Operation Luttich The Mortain Offensive

[Wolfkin]

Hello all!

In no way do I want to downplay the performance of the 30th Infantry Division during the Mortain Offensive, also know as Operation Luttich, because it indeed was impressive. In all probability, this could have been the most impressive performance of U.S. troops during WWII in the ETO. This is more impressive and against greater odds than the Bastogne siege. But, just like at Bastogne, certain units are not mentioned that do deserve mention.

Most accounts act as if the 101st Airborne Division was alone at Bastogne. No mention is made of the Armoured Roadblocks of CCR of the 9th Armoured Division or of the contribution of CCB of the 10th Armoured Division. It is a similar situation with the Mortain Offensive. I think being unaware of these facts can distort the picture of these events.

There is no doubt that the 30th Infantry Division bore the brunt of the fighting and this is where the similarity with Bastogne ends. There were units in the path of the German forces before they reached Bastogne. The 28th Infantry Division and CCR of the 9th Armoured Division stood in the path before the 101st Airborne Division arrived on the night of December 18/19.

During the Mortain Offensive, the 30th Infantry Division stood alone in the initial phase. But, just like the Bastogne battle, most accounts fail to mention the attached units and make it seem like it was just the infantry alone against tanks. The 30th Infantry Division had attached the 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, the 743rd Tank Battalion and the 105th Combat Engineer Battalion. During the battle CCB of the 3rd Armoured Division arrived in support. There were also elements of the 4th Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division and 35th Infantry Division in the area.

Please see the following list compiled by myself to gain a greater understanding of the opposing forces:

U.S. forces involved in Operation Luttich (Mortain Offensive)

-120th Infantry Regiment/30th Infantry Division in Mortain area and Hill 314 and Hill 285.
-117th Infantry Regiment/30th Infantry Division in St. Barthelemy area.
-119th Infantry Regiment/30th Infantry Division in reserve 5km West of Juvigny.
-105th Combat Engineer Battalion in various support roles.
-A company of 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion attached to each Infantry Regiment.
-743rd Tank Battalion attached in support of 119th and 120th Infantry Regiments.
-39th Infantry Regiment/9th Infantry Division in area North of Le Mesnil-Tove.
-8th Infantry Regiment/4th Infantry Division in area of See River North of Le Mesnil-Tove.
-12th Infantry regiment/4th Infantry Division in Le Mesnil-Tove area.
-CCB 3rd Armoured Division arrived in area near Le Mesnil-Tove.
-134th Infantry regiment/35th Infantry Division in area South of Mortain.
-654th Tank Destroyer Battalion in support of 35th Infantry Division.
-737th Tank battalion in support of 35th Infantry Division.
-CCA 2nd Armoured Division in Barenton-Ambrieres area South of Mortain.
-CCA 3rd Armoured Division in Barenton-Ambrieres area South of Mortain.
-1st Infantry Division in Barenton-Ambrieres area South of Mortain.
-90th Infantry Division in Barenton-Ambrieres area South of Mortain.

German forces involved in Operation Luttich (Mortain Offensive)

-KG Kuhlmann of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte with I/SS Panzer Regiment 1 and III/SS Panzergrenadier Regiment 2 attached to 2nd Panzer Division in the St. Barthelemy-Juvigny area.

-KG Knittel of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte with SS Panzer Aufklarung Abteilung 1 attached to 2nd Panzer Division in the Le Mesnil-Tove area.

-These two KG’s moved through St. Barthelemy with KG Knittel taking the route of St. Barthelemy-Belle Fontaine-Le Mesnil-Tove and KG Kuhlmann taking the route of St.Barthelemy-La Rossaye-La Vallee-Juvigny.

-2nd Panzer Division formed a KG which included KG Knittel and took a route through the Northern part of St.Barthelemy toward Belle Fontaine and Le Mesnil-Tove. KG Kuhlmann, which was also attached to the 2nd Panzer Division, took a route through the Southern part of St.Barthelemy onto their route toward La Rossaye, La Vallee and Juvigny.

-116th Panzer Division was to hold the Sourdeval area and advance along a route North of the See River, but in fact, was unable to advance at all.

-KG Deutschland of the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich with SS Panzergrenadier Regiment 3 Deutschland, SS Panzer Aufklarung Abteilung 2 and elements of SS Panzer Regiment 2 in the Mortain area and area South of Mortain.

-KG Der Fuhrer of the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich with SS Panzergrenadier Regiment 4 Der Fuhrer and SS Sturmgeschutz Abteilung 2 in area North of Mortain toward L’Abbaye Blanche.

KG Ullrich of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division Gotz von Berlichingen with a Panzergrenadier Battalion and a PzKpfw IV Zug of SS Panzer Regiment 2 attached to 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich in area Northwest of Mortain around Hill 285.

-KG Fick of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division Gotz von Berlichingen with Panzergrenadier elements attached to the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich in area of Hill 314 East of Mortain.

-Battalion of the 275th Infantry Division in the area of Barenton South of Mortain.

-I/SS Panzergrenadier Regiment 2 and II/SS Panzergrenadier Regiment 2 of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte arrived later in the battle and are deployed in the St.Barthelemy area and area South of St.Barthelemy.

So, it will be clear upon analysis that the actions of the 30th Infantry Division were decisive in delaying the German attack. Once U.S. forces arrived in support however, the result was the stopping of the German advance. Tactical Air Support was important as well in stopping the German advance but I believe this to be exaggerated a great deal. For example, of 17 destroyed Panther tanks found in the Leibstandarte area of operations, only 4 were found to be destroyed by air weapons while 6 were destroyed by ground weapons, the rest were abandoned by the crews.

So, the big argument, could the Germans have had any success at all with this operation? I think it is amazing that they were able to advance at all! When one considers the state of the Divisions involved and realizes that none were complete Divisions. This is where many accounts make mistakes. They talk of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte and 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich as if they were fresh and complete Divisions. They were not.

For example, the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich in the few weeks before the Offensive, had been surrounded and broken out of a pocket created during Operation Cobra. They had then been regrouped and launched into this Offensive. 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte had been fighting along the Bourguebus-Verrieres Ridge since Operation Goodwood on July 18, and had just been sent to be involved in this Operation. Their units were deployed into action as they arrived. These were chaotic conditions to be launching an offensive in.

I have seen maps were the Panzer Divisions are all lined up and all going through the town of Mortain! This is indeed hilarious as the Panzer Divisions all had their different assigned routes with only the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich with the attached elements of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division Gotz von Berlichingen going through the town of Mortain. The 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte was not even complete and was attached to the 2nd Panzer Division.

The German Offensive really had no chance of success but this does not mean that the actions of the 30th Infantry Division should be ignored. Their actions were more impressive and against greater odds than the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne. It is a wonder why this battle is not given as much attention as the Bastogne battle. I think it should be given more attention because while the Bastogne battle is full of inaccuracies and exaggerations the Mortain battle is largely true.

What do y’all think?!

Cheers,

Wolfkin

[Wolfkin]

Hello all!

Now, here is a comparison with the Bastogne battles to emphasize my point. Upon analysis, one will soon realize that it was actually after the siege was lifted when the larger number of forces were brought to the area.

Here is a comparison of the German and U.S. forces in the Bastogne area compiled by myself to paint an accurate portrayal of the battles in the Bastogne area.

Bastogne siege from December 22-December 26, 1944

U.S. forces in Bastogne:

-101st Airborne Division
-CCB 10th Armoured Division
-CCR 9th Armoured Division
-35th, 44th and 158th Combat Engineer Battalions

German forces surrounding Bastogne:

-26th Volksgrenadier Division
-15th Panzergrenadier Division
-KG based on the 901st Panzergrenadier Regiment and a PzKpfw IV Kompanie both of the Panzer Lehr Division.
-5th Fallschirmjager Division

NOTE: The 2nd Panzer Division and Panzer Lehr Division were not involved in the siege. They had left the area on the 22nd after bypassing the town to the North and South. Except, of course, the Kampfgruppe left behind by the Panzer Lehr Division. The 5th Fallschirmjager Division was mainly involved in opposing the siege relief actions and not in surrounding the town.

U.S. forces involved in siege relief:

-4th Armoured Division
-26th Infantry Division
-80th Infantry Division

Area of Bastogne after siege was lifted from December 26/27, 1944

German forces sent to area after the siege was lifted:

-Fuhrer Begleit Brigade
-Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade
-3rd Panzergrenadier Division
-1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte
-9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen
-12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend
-9th Volksgrenadier Division
-79th Volksgrenadier Division
-167th Volksgrenadier Division
-340th Volksgrenadier Division

U.S. forces sent to area after the siege was lifted:

-6th Armoured Division
-11th Armoured Division
-CCA 9th Armoured Division
-35th Infantry Division
-87th Infantry Division
-90th Infantry Division
-17th Airborne Division

Cheers,

Wolfkin

[Qvist]

Point well made Wolfkin. You'd think writers would know better than just adding up the divisions, but perhaps the last stand drama of pitting a single unit against an impressive list of panzer attackers is just too tempting

cheers

[Rich]

Point well made Wolfkin. You'd think writers would know better than just adding up the divisions, but perhaps the last stand drama of pitting a single unit against an impressive list of panzer attackers is just too tempting

cheers

Uh yes, but you also have to be careful in describing units that were "in the area" of as if they were capable of intervening - at least in a meaningful way - in the events described. So, for instance, describing the US 1st and 90th Infantry Divisions as being in the area of "Barenton-Ambrieres" seems to imply that they were in position to intervene in the battle. However that is not really true. The 90th for one, was fully engaged in crossing the Mayenne River at Mayenne, some 45 kilometers to the southeast. I was fully engaged with the newly arriving 308.ID and 9.Pz.D. so could have done little if the German attack had succeeded in any way. The situation for the 1st ID was similar.

And even the 30th Division was not in so good a position as you seem to imply, it had just taken over the position from 1st ID and was not well oriented to the terrain as yet. A task force of one battalion of the 2nd/119th and on battalion of the 3rd/120th Infantry was attached to the 2nd AD south of Barenton. Worse, the positions of the 823rd TD Bn had originally been those selected for the TDS battalion attached to the 1st ID, which was an SP rather than a towed battalion. The result was that many of the positions had poor fields of fire (the gun tube was about a meter lower than planned), and some were in such hard ground that the trails couldn't be dug in, limiting traverse and creating problems with recoil. The 743rd Tank Bn had no 76mm-armed Shermans, and had detached B Company with the TF of the 120th Infantry attached to the 35th ID near Barenton. The remaining two medium companies were using the "down time" to do major maintenance, and only about 15 of their Shermans were operational when the German attack began.

So they initial defense was pretty much limited to the five available infantry battalions of the 30th (one more IIRC was in corps reserve and the another was in division reserve) and two battalions of the 39th Infantry (not under the tactical control of the 30th initially), with about 24 3" TD guns and their organic 57mm AT guns. They were fortunate that major elements of the 3rd AD were available west of Juvigny, but it wasn't until late in the day after the initial German attack had already been blunted that major elements were committed - and those mostly against the penetration by 2.Pz.Div. between the 39th and 117th Infantry.

And they didn't even enjoy much artillery support in the initial phases, due to the darkness and later morning fog and because of problems with confusion regarding unit locations. And as far as air support goes it appears that the initial "support" pretty much was all in favor of the Germans, as 2nd TAF Typhoons repeatedly attacked the 117th Infantry positions west of Abbaye Blanche - at one point nearly crippling the antitank defenses by disabling a number of 3" guns of the 823rd.

But aside from those few quibbles so far you have made a good start to this thread.

[mlicari]

most accounts fail to mention the attached units

Could you let us in on what these accounts are? I've read one where your critique applies (Featherstone, which isn't very good), and another where I think the attached units were adequately covered (Reardon).

If you don't think Reardon did a good job, I'd like to know why. I enjoyed the book, but I may be missing something.

Cheers,
Mike

[Rich]

most accounts fail to mention the attached units

Could you let us in on what these accounts are? I've read one where your critique applies (Featherstone, which isn't very good), and another where I think the attached units were adequately covered (Reardon).

If you don't think Reardon did a good job, I'd like to know why. I enjoyed the book, but I may be missing something.

Cheers,
Mike

Yep Reardon did an excellent job and should be considered pretty much the best English language account to date. Featherstone OTOH pretty much appeared to have cribbed everything he did from "Against the Panzers" and the SAIC report that book was derived from - with only marginal acknowledgement of the fact. I would recommend the first, but not the second.

[Wolfkin]

Hello Rich!

Good point about the 1st and 90th Infantry Divisions. I guess I just added them to be "fair" in a way because I added two German units that really played no part in the battle. These were the battalion of the 275th Infantry Division and the 116th Panzer Division. The 116th Panzer Division apparently did not advance at all. Of course, this doesn't really seem "fair" and I see now that adding them to the list was unnecessary.

That is also a good point that the 30th Infantry had just moved into these positions. They barely had time to get to know the area before the German attack. The same could also be said, however, of elements of the Leibstandarte who were cast into the battle as they arrived.

I take it as a compliment that a professional such as yourself finds this account pretty good considering the fact that I am an amateur in comparison. I have researched WWII for over eleven years but really have had a hard time finding good sources and probably have less sources than some. This means lots of notes taken down on paper!

Cheers,

Wolfkin

[Wolfkin]

Hello Mike!

Perhaps I should have written "most accounts that I have read" in my above post. But, suffice it to say, that it was actually Michael Reynolds' book Steel Inferno, that made me more aware of the details of the Mortain Offensive than any other book I had read. Off the top of my head I can name books by Keegan, Badsey, Mason, Hastings, Wilmot and Lucas that give terrible descriptions of this battle. As well as a host of terrible websites.

Of course, I realize that these are all just general histories but an attempt at some sort of detail should be attempted. Especially since these books are the most commonly found ones in libraries. Some of these books limit the account to less than two pages. I think this battle should be looked at more.

The problem is, just like at Bastogne, that a lot of accounts always just say "The 101st at Bastogne" or "The 30th at Mortain". It is my opinion that one needs to mention all the units involved to get an accurate portrayal. Isn't it strange that there are so few accounts that go into detail? Is there only those two?

Cheers,

Wolfkin

[101stDoc]

I dunno if I agree with all of your conclusions on the comparisons between Mortain & the Ardennes, but ok.

The 9th could have had a really bad disaster here. I have a bit of an interest in this unit (family related).

Two bttns (1 & 3) in the 39th both lost their ammo dumps & field trains early in the battle/campaign (would you call this a battle or a campaign?). The regimental CP was also cut off from the bttn phone lines. First day in fact, all within a few hours. Luckily some word got to Cherence le Roussel in time for them to take some precautions, which included warning the 30th ID of incoming visitors.

Just north of the German armor advance on August 7th, a platoon from 39th Cannon Coy had to destroy their weapons & vehicles. But, their platoon leader stayed put and ultimately reported that he'd seen 55 enemy vehicles pass his position.

Eventually the 39th was split in two forces...the infantry bttns to the north, and to the south a composite unit of Rgt HQ, remnants of cannon coy, AT coy, & 26th FA. A small det from HQ Coy went to block any penetrations south of the La Bernardaye crossroads.

In the coming actions, 26th Arty under LtCol Justin W Stoll, did a great job holding off the enemy, tho they did get within 500 yds in places. Throughout the day, most of 9th DivArty as well as tac-air supported the infantry, & positions were mostly held. That evening tho, the 39th was attached to the 4th ID for the rest of the battle for Cherence le Rousell.

1st Bttn, 39th IR got a DUC for the Battle of Cherence le Roussel, & quite a few medals were dished out (unfortunantly most of them were Purple Hearts).

Doc

[mlicari]

The problem is, just like at Bastogne, that a lot of accounts always just say "The 101st at Bastogne" or "The 30th at Mortain". It is my opinion that one needs to mention all the units involved to get an accurate portrayal. Isn't it strange that there are so few accounts that go into detail? Is there only those two?

I do agree that most accounts give short shrift to the other units at Bastogne besides the 101st. This is personally interesting to me, as my Grandfather fought in the HQ section of Team Cherry, one of the teams in CCB of the 10th AD.

I also agree that the Mortain attack is understudied. This is curious, as it factored largely into how the Falaise encirclement (or partial encirclement, if you like) played out.

Cheers,
Mike

[101stDoc]

The problem is, just like at Bastogne, that a lot of accounts always just say "The 101st at Bastogne" or "The 30th at Mortain".

Well, there are always regimental histories.

'Eight Stars To Victory", the official 9th ID history, has some good info, tho not to an incredible extent (half a dozen to a dozen pages or so IIRC).

Certainly a 30th ID regimental or related book probably has info.

Doc

[Rich]

I do agree that most accounts give short shrift to the other units at Bastogne besides the 101st. This is personally interesting to me, as my Grandfather fought in the HQ section of Team Cherry, one of the teams in CCB of the 10th AD.

I also agree that the Mortain attack is understudied. This is curious, as it factored largely into how the Falaise encirclement (or partial encirclement, if you like) played out.

Cheers,
Mike

Yeah, partly it seem that the divisions that get "credit" are simply those that either provide the overall headquarters - as at Bastogne - or those who have more or less the entire division involved in an engagement - as at Mortain. But focusing on those "macrocosms" tend to filter out the "microcosm" details such as the incredible stand of the 1st/117th Infantry and B/823rd TD Bn at St. Barthelemy and the "rescue" of the VIII Corps Artillery by Team Cherry (IIRC, or was it Team Ryerson?) and other elements of the 10th AD at Bastogne. Absent the first and events in the "campaign" of Mortain may have gone very differently (without changing the ultimate outcome), absent the second and quite possibly the "stand" of the 101st could have collapsed for lack of artillery support.

And sadly much of the events in the American sector in Normandy during July and August are both poorly reported and poorly understood. But I'm working on it. :) BTW, it is interesting to note that during the first few days of the battle at Mortain elements of the US XV Corps were racing from Mayenne to Le Mans - some 80 kilometers east of Mortain! :)

[Wolfkin]

Hello Doc!

No offence intended! The Airborne boys did pretty good too! I just feel that Mortain is quite overlooked compared to Bastogne.

I think the Mortain battles would be best described as a campaign. It is hard to say. A campaign is several battles so I guess I would call it a campaign. Because during the Mortain campaign there was the battle of St. Barthelemy, the battle of Mortain and so on. Or perhaps a campaign needs to be of a longer duration? For example, the Normandy campaign. What do y'all think?

Cheers,

Wolfkin

[Wolfkin]

Hello Mike!

That is very interesting to hear! Your Grandfather was in Team Cherry of CCB of the 10th Armoured! I have to say it is an honour to speak with a relative of a person who was involved in actions that I have spent much time researching.

Cheers,

Wolfkin

[Rich]

I think the Mortain battles would be best described as a campaign. It is hard to say. A campaign is several battles so I guess I would call it a campaign. Because during the Mortain campaign there was the battle of St. Barthelemy, the battle of Mortain and so on. Or perhaps a campaign needs to be of a longer duration? For example, the Normandy campaign. What do y'all think?

The consequence of being human and developing language. As it gets more complex we start losing track of what some things may mean.

Overall it is perhaps best to attach geographical, temporal and spatial (in terms of the size of the forces involved) definitions to each of the terms. Our humble (and very flexible definitions) at TDI are roughly:

"Campaigns" are generally a series of "battles" between forces generally larger than a single division that extend over a period of not less than about five days, but sometimes for as long as months and which encompass a large series of specific objectives and/or a large number of general objectives.

"Battles" are generally a series of "engagements" between forces as large as a corps, but generally not smaller than divisions that extend over one to five days and which encompass a small number or series of general objectives or a set of specific objectives.

"Engagements" are generally a series of "actions" between forces as large as a division, but usually are battalion to brigade-sized, that usually last less than a day and which encompass a small number of specific objectives.

"Actions" are generally a series of "duels" between platoon to battalion-size forces that usually last no longer than a day and are generally only a few hours in duration and which generally encompass a single objective.

"Duels" are generally just that and sometimes are fought between "units" of individual men or weapons systems (usually armored vehicles or heavy weapons). They generally last a few minutes to an hour and are often repeated until the "unit" is exhausted or destroyed and replaced by a new "unit" (or the duels terminate).

So we can describe the "battle" at Mortain as occuring between the reinforced 30th ID and the KG of 1., 2., and 17.-SS and 2.Pz. between the period of about 8 and 12 August 1944. But it was made up of a larghe number of engagements occuring at Cherence, St. Barthelemy. Abbaye Blanche, Mortain, Hill 314, Barenton and so on.

Hope this helps (and/or makes sense).