm: Geschichte der 25. Division, Hrsg.: Kameradenhilfswerk 25 e.V., Stuttgart 1983
http://www.kavallerie-regiment18.de/aa25.html

Cheers. Raúl M .