Posted: Tue Apr 26, 2005 4:30 pm
DKiG: 03.03. 1942 as Major z.V. and Kdr. II./S.R.8.
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Great!!!Michi wrote:22. Dezember 1942:
Der I./SS-PolInfRgt 1 werden unterstellt:
BeoBttr. 16 ...... Hptm Bätz
MarschVbd 179 .... ???? Gützka
sPzJgKp 518 ....... Olt Wilde
sPzJgKp 611 ....... Olt Pohl
5 Sfl 7,5cm
23. Dezember 1942:
Es scheiden aus:
BeoBttr 16
MarschVbd 179
Es verbeiben bei I./SS-PolInfRgt 1:
von sPzJgKp 518 1 Pak
von sPzJgKp 611 50 Mann
vom ArtRgt 111 10 Mann
von 1./NaAbt 429(?) 3/9/80 Mann
Aufgabe: Verteidigung von Metschesche/Metsheshe.
MfG Michi
No, from the KTB of the I./SS-PolInfRgt 1.Great!!!Michi wrote:
22. Dezember 1942:
Der I./SS-PolInfRgt 1 werden unterstellt:
BeoBttr. 16 ...... Hptm Bätz
MarschVbd 179 .... ???? Gützka
sPzJgKp 518 ....... Olt Wilde
sPzJgKp 611 ....... Olt Pohl
5 Sfl 7,5cm
23. Dezember 1942:
Es scheiden aus:
BeoBttr 16
MarschVbd 179
Es verbeiben bei I./SS-PolInfRgt 1:
von sPzJgKp 518 1 Pak
von sPzJgKp 611 50 Mann
vom ArtRgt 111 10 Mann
von 1./NaAbt 429(?) 3/9/80 Mann
Aufgabe: Verteidigung von Metschesche/Metsheshe.
MfG Michi
Is this from the Brigade Schuldt's KTB?
Marko
I'm still working on it. I'm having a hard time, because my German is largely passive at the moment. But, I'm already more than halfway through it, so give me a few more days, please.Marko wrote:Abel, how's the translation going on. I'm more or less finished.
Could You please break these abbreviations? I'm not qualified to do so...Kps VersStp ... (06405) ... Hptm Uhlig
MunVerw ... (31333) ... OWachtm R????
4. Kpo ... Centraris ... (PM 139) ... ???? Liethie, Antonio
Trp SMG ... (Zen Chamillo)??? ... Marnari, Virginio
What do You mean by a huge problem? To me, most of the stuff about this battalion seems as clear as it gets in this theatre of ops.The huge problem is the I./SS-PolInfRgt 1.
The numbers are field-post numbers.Kps VersStp ... (06405) ... Hptm Uhlig
MunVerw ... (31333) ... OWachtm R????
4. Kpo ... Centraris ... (PM 139) ... ???? Liethie, Antonio
Trp SMG ... (Zen Chamillo)??? ... Marnari, Virginio
Could You please break these abbreviations? I'm not qualified to do so...
I copied it from my source.(Zen Chamillo)
The huge problem on the I./SS-PolInfRgt 1 is that many sources/books don't notice that there were 2 columns of the I./SS-PolInfRgt 1 fighting in a distance of each other at least 25 mls / 40 km, some times 100 and more miles! So many sources/books tell us of a single I./SS-PolInfRgt 1 fighting in difference areas on the same date.The huge problem is the I./SS-PolInfRgt 1.
What do You mean by a huge problem? To me, most of the stuff about this battalion seems as clear as it gets in this theatre of ops.
Husemann (Die guten Glaubens waren. Bd. II) managed to decipher this in Korps-Vers.Stützpunkt. So maybe a Korps Versorgungsstützpunkt?Kps VersStp ... (06405) ... Hptm Uhlig
I 've never heard this.After a bad start (like you mentioned - Battalion Dietrich) the things got even worse when the group was once more split in two (Gruppe Dahl - half of VII./LSSAH) before finally reaching Skassyrskaja.
This was just another ad-hoc group made up from elements of different formations trapped in Millerowo under Hptm. Hans-Albert Kallien's command (DKiG: 5.4.1943 as Hptm. in III./Geb.Jg.Rgt.144). So there's basically little or no record of its composition or actions. The panzers were aparently from a repair workshop stationed at Millerowo so they could have belonged to any of the many panzer divisions which passed through Millerowo in 1942. The number of panzers eventually rose to a company strenght.Abel Ravasz wrote:
This is the first time I see a KG Kallien mentioned. Could You please give us some feedback on this unit if You can?
Thanks to Lupo Solitario for this one.Lupo Solitario wrote:In the North Group [Blocco Nord], forces lost soon contact with XXXV Corps Command and had to self -organize. First of all, germans and italians reciprocately refused to obey each other. The point was that there were three italian generals and none german but command of 298th division refused to obey to italians, while italian generals refused to obey to officers of lower rank.
At last, situation was forced cause germans had the only radio still working and so italians had to call to germans what to do. However, it was always an uneasy coworking.
All notes, emphasises and ommitment as noted by brackets are mine.The Hungarian 2nd Army and the Italian 8th Army adjoined the sector of the 2. Armee in the employment area of Woronesh to the south along the Don river.
More than once, the commander of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 201, Major Heinz Huffmann, had to answer a cry for help from these armies and take his Sturmgeschütze into the threatened areas. [...]
On 4 November the battalion was attached to the 27. Panzer-Division along with Panzer-Verband 700 (Panzer-Späh-Kompanie 700). The commander reported to the commander of the 27. Panzer-Division on 15 November, but by 23 November the battalion had already been detached from that division. It was to be rail loaded, but nobody knew where it was going. A few rumours mentioned Africa. However, when the battalion was loaded onto the trains, it moved south where, on 19 November, the two great pincer movements of the Russian attack on Stalingrad had begun and had quickly gained ground.
Millerowo was reached after an uninterupted 48-hour trip by the rail. The battalion unloaded and then road marched in the direction of Stalingrad. It halted in the middle of the march, directed back to Millerowo and then continued north to the city of Rossosch in the Italian 8th Army's sector, where things have heated up. The rear area services of the XXIV. Panzer-Korps were still in the city.
On 1 December some of the combat elements rolled through the deep snow into the Italian Tridentina Division's sector. Fortunately for the battalion a shipment of new Sturmgeschütze had arrived in Rossosch during this period.
The rest of the battalion, still attached to the 27. Panzer Division, recieved orders from Heeresgruppe B on 8 December: "Early on 9 December 27. Panzer-Division is to move into the area of Bogutschar-Beliy and Kolodes-Pissarewka-Kusmenkoff. Three Kampfgruppen are to be formed... Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 201 is assigned to Kampfgruppe I, Oberstleutnant Maempel." [...]
Kampfgruppe Maempel received orders to make contact with the 298. Infanterie Division. [...]
On 16 December the Red Army attacked with everything it had. Kampfgruppe Maempel and the attached Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 201 were able to prevent the breakthrough in the Filonowo-Gatjutschje area. The Sturmgeschütze were successful in knocking out 20 enemy targets. Oberstleutnant Rolf Maempel led magnificently and knew that he could rely on the men of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 201.
When the defense collapsed at Botgutschar, the Sturmgeschütze were the last out of the city on 18 December, and a little later they were sucked into the gigantic confusion of the retreating Italian units. The Russian tanks spearhead pushed into the fleeing mass to the south.
With thousands of Italians, the Sturmgeschütze had reached Arbusow. Already encircled, they continued the attempt to breakout to the southwest on Christmas Eve and made it to the strongpoint at Tschertkowo. [...]
Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 201 wasn't able to pull itself out of the confusion of the defeat until January 1943. Its 3rd Battery had had an especially difficult time. This independent battery, under the command of Oberleutnant Anton Grünert, started off on 18 December as ordered by corps [XXIV. Panzerkorps - Á.R.]. [...] The objective of the eight Sturmgeschütze was the area of the Red Army breakthrough at Botgutschar. [...]
In the days that followed [1 February 1943 - Á.R.] the Sturmgeschütze [3./StuG Abt 201 - Á.R.] rolled on Kharkov. There, once again, they had to mount new short-barreled Sturmgeschütze and stop the pursuing Russians before they were finally relieved and sent with the main body of the battalion to Baruth.