Feldgrau.net

Operational disposition means physical location. The operational readiness rate for Taifun in the OP for the tanks was 60% which is equal or better than it was for the proposed 1 Sep operation. Perhaps you've missed that there were 3 Pz Gruppen for Taifun in the OP as opposed to 2 for the proposed ...

I have heard this simpleton assumption many times... Look at a map, see where the movements to the flanks took place, where they were supplied from and where those units ultimately were supplied from during Taifun. AGC did not have the requisite supply arteries on the central axis in August to faci...

It looks like heavy offensive fighting and heavy defenceive fighting required the same amount of supplies but as I mentioned if you have a sustained successful offensive your log network won't be as developed and therefore supply will be more difficult. A deep penetration will always face logistica...

You clearly don't know the OTL.... Timoshenko and Zhukhov's fresh armies in front of AGC counterattcked all through the end of July and into the early part of Sep which had a huge effect on AGC as well as themselve. Just shows that not attacking oneself does not guarantee consuming less resources a...

They may or may not have but they were hardly the only units involved were they? And what did they carry 3days worth of supply? Even if more they may not have known what thier log strcucture would look like in a week or two. You seriously underestimate what a chief of staff of a unit knows about al...

Why don't you try a side by side comparison of hypothetical Taifun 1 Sep and Taifun from the OTL. Look at the OOB of both sides, operational dispositions of both sides, where the German railheads were and tell me that these operations are the same just with different weather??? Not only the weather...

Attempting to execute an operation on a shoestring in hopes you will succeed is asinine and that is what you are suggesting. I gave you the sources for German logistcal planning, those are the same ones used bu your senior german officers. They used those tools but underestimated the enemy's forces...

Sure...The German General Staff knew that the Barbarossa plan would work too. Believing they could attack in no way guarantees overall success. The Soviets had already proven to be far more resourceful than what these experts had believed, what makes this particular situation different? They could ...

My opinion is simply that of many senior german officers in command at the time and so I do not have to worry about credibility here. They're opinion was wrong as proven by history. They underestimated the enemy's forces, resources and overestimated their own. In short; they're estimates were wrong...

That is your opinion and it is not supported by fact (if you think it is then cite a credible source which should be quite a challenge). The facts clearly show otherwise for a 1 September Taifun type attack. Actually the expert opinion of a lot of german commanders whose opinion has more weight tha...

To simplify the concept: If you plan to take a trip for 3 days to a known destination, what is your minimum requirement for food, fuel, money? Absolute bare minimum that you need to make the trip, any less of any and you cannot go. Military operations are a lot more complicated. Assumptions about a...

That is a pedestrian response and incredibly oversimplified. The dynamic of AGC's front changed substantially in those 30 days, as were the changes behind AGC's front which all served to enhance Taifun's effect in October. I suggest you apply a little research before making that kind of statement a...

Bot of course it can. The key is looking at the main arteries for logistics. If the rail lines that are supplying AGC are not being used to support those operations to the north and south then the impact on the resupply ops for AGC is minimal. Guderians force could obviously only be supported over ...

Actually I believe if you look hard enough you will find that it is quantified at least in a general sense. The quantities of the various classes of supply given the posture of the unit are not unknonw. Assumptions on expected ammo usage were based on previous experience. Units had a certain amount...

"Concentrating everything" was not possible. An advance on Moscow that started at the end of August was pretty much what happened was it not? Admitedly there was a pause to clear a threat to the flank of that advance but with that threat not cleared the advancing units were at risk. No, a...