panzerschrek in Type 44 pz. div.

[MadDog]

I am assuming that the Pz.Gr. regiments in a Type 44 panzer division were authorized a number of panzerschrek, but I havnt found a number yet. Does anyone know the number, or alternatively, the KsTN that would list this ?

thanks,

Mad Dog

[Alanmccoubrey]

There are Panzerschreck listed on Christoph's site for K.St.N.1114a (fG) (1.11.1944), is that dated too late for your question ?

[MadDog]

Ah, that would do nicely. Generally, I start with a source that is fairly consistent (Handbook on German Military Forces), but is missing some info here and there. 1114a (fg) should be fine.

thanks,

Mad Dog

[hero.]

Hello Mad Dog and Allan !

This is a very interesting question !
Just a few remarks :
As that KStN, mentioned by Alan, is from November 1944, I tried to find out what was authorized before.

In Keilig, Section 103, V, resp., 102,V is a detailed breakdown of a Pz.Div. 44 and
also of a Pz.Gren.Div. 1944, which both were to become effective from mid August 1944 onward.

From that, both types of divisions were authorized not a single Raketen-Panzer-Büchse 54 (= Panzerschreck) !
(Despite the fact, that each Pz.Gren-Rgt. lost 9- 7,5 cm Pak (if I counted correctly), with respect to Pz.Div. 43 Gliederung.
If that was the case in August 1944, I would assume that there was no Panzerschreck before that date as well.

Only within the Gliederung Pz.Div. 45, (for Pz.Div. and Pz.Gren.Div.), Panzerschreck can be found :

- each of the two Pz.Gren.Rgt. had (in theory) :
- Staff ( 3 Panzerschreck (= R.Pz.B.))
-- regimental Pi-Kp. ( 9 R.Pz.B.)

and within each of the two Pz.Gren-Btls. :
-- Btl.-Staff (3 R.Pz.B)
---- Vers.Kp. (3 R.Pz.B.)
---- 1. Kp. (3 R.Pz.B.)
---- 2. Kp. (3 R.Pz.B.)
---- 3. Kp. (3 R.Pz.B.)

Which would add up to a total of (2 x 15) + 9 + 3 = 42 Panzerschreck in the Pz.Gren.Rgt.

The gemischte Pz.Rgt. had its only 3 Panzerschreck in the Versorgungs-Kp. of the PzGren.Btl.(gp).

-----------------------------------------

I was very astonished on those data, because I had the impression, that there was always
a lack of anti-tank weapons in the second half of the war in all German units ?!
For which the Panzerschreck could be a cheap and easy (although unsufficient) replacement ?!

Therefore I would like to ask the following questions :

- Is the above finding correct, that there were NO (authorized) Panzerschreck in both, Pz.Div.
and Pz.Gren.Div., until the end of 1944 ?!

- How was it in reality ?! Could somebody kindly check, whether some of those weapons can be found,
e.g. in the Zustandsberichte earlier in 1944 ?! (Or knows, whether they were in use "inofficially" )?!

- How was it in 1945 ?! My understanding is, that very few units were converted (resp. formed)
according to the Pz.Div. 45 Gliederung. Has anybody an idea, how rare / how common a Panzerschreck
was to be found in a Panzer-Division or a Panzergrenadier-Division in 1945 ?!
According to NARA T78R398 H1/38 the two Pz.Div. of Pz.Korps Feldherrnhalle were ordered to be formed according
to Pz.Div. 44 (!) but were authorized the number of Panzerschreck, given above .
However, a Gliederung of Pz.Gren.Div. Kurmark, formed end of January 45, doesn't show any R.Pz.B.
They also can not be found in the graphical Gliederung of Pz.Div. Holstein (which should have 57 at hand,
according to this post by Martin Block : http://forum.panzer-archiv.de/viewtopic ... 4846#84846 )
I find all this very confusing ! Could anybody help, to clear up some of those matters ?!

- Finally :
Could somebody give an explanation for the apparent lack of this weapons in Pz.Gren.-units in 1944 ?!
It seems, all were allocated either to the Inf.-Div. (and similar) or were used for building Panzerzerstörer-Btl.
Wouldn't it have made sense to allocate for example a Pz.-Zerstörer-Trupp at least to each Btl.-Staff,
a) for its own protection
b) as a small (Eingreif-) Reserve ?!

Best regards,

hero.

[MadDog]

It does seem counter-intiuitive that there would be no PzSk in a Pz division until so late.

Mad Dog

[Martin Block]

Gentlemen,

A fully equipped Pz.Div. 1944 should have had:

79x 7,5 cm L/70 Kwk in Panther tanks
81x 7,5 cm L/48 Kwk in Pz. IV tanks
31x 7,5 cm L/48 Stuk in Pz.Jg. IV or Stu.Gesch.
12x 7,5 cm Pak 40 mot.Z.
12x 8,8 cm Flak mot.Z.
i.e. 205 heavy a/t weapons capable of destroying enemy tanks at short, medium, and long ranges.

A fully equipped Pz.Gren.Div. 1944 should have had:
76x 7,5 cm L/48 Stuk in Pz.Jg. IV or Stu.Gesch.
18x 7,5 cm Pak 40 mot.Z.
12x 8,8 cm Flak mot.Z.
i.e. 96 heavy a/t weapons capable of destroying enemy tanks at short, medium, and long ranges.

A fully equipped Inf.Div. 1944
a) with a Pz.Jg.Abt. 1. Glied.Art should have had:
at worst just 21x 7,5 cm Pak 40 mot.Z., or
b) with a Pz.Jg.Abt. 3. Glied.Art should have had:
10x 7,5 cm L/48 Stuk in Pz.Jg. 38 or Stu.Gesch.
14x 7,5 cm Pak 40 Sfl.
21x 7,5 cm Pak 40 mot.Z.
at best 45 heavy a/t weapons capable of destroying enemy tanks at short, medium, and long ranges.

So even if one adds the authorized 98 Pz.Schreck, an Inf.Div. 1944 still had 62 a/t weapons less than a Pz.Div. 44's 205 (effective at all ranges) at best. And even a Pz.Gren.Div. 1944 had the benefit of having at least 51 more long range a/t weapons than a Inf.Div. So why should the planners of the Pz.Div./Pz.Gren.Div. 44 concept have added any short range a/t weapons in the first place?

That the actual effectiveness of Pz.Faust and Pz.Schreck and the nature of the fighing then soon called for more close range a/t weapons in all units is another matter, but at least on paper both Pz.Div. 1944 and Pz.Gren.Div. 1944 should have been more than able to deal with enemy tanks at all ranges when compared to an Inf.Div. 1944. And after all there were far more Inf.Div. to be equipped than Pz. and Pz.Gren.Div.. Makes perfect sense to me if Inf.Div. were given priority.

Just my 2 Cents

Martin Block

[Martin Block]

Sorry for my poor mathematics above, it was late at night and ...
Pz.Div. 44 = 215 heavy a/t weapons
Pz.Gren.Div. 44 = 106 heavy a/t weapons
Inf.Div. 44 (3. Glied.Art.) = 45 heavy a/t weapons and 98 Pz.Schreck.

Differences in heavy a/t weapons:
Pz.Div. 44 vs. Inf.Div. 44 = 170 (62 if Pz.Schreck are included)
Pz.Gren.Div. 44 vs. Inf.Div. 44 = 61

Sorry again

Martin Block

[Gary Kennedy]

The total absence of the RPzB 54 from the fG version of the Panzer Grenadier Regt (and likewise the Reconnaissance and Pioneer Bn versions) has always struck me as odd. The preceding reorganisation of Nov 1943 had allowed for a sizeable allocation of Panzerschrecks to the Panzer Grenadier Bns (both armd and mot) of one per Rifle Squad and four per Rifle Coy in a dedicated Atk Det at Coy level. I seem to recall that Niklas Zetterling's old Normandy site mentioned Panzer Lehr Panzer Grenadier Bns having 39 x RPzB 54s apiece, which matched nicely with the KStN total.

When the fG 'freed organisation' comes along a few months later, all those Panzerschrecks vanish from the new KStN for the Panzer Grenadier and Panzer Reconnaissance units. Also in the fG reorganisation the Anti-tank Pl of three Pak40 guns (or substitute pieces) previously found in each PzGren Regt and Bn, and the Pz Recce Bn, are likewise deleted.

So, either when the Apr 44 KStN were produced the Panzerschrecks literally got missed off, or there was a conscious decision to remove, or simply not supply said weapons to units. Given the 8,8-cm RPzB 54 was a very effective anti-tank weapon, I've never been able to come up with a convincing argument as to why that might have been. Coupled with the removal of the Bn level towed anti-tank guns, you now have infantry and recce units in an Armd Div that do not have any organic anti-tank capability outside of the Panzerfaust, issue of which wasn't shown on KStN any more than hand greandes was.

There remained, as Martin pointed out, numerous other quite capable weapons in the inventory, but the Panzer IVs, Panthers and 8,8-cm Flak guns all had day jobs. The Panzerjager Bn had perhaps twelve towed and twenty SP weapons on the books, fewer pieces than in previous organisations, and would be stretched quite thin if parcelled out to the inf Bns.

Perhaps the fact that the Nov 44 fG KStN reintroduced the Panzerschreck, albeit at a reduced allocation of three per Rifle Coy, was a recognition that it was required as much by PzGrens as it was by 'normal' Inf Divs. Still, it's always seemed a bizarre decision to me to collect in the perfectly effective anti-tank weapons from the PzGren Regts at roughly the time the allies were putting substantial numbers of tanks into the field. Units may not have handed them in, of course, but I'm still curious as to what the reasoning behind the changed organisation actually was.

Gary

[MadDog]

I take Martin's point - I guess the quartermasters were running low on them and decided to prioritize them to the infantry units. Still, I agree that it seems to me that the lack of PzSk would be detrimental to some degree.

But, as they say, "it is what it is".

Mad Dog

[hero.]

Hello gentlemen !

First I would like to apologize to Martin Block, who took the time, to provide such an
detailed answer to my questions and I didn't find the time to appreciate it with a short response.
(That was caused by real world troubles, but that cannot be an excuse for not even posting a little
acknowledgement ! Sorry, Martin !)

I would like to correct that now, by saying: Thank you very much, Martin, for that excellent post !
(I can only hope it's not too late !)

The second reason, I would like to apologize, is that I was so convinced by the "logic" of my own idea :
No RPzB 54 in the August 1944 KStN = No RPzB 54 before !,
that I didn't even check for the truth of it ! That was a big mistake and really embarassing !

Big thanks to Gary, for setting that straight !

---------------------------------------------
According to the arguments given by Martin :

1.) I fully agree with his point that it makes sense to give Infantry Divisions absolute priority to be
equipped with RPzB 54 first. It comes out very clear from the way he presented the data.
I think there is absolutely no doubt on that !

2.) When raising my questions, I hadn't seen it from the grand view of the organizational planners,
that Martin presented (which is obviously the correct one).

I just thought (very similar to Gary), from the point of view of the Panzergrenadiers,
a) that it would have been useful to have some of those Pz.Schreck at hand, in addition to any long range equipment,
as I thought they were superior in comparison to a Panzerfaust.

b) that it would not have posed a huge logistical burden, because those weapons (and the ammunition) were
relative light, small and it doesn't take any additional equipment to deploy them for action.
So, a very good input/benefit ratio (I thought).

3.) According to the numbers of Panzerschreck available :
In "Das Deutsche Reich und der 2. WK", Vol. 5/2, p. 625-627, there is a table on the production
of these weapons (BAMA RH 8/v. 1093 ff.) :
According to that, mass production started in October 1943, with ~ 50000 produced in 1943 and
then about 30000/month from January - June and 17500 in July, when the order of 382000 was fully executed.

From that numbers, I would assume, that a shortage in weapons alone, should not have been the major reason,
why the planners took the Panzerschreck out of the KStN of Pz.Div./Pz.Gren.Div. in mid 1944 ?!


4.) On the same pages are some interesting figures on the number of tanks, that are knocked out by
the different types of weapons (referring to Hahn, Waffen u. Geheimwaffen, p.98).

According to that table, about 85 %(+/-) of the tank losses occured by the long ranging tanks/Pak/StuG/PzJg.
9% by artillery or mines and 6% by means of close combat. This clearly underlines the correctness
of Martins analysis. But I thought it could be interesting to have some numbers :

In_1944_(Eastfront only):____________Jan_________Feb_________March________April_____total_(Jan-April 44)

Destroyed_tanks_(total)_____________4727________2273________2663_________2878________12541______

of_those:_Known_by_which_weapon___3670________1905________1031_________1542_________8148______

knocked_out:_by_Pz.kampfwagen_____1401_(38%)___853_(45%)___122_(12%)_____820_(53%)___3196_(39%)

______"______by_Pak_______________1050_(29%)___341_(18%)___327_(32%)_____251_(16%)___1969_(24%)

______"__by_StuG_or_Pz.Jäg__________757_(21%)___427_(22%)___297_(29%)_____236_(15%)___1717_(21%)

______"__by_artillery_or_mines________348__(9%)___148__(8%)___142_(14%)______63__(4%)____701__(9%)

______"__in_close_combat___________114__(3%)____91__(5%)___143_(14%)_____172_(11%)____520__(6%)


There is also a breakdown, how the 520 close combat knock-outs occured :
51 % by using a Panzerfaust, 17 % by a Panzerschreck, 15 % by T-mines, 13 % by Hafthohlladungen,
4 % by Handgrenades (but all percentages with high fluctuations from month to month).

I think, the interpretation of those data, regarding the effectiveness of Pz.schreck vs. Pz.faust,
is not so easy, as one would need to know how many Panzerschreck were available at the front
in that timeframe, in comparison to the Panzerfaust (Pz.faust production : 350,000 in 1943 alone),
how trained the soldiers were in using them etc.

=> But could it be, that the planners made the same considerations as Martin, that there were plenty
of weapons in Pz.Div. and Pz.Gren.Div. that were accountable for the majority of tank knockouts and
on the other hand, seeing that numbers, had the idea that Pz.Div. and Pz.Gren.Div. had already enough
of the other close combat weapons (which were of minor importance for achieving knockouts anyway) ?

It would be interesting to know, if there are similar statistics for the fightings in June/July 1944
(or later on) and whether any substantial changes or trends occured.
Any Erfahrungsberichte / Einsatzberichte ?!

BTW: There is an interesting quotation by Speer after a front visit (source as under 3.)) :
"Within the hands of battleproven units, Ofenrohr[=Panzerschreck] and Panzerfaust are excellent weapons.
However, the meager knockout numbers with these weapons lead to the assumption, that the majority of
soldiers is not able to fight with this weapons."
[Reise des Reichsministers Speer in den Westen v. 10. bis 14.9.1944; BA, R 3/1539]

I would be glad to hear any comments or input to those figures !


5.) Regarding my question : How was it in reality and whether some units were equipped with "unofficial" Pz.Schreck :

- Gary pointed out that Panzer-Lehr-Division was fully equipped (with respect to the 1.11.43 KStN).

- According to the Zustandsberichte of 17. SS-PzGren.Div GvB it was not authorized any Pz.Schreck before late 1944.
But the division reported the following figures (each time Soll = 0 !) :
01.06.44 : 5 Pz.Schreck
01.07.44 : 30 Pz.Schreck (10 in each Pz.Gren Rgt., 2 at divisonal HQ, 3 at Stabs-Kp. SS Pz.Rgt 17, 5 with PzJg.Abt.)
01.08.44 : 0 Pz.Schreck; 1 Puppchen
15.08.44 : 1 Pz.Schreck; 1 Puppchen
15.09.44 : 58 Pz.Schreck; 11 Puppchen

The first Zustandsbericht with a reported Soll of 80 Pz.Schreck is from 19.12.1944 :
Then the division reported 133 Pz.Schreck ready and 12 in repair !

From that data it seems, that the division had some use for those weapons (and also found some way to organize them ).
It would be interesting, if anybody could provide similar data from other units .

Sorry again, and best regards,

hero.

[michael kenny]

Whilst it will not change the % the figures used for 'kills' are in fact claims.

[Piet Duits]

From what I have found so far in files of units from the eastern front, a typical division (either Infantry, Jäger, Panzergrenadier and Panzer) should have 30 Panzerschrecks each. Where they were distributed I don't know.
Why those weapons were not listed in the SOLL, I don't know either. They were rather important, and unlike the Panzerfaust, were reusable.

It's only a guess from my side, but perhaps it had to do with the protective shield which wasn't directly supplied with the weapon.

[V. Andries]

This topic has also been puzzling me. Apart from the reason mentioned by Martin Block, which is most likely the main one, and next to Piet's suggestion, there are other possible explanations for the temporary 'disappearance' of the Panzerschreck in the 1944 KStN of the Panzergrenadiere. However, they all remain more or less related to the point Martin made earlier.

In a context of limited resources and the introduction of the Infanterie-Division 44, in which the number of AT-guns was reduced and compensated for by Panzerschreck, it is not unlikely that choices had to be made in delivery priorities. If a Pz.Div. or Pz.Gren.Div. already has this number of high-velocity guns, it is a normal choice to send other AT-means to the type of troops who need it the most.

Early on, delivery of the Panzerschreck was slow and there were also ammo deficiency problems. At the same time, production of the less unwieldy Panzerfaust was starting off and further development was underway. Maybe the armored branch temporarily settled for this weapon.

(In this context it should be noted that KStN 1114c (gp.) 1.11.43 mentioned in a footnote that smaller AT/weapons were to be valid substitutes for the R.Pz.B. 'Andere leichte Panzerabwehrwaffen rechnen an'. Maybe this was written with the Panzerfaust in mind.)

True, the Panzerfaust's range is shorter, but for troops who already had a fair deal of long-ranged AT capacity through the Panzer and Panzerjäger within the division, close AT defence (at least in theory) was likely to have been more 'passive'. For this the Panzerfaust would have sufficed.

On the other hand, the Panzerschreck was (again at least in theory) to be used as a more 'proactive' infantry AT defence. It required more training (and training was already short), preferably dedicated crews and a concentrated commitment, which is how Panzer-Zerstörer-Kompanien came about in the infantry branch. The KStN developers in the armored branch might have wanted to spare this additional effort, focussing instead on Panzerjäger for the active defence and relying on the Panzerfaust for close defence.

Let's not forget the people who developed the KStN were working on paper and prone to errors in judgment, balancing production prognoses, feedback from the battlefield and orders from above. In the end, the reappearance of the Panzerschreck with the KStN of 1.11.44 was maybe nothing less than giving in to the 'de facto'-situation within the Pz.Gren.Btle in the field, where Pz.Schreck had remained, regardless of their absence in the 1.4.44 KStN. Or, like Gary put it, a recognition of the weapon's value, also within the context of a Pz.Gren.Btl.

The question is then through which channels the weapons were obtained.