Hello Sid
Interesting subject. I just have Rauchensteiner's Krieg in Österreich at hand and he states (unfortunately without source to verify) that the Gneisenau alert originally was to counter inner insurgencies, Allied air landings and things like guarding important objects. This sounds very much like the earlier Walküre order to me. From what I can gather, drafting the particular "Gneisenau" order was in the competence of the individual Wehrkreis and thus indeed an Ersatzheer task, probably under guidance of the B.d.E. who gave some guiding lines. Raucensteiner gives as an example that in September 1944, the Gneisenau order for WK XVII was changed due to the fact that the counter-insurgency domain was now given to the Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer (kind of a back to the roots for the SS, I might say). Also the meaning of the order now changed, it meant the move of the Ersatzheer into the Reichschutzstellung. I think this could be the pattern applied to other WK, too.
Cheers
Hans
Differences between Grenadier and Volksgrenadier Divisions?
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sid guttridge
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Hi Hans,
Thanks for that.
Walkure went through various phases. However, all had in common the emergency raising of units from the Ersatzheer before their normal training was complete. Walkure I was used in December 1941 to raise divisions to plug holes in the German front opposite Moscow. Walkure II was used to raise divisions for France in order to release other more experienced divisions for the Caucasus offensive in mid-1942. Walkure III, I think, raised several divisions in January 1944. Walkure IV seems to have been the raising of the Grenadier divisions in July 1944.
The internal security role seems to have become important after Stalingrad with Walkure III. However, apart from very local call-outs after the more devastating Allied air raids, when civil cohesion verged on collapse, the only attempt to use Walkure for internal security reasons seems to have been by the bomb plotters. All other Walkure call outs were to reinforce the Feldheer.
Walkure could only be declared by two people: Hitler or the head of the Ersatzheer, General Fromm. The bomb plotters were amongst Fromm's closest assistants. Both his immediate deputy and chief of staff (Stauffenberg) were at its core. By killing Hitler, the only remaining person who could call Walkure was Fromm. However, they failed to kill Hitler and Fromm checked by phone that Hitler was alive. Thereafter he wouldn't co-operate and the plot fell apart. Although signals ordering Walkure were sent out to every wehrkreis, the confusion at Ersatzheer HQ prevented most of them putting it into action to any degree. I believe only WKXVII (Vienna) saw any serious attempt to round up Nazis and this did not get very far.
A question: Do you know if later in the war Austrians were deliberately sent to Alt Reich divisions in order to keep them reliable? "The Oxford Companion to WWII" says that this happened, but when I wrote to the author asking about this, I got no reply. I know that Austrian military losses were slightly lower than for any Alt Reich wehrkreis. Were there signs of increasing Austrian military unreliability later in the war? Yugoslav partisans managed to recruit a battalion of Austrians, but only a company of Germans. If the Austrians did prove less reliable later in the war, were any measures taken to keep them in line?
Cheers,
Sid.
Thanks for that.
Walkure went through various phases. However, all had in common the emergency raising of units from the Ersatzheer before their normal training was complete. Walkure I was used in December 1941 to raise divisions to plug holes in the German front opposite Moscow. Walkure II was used to raise divisions for France in order to release other more experienced divisions for the Caucasus offensive in mid-1942. Walkure III, I think, raised several divisions in January 1944. Walkure IV seems to have been the raising of the Grenadier divisions in July 1944.
The internal security role seems to have become important after Stalingrad with Walkure III. However, apart from very local call-outs after the more devastating Allied air raids, when civil cohesion verged on collapse, the only attempt to use Walkure for internal security reasons seems to have been by the bomb plotters. All other Walkure call outs were to reinforce the Feldheer.
Walkure could only be declared by two people: Hitler or the head of the Ersatzheer, General Fromm. The bomb plotters were amongst Fromm's closest assistants. Both his immediate deputy and chief of staff (Stauffenberg) were at its core. By killing Hitler, the only remaining person who could call Walkure was Fromm. However, they failed to kill Hitler and Fromm checked by phone that Hitler was alive. Thereafter he wouldn't co-operate and the plot fell apart. Although signals ordering Walkure were sent out to every wehrkreis, the confusion at Ersatzheer HQ prevented most of them putting it into action to any degree. I believe only WKXVII (Vienna) saw any serious attempt to round up Nazis and this did not get very far.
A question: Do you know if later in the war Austrians were deliberately sent to Alt Reich divisions in order to keep them reliable? "The Oxford Companion to WWII" says that this happened, but when I wrote to the author asking about this, I got no reply. I know that Austrian military losses were slightly lower than for any Alt Reich wehrkreis. Were there signs of increasing Austrian military unreliability later in the war? Yugoslav partisans managed to recruit a battalion of Austrians, but only a company of Germans. If the Austrians did prove less reliable later in the war, were any measures taken to keep them in line?
Cheers,
Sid.
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Hans Weber
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Hello Sid
If you ask if I found direct evidence in original documents regarding the unreliability of Austrian troops, the answer is no. But I didn't exactly look for them, either. 2. Panzer Division, 9. Panzer Division and 44. ID all had big quotas of Austrians and I wouldn't rate them under unreliable units. 116. PD (not an Austrian unit) would be in a better position to earn this lable, however only due to its commander v. Schwerin, who was opposed to the Nazis. These 3 Panzer Divisions actually had a good combat record.
However, I found traces of what you said elsewhere. In Brettner's Die letzten Kämpfe des II. Weltkrieges (in Austria), there is an interesting report by Lt Hugo Pepper, member of Art.Ers.Abt. 109. He said this unit was moved at the end of 1944 from Brünn to Amstetten, Austria. He said this was due to the facts that it was considered as politically unreliable, that it was almost a 100% made from Austrians and that elements of the Austrian resistance in the WK XVII in high command functions wanted them to be at hand. The way he puts it, one might get the impression that political unreliable and beeing 100% Austrian could go hand in hand. The unit, also called Kampfgruppe Hollenstein, in due course made a insurrection at the close of the war, attacked Police and RAD installation and got into fighting with the SS and was dispersed. They were recognized later as partisans both by the US and the Russians, the report goes on.
HTH
Cheers
Hans
If you ask if I found direct evidence in original documents regarding the unreliability of Austrian troops, the answer is no. But I didn't exactly look for them, either. 2. Panzer Division, 9. Panzer Division and 44. ID all had big quotas of Austrians and I wouldn't rate them under unreliable units. 116. PD (not an Austrian unit) would be in a better position to earn this lable, however only due to its commander v. Schwerin, who was opposed to the Nazis. These 3 Panzer Divisions actually had a good combat record.
However, I found traces of what you said elsewhere. In Brettner's Die letzten Kämpfe des II. Weltkrieges (in Austria), there is an interesting report by Lt Hugo Pepper, member of Art.Ers.Abt. 109. He said this unit was moved at the end of 1944 from Brünn to Amstetten, Austria. He said this was due to the facts that it was considered as politically unreliable, that it was almost a 100% made from Austrians and that elements of the Austrian resistance in the WK XVII in high command functions wanted them to be at hand. The way he puts it, one might get the impression that political unreliable and beeing 100% Austrian could go hand in hand. The unit, also called Kampfgruppe Hollenstein, in due course made a insurrection at the close of the war, attacked Police and RAD installation and got into fighting with the SS and was dispersed. They were recognized later as partisans both by the US and the Russians, the report goes on.
HTH
Cheers
Hans
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sid guttridge
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Hi Hans,
That is completely new information to me. Many thanks.
I know that when the Austrian Army was first absorbed into the Wehrmacht in 1938, a point was made of ensuring that half the senior wehrkreis/corps and divisional commanders were German and half Austrian. Where the commander was German, his deputy was Austrian, and where the commander was Austrian his deputy was German. Whether this arrangement persisted during the war I do not know.
Furthermore, 2nd Panzer Division had its depot moved from Germany to Vienna, while the Austrian Schnelle Division was moved from Vienna to 2nd Panzer Division's old depot in Germany in order to form 4th Panzer Division. Thus, at least initially, 2nd Panzer Division was an implied potential occupation force in the Austrian capital. As I understand it, 2nd Panzer Division then began to induct Austrians and became a largely Austrian unit during the war.
On the whole, the Austrian units don't seem to have performed much below wider German standards. If they did perform slightly worse, it may be because conscription was introduced later in Austria and there was a lower proportion of trained Austrians at the outbreak of war. I think only one division of Austrian reservists could be formed in the winter of 1939-40, which was far below the Reich average.
One gets hints that Austrians were not trusted quite as fully as Alt Reich Germans, but there seems to be limited published evidence on the subject. I think there is a research paper in this for someone.
Cheers,
Sid.
That is completely new information to me. Many thanks.
I know that when the Austrian Army was first absorbed into the Wehrmacht in 1938, a point was made of ensuring that half the senior wehrkreis/corps and divisional commanders were German and half Austrian. Where the commander was German, his deputy was Austrian, and where the commander was Austrian his deputy was German. Whether this arrangement persisted during the war I do not know.
Furthermore, 2nd Panzer Division had its depot moved from Germany to Vienna, while the Austrian Schnelle Division was moved from Vienna to 2nd Panzer Division's old depot in Germany in order to form 4th Panzer Division. Thus, at least initially, 2nd Panzer Division was an implied potential occupation force in the Austrian capital. As I understand it, 2nd Panzer Division then began to induct Austrians and became a largely Austrian unit during the war.
On the whole, the Austrian units don't seem to have performed much below wider German standards. If they did perform slightly worse, it may be because conscription was introduced later in Austria and there was a lower proportion of trained Austrians at the outbreak of war. I think only one division of Austrian reservists could be formed in the winter of 1939-40, which was far below the Reich average.
One gets hints that Austrians were not trusted quite as fully as Alt Reich Germans, but there seems to be limited published evidence on the subject. I think there is a research paper in this for someone.
Cheers,
Sid.
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Hans Weber
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Hello Sid
Here is some info I have on the Officer corps of the Bundesheer. Of course, politics and race were the key factors if one wanted to keep the pension (which must have been far better than the one in the Bundesheer). Older officers were phased out, 55% of the generals had to take a leave, younger officers were considered to be able to learn the right way of thinking. In all, about 1600 out of 2128 were taken over. 50 Officers formerly expulsed from the Bundesheer as Nationalsocialists were let in again. Most of the officers had to move into the Altreich, but about 55% of the last levy of lieutenants could remain in Austria (Schottelius and Caspar, Deutsche Militärgeschichte, Band 4, p. 310). Hitler deliberatly decided against a seperation of the two armies and wanted Austrians and Germans mixed together.
Cheers
Hans
BTW: the Pz. Rgt 33 from 9. PD kept the "Prinz Eugen" tradition from the Bundesheer. Tanks of I./Pz. Rgt. 33 still sported a the silouette of Prinz Eugen on a horse taken from his monument on their turrets as late as December 1944.
Indeed 2nd Panzer was moved from Würzburg to Vienna. But wasn't the Austrian schnelle Division moved to St. Pölten, where it became the 4. leichte Division, which turned into 9. Panzer Division? Afaik, a brand new 4. Panzer Division was formed at Würzburg, from units of the former Austrian Heer and from the Reich proper.Furthermore, 2nd Panzer Division had its depot moved from Germany to Vienna, while the Austrian Schnelle Division was moved from Vienna to 2nd Panzer Division's old depot in Germany in order to form 4th Panzer Division. Thus, at least initially, 2nd Panzer Division was an implied potential occupation force in the Austrian capital. As I understand it, 2nd Panzer Division then began to induct Austrians and became a largely Austrian unit during the war
Here is some info I have on the Officer corps of the Bundesheer. Of course, politics and race were the key factors if one wanted to keep the pension (which must have been far better than the one in the Bundesheer). Older officers were phased out, 55% of the generals had to take a leave, younger officers were considered to be able to learn the right way of thinking. In all, about 1600 out of 2128 were taken over. 50 Officers formerly expulsed from the Bundesheer as Nationalsocialists were let in again. Most of the officers had to move into the Altreich, but about 55% of the last levy of lieutenants could remain in Austria (Schottelius and Caspar, Deutsche Militärgeschichte, Band 4, p. 310). Hitler deliberatly decided against a seperation of the two armies and wanted Austrians and Germans mixed together.
Cheers
Hans
BTW: the Pz. Rgt 33 from 9. PD kept the "Prinz Eugen" tradition from the Bundesheer. Tanks of I./Pz. Rgt. 33 still sported a the silouette of Prinz Eugen on a horse taken from his monument on their turrets as late as December 1944.
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sid guttridge
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Hi Hans,
You are absolutely right. I was going to make exactly that correction. 4th Panzer Divison included elements of both the Austrian Schnelle Division (KfJgBtl.1), 1st Infantry Division (IR.1, IKnAbt.1), 3rd Infantry Division (I & III/AR.3) and 4th Infantry Division(II/AR.4), but the bulk of the Schnelle Division went, as you correctly say, into 4th Light Division. Sorry.
Prinz Eugen was incredibly popular. Admiral Horthy of Hungary was invited by Hitler to launch the Kriegsmarine's heavy cruiser Prinze Eugen as he had fought the Turks on Hungarian soil. 7th SS Division bore his name and the Italians had a cavalry regiment named after him. Prinz Eugen seems to have been a universal central European hero - yet he was born in France, I think. He is even popular in the UK where he shared the honours at three of Marlborough's four great victories. Perhaps the EU should adopt him as its central military hero. Even the first two letters of his name are symbolic: EU!
Cheers,
Sid.
You are absolutely right. I was going to make exactly that correction. 4th Panzer Divison included elements of both the Austrian Schnelle Division (KfJgBtl.1), 1st Infantry Division (IR.1, IKnAbt.1), 3rd Infantry Division (I & III/AR.3) and 4th Infantry Division(II/AR.4), but the bulk of the Schnelle Division went, as you correctly say, into 4th Light Division. Sorry.
Prinz Eugen was incredibly popular. Admiral Horthy of Hungary was invited by Hitler to launch the Kriegsmarine's heavy cruiser Prinze Eugen as he had fought the Turks on Hungarian soil. 7th SS Division bore his name and the Italians had a cavalry regiment named after him. Prinz Eugen seems to have been a universal central European hero - yet he was born in France, I think. He is even popular in the UK where he shared the honours at three of Marlborough's four great victories. Perhaps the EU should adopt him as its central military hero. Even the first two letters of his name are symbolic: EU!
Cheers,
Sid.
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Hans Weber
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sid guttridge
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