Although I have to confess some forum posters have a remarkable though unvoluntary talent as comedians.
Heh heh. Yes, torturing darrin can be diverting. But at least I can say I don't enjoy myself by pulling the wings off of flies or torturing small animals.
The good of this as well as previous "discussions" is the many interesting data snippets are spread out during the course .
Oh, and here is the latest, for any of those who believe - as evidently Darrin does - that I am concealing something.
So, more data for Darrin to mangle, fail to remember, and/or ignore as he sees fit.
Losses of SP TD, Sturmgeschuetz and Panzerjaeger
June –
German
27 StuG-III (L48)
29 Pak Sfl 7.5cm
56 Total
6-20 June –
US
1 M-10
1 Total
July –
German
68 StuG-III (L48)
15 Pak Sfl 7.5cm
83 Total
21 June-20 July
US
17 M-10
17 Total
August –
German
14 Stu-Pz
98 StuG-III (L48)
24 Pak Sfl 7.5cm
136 Total
21 July-20 August
US
28 M-10
6 M-18
34 Total
September –
German
17 Pz-IV (L70) (PzJg-IV)
2 StuG-III (L24)
4 StuG-III (L43)
348 StuG-III (L48)
2 StuG-IV (L48)
21 StuH
71 JgPz-38t
65 Pak Sfl 7.5cm
24 Jagdpanther
554 Total
21 August-20 September
US
40 M-10
6 M-18
46 Total
21 September-20 October
US
71 M-10
14 M-18
2 M36
87 Total
June-September
German Total – 829
6 June – 20 October
US Total – 185
From this must we assume that the US SP TD were 4.48-times as effective as the German?
BTW, when will the Normandy book be ready? Although, I guess, doing a forum search should result in half the script .
You guessed it. Right now I am working on various Allied OB data. The hardest part is proving to be the narrative thread linking everthing together, right now it is still pretty disjointed. And I have to work too (concealing and altering data at my mysterious job at the Institute ). So it will probably be at least a year and maybe longer if I can't make a research trip to London this year (and I would like to get in one to Freiburg as well). So it goes.
BTW, any bets on whether that was really darrin's "last" post?
No more replies to rich at least on this thread but perhaps on this board. Just a comment on his ability to twist facts to fit his own purpose which is big reason why I suspect much of his data.
----------
Now the TE strength of US Army Armor units as of 1 January 1945 was as follows:
14 'Light' Armor Divisions @ 168 plus 9 in the three AFA battalions (approved as an MTOE in December 1944) = 2478
2 'Heavy' Armor Divisions @ 232 (there is no evidence that the MTOE above was approved for the AFA battalions in the heavy divisions, however the actual TE number of mediums varied, going as low as 222 at one point) = 464
21 AFA Battalions @ 3 = 63
58 Medium Tank Battalions @ 54 = 3132
2 MX Tank Battalions @ 18 = 36
Total = 6173
Now the total theater reserves mandated varied by theater as did the replcement factor. However, it appears that a minimum of 25 percent of TE was maintained as a reserve in theater, plus about 10 percent in CONUS = 2160
Finally, losses. I have yet to find complete loss data except for 12th AG (1st, 3rd, and 9th Army). The total number of Sherman losses to 8 May 1945 in 12th AG (all types) was 3255. I would be greately surprised if the total losses of all other theaters exceeded this total, however in abscence of any other data I will guesstimate that another 2000 were lost.
So we have a total of at least 11,588 accounted for in US service. Add 22098 Lend-Lease and we have 35,686 of 49,234 accounted for.
Finally, 2,283 production M4 were converted to M36, 1,653 to M32 ARV, and 275 to Mine Exploder tanks = 4211
So about 9000 remain AWOL.
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This a complete quote by rich from his website that he has magaged to scare most people away from. The quote is taken from the thread below "Where did all the shermans go?".
Its interesting to see that even he admits there were at least 9000 US shermans that wern't accounted for. I'm not sure what richs defination of excess is. Having 1.5 times as many US shermans at the end of the war as they still had in the field TOE certainly meets my def of exccess. Yet anytime I mention this before this post and since this post he laughs at the idea. In fact he metions this point below in one of his first post in this tread.
Rich wrote:
P.S., it is also untrue that Darrin 'guesses' his figures. AFAIK he has three sources - my friend Niklas Zetterling, MG Krivosheev and myself . In my case he tends to take the figures I have supplied him over the years, then missapplies them (or only uses selected parts of them), uses them to argue points with me (always forgetting the original source), and eventually mangles them into something unrecognizable. Thus he is readily able to argue that the US Army had more M4 than they knew what to do with, ignoring the actual shortages that were seen in the field. Oh, and eventually I think he comes to believe that I am unable to understand his reasoning, because I don't have access to the same facts that he does.
Rich certainly has this I am Mr perfect attitude and anything I say must be treated as correct as the bible even if it is wrong. I hope he doesn't let this affect his 'research' but I am doubtful. He at least shouldn't let this affect the way he treats posters who are after all people.
-The number of excess shermans according to Rich was 9000.
-The number of losses during the entire war in ALL theaters acc to Rich was 5000.
-Acc to Rich the sherman TOE for all units and theaters was over 6000.
The US had enough excess shermans to last for almost 2 more wars at that rate. Even then they would not run out of shermans up front until the end of a third war.
Anyone who does not think this is excess production is obviously delisonal.
I have a huge amount of respect for people like Nicklas Zetterling and Chris Lawerance but a great distate for the way you conduct yourself.
You know Darrin, that's just about the limit from someone who has conducted himself with a complete lack of sense, reason or civility so far on this thread.
This a complete quote by rich from his website that he has magaged to scare most people away from.
"Most people" being in fact synonymous with "Darrin", who left after a thread in which he was asked by the moderator to try and behave politely, which he took as a deadly insult
Darrin in his inimitable way has raised yet again a subject I thought was long settled. However, to recapitulate with the fruits of my most recent research – and some thought – we may find the following facts about the situation of M-4 tanks by the end of the war (VE-Day).
A.) Actual on hand and unit requirements were:
Total on hand with units of 12th AG as of 5 May 1945 was circa 3,738
Total T/E 12th AG as of 30 April 1945 was 4,184
Total on hand with units Seventh Army as of 30 April 1945 was 996
Total T/E Seventh Army as of 30 April 1945 was 1,029
Total T/E 15th AG as of 1 May 1945 was 561
Total T/E PTO as of 1 May 1945 was 789
Total T/E CONUS and en route was 240
Total on hand with units was circa 6,324
Total T/E with units was 6,731
B.) Known losses were:
Total Losses 12th AG to 12 May 1945 was 3,255
Total Losses 15th AG to 14 September 1944 was 588
Partial Losses 6th AG 15 August – 1 May 1945 was 295
Total Losses II Corps, Tunisia, 15 March-9 May 1943 was 60
Total Losses Seventh Army, Sicily was 8
Total Losses 1st AD, Tunisia, 14-21 February 1943 was 94
Total Known Losses was 4,300
C.) Reserves required and known reserves/transits were:
Reserves required for Seventh Army, 12th and 15th AG (total T/E 5,774) was set at 35% or 2,021
(As of 20 March 1945 12th AG reserve requirement was 1,704 of which 848 were in theater and another 2,629 were on release, but not received – i.e., were in CONUS)
(A total of 4,384 M-4 were received by ETOUSA – 6th and 12th AG – 1 February-20 May 1945)
(As of 29 April Seventh Army reserve requirement was 342 – including 2eme DB – of which 63 were on hand)
Reserves required for PTO (total T/E 789) at 35% = 276
Reserves required for CONUS (total T/E 240) at 0.5% = 12
Total reserve requirement was circa 2,309
D.) Total Lend-Lease shipped were:
Total Lend Lease shipped was 22,098 (It is difficult to identify when the last LL shipments went out. However, it is known that Britain had received 33,246 ‘tanks’ from “overseas,” including 5,381 Canadian production by the end of the 2nd QTR 1944. Given that the total ‘tanks’ shipped by the US to the Commonwealth –the only other source for ‘overseas’ tanks – were 30,267, then it seems likely that the bulk had been shipped by May 1945. ‘Tanks’ in this context included SP AT guns and SP artillery.)
Total other were:
E.) Total M-4 conversions through 2nd QTR 1945 to M-36, T-5 ARV and various MX was 3,610
F.) Total M-4 rebuilt 3rd QTR 44-2nd QTR 45 was 3,735 (no rebuilds are known to have reached a war theater)
Thus the total ‘consumption’ (total with units, total reserve requirement, total Lend-Lease, total in re-build, and total conversions) of M-4 through about 8 May 1945 was 42,376 (6,324+4,300+2,309+22,098+3,735+3,610).
G.) To this may be added all or part of those M-4 ‘just completed,’ which were:
1st QTR 1945 4,076
2nd QTR 1945 2,687
These last two (F and G) represent the bulk of the ‘intangibles’ in this equation. It may justly be said that G is probably partly duplicated in C (in transit), although those ‘recently built’ in E and F are excluded from G. However, we may also say that although B probably includes the bulk of the M-4 losses, it cannot be said to include all M-4 losses, and thus may balance any error in overstating the totals in E, F and G. Thus we may estimate that the total ‘consumption’ and ‘just completed’ M-4 to about 8 May 1945 was +/- 49,139. Given that total M-4 Production through 2nd QTR 1945 was 49,204, we may assume that the ‘balance sheet’ is substantially accounted for and that there are no ‘missing’ M-4. We may also fairly assume that the ‘excess’ of M-4 amounted to +/- 6,422 (the rebuilds known to have remained in the US and probably the bulk of the 2nd QTR production), most of which were likely in CONUS as of May 1945. Other sources have indicated that there were "7,000" M-4 in CONUS as of 1 February 1945. Given that 4,384 were shipped to ETOUSA after that, and that production was 4,096 February-April 1945, it is unlikely that the 'excess' could have been reduced much below 6,700 by 1 May 1945.
Although it appears likely that the ‘excess’ of M-4 in the US probably amounted to over 6,000 (it is still possible that my original off the cuff estimate of 9,000 could be valid), it cannot be claimed that the US Army had ‘more than they needed’ since the end-users – the units in the field – were still experiencing shortages through VE-Day. 12th AG was at 89.3 percent of T/E and Seventh Army was at 96.8 percent of T/E – even after many of the bottlenecks had been eliminated and after massive shipments (note the number received by ETOUSA) to rebuild the losses suffered that December and January had been received. Shortages during earlier periods had been severe and had been masked in part by expedients such as the decision to delay the replacement of 9 M-8 HMC Assault Guns in the armored divisions in December and the elimination of the 'replacement' tank sections in 2nd and 3rd AD.
One final requirement probably weighing on the minds of Army planners was that much of the armored force in the ETO and MTO were slated for the invasion of Japan. This may account for the retention of much the 'excess' in CONUS, since it was impracticable to ship tanks from Europe to US east coast ports, ship them by rail to the west coast and issue them to the units reconstituting for the invasion. In other words, they did in fact have to plan for at least 'one more war' - even if that war was never actually fought.
Of course, what this excursis has to do with supposed measures of effectiveness is beyond me.
Rich wrote:
From this must we assume that the US ...was... 4.48-times as effective as the German?
It seems you forgot to take your reality pills this moring.
And it seems that you fail to recognize facetiousness.
BTW, how can you one day argue that such a ratio calculated for German versus Allied tank losses is a valid measure, while on the next you argue that a similar calculation for German versus Allied SP gun losses is indicative of what I suppose you would term a "delisonal" [sic] mind?
Rich wrote:
As of 20 August First Army had operational:
865 M4 75mm
218 M4 76mm
69 M4 105mm
691 M5 37mm
As of 19 August Third Army had operational:
782 M4 75mm
17 M4 76mm
90 M4 105mm
365 M5 37mm
Another one of his delisusional ideas he continues to grab to is the allies had much smaller op numbers then they actually did. Even accourding to his numbers we have 3097 operational US tanks of all types on the 20th of aug.
Rich wrote:
BTW, as of last light on 31 July the British tank "fighting strengths" (i.e., operational strength) was:
First Canadian Army - 966
Second British Army - 1,554 (including 212 in 6th Gds Tk Bde, 133 in 31 Tk Bde, and 214 in 34 Tk Bde)
Note that types were not differentiated, although of course the bulk of those in the tank brigades were Churchills.
Plus at least 2520 op CW tanks on the night of the 31st of july. Op str is usually lower at last light then in the morning but we will ignore this small discrepency.
If we add togeather his op numbers for CW tanks on the 31st jul with his US op tanks on the 20th aug it would equal 5617.
Now obviously adding togeather data from 2 different dates creates a problem. The US op tank numbners would have been lower on the 31st jul compared to 20th aug. If I compare the ger numbers from the 1st of aug which were 1000 op tanks, TDs etc the actual ger number on the 20th of aug would be much lower at least partiaally balancing this effect. I would like to use the US numbers from the 1st of aug but rich did not provide this.
So we have about 5617 op US and CW tanks aginst 1000 op ger tanks, TDS, AGs etc.... The actual ratio of op tanks at the beg of is over 5 western alied tanks to each ger one. This is the adv in the beging of aug and prob incresed from this point as more allied units were landed during the war.
Darrin wrote:
Plus about 681 op M10 and M18 TDs if the avg op str for tanks held true for the TDs. Both these TDs had guns of the same pen proabilites and small quaites of HVAP ammo.
In truth the above numbers include the ger TDs AGs etc but leaves out the US TDs at least which see my post above may have numbered 681 op M10 and M18. That would make 6298 op US tanks and TDs of all types plus a certain number of CW tanks that I am unsure what it does or does not include.
That makes 6298 op allied tanks and TDs vs 1000 ger tanks, TDs, AGs etc. Increasing the ratio of op allied tanks to ger allied tanks to OVER 6 TIMES.
Anyone who does not see allied op adv as being EXTREMLY LARGE is certainly continues to deny reality. If over 6 times more op tanks is a shortage in the field then maybe he should define what his defination of shortage is.
Darrin wrote:Another one of his delisusional ideas he continues to grab to is the allies had much smaller op numbers then they actually did. Even accourding to his numbers we have 3097 operational US tanks of all types on the 20th of aug.
This gets weirder and weirder - as usual. Where did I ever state anything other than the breakdown of M-4 by Army and type? Have I ever claimed that the numbbers on 19/20 August were smaller?
Plus at least 2520 op CW tanks on the night of the 31st of july. Op str is usually lower at last light then in the morning but we will ignore this small discrepency.
Darrin, the British reported strengths as of "last light." That is not a "discrepency" it is a simple fact of life. The US reported strengths in the morning, typically as of 0600.
If I compare the ger numbers from the 1st of aug which were 1000 op tanks, TDs etc the actual ger number on the 20th of aug would be much lower at least partiaally balancing this effect. I would like to use the US numbers from the 1st of aug but rich did not provide this.
Uh darrin? How do you know that the Germans had 1,000 operational tanks on 1 August? And would you like to have the US strengths reported for 1 August?
Anyone who does not see allied op adv as being EXTREMLY LARGE is certainly continues to deny reality. If over 6 times more op tanks is a shortage in the field then maybe he should define what his defination of shortage is.
darrin, don't forget the M-5.
BTW, have I argued that the Allied versus German advantage wasn't great? If so, where? I seem to fail to find that argument put forward here by me. And you realize that you can't develope shortages in ratios - the ratio of Allied to German strengths has nothing to do with US Army shortages of medium tanks on hand to T/E strengths? They are two different subjects.
That makes 6298 op allied tanks and TDs vs 1000 ger tanks, TDs, AGs etc. Increasing the ratio of op allied tanks to ger allied tanks to OVER 6 TIMES.
Anyone who does not see allied op adv as being EXTREMLY LARGE is certainly continues to deny reality. If over 6 times more op tanks is a shortage in the field then maybe he should define what his defination of shortage is.
Probably the Germans should have recalled SS-Panzerdivision Gespenster from the eastern front, which in previous battles against the Soviets at the Ural area had achieved a casualty exchange ratio of approx. 1:238, as some usually very well informed members have laid out in this forum a while ago.
This was an outstanding combat record even against the inferior Soviet army and they should not have had a problem to achieve a casualty exchange ratio of at least 1:25 against the Americans, thereby rendering even the EXTREMELY LARGE allied advantage in tank numbers ineffective.
Rich wrote:
As of 20 August First Army had operational:
865 M4 75mm
218 M4 76mm
69 M4 105mm
691 M5 37mm
As of 19 August Third Army had operational:
782 M4 75mm
17 M4 76mm
90 M4 105mm
365 M5 37mm
Darrin wrote:
Plus about 681 op M10 and M18 TDs if the avg op str for tanks held true for the TDs. Both these TDs had guns of the same pen proabilites and small quaites of HVAP ammo.
The total number of op US tanks on the 20th of aug was 3097 plus about 681 op US TDs. This makes a total of 3778 op shermans, stuarts, M10 and M18 TDs.
In the back of Zetterlings Normandy book the est TOE for the US is 4267 units of all types. This may actually exceed richs actual op numbers by combat type but I will assume it doesn't.
We have accounted for at least 89% of the TOE in the operational numbers. This is an extremly high number for any other coutry during the war. It may have droped from 95% or so during the month but their would be nothing unusual about this during the fast fwd movment that happened this month.
Units don't get new tanks just because they broke down or were damaged ie non operational. They only get them when they are des. Perhaps a min of 5% of the allied tanks were not missing through des but were non operational. If we add togeather op and non op we might get 94% at the very least.
I mean aug was not a cake walk for the US. Rich says the US losses were highest in aug at about 665 des tanks plus an undetermined number of des TDs. For every western allied tank des at least one was put out of commision due to either breakdown or damage. That means perhaps 1650 US tanks were des or damage during this month. This represents 39% turnover in total number of TOE tanks in 1 month.
Normally thier is a delay between when a tank is des in the field. The tank is offical reported des to the replacment depot and new tanks arrived at the unit. During aug with the higher losses and longer dis to ship these tanks from the depot to the front it is completely normal that the op % of TOE droped to 89%.
One interesting point emerges. At what stage was a damaged tank removed from unit strength and was the issue of a replacement automatic or did it require staff authorisation? I've got no idea about the US system.
As I understand the UK system replacements tanks (and SP guns) were handled through the armoured delivery units. I'd guess a unit lost a tank when it was deemed beyond repair by the divisional workshop, they would probably have made this judgement based on the time needed. I'd also guess that tanks were 'controlled stores' and therefore dubject to staff control so replacement issues were not automatic.
There's no doubt the Brits were short of Shemans, evidence for this is gunner. In 1944 8 Army wanted more Shermans as Anti-gun gun tractors but were told none were available and they'd have to find them from their own resources. I've no idea what the mods were and would be interested if anyone can help. By way of a hint I refer to the little known 'Crusader Mk 3, Gun Tower Mk 1' that was issued to some corps anti-tank regiments (and perhaps one or two of those under GHQ/21 AG control).
Of course unit tank strengths also had to accomodate mechanical failures, many of which required work by divisional workshops. This too could lead to disparities about holdings of 'fit' tanks. For example during the pursuit from the Seine 21 AG lost 78 tanks to hostile action (this incl 3 Brit, 1 Cdn, 1 Pol Armd Divs + 8 Armd Bde), mechanical failures needing div workshop attention were a lot higher, in fact they were flying tank spares forward. Some 40% of the 78 were Polish.
" rich the form moderator who is one of the historians at TDI and has written books and done historical reserch for US army projects. He is the best expert I know on the ger and US army".
Is this the Darrin who describes himself thus:
"I have an undergrad in scinece and a masters and work in a res lab. I took a few history cources in university and served a few years as a junior officer in the army. I´m certainly not an expert on anything historiical but feel I am much better qualified then you"
Or comments:
"I folow his books better than you because I have more metal capacity in that regard."
The Darrin who writes:
"Aslo us scientist are not very good at speeling or even writing in full english. But we are very good at reading even dry text like what zetterling offers and anylzing numbers from the text. "
"I have more metal capacity in that regard".
"I have as much right to give my opinon as anyone else and mine seems more likly to be correct then someone who never went beyond high school. Its not scorn its knowledge, creditials and reality"
Bottom line is their is no point in trying to debate with Darrin. He knows he is right but we lesser beings fail to see it.
Darrin wrote:Normally thier is a delay between when a tank is des in the field. The tank is offical reported des to the replacment depot and new tanks arrived at the unit. During aug with the higher losses and longer dis to ship these tanks from the depot to the front it is completely normal that the op % of TOE droped to 89%.
RICHY RICH MYTH NUMBER 3 BUSTED !!!!!!!!!!!
Darrin, would you mind elucidating exactly what "myth" you think you have "busted"? You have restated the glaringly obvious, how is that "myth busting" - and when have I ever stated anything different? And if it is the third, which were numbers one and two?
). So it will probably be at least a year and maybe longer if I can't make a research trip to London this year (and I would like to get in one to Freiburg as well). So it goes.