Gents,
I am reading an excellent book of Alex Buchner, OSTFRONT 1944. In the Chapter Brody, Buchner provides very intersting details regarding failed attempts of the 16. Panzer Division and 17. Panzer Division of the Fourth Panzer Armee from the north and 1. Panzer Division and 8. Panzer Division of the First Panzer Armee from the south to de-block and save the XIII German Corps encircled in Brody pocket. Like in case with Stalingrad, Cherkassy and Tarnopol, these efforts were in vain and German panzer divisions suffered heavy losses.
I am looking for a strength report including panzer composition of 16. PD, 17. PD, 1.PD and 8. PD as of July 13th 1944 before the attack and as of July 27th 1944 after anniihilation of the Brody pocket and fall of Lvov.
According to Alex Buchner only 8. Panzer Division during two weeks of combats lost 2,360 personnel as KIA, WIA and MIA, 8 panzers, 77 SPW's and 24 cannons were written-off.
Thanks in advance for info.
Best Regards from Russia,
Failure of 16. PD, 17. PD, 1.PD and 8. PD at Brody, 1944
Moderator: sniper1shot
-
panzerschreck1
- Enthusiast
- Posts: 408
- Joined: Sat Dec 03, 2005 4:39 am
Hi Igorn!
Do you have by chance any info on the Korps abt C encirclement at Brody?
see the link below ....
http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=21322
Do you have by chance any info on the Korps abt C encirclement at Brody?
see the link below ....
http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=21322
"Perish any man who suspects that these men either did or suffered anything unseemly."[
Hi Panzerschreck1,
According to Alex Buchner Korpsabteilung C of General Wolfgang Lange comprising of 183th, 217th and 339th Divisional Groups as the strongest formation in the pocket was spearheaded breakthrough attempt on the dawn of July 20th 1944. One battalion of the 361th Infantry division and 249th Assault Guns Brigade was attached to it with the mission to force-cross the Bug River at Bely Kamen and capture the are between Skvarshava and Khilchitse. At the same time 349th Infantry Division was supposed to capture the Hill 334 in order to potect the right flank of the Korpsabteilung C. 14th SS Grenadier Division, 361th Infantry Division and 454th Security Division had to cover the retreat of the first two formations so that later to retreat themselves according to the order.
The assault started well, the 183th Div Group crossed the Bug river and by 7.25 a.m. reached the area of Belzek occupied by th enemy. 217th Div. Group faced strong defense near the Hill 366 where Russians applied SP guns and tanks. Till the afternoon the assault developed according to a plan. The 183th Div. Group captured the Hill 257, the armored group reached Pochapy. 349th Infantry Division captured the Hill 334 and went on escaping in south direction. It seemed that everything was going well.
Now 183th Div Group had to attack Knyazhe, 217th Div. Group was supposed to capture Khilchitse and then take a defense in the east direction to wait for the 349th Infantry Division who was lagging behind.
8-10 kilometers along the highway Zlochev-Lvov were left to reach the spearheads of the 1. Panzer Division and 8. Panzer Division. These 8-10 kilometers meant death of thousands of German soldiers. Now situation took a turn for the worse with each hour. From the second half of the day onwards the Soviet Aviation started their on-going raids. Formations of bombers, shturmovics droped bombs and were straffing the escaping columns of Germans, their artillery and command control points. The first great loss figures in personnel and vehicles were reported. On July 21st 1944, 183th Div Group failed to move forward and was thrown back to the Hill 257. Then with the advent of the day light Russian aviation continued its strong air raids... The order was given to start the night assault on the night from July 21 to 22nd. In Corps'staff the mood was down. There were doubts that the breakthrough would succeed. At 01.00 a.m the remnants of the Korpsabteilung C (399th Div Group) and a regiment of 349th Division formed three assault groups for the last attack. Around 3.00 a.m. in the darkness they moved forward. But the enemy opened strong fire from the well organized positions at the hills in the area of Voronjachki and Lachki. Russians defense was supported by tanks, anti-tank and field guns...From Juky 22nd 1944 onwards XIII AK ceased to exist. Only one combat group managed to escape. For the Germans the freedom was at the south behind the highway Zlochev-Lvov. That was the deadly dangerous road. The Russians quickly sealed off the breakthrough sector. This mostly open terrain was under strong and well targeted fire. German soldiers wave after wave without any order and interaction between each other were rushing there with "Hurrah!". Dense columns and raws of the thousands unmanaged soldiers and remaining officers tried to escape in the desperate attempt. Rear and supply units including wounded mixed up with others and were rushing there. Horse carts, trucks were trying to drive through the crowd under artillery and "Stalin Organ" fire. Killed and wounded were falling down while those still alive were rushing forward. Horor scenes were everywhere- killed horses, turned down horse carts, destroyed tracks and Assault Guns. The casualties were gigantic. Apart from enemy artillery fire from the west, east and later with north, Russian IL-2 Shturmovics appeared in the sky and attacked escaping Germans. In this hellish fire, which lasted for three and a half hours many German combat groups were completely annihilated. Commanders were dying with their soldiers. XIII AK Commander General of Infantry Arthur Hauffe and his Head of Staff were killed while advancing along with the spearhead Battalion.The commander of the 454th Security Division General Nedtwig was severely wounded. 361th Infantry Division Commander General Lindemann was captured by Russians. 183th and 217th Divisional Group Commanders were missed in action. Only very few men managed to escape to the forests to the south-east of Lachkov.
![:[]](./images/smilies/icon_study.gif "Study")
Best Regards from Russia,
According to Alex Buchner Korpsabteilung C of General Wolfgang Lange comprising of 183th, 217th and 339th Divisional Groups as the strongest formation in the pocket was spearheaded breakthrough attempt on the dawn of July 20th 1944. One battalion of the 361th Infantry division and 249th Assault Guns Brigade was attached to it with the mission to force-cross the Bug River at Bely Kamen and capture the are between Skvarshava and Khilchitse. At the same time 349th Infantry Division was supposed to capture the Hill 334 in order to potect the right flank of the Korpsabteilung C. 14th SS Grenadier Division, 361th Infantry Division and 454th Security Division had to cover the retreat of the first two formations so that later to retreat themselves according to the order.
The assault started well, the 183th Div Group crossed the Bug river and by 7.25 a.m. reached the area of Belzek occupied by th enemy. 217th Div. Group faced strong defense near the Hill 366 where Russians applied SP guns and tanks. Till the afternoon the assault developed according to a plan. The 183th Div. Group captured the Hill 257, the armored group reached Pochapy. 349th Infantry Division captured the Hill 334 and went on escaping in south direction. It seemed that everything was going well.
Now 183th Div Group had to attack Knyazhe, 217th Div. Group was supposed to capture Khilchitse and then take a defense in the east direction to wait for the 349th Infantry Division who was lagging behind.
8-10 kilometers along the highway Zlochev-Lvov were left to reach the spearheads of the 1. Panzer Division and 8. Panzer Division. These 8-10 kilometers meant death of thousands of German soldiers. Now situation took a turn for the worse with each hour. From the second half of the day onwards the Soviet Aviation started their on-going raids. Formations of bombers, shturmovics droped bombs and were straffing the escaping columns of Germans, their artillery and command control points. The first great loss figures in personnel and vehicles were reported. On July 21st 1944, 183th Div Group failed to move forward and was thrown back to the Hill 257. Then with the advent of the day light Russian aviation continued its strong air raids... The order was given to start the night assault on the night from July 21 to 22nd. In Corps'staff the mood was down. There were doubts that the breakthrough would succeed. At 01.00 a.m the remnants of the Korpsabteilung C (399th Div Group) and a regiment of 349th Division formed three assault groups for the last attack. Around 3.00 a.m. in the darkness they moved forward. But the enemy opened strong fire from the well organized positions at the hills in the area of Voronjachki and Lachki. Russians defense was supported by tanks, anti-tank and field guns...From Juky 22nd 1944 onwards XIII AK ceased to exist. Only one combat group managed to escape. For the Germans the freedom was at the south behind the highway Zlochev-Lvov. That was the deadly dangerous road. The Russians quickly sealed off the breakthrough sector. This mostly open terrain was under strong and well targeted fire. German soldiers wave after wave without any order and interaction between each other were rushing there with "Hurrah!". Dense columns and raws of the thousands unmanaged soldiers and remaining officers tried to escape in the desperate attempt. Rear and supply units including wounded mixed up with others and were rushing there. Horse carts, trucks were trying to drive through the crowd under artillery and "Stalin Organ" fire. Killed and wounded were falling down while those still alive were rushing forward. Horor scenes were everywhere- killed horses, turned down horse carts, destroyed tracks and Assault Guns. The casualties were gigantic. Apart from enemy artillery fire from the west, east and later with north, Russian IL-2 Shturmovics appeared in the sky and attacked escaping Germans. In this hellish fire, which lasted for three and a half hours many German combat groups were completely annihilated. Commanders were dying with their soldiers. XIII AK Commander General of Infantry Arthur Hauffe and his Head of Staff were killed while advancing along with the spearhead Battalion.The commander of the 454th Security Division General Nedtwig was severely wounded. 361th Infantry Division Commander General Lindemann was captured by Russians. 183th and 217th Divisional Group Commanders were missed in action. Only very few men managed to escape to the forests to the south-east of Lachkov.
Best Regards from Russia,
Igor
-
Martin Block
- Enthusiast
- Posts: 416
- Joined: Sat Nov 02, 2002 11:09 am
While I do not have the figures for those particular dates the monthly status reports of the four Pz.Div.s found in the BA/MA Freiburg show the following losses in tanks and personnel during the whole month of July 1944:
1. Pz.Div.
On 1.7.1944
Pz.Rgt. 1 had (figures reflect totals)
1 Pz.Bef.Wg. III
34 Pz. IV L/48
41 Pz. V Panther
Pz.Jg.Abt. 37 had
12 StuG III
18 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
On 1.8.1944
Pz.Rgt. 1 had (figures reflect totals)
1 Pz.Bef.Wg. III
20 Pz. IV L/48
14 Pz. V Panther
Pz.Jg.Abt. 37 had
9 StuG III
8 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
Replacements sent during Juli 1944: None
=> Total losses in July 1944
14 Pz. IV L/48
27 Pz. V Panther
3 StuG III
10 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
Divisional losses in personnel: 439 KIA, 2099 WIA, 247 MIA
8. Pz.Div.
On 1.7.1944
I./Pz.Rgt. 10 had (figures reflect totals)
1 Pz.Bef.Wg. III
1 Pz. III 5 cm L/60
11 Pz. IV L/48
1 Pz. IV L/24
Pz.Jg.Abt. 43 had
19 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
On 1.8.1944
I./Pz.Rgt. 10 had (figures reflect totals)
1 Pz.Bef.Wg. III
4 Pz. IV L/48
1 Pz. IV L/24
Pz.Jg.Abt. 43 had
12 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
Replacements sent during Juli 1944: None
=> Total losses in July 1944
7 Pz. IV L/48
7 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
Divisional losses in personnel: 308 KIA, 1153 WIA, 900 MIA
16. Pz.Div.
On 1.7.1944
Pz.Rgt. 2 had (figures reflect totals)
53 Pz. IV L/48
31 Pz. V Panther
III./Pz.Rgt. 2 (acting as Pz.Jg.Abt.) had
1 Pz.Bef.Wg. III
19 StuG III
On 1.8.1944
Pz.Rgt. 2 had (figures reflect totals)
28 Pz. IV L/48
20 Pz. V Panther
III./Pz.Rgt. 2 (acting as Pz.Jg.Abt.) had
1 Pz.Bef.Wg. III
30 StuG III
Replacements sent during Juli 1944: 8 Pz. V Panther, 17 StuG III
=> Total losses in July 1944
25 Pz. IV L/48
19 Pz. V Panther
6 StuG III
Divisional losses in personnel: 301 KIA, 1247 WIA, 245 MIA
17. Pz.Div.
This division caused me some problems because it does not show totals in it's monthly 'Kriegsgliederungen' but only operational tanks plus tanks in short term repair. Figures about tanks perhaps being in long term repair are missing.
On 1.7.1944
II./Pz.Rgt. 39 had
31 operational Pz. IV L/48 + 2 in short term repair
Pz.Jg.Abt.27 had
7 operational StuG III + 2 in short term repair
15 operational 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns + 14 in short term repair
On 1.8.1944
II./Pz.Rgt. 39 had
9 operational Pz. IV L/48 + 5 in short term repair
Pz.Jg.Abt.27 had
0 operational StuG III + 0 in short term repair
4 operational 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns + 2 in short term repair
Replacements sent during Juli 1944: 17 Pz. IV L/48
=> Total losses in July 1944 (estimated)
up to 36 Pz. IV L/48
up to 7 StuG III
up to 23 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
Divisional losses in personnel: 296 KIA, 1359 WIA, 411 MIA
=> Total losses for all four Pz.Div. in July 1944:
~ 82 Pz. IV L/48
~ 46 Pz. V Panther
~ 16 StuG III
~ 40 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
Losses in personnel: 1344 KIA, 5858 WIA, 1803 MIA
I do not have any original reports from Korps-Abt. C but according to W. Lange in 'Korpsabteilung C' published in 1961 a total of 4162 men were reported as dead and missing along with all heavy weapons and equipment of the division in the after action report.
Martin Block
1. Pz.Div.
On 1.7.1944
Pz.Rgt. 1 had (figures reflect totals)
1 Pz.Bef.Wg. III
34 Pz. IV L/48
41 Pz. V Panther
Pz.Jg.Abt. 37 had
12 StuG III
18 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
On 1.8.1944
Pz.Rgt. 1 had (figures reflect totals)
1 Pz.Bef.Wg. III
20 Pz. IV L/48
14 Pz. V Panther
Pz.Jg.Abt. 37 had
9 StuG III
8 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
Replacements sent during Juli 1944: None
=> Total losses in July 1944
14 Pz. IV L/48
27 Pz. V Panther
3 StuG III
10 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
Divisional losses in personnel: 439 KIA, 2099 WIA, 247 MIA
8. Pz.Div.
On 1.7.1944
I./Pz.Rgt. 10 had (figures reflect totals)
1 Pz.Bef.Wg. III
1 Pz. III 5 cm L/60
11 Pz. IV L/48
1 Pz. IV L/24
Pz.Jg.Abt. 43 had
19 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
On 1.8.1944
I./Pz.Rgt. 10 had (figures reflect totals)
1 Pz.Bef.Wg. III
4 Pz. IV L/48
1 Pz. IV L/24
Pz.Jg.Abt. 43 had
12 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
Replacements sent during Juli 1944: None
=> Total losses in July 1944
7 Pz. IV L/48
7 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
Divisional losses in personnel: 308 KIA, 1153 WIA, 900 MIA
16. Pz.Div.
On 1.7.1944
Pz.Rgt. 2 had (figures reflect totals)
53 Pz. IV L/48
31 Pz. V Panther
III./Pz.Rgt. 2 (acting as Pz.Jg.Abt.) had
1 Pz.Bef.Wg. III
19 StuG III
On 1.8.1944
Pz.Rgt. 2 had (figures reflect totals)
28 Pz. IV L/48
20 Pz. V Panther
III./Pz.Rgt. 2 (acting as Pz.Jg.Abt.) had
1 Pz.Bef.Wg. III
30 StuG III
Replacements sent during Juli 1944: 8 Pz. V Panther, 17 StuG III
=> Total losses in July 1944
25 Pz. IV L/48
19 Pz. V Panther
6 StuG III
Divisional losses in personnel: 301 KIA, 1247 WIA, 245 MIA
17. Pz.Div.
This division caused me some problems because it does not show totals in it's monthly 'Kriegsgliederungen' but only operational tanks plus tanks in short term repair. Figures about tanks perhaps being in long term repair are missing.
On 1.7.1944
II./Pz.Rgt. 39 had
31 operational Pz. IV L/48 + 2 in short term repair
Pz.Jg.Abt.27 had
7 operational StuG III + 2 in short term repair
15 operational 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns + 14 in short term repair
On 1.8.1944
II./Pz.Rgt. 39 had
9 operational Pz. IV L/48 + 5 in short term repair
Pz.Jg.Abt.27 had
0 operational StuG III + 0 in short term repair
4 operational 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns + 2 in short term repair
Replacements sent during Juli 1944: 17 Pz. IV L/48
=> Total losses in July 1944 (estimated)
up to 36 Pz. IV L/48
up to 7 StuG III
up to 23 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
Divisional losses in personnel: 296 KIA, 1359 WIA, 411 MIA
=> Total losses for all four Pz.Div. in July 1944:
~ 82 Pz. IV L/48
~ 46 Pz. V Panther
~ 16 StuG III
~ 40 'Marder' type self propelled a/t guns
Losses in personnel: 1344 KIA, 5858 WIA, 1803 MIA
I do not have any original reports from Korps-Abt. C but according to W. Lange in 'Korpsabteilung C' published in 1961 a total of 4162 men were reported as dead and missing along with all heavy weapons and equipment of the division in the after action report.
Martin Block
Martin,
Thanks very much for the provided info. I have checked my archives and compared them with info from Alex Buchner’s book. What I discovered that Alex Buchner confused the number of panzer, which remained with 8. Panzer Division as of 31.07.44 with the number of lost panzers, which in reality was much more then 8 and was reaching 120 panzers.
The below stated data is based on the info posted by Kamen.
Armored strength by 1.07.44
1.PzD - 78 + 12 Marders
8.PzD - 128 + 19 Marders
16.PzD - 101 + 17 StuG (received on 28.07.1944)
17.PzD - 40 + 29 Marders
Moreover, three of the divisions (8., 16. and 17.) had SP artillery (8 batteries total) with about 40 SP Guns - Wespe and Hummel.
sPzAbt 506 – 46
In total: 393 panzers + 60 Marders + 40 Wespe and Hummel +17 StuG
In particular, the four Panzer divisions (1., 8., 16., 17.) have had lost 10 602 men and almost all of their armor by 31 July. On 31 July 44 the recently arrived 24.PzD reported 1 143 men only after a week of combat.
Here is the strength (Panzers and StuG) of the four Pz Divisions after two weeks of combat (i.e. as per 31.7.44):
1.PzD - 41 (18 operational) + 9 (4) Marders
8.PzD - 8 (5 operational) + 9 (7) Marders
16.PzD - 47 (14 operational) This division had received 17 factory new StuGIII on 28.7.44. Only three (!) of them were operational three days later...
17.PzD - 14 (9 operational) + 6 (4) Marders
Moreover, sPzAbt 506 had been forced to destroy all of its tanks (40 or so) right after the battle of Brody.
In total: 116 panzers ( 52 operational) + 24 Marders (15 operational) + 3 StuG
Total Losses (write-off)
1.PzD – 37 panzers + 3 Marders
8.PzD – 120 panzers+ 10 Marders
16.PzD – 54 panzers + 14 StuG (during 3 days!)
17.PzD – 26 panzers + 23 Marders
sPzAbt 506 – 40 panzers
Total write-off: 277 panzers + 50 SP Guns; On top of it 64 panzers and 9 SP Guns in repair
Out of originally available 393 panzers in two weeks of combats only 52 remained operational!!!
Out of originally available 60 Marders in two weeks of combats only 15 remained operational!!!
Best Regards from Russia,
Thanks very much for the provided info. I have checked my archives and compared them with info from Alex Buchner’s book. What I discovered that Alex Buchner confused the number of panzer, which remained with 8. Panzer Division as of 31.07.44 with the number of lost panzers, which in reality was much more then 8 and was reaching 120 panzers.
The below stated data is based on the info posted by Kamen.
Armored strength by 1.07.44
1.PzD - 78 + 12 Marders
8.PzD - 128 + 19 Marders
16.PzD - 101 + 17 StuG (received on 28.07.1944)
17.PzD - 40 + 29 Marders
Moreover, three of the divisions (8., 16. and 17.) had SP artillery (8 batteries total) with about 40 SP Guns - Wespe and Hummel.
sPzAbt 506 – 46
In total: 393 panzers + 60 Marders + 40 Wespe and Hummel +17 StuG
In particular, the four Panzer divisions (1., 8., 16., 17.) have had lost 10 602 men and almost all of their armor by 31 July. On 31 July 44 the recently arrived 24.PzD reported 1 143 men only after a week of combat.
Here is the strength (Panzers and StuG) of the four Pz Divisions after two weeks of combat (i.e. as per 31.7.44):
1.PzD - 41 (18 operational) + 9 (4) Marders
8.PzD - 8 (5 operational) + 9 (7) Marders
16.PzD - 47 (14 operational) This division had received 17 factory new StuGIII on 28.7.44. Only three (!) of them were operational three days later...
17.PzD - 14 (9 operational) + 6 (4) Marders
Moreover, sPzAbt 506 had been forced to destroy all of its tanks (40 or so) right after the battle of Brody.
In total: 116 panzers ( 52 operational) + 24 Marders (15 operational) + 3 StuG
Total Losses (write-off)
1.PzD – 37 panzers + 3 Marders
8.PzD – 120 panzers+ 10 Marders
16.PzD – 54 panzers + 14 StuG (during 3 days!)
17.PzD – 26 panzers + 23 Marders
sPzAbt 506 – 40 panzers
Total write-off: 277 panzers + 50 SP Guns; On top of it 64 panzers and 9 SP Guns in repair
Out of originally available 393 panzers in two weeks of combats only 52 remained operational!!!
Out of originally available 60 Marders in two weeks of combats only 15 remained operational!!!
Best Regards from Russia,
Igor
Martin,
Thanks very much for the provided info. I have checked my archives and compared them with info from Alex Buchner’s book. What I discovered that Alex Buchner confused the number of panzer, which remained with 8. Panzer Division as of 31.07.44 with the number of lost panzers, which in reality was much more then 8 and was reaching 120 panzers.
The below stated data is based on the info posted by Kamen.
Armored strength by 1.07.44
1.PzD - 78 + 12 Marders
8.PzD - 128 + 19 Marders
16.PzD - 101 + 17 StuG (received on 28.07.1944)
17.PzD - 40 + 29 Marders
Moreover, three of the divisions (8., 16. and 17.) had SP artillery (8 batteries total) with about 40 SP Guns - Wespe and Hummel.
sPzAbt 506 – 46
In total: 393 panzers + 60 Marders + 40 Wespe and Hummel +17 StuG
In particular, the four Panzer divisions (1., 8., 16., 17.) have had lost 10 602 men and almost all of their armor by 31 July. On 31 July 44 the recently arrived 24.PzD reported 1 143 men only after a week of combat.
Here is the strength (Panzers and StuG) of the four Pz Divisions after two weeks of combat (i.e. as per 31.7.44):
1.PzD - 41 (18 operational) + 9 (4) Marders
8.PzD - 8 (5 operational) + 9 (7) Marders
16.PzD - 47 (14 operational) This division had received 17 factory new StuGIII on 28.7.44. Only three (!) of them were operational three days later...
17.PzD - 14 (9 operational) + 6 (4) Marders
Moreover, sPzAbt 506 had been forced to destroy all of its tanks (40 or so) right after the battle of Brody.
In total: 116 panzers ( 52 operational) + 24 Marders (15 operational) + 3 StuG
Total Losses (write-off)
1.PzD – 37 panzers + 3 Marders
8.PzD – 120 panzers+ 10 Marders
16.PzD – 54 panzers + 14 StuG (during 3 days!)
17.PzD – 26 panzers + 23 Marders
sPzAbt 506 – 40 panzers
Total write-off: 277 panzers + 50 SP Guns; On top of it 64 panzers and 9 SP Guns in repair
Out of originally available 393 panzers in two weeks of combats only 52 remained operational!!!
Out of originally available 60 Marders in two weeks of combats only 15 remained operational!!!
Best Regards from Russia,
Thanks very much for the provided info. I have checked my archives and compared them with info from Alex Buchner’s book. What I discovered that Alex Buchner confused the number of panzer, which remained with 8. Panzer Division as of 31.07.44 with the number of lost panzers, which in reality was much more then 8 and was reaching 120 panzers.
The below stated data is based on the info posted by Kamen.
Armored strength by 1.07.44
1.PzD - 78 + 12 Marders
8.PzD - 128 + 19 Marders
16.PzD - 101 + 17 StuG (received on 28.07.1944)
17.PzD - 40 + 29 Marders
Moreover, three of the divisions (8., 16. and 17.) had SP artillery (8 batteries total) with about 40 SP Guns - Wespe and Hummel.
sPzAbt 506 – 46
In total: 393 panzers + 60 Marders + 40 Wespe and Hummel +17 StuG
In particular, the four Panzer divisions (1., 8., 16., 17.) have had lost 10 602 men and almost all of their armor by 31 July. On 31 July 44 the recently arrived 24.PzD reported 1 143 men only after a week of combat.
Here is the strength (Panzers and StuG) of the four Pz Divisions after two weeks of combat (i.e. as per 31.7.44):
1.PzD - 41 (18 operational) + 9 (4) Marders
8.PzD - 8 (5 operational) + 9 (7) Marders
16.PzD - 47 (14 operational) This division had received 17 factory new StuGIII on 28.7.44. Only three (!) of them were operational three days later...
17.PzD - 14 (9 operational) + 6 (4) Marders
Moreover, sPzAbt 506 had been forced to destroy all of its tanks (40 or so) right after the battle of Brody.
In total: 116 panzers ( 52 operational) + 24 Marders (15 operational) + 3 StuG
Total Losses (write-off)
1.PzD – 37 panzers + 3 Marders
8.PzD – 120 panzers+ 10 Marders
16.PzD – 54 panzers + 14 StuG (during 3 days!)
17.PzD – 26 panzers + 23 Marders
sPzAbt 506 – 40 panzers
Total write-off: 277 panzers + 50 SP Guns; On top of it 64 panzers and 9 SP Guns in repair
Out of originally available 393 panzers in two weeks of combats only 52 remained operational!!!
Out of originally available 60 Marders in two weeks of combats only 15 remained operational!!!
Best Regards from Russia,
Igor
-
Martin Block
- Enthusiast
- Posts: 416
- Joined: Sat Nov 02, 2002 11:09 am
I should have been more specific regarding the tank strength of the 8. Pz.Div.. The division had been massively strengthened by tactically attaching the Pz.Abt.(Fkl.) 301 with StuG III and the I./Pz.Rgt. 11 with Panthers. That should explain Kamen's figure of 128 tanks on 1.7.1944.
Unfortunately I do not have the contemporary status reports for Pz.Abt.(Fkl.) 301 available so I can't add any more details.
For I./Pz.Rgt. 11 I have
1.7.1944: 76 Pz. V Panther
Replacements during July/August 1944: None
1.9.1944: 12 Pz. V Panther
=> Total losses 1.7. - 1.9.1944 = 64 Pz. V Panther
Now I wonder is there any chance of providing similar detail about the opposing force? Which Russian tank units were engaged? How were they equipped? What losses did they suffer?
Martin Block
Unfortunately I do not have the contemporary status reports for Pz.Abt.(Fkl.) 301 available so I can't add any more details.
For I./Pz.Rgt. 11 I have
1.7.1944: 76 Pz. V Panther
Replacements during July/August 1944: None
1.9.1944: 12 Pz. V Panther
=> Total losses 1.7. - 1.9.1944 = 64 Pz. V Panther
Now I wonder is there any chance of providing similar detail about the opposing force? Which Russian tank units were engaged? How were they equipped? What losses did they suffer?
Martin Block
Igorn,
It seems you particularly like to show failure, fiasco of panzer units. As I see you are a russian native, I would have your opinion about the best soviet unit during WWII. A friend of mine told me that the 13GD inf div was certainly the very best unit of the whole soviet army ! I must say I don't know anything about it. So if you could give some information about the most famous soviet units of WWII and why they got the GD label, that would be very kind of you.
As an example I hav eoften read that the most feared unit were the AT unit, as they were very courageous and skilful
if you want we can take it private and I'm sorry for being of topic...
It seems you particularly like to show failure, fiasco of panzer units. As I see you are a russian native, I would have your opinion about the best soviet unit during WWII. A friend of mine told me that the 13GD inf div was certainly the very best unit of the whole soviet army ! I must say I don't know anything about it. So if you could give some information about the most famous soviet units of WWII and why they got the GD label, that would be very kind of you.
As an example I hav eoften read that the most feared unit were the AT unit, as they were very courageous and skilful
if you want we can take it private and I'm sorry for being of topic...
KG voss,KG voss wrote:Igorn,
It seems you particularly like to show failure, fiasco of panzer units.
The point is that I am working on the book focusing on the strategic and tactical wins of the Soviet Army against German Panzer Waffen. It includes chapters on
1. Kursk (Panther Panzer Brigade 10 and 13th attached to GD -200 Panthers against 1st Soviet Tank Army and sPJR 656 (Ferdinande) at Ponyri.)
2. Zhitomir-Berdichev (with focus on the failure of LAH, 25th Pz Div, 1Pz. Div to recapture Kiev and 3rd Russian Guards Tank Army and 1 st Tank Army)
3. Cherkassy (with focus on 5. SS Wiking, LAH, Pz Rgt Bake, 1 Pz Div and 5th Guards Tank Army and 2nd Tank Army)
4. Tarnopol (failure of 9.SS Pz Div + Kampfgruppe Fiebe incl sPzAbt 507 to rescue Tarnopol pocket)
5. Bagration (defeat of sPzAbt 501, sPzAbt 505 and sPzAbt 507, 20 Pz Div, 78th Sturm Div, 5th Pz Div -70 Panthers +55 Pz IV)
6. Lvov-Sandomir
a. "Koltov Corridor" - unprecedented operation of 3rd Guards Tank and 4th Tank Armies
b. Brody Pocket and failure of 1.Pz Div, 8Pz. Div, 17th Pz Div, 18th Pz Div + sPzAbt 506
c. Sandomir bridgehead - fiasco of Tiger II of sPzAbt 501 against T-34-85 and JS-II
7. Hungary and Austria
a. Debrecen + Budapest
b. Konrad I, II and III - failure of IV SS Pz Corps includ. sPzAbt 503 and sPzAbt 509 to salvage Budapest grouping
c. Balaton Lake + Vienna - defeat of 6. SS Panzer Armee
8. East-Prussia and Vistula-Oder
a. Tank Battle at Kelce (including defeat of sPzAbt 424 at Lisow)
b. Fiasco of 7 Pz Div at Pultutsk
c. GD + HH
9. Sonnenwende at defeat of 11. (SS Panzer) Armee
Best Regards from Russia,
Igor
KG voss,KG voss wrote: As I see you are a russian native, I would have your opinion about the best soviet unit during WWII. A friend of mine told me that the 13GD inf div was certainly the very best unit of the whole soviet army ! I must say I don't know anything about it. So if you could give some information about the most famous soviet units of WWII and why they got the GD label, that would be very kind of you.
As an example I hav eoften read that the most feared unit were the AT unit, as they were very courageous and skilful
if you want we can take it private and I'm sorry for being of topic...
I would single out the following Soviet formations on the Army level:
8th Guards Army of General Vasily Chuikov (ex 62th Army), which included the legendary 13th Guards Rifle Division of the General Rodimtsev for the tenacious defeat of Stalingrad and Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations
3th Army of General Gorbatov for excellent execution of Bagration and East-Prussian operatons
9th Guards Army (elite VDV-Air Landing Forces Army) of General Vasily Glagolev for the defeat of 6.SS Panzer Armee and excelent execution of the Vienna operation
1st Guards Tank Army of General Katukov (Tula, Kursk, Dnepr, Zhitomir-Berdichev, Proskurov-Chernovtsy, Lvov-Sandomir, Vistula-Oder, Berlin)
3rd Guards Tank Army of General Rybalko (Stalingrad offensive, Kursk-Orel, Dnepr Battle, Zhitomir-Berdichev, Lvov-Sandomir, Vistula-Oder, Berlin)
Best Regards from Russia,
Igor
Hi KG Voss 
Slightly off topic but in response to your question.
13th Guards Rifle Division was indeed a very good Soviet unit and a look at the divisional history will show it was involved in many of the major battles on the way to Berlin and the defeat of Germany. Stalingrad, Belgorod-Kharkov, Poltava, Krivoi Rog, Kirovograd, Lvov-Sandomir, Vistula-Oder and the Berlin assault.
To give it it's full title it is "Trinadtsataya guardeiskaya; Poltavskoi ordena Lenina dvazhdy Krasnoznamennoi ordena Suvorova i Kutuzova strelkovoi divizii". In English it is "The 13th Guards; the Poltava, Order of Lenin, twice Red Banner, Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov, 13th Guards Rifle Division".
Originally raised as 87th Rifle Division at Kursk from elements of 3 Airborne corps in November 1941 awarded Guards status 19/01/1942 and renamed 13th Guards Rifle Division.
Russian units were awarded Guards status or honorifics where they had singularly distinguished themselves in combat or in the liberation of certain areas, such as Poltava in the 13th Guards case.
They may be classed as "elite" units but still had some setbacks during the later years. For example the 13th Guards Rifle Division was badly mauled in August 1944 when it was broken through by the SS Das Reich Division in the German Counter offensive during the Russian Belgorod-Kharkov operation.
Hi Igorn
It is also interesting to see that you have noted the role of the 1st Guards Tank Army of General Katukov as worthy of praise indicating their role at Kursk.
Although it certainly helped to blunt the offensive of both the 48th & SS Panzer Corps it was severely depleted in the defensive battles losing around two thirds of its initial strength. It was continually reinforced by the Front commander, Vatutin, pulling armoured units from neighbouring Armies throughout the operation. 2 Tank Corps on the 05/07/43, 2 Tank Brigades on 07/07/43 and a Tank Corps, Tank Brigade and 3 Tank Regiments on 08/07/43. I can't help but feel that Katukov could have used , what is essentially a sharp offensive deep driving tool, to better effect at Kursk.
Just one incident of a tactical reverse for Katukov was the severe losses suffered by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps on 08/07/06. In probably the first recorded instance when an armoured attack was halted largely by airpower alone the 2nd Guards Tank Corps lost a reputed 50 tanks in a couple of hours to a combination of the SS Totenkopfs Panzer Regiment and four squadrons of 30mm armed Henschel HS-109's.
1st Guards Tank Army finished Kursk with around 150-200 Tanks. Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army the same, prompting Stalin to reportedly ask of Rotmistrov "What have you done to your magnificent Tank Army?"
1st Guards Tank Army also suffered heavily in the Belgorod-Kharkov operation or "Operation Polkovodets-Rumyantsev" as the Soviets referred to it. It had been replenished heavily in the two weeks since the end of Kursk and now had around 540 Tanks. Overextending their unsupported advance towards Bogodukhov they were caught by the German 3rd Panzer Corps counterattack and again lost around a third of it's strength. By 09/08/43 1st Guards Tank Army was down to around 260 Tanks & SPGs and by 13/08/43 it was down to 134 Tanks & SPGs.
This isn't to point out that these units "failed", to use your term. It just means that they suffered heavily in their attacks and suffered tactical defeats, thats what happens in war. Both sides can point to the fact that many units took great casualties trying to achieve their goals such as 16. Panzer Division and 17. Panzer Division of the Fourth Panzer Army and 1. Panzer Division and 8. Panzer Division of the First Panzer Army at Brody. There is no doubt these Panzer Divisions failed to reach Brody and break the encirclement and suffered a tactical defeat. The same can be said of a lot of the units in the Soviet Army such as those mentioned above. Those people who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones.
Regards
David
Slightly off topic but in response to your question.
13th Guards Rifle Division was indeed a very good Soviet unit and a look at the divisional history will show it was involved in many of the major battles on the way to Berlin and the defeat of Germany. Stalingrad, Belgorod-Kharkov, Poltava, Krivoi Rog, Kirovograd, Lvov-Sandomir, Vistula-Oder and the Berlin assault.
To give it it's full title it is "Trinadtsataya guardeiskaya; Poltavskoi ordena Lenina dvazhdy Krasnoznamennoi ordena Suvorova i Kutuzova strelkovoi divizii". In English it is "The 13th Guards; the Poltava, Order of Lenin, twice Red Banner, Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov, 13th Guards Rifle Division".
Originally raised as 87th Rifle Division at Kursk from elements of 3 Airborne corps in November 1941 awarded Guards status 19/01/1942 and renamed 13th Guards Rifle Division.
Russian units were awarded Guards status or honorifics where they had singularly distinguished themselves in combat or in the liberation of certain areas, such as Poltava in the 13th Guards case.
They may be classed as "elite" units but still had some setbacks during the later years. For example the 13th Guards Rifle Division was badly mauled in August 1944 when it was broken through by the SS Das Reich Division in the German Counter offensive during the Russian Belgorod-Kharkov operation.
Hi Igorn
It is also interesting to see that you have noted the role of the 1st Guards Tank Army of General Katukov as worthy of praise indicating their role at Kursk.
Although it certainly helped to blunt the offensive of both the 48th & SS Panzer Corps it was severely depleted in the defensive battles losing around two thirds of its initial strength. It was continually reinforced by the Front commander, Vatutin, pulling armoured units from neighbouring Armies throughout the operation. 2 Tank Corps on the 05/07/43, 2 Tank Brigades on 07/07/43 and a Tank Corps, Tank Brigade and 3 Tank Regiments on 08/07/43. I can't help but feel that Katukov could have used , what is essentially a sharp offensive deep driving tool, to better effect at Kursk.
Just one incident of a tactical reverse for Katukov was the severe losses suffered by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps on 08/07/06. In probably the first recorded instance when an armoured attack was halted largely by airpower alone the 2nd Guards Tank Corps lost a reputed 50 tanks in a couple of hours to a combination of the SS Totenkopfs Panzer Regiment and four squadrons of 30mm armed Henschel HS-109's.
1st Guards Tank Army finished Kursk with around 150-200 Tanks. Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army the same, prompting Stalin to reportedly ask of Rotmistrov "What have you done to your magnificent Tank Army?"
1st Guards Tank Army also suffered heavily in the Belgorod-Kharkov operation or "Operation Polkovodets-Rumyantsev" as the Soviets referred to it. It had been replenished heavily in the two weeks since the end of Kursk and now had around 540 Tanks. Overextending their unsupported advance towards Bogodukhov they were caught by the German 3rd Panzer Corps counterattack and again lost around a third of it's strength. By 09/08/43 1st Guards Tank Army was down to around 260 Tanks & SPGs and by 13/08/43 it was down to 134 Tanks & SPGs.
This isn't to point out that these units "failed", to use your term. It just means that they suffered heavily in their attacks and suffered tactical defeats, thats what happens in war. Both sides can point to the fact that many units took great casualties trying to achieve their goals such as 16. Panzer Division and 17. Panzer Division of the Fourth Panzer Army and 1. Panzer Division and 8. Panzer Division of the First Panzer Army at Brody. There is no doubt these Panzer Divisions failed to reach Brody and break the encirclement and suffered a tactical defeat. The same can be said of a lot of the units in the Soviet Army such as those mentioned above. Those people who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones.
Regards
David
"Whoever wishes to master the art of war must study it continuously. I....am of the opinion that one lifetime is not enough to attain this goal." - Frederick II
Von salza,
Thanks very much for your reply This is exactly the kind of datas i'm looking for. I know a lot of soviet units got the "guards" status, but I was wondering wich one in the end were the nost prestigious and efficient one during WWII. As I don't want to bother Igorn with this, I take it private and send you a private message to continue this topic if you don't mind..
Igorn,
Thanks very much for your reply too. It is very interesting, the point is that I was wondering more about the soviet units at divisional level than army level though..
About the case of 1GTA of katukov and Rotmistrov 's 5GTA, I would say that these units had certainly no others options than too take such high casulaties in order to succeed in their missions though Rotmistrov was certainly not that a good commander as Katukov. After all the german army was a very potent fighting army til the end of the war.
Thanks very much for your reply
This is exactly the kind of datas i'm looking for. I know a lot of soviet units got the "guards" status, but I was wondering wich one in the end were the nost prestigious and efficient one during WWII. As I don't want to bother Igorn with this, I take it private and send you a private message to continue this topic if you don't mind.. Igorn,
Thanks very much for your reply too. It is very interesting, the point is that I was wondering more about the soviet units at divisional level than army level though..
About the case of 1GTA of katukov and Rotmistrov 's 5GTA, I would say that these units had certainly no others options than too take such high casulaties in order to succeed in their missions though Rotmistrov was certainly not that a good commander as Katukov. After all the german army was a very potent fighting army til the end of the war.
First of all you seem to confuse Aug 1943 with Aug 1944. Secondly, I would like to see the basis for your conclusions. Did you see the archival sources like casualties reports of 13 Guards Rifle Division, dated Aug 1943? As far as DR is concerned, I can reply to you that after combat at Kursk and Kharkov by end of August 1943 it was badly mauled itself.von Salza wrote: For example the 13th Guards Rifle Division was badly mauled in August 1944 when it was broken through by the SS Das Reich Division in the German Counter offensive during the Russian Belgorod-Kharkov operation.
As of July 5th, 1943 the Soviet First Tank Army had 556 tanks + 24 SU-122 and SU-76.von Salza wrote:Although it certainly helped to blunt the offensive of both the 48th & SS Panzer Corps it was severely depleted in the defensive battles losing around two thirds of its initial strength.
Source: The Central Archive of the Russian Defense Ministry (ZAMO RF, F 203. Op 2843, D. 26)
First Tank Army, together with 5th Guards Tank Corps and 10th Tank Corps and troops of the 6th Guards Army managed to hold the enemy in Oboyan direction in tenacious defense inflicting the heavy casualties on the enemy. German 48th Tank Corps, for example, which started Citadel with 595 panzers and SP guns (including Panthers of Panzer-Brigade 10) by July 10th had only about 200 tanks and SP guns operational. Having less strength compared to SS Panzer-Corps, during 5 days of combat, 48th Panzer Corps lost 1.6 times more men (5,500 men). One has to include losses of LAH, which from 7th to 9th July fought against the First Tank Army.
During 4 days of heavy combat from July 6th to July 9th, it lost 220 tanks as a write-off.
Source: The Central Archive of the Russian Defense Ministry (ZAMO RF, F 203. Op 2843, D. 325. L.52, 53, 54, 56)
So, as one can see, the First Tank Army didn’t lose 2/3 of its strength.
David, why should I take the claims of German pilots for granted, especially, when these losses are not confirmed by the Russian archival sources. I am sure you would be interested to learn about other instances of Luftwaffe attacks against armor like this one:von Salza wrote:Just one incident of a tactical reverse for Katukov was the severe losses suffered by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps on 08/07/06. In probably the first recorded instance when an armoured attack was halted largely by airpower alone the 2nd Guards Tank Corps lost a reputed 50 tanks in a couple of hours to a combination of the SS Totenkopfs Panzer Regiment and four squadrons of 30mm armed Henschel HS-109's.
“On 13 July 1943, Panzer-Regiment 11 of the 6. Panzer-Division was mistakenly bombed by the Luftwaffe and suffered many casualties. Killed were Major von Biberstein, the commander of Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 114, Hauptmann Oeckel, the commander of the I./Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 114 and Oberleutnant Wagemann, a battery commander in Sturmgeschuetz-Abteilung 228. Among the wounded were Oberst von Oppeln-Bronikowski, the commander of Panzer-Regiment 11, and Major Baeke, the commander of the II./Panzer-Regiment 11”
J. Restayn and N.Moller, Operation Citadel, Volume 1: the South
And some other instances when aviation was applied against armor during Kursk battle. Robert Jackson wrote in his book:
“Russian IL-2 low-flying attack aircrafts armed with new 37-mm gun and special anti-tank bombs were applied during the Kursk Battle. German casualties and losses caused by these machines grew quickly. Thus, just during only one combat, Russian IL-2 aircrafts ‘combed’ the German 9th Tank Division and for 20 minutes burnt 70 German tanks. The Russian pilot, Guard Senior Lieutenant Gorovets, attacked a group of twenty Junkers with his Jak-9 and during only one combat eliminated 9 (nine)German aircrafts. The Russian revenged relentlessly to Germans for bitter summer days of 1941…” (Jackson R, The Red Falcons. London, 1970)
Do you mean operational tanks? What about 233 tanks it had in repair and which were refurbished by early August and took part in the Soviet offensive?von Salza wrote:1st Guards Tank Army finished Kursk with around 150-200 Tanks.
Source: The Central Archive of the Russian Defense Ministry (ZAMO RF, F 203. Op 2843, D. 325. L.52, 53, 54, 56)
It was "replenished heavily" mostly by repairing damaged tanks from 233 tanks it had in repair as of 10th July 1943.von Salza wrote: It had been replenished heavily in the two weeks since the end of Kursk and now had around 540 Tanks.
General Katukov is witnessing that he had about 631 tanks and SP guns prior to the start of Citadel. “By July 14th 1943 it became clear that enemy offensive on which Hitler’s High Command bet huge hopes completely failed. They had to shift to defensive having suffered colossal losses in personnel and vehicles. On that day for us, tankers of the 1st Tank Army defensive combats at Kursk Bend ended. Tank Army troops were taken to the rear areas at the night of July 16th and were replaced on the Oboyan sector by the units of the 6th Guards Army. We billeted again familiar to us villages of Oboyan area and began preparation for the new offensive combats. Our main task was to replenish the tank park by repairing the damaged machines using our own resources… We managed to increase number of operational tank and SP guns up to 500 vehicles by the end of July 1943 on our own by means of repairing damaged vehicles. With these tanks we went on offensive later.
Katukov Mikhail, On the Spearhead of the Main Blow, Moscow, Voenizdat,
Here we go. “Our offensive was developing well. Our units advanced by 15-30 kilometers on the first day and chopped the enemy grouping in Tomarovka from the Belgorod’s grouping. On night of August 4 1943 the formations of the 8th Guards Mechanized Corps broke through the second defensive line in the area of Domnino and began rapid advancement to the south. In the second half of August 4th we withdrew 11th Guards Rank Corps from Tomarovka and moved it into breakthrough after 8th Guards Mechanized Corps. By August 6th these formations developed their success and moved by 50 kilometers. 31ST Tank Corps, which was in the second echelon of the Army distinguished itself at that time. Together with 5th Guards Tank Corps on 5th August 1943 it encircled and almost completely wiped out the 19th German Panzer Division in the area of Tomarovka. I will tell how this happened. Few kilometers were left to Bogodukhov. The 1st Tank Army Staff was moving behind the first echelon. Almost without delays we were driving on the road covered by trees. Sounds of artillery barrages were in the air. Suddenly, one of staff officers who was in the head of the column, stopped his car, jumped out of it and looked in binocular. We also halted. What it is? From Tomarovka and nearby grove the German tanks were running. It seemed that they wanted to come to the rear of our Army spearhead and inflict a blow to our second echelon. We noticed crosses on the armor. Shalin transmitted an order to the Brigade of the 11th Guards Tank Corps, which were on the right flank to turn immediately at 90’ angle towards German panzers. 31st Tank Corps also changed the course of its movements and get closer to the German tanks. Thus, suddenly rather big tank combat occurred. Right flank Tank Brigade of the 11th Guards Tank Corps and formations of the 31th Tank Corps while getting closer to German tank were outflanking them from two sides. But the blow of the 5th Guards Tank Corps of General Kravchenko from the rear was decisive. As soon as General Kravchenko learnt about tank combat, which broke out nearby, he turned around his brigades and rapidly came into rear of the 19th Panzer Division. Germans were rushing about. Roads to west, south and north were sealed off by Soviet tankers from three sides. In addition, Soviet IL-2 storming aviation was in the air to help the Soviet troops. That was a short combat. The German Panzer Division was defeated by joint efforts. Over 50 German panzers remained on the battlefield. General Schmidt, the commander of the German 19th Panzer Division was killed in action. His staff car with documents and personal belongings was brought by our tankers to my command control point. Significant group of German soldiers and NCO’s were captured as POW. In Tomarovka we captured intact German panzers, which seemed to be just released from repair. During five days of combat the formations of the 1st Tank Army covered in combats about 100 kilometers. The spearhead of the 11th Guards Tank Corps including 22nd Tank Brigade of Colonel Vedenichev by the end of August 7th broke in Bogodukhov. We didn’t face stiff resistance here. The town was occupied by rear units, which didn’t expect sudden appearance of Soviet tanks and therefore we captured rich booties. The whole food stocks, warehouses of engineering and building materials were captured there and later sent to Kiev to rebuild the capital of Ukraine. About 700 tons of fuel was captured in Bogodukhov. Next day Germans threw their bombers in attempt to destroy the warehouses, which ruined many buildings in town. Enemy made desperate efforts by means of the 3rd Panzer Corps and strong artillery and aviation support to push us back from our positions.von Salza wrote: Overextending their unsupported advance towards Bogodukhov they were caught by the German 3rd Panzer Corps counterattack and again lost around a third of it's strength. By 09/08/43 1st Guards Tank Army was down to around 260 Tanks & SPGs and by 13/08/43 it was down to 134 Tanks & SPGs.
The enemy pressure was increasing. Now our Tank Army was on the defensive in one echelon. All three Corps’ were placed on the front line, arranging mobile ambushes on hills, grove edges and towns outskirts. We were under on-going artillery and mortar fire. 31st Tank Corps took a blow on itself. Our tankers applied tested methods of mobile ambushes and withstand the pressure. Hitlerists’ cast their tanks many times on the positions of our Corps. Next combat happened near the Corps’ command control point. Germans didn’t sustain the blow of our tankers and retreated leaving several knocked out vehicles. In the meantime the enemy attacks to the south of Bogodukhov didn’t weaken. In few hours Hitlerists’ pressed us by 3-4 kilometers. They failed to achieve more. Units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and 32nd Rifle Corps, which were standing to the east of Bogodukhov came to help us. By August 16th we managed to stop the assault of German Panzer divisions by joint efforts. After that the 1st Tank Army was turned to west, where the enemy built up strong grouping in the area of Akhtyrka in an attempt to encircle 27th Army of General Trofimenko and then to come to Bogodukhov. Here our tankers together with units of 27th Army and 4th Guards Army successfully repelled German counter-attack. By that action participation of the 1st Tank Army in Belgorod-Kharkov operation ended.
We had a respite and used it to prepare our units for new combats. On the training grounds cracked shots and rattled engines. In the repair workshops maintenance workers were busy day and night by welding and repairing damaged vehicles. Dyner (Head of Maintenance section) and his team didn’t get any rest. We set a target for them to increase number of operational tanks and SP guns up to 552 vehicles. That was necessary since we didn’t get new machines so far. On our requests we were receiving an answer that when we would be committed into action then number of machines would be replenished up to full strength.”
Katukov Mikhail, On the Spearhead of the Main Blow, Moscow, Voenizdat,
I have noticed that when someone is talking here about the German panzer losses they always talk only about total losses (write-off) and don't count panzers in repair, even in long-term one as the losses. They always ignore losses of German SP guns such as Grille, Marder, Hummel, Wespe or Nashorn while they count losses of all Soviet vehicles including open-topped SU-76. They count all Soviet tanks in repair as total losses and base their loss figures on claims of German tankers, while even German High Command halved their claims.
Merry Christmas guys!
Best Regards from Russia,
Igor
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Martin Block
- Enthusiast
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Overclaiming of enemy losses seems to have been not a virtue of the German pilots alone!
"Thus, just during only one combat, Russian IL-2 aircrafts ‘combed’ the German 9th Tank Division and for 20 minutes burnt 70 German tanks."
AFV status 9. Pz.Div. on 30.6.1943
Tanks:
Pz. II = 1 (0 operational)
Bef.Pz. III = 6 (5 operational)
Pz.Beob. III = 4 (4 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/42) = 8 (0 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/60) = 30 (28 operational)
Pz. IV (L/24) = 8 (6 operational)
Pz. IV (L/43) = 27 (26 operational)
Pz. IV (L/48) = 3 (3 operational)
Self propelled guns:
Marder = 16 (? operational)
Wespe = 0
Hummel = 0
Grille = 0
Total = 87 (72 operational) tanks & 16 (? operational) s/p guns
AFV status 9. Pz.Div. on 31.7.1943
Tanks:
Pz. II = 1 (1 operational)
Bef.Pz. III = 6 (5 operational)
Pz.Beob. III = 4 (4 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/42) = 5 (0 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/60) = 25 (11 operational)
Pz. IV (L/24) = 7 (2 operational)
Pz. IV (L/43) = 21 (14 operational)
Pz. IV (L/48) = 18 (13 operational)
Self propelled guns:
Marder = 13 (? operational)
Wespe = 12 (? operational)
Hummel = 6 (? operational)
Grille = 0
Total = 87 (50 operational) tanks & 31 (? operational) s/p guns
Replacements received during July 1943: 26 Pz. IV L/48, 12 Wespe, 6 Hummel
=> Losses during the whole month of July 1943
Pz. II = 0
Bef.Pz. III = 0
Pz.Beob. III = 0
Pz. III (5 cm L/42) = 3
Pz. III (5 cm L/60) = 5
Pz. IV (L/24) = 1
Pz. IV (L/43) = 6
Pz. IV (L/48) = 11
Self propelled guns:
Marder = 3
Wespe = 0
Hummel = 0
Grille = 0
Total = 26 tanks & 3 s/p guns
So much for that 70 tanks burnt in a 20 minute IL-2 air attack! I do not have exact figures for APCs and armored recce cars, but according to the status reports the 9. Pz.Div. on 1.7.1943 had 85% out of 324 authorized "Schtz.Pz., Pz.Sp.Wg, Art.Pz.B.Wg." operational plus another 4% in short term repair.
By 1.8.1943 this had been reduced to 67% operational and 7% in short term repair. No replacement SPW nor Pz.Späh-Wg. were shipped to the division during July 1943 so one can calculate the total losses to about 288 - 240 = 48 other armored vehicles.
So actually the claim of those IL-2 pilots covers all total write-offs in armored vehicles the division suffered throughout the whole month of July 1943!!! In fact as far as I could establish no German armored unit at all suffered AFV losses in such magnitude by air attack alone during the Kursk Battle.
Now to the 19. Pz.Div.: "Together with 5th Guards Tank Corps on 5th August 1943 it encircled and almost completely wiped out the 19th German Panzer Division in the area of Tomarovka."
Looking at the status reports of the 19. Pz.Div. for August 1943 it suffered considerably, that's correct, but it was far from being almost completely wiped out!
On 1.9.1943 the division reported the total of losses in personnel for the whole month of August 1943 as:
438 KIA
836 WIA
589 MIA
The division was still 10.684 men strong (authorized strength 15.103 men) and had received just 311 men received as replacements during the month.
In terms of armor the division suffered 50% total losses and had just a handfull of tanks left operational:
AFV status 19. Pz.Div. on 31.7.1943
Tanks:
Pz. II = 2 (2 operational)
Bef.Pz. III = 5 (5 operational)
Pz.Beob. III = 4 (4 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/42) = 5 (4 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/60) = 19 (12 operational)
Pz. III (7,5 cm L/24) = 9 (5 operational)
Pz. IV (L/24) = 2 (2 operational)
Pz. IV (L/43) = 23 (6 operational)
Pz. IV (L/48) = 10 (10 operational)
Self propelled guns:
Marder = 13 (? operational)
Wespe = 0
Hummel = 0
Grille = 0
Total = 79 (50) tanks & 13 s/p guns
AFV status 19. Pz.Div. on 31.8.1943
Tanks:
Pz. II = 1 (0 operational)
Bef.Pz. III = 2 (1 operational)
Pz.Beob. III = 3 (1 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/42) = 3 (0 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/60) = 10 (1 operational)
Pz. III (7,5 cm L/24) = 5 (2 operational)
Pz. IV (L/24) = 2 (1 operational)
Pz. IV (L/43) = 2 (0 operational)
Pz. IV (L/48) = 12 (3 operational)
Self propelled guns:
Marder = 9 (6 operational)
Wespe = 0
Hummel = 0
Grille = 0
Total = 40 (9) tanks & 9 s/p guns
Replacements received during August 1943: 8 Pz. IV L/48
=> Losses during the whole month of August 1943
Pz. II = 1
Bef.Pz. III = 3
Pz.Beob. III = 1
Pz. III (5 cm L/42) = 2
Pz. III (5 cm L/60) = 9
Pz. IV (L/24) = 4
Pz. IV (L/43) = 21
Pz. IV (L/48) = 6
Self propelled guns:
Marder = 4
Wespe = 0
Hummel = 0
Grille = 0
Total = 47 tanks & 3 s/p guns
Again I do not have exact figures for APCs and armored recce cars, but according to the status reports the 19. Pz.Div. on 1.7.1943 (I don't have the report for 1.8.1943) had 52 out of 60 authorized "Schtz.Pz., Pz.Sp.Wg, Art.Pz.B.Wg." operational plus 1 in short term repair (the division had no armored infantry battalion).
By 1.9.1943 this had been reduced to 18 operational and 8 in short term repair. 21 le.Pz.Späh-Wg. but no SPW had been shipped to the division during Juli and August 1943. From that one can calculate the total losses to about 53+21-26 = 48 other armored vehicles at maximun since I do not have figures for vehicles in long term repair.
In terms of other weapons and equipment the division had available at the end of August 1943:
15 towed heavy a/t guns (52% of authorized strength)
29 towed artillery guns (80% of authorized strength)
358 light and heavy machine guns (58% of authorized strength)
19 mortars (63% of authorized strength)
5 heavy a/t rifles (33% of authorized strength)
76+ tracked towing vehicles (46,5% of authorized strength) (+ means vehicles possibly in long term repair not included)
76+ light towing vehicles, tracked (46,5% of authorized strength)
32+ heavy towing vehicles, tracked (63% of authorized strength)
120+ 'Maultier' type half tracked trucks
198+ trucks (cross country) (41% of authorized strength)
1158+ trucks (standard) (134% of authorized strength)
Can't provide figures for the beginning of the month because the report is not available. Also do not know if and how many replacements in weapons and equipment were received during August 1943.
Nevertheless I hope this helps to somewhat clarify the picture.
Martin Block
P.S.: It would still be very interesting to learn more about the actual losses on the Russian side. Is there no way to establish that more accurately as from post war books? Were Russian units not required to file any status reports at regular intervalls? If so, did none of these survive in archives? Did no historian ever care to look them up? How exactly do German claims match or not match actual Russian losses?
"Thus, just during only one combat, Russian IL-2 aircrafts ‘combed’ the German 9th Tank Division and for 20 minutes burnt 70 German tanks."
AFV status 9. Pz.Div. on 30.6.1943
Tanks:
Pz. II = 1 (0 operational)
Bef.Pz. III = 6 (5 operational)
Pz.Beob. III = 4 (4 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/42) = 8 (0 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/60) = 30 (28 operational)
Pz. IV (L/24) = 8 (6 operational)
Pz. IV (L/43) = 27 (26 operational)
Pz. IV (L/48) = 3 (3 operational)
Self propelled guns:
Marder = 16 (? operational)
Wespe = 0
Hummel = 0
Grille = 0
Total = 87 (72 operational) tanks & 16 (? operational) s/p guns
AFV status 9. Pz.Div. on 31.7.1943
Tanks:
Pz. II = 1 (1 operational)
Bef.Pz. III = 6 (5 operational)
Pz.Beob. III = 4 (4 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/42) = 5 (0 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/60) = 25 (11 operational)
Pz. IV (L/24) = 7 (2 operational)
Pz. IV (L/43) = 21 (14 operational)
Pz. IV (L/48) = 18 (13 operational)
Self propelled guns:
Marder = 13 (? operational)
Wespe = 12 (? operational)
Hummel = 6 (? operational)
Grille = 0
Total = 87 (50 operational) tanks & 31 (? operational) s/p guns
Replacements received during July 1943: 26 Pz. IV L/48, 12 Wespe, 6 Hummel
=> Losses during the whole month of July 1943
Pz. II = 0
Bef.Pz. III = 0
Pz.Beob. III = 0
Pz. III (5 cm L/42) = 3
Pz. III (5 cm L/60) = 5
Pz. IV (L/24) = 1
Pz. IV (L/43) = 6
Pz. IV (L/48) = 11
Self propelled guns:
Marder = 3
Wespe = 0
Hummel = 0
Grille = 0
Total = 26 tanks & 3 s/p guns
So much for that 70 tanks burnt in a 20 minute IL-2 air attack! I do not have exact figures for APCs and armored recce cars, but according to the status reports the 9. Pz.Div. on 1.7.1943 had 85% out of 324 authorized "Schtz.Pz., Pz.Sp.Wg, Art.Pz.B.Wg." operational plus another 4% in short term repair.
By 1.8.1943 this had been reduced to 67% operational and 7% in short term repair. No replacement SPW nor Pz.Späh-Wg. were shipped to the division during July 1943 so one can calculate the total losses to about 288 - 240 = 48 other armored vehicles.
So actually the claim of those IL-2 pilots covers all total write-offs in armored vehicles the division suffered throughout the whole month of July 1943!!! In fact as far as I could establish no German armored unit at all suffered AFV losses in such magnitude by air attack alone during the Kursk Battle.
Now to the 19. Pz.Div.: "Together with 5th Guards Tank Corps on 5th August 1943 it encircled and almost completely wiped out the 19th German Panzer Division in the area of Tomarovka."
Looking at the status reports of the 19. Pz.Div. for August 1943 it suffered considerably, that's correct, but it was far from being almost completely wiped out!
On 1.9.1943 the division reported the total of losses in personnel for the whole month of August 1943 as:
438 KIA
836 WIA
589 MIA
The division was still 10.684 men strong (authorized strength 15.103 men) and had received just 311 men received as replacements during the month.
In terms of armor the division suffered 50% total losses and had just a handfull of tanks left operational:
AFV status 19. Pz.Div. on 31.7.1943
Tanks:
Pz. II = 2 (2 operational)
Bef.Pz. III = 5 (5 operational)
Pz.Beob. III = 4 (4 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/42) = 5 (4 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/60) = 19 (12 operational)
Pz. III (7,5 cm L/24) = 9 (5 operational)
Pz. IV (L/24) = 2 (2 operational)
Pz. IV (L/43) = 23 (6 operational)
Pz. IV (L/48) = 10 (10 operational)
Self propelled guns:
Marder = 13 (? operational)
Wespe = 0
Hummel = 0
Grille = 0
Total = 79 (50) tanks & 13 s/p guns
AFV status 19. Pz.Div. on 31.8.1943
Tanks:
Pz. II = 1 (0 operational)
Bef.Pz. III = 2 (1 operational)
Pz.Beob. III = 3 (1 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/42) = 3 (0 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/60) = 10 (1 operational)
Pz. III (7,5 cm L/24) = 5 (2 operational)
Pz. IV (L/24) = 2 (1 operational)
Pz. IV (L/43) = 2 (0 operational)
Pz. IV (L/48) = 12 (3 operational)
Self propelled guns:
Marder = 9 (6 operational)
Wespe = 0
Hummel = 0
Grille = 0
Total = 40 (9) tanks & 9 s/p guns
Replacements received during August 1943: 8 Pz. IV L/48
=> Losses during the whole month of August 1943
Pz. II = 1
Bef.Pz. III = 3
Pz.Beob. III = 1
Pz. III (5 cm L/42) = 2
Pz. III (5 cm L/60) = 9
Pz. IV (L/24) = 4
Pz. IV (L/43) = 21
Pz. IV (L/48) = 6
Self propelled guns:
Marder = 4
Wespe = 0
Hummel = 0
Grille = 0
Total = 47 tanks & 3 s/p guns
Again I do not have exact figures for APCs and armored recce cars, but according to the status reports the 19. Pz.Div. on 1.7.1943 (I don't have the report for 1.8.1943) had 52 out of 60 authorized "Schtz.Pz., Pz.Sp.Wg, Art.Pz.B.Wg." operational plus 1 in short term repair (the division had no armored infantry battalion).
By 1.9.1943 this had been reduced to 18 operational and 8 in short term repair. 21 le.Pz.Späh-Wg. but no SPW had been shipped to the division during Juli and August 1943. From that one can calculate the total losses to about 53+21-26 = 48 other armored vehicles at maximun since I do not have figures for vehicles in long term repair.
In terms of other weapons and equipment the division had available at the end of August 1943:
15 towed heavy a/t guns (52% of authorized strength)
29 towed artillery guns (80% of authorized strength)
358 light and heavy machine guns (58% of authorized strength)
19 mortars (63% of authorized strength)
5 heavy a/t rifles (33% of authorized strength)
76+ tracked towing vehicles (46,5% of authorized strength) (+ means vehicles possibly in long term repair not included)
76+ light towing vehicles, tracked (46,5% of authorized strength)
32+ heavy towing vehicles, tracked (63% of authorized strength)
120+ 'Maultier' type half tracked trucks
198+ trucks (cross country) (41% of authorized strength)
1158+ trucks (standard) (134% of authorized strength)
Can't provide figures for the beginning of the month because the report is not available. Also do not know if and how many replacements in weapons and equipment were received during August 1943.
Nevertheless I hope this helps to somewhat clarify the picture.
Martin Block
P.S.: It would still be very interesting to learn more about the actual losses on the Russian side. Is there no way to establish that more accurately as from post war books? Were Russian units not required to file any status reports at regular intervalls? If so, did none of these survive in archives? Did no historian ever care to look them up? How exactly do German claims match or not match actual Russian losses?
First of all thanks for your post. I have checked again the book of Jackson R, The Red Falcons. London, 1970. In fact he was referring to 70 burnt and damaged vehicles, including tanks, SP-guns, half-trucks and other machines and not only tanks. This was typo error.Martin Block wrote:Overclaiming of enemy losses seems to have been not a virtue of the German pilots alone!
"Thus, just during only one combat, Russian IL-2 aircrafts ‘combed’ the German 9th Tank Division and for 20 minutes burnt 70 German tanks."
AFV status 9. Pz.Div. on 30.6.1943
Tanks:
Pz. II = 1 (0 operational)
Bef.Pz. III = 6 (5 operational)
Pz.Beob. III = 4 (4 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/42) = 8 (0 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/60) = 30 (28 operational)
Pz. IV (L/24) = 8 (6 operational)
Pz. IV (L/43) = 27 (26 operational)
Pz. IV (L/48) = 3 (3 operational)
Self propelled guns:
Marder = 16 (? operational)
Wespe = 0
Hummel = 0
Grille = 0
Total = 87 (72 operational) tanks & 16 (? operational) s/p guns
AFV status 9. Pz.Div. on 31.7.1943
Tanks:
Pz. II = 1 (1 operational)
Bef.Pz. III = 6 (5 operational)
Pz.Beob. III = 4 (4 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/42) = 5 (0 operational)
Pz. III (5 cm L/60) = 25 (11 operational)
Pz. IV (L/24) = 7 (2 operational)
Pz. IV (L/43) = 21 (14 operational)
Pz. IV (L/48) = 18 (13 operational)
Self propelled guns:
Marder = 13 (? operational)
Wespe = 12 (? operational)
Hummel = 6 (? operational)
Grille = 0
Total = 87 (50 operational) tanks & 31 (? operational) s/p guns
Replacements received during July 1943: 26 Pz. IV L/48, 12 Wespe, 6 Hummel
=> Losses during the whole month of July 1943
Pz. II = 0
Bef.Pz. III = 0
Pz.Beob. III = 0
Pz. III (5 cm L/42) = 3
Pz. III (5 cm L/60) = 5
Pz. IV (L/24) = 1
Pz. IV (L/43) = 6
Pz. IV (L/48) = 11
Self propelled guns:
Marder = 3
Wespe = 0
Hummel = 0
Grille = 0
Total = 26 tanks & 3 s/p guns
So much for that 70 tanks burnt in a 20 minute IL-2 air attack! I do not have exact figures for APCs and armored recce cars, but according to the status reports the 9. Pz.Div. on 1.7.1943 had 85% out of 324 authorized "Schtz.Pz., Pz.Sp.Wg, Art.Pz.B.Wg." operational plus another 4% in short term repair.
By 1.8.1943 this had been reduced to 67% operational and 7% in short term repair. No replacement SPW nor Pz.Späh-Wg. were shipped to the division during July 1943 so one can calculate the total losses to about 288 - 240 = 48 other armored vehicles.
So actually the claim of those IL-2 pilots covers all total write-offs in armored vehicles the division suffered throughout the whole month of July 1943!!! In fact as far as I could establish no German armored unit at all suffered AFV losses in such magnitude by air attack alone during the Kursk Battle.
I have also checked the Tank Losses Report of 9.Panzer-Division for the period of 5-7 July 1943 as reported by Heersgruppe Mitte, with an effective date of 7 July 1943.
9. Panzer-Division
• 2 Panzer IV (long): Total losses
• 15 Panzer III’s (long) (trough battle damage and mechanical failures)
• 3 Panzer IV (short): mechanical failures
• 5 Panzer IV (long): battle damage
• 29 Panzer IV: mechanical damage
Source: J. Restayn and N.Moller, Operation Citadel, Volume 2: The North
Conclusion: out of the original 88 operational vehicles as of July 7th 1943, there were 52 non-operational tanks and 2 total losses in the 9.Panzer-Division after 3 days of combats. Considerable number of tanks in repair later on was written-off as total losses. If one adds number of lost and damaged SP-guns, half-tracks and other vehicles like SPW etc. the number stated by Jackson would be quite possible. And let’s not be misled by the term mechanical failures. The German command quite possibly could have disguised a number of damaged vehicles by IL-2 by mechanical damages.
But I agree with you on the point that both parties exaggerated the number of their wins and knocked-out tanks.
As far as 19. Panzer-Division is concerned I advise you to read the Paul Carell, The Scorched Earth. There is a very good description of the combat General Katukov was referring to from the German perspective including the death of the General Schmidt, the Commanding General of the German 19. Panzer-Division.Martin Block wrote:Now to the 19. Pz.Div...Looking at the status reports of the 19. Pz.Div. for August 1943 it suffered considerably, that's correct, but it was far from being almost completely wiped out!Martin Block
Martin, I will get back to you on this point but you can start with Krivosheev's book just to get the rough idea on Soviet losses.Martin Block wrote:P.S.: It would still be very interesting to learn more about the actual losses on the Russian side. Is there no way to establish that more accurately as from post war books? Were Russian units not required to file any status reports at regular intervalls? If so, did none of these survive in archives? Did no historian ever care to look them up? How exactly do German claims match or not match actual Russian losses?
Best Regards from Russia,
Igor