Most sources I've read give the numbers for tanks engaged at Prokhorovka as roughly 700 German vs 850 Russian machines with losses about equal for both sides. Yet near as I can figure the SS Pz Divs couldn't have had more than 500 AFV (incl assault guns / pz jag) total even at the beginning of the battle of Kursk.
Where there attachments to make up the difference or is something wrong with these figures? Near as I can tell that engagement was strictly an SS battle and I'm unaware of any Heer units to make up the difference.
Also - re Panthers at Kursk. Usual figures are 200 for Lauchert's Brigade plus more with GD 1st Pz Bn and SS Pz Korps. I've seen a photo of a guy in SS camo waving on some panthers from the turret in what looks like a wheat field. Near as I can tell that was Das Reich. Did LAH and T-Div have any?
Where there any panthers with Model?
Can someone tell me the actual distribution of Panthers at Kursk? How many, who had them, etc.
Thanks
Reb
Kursk / Prokhorovka Questions
Moderator: sniper1shot
"The number of SS tanks actually involved in the battle has been variously reported as high as 700 by some authorities, while others have estimated between 300 to 600. Even before the Battle of Kursk began, however, the II SS Panzer Corps never had 500 tanks, much less 700. On July 4, the day before Operation Citadel was launched, Hausser's three divisions possessed a total of 327 tanks between them, plus a number of command tanks. By July 11, the II SS Panzer Corps had a total of 211 operational tanks--Totenkopf had 94 tanks, Leibstandarte had only 56 and Das Reich possessed just 61. Damaged tanks or tanks undergoing repairs are not listed. Only 15 Tiger tanks were still in action at Prochorovka, and there were no SS Panthers available. The battalions that were equipped with Panthers were still training in Germany in July 1943."
From a post in this thread made by esteemed forum member Timo W.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=39633
--Mike
From a post in this thread made by esteemed forum member Timo W.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=39633
--Mike
From an article written by George M. Nipe Jr.
(...) Prochorovka is one of the best-known of the many battles on the Eastern Front during World War II. It has been covered in articles, books and televised historical documentaries, but these accounts vary in accuracy; some are merely incomplete, while others border on fiction. In the generally accepted version of the battle, the three SS divisions attacked Prochorovka shoulder to shoulder, jammed into the terrain between the Psel and the railroad. A total of 500 to 700 German tanks, including dozens of Panzerkampfwagen Mark V Panther medium tanks with 75mm guns and Panzerkampfwagen Mark VI Tiger heavy tanks with deadly 88mm cannons, lumbered forward while hundreds of nimble Soviet T-34 medium tanks raced into the midst of the SS armor and threw the Germans into confusion. The Soviets closed with the panzers, negating the Tigers' 88mm guns, outmaneuvered the German armor and knocked out hundreds of German tanks. The Soviet tank force's audacious tactics resulted in a disastrous defeat for the Germans, and the disorganized SS divisions withdrew, leaving 400 destroyed tanks behind, including between 70 and 100 Tigers and many Panthers. Those losses smashed the SS divisions' fighting power, and as a result Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army had no chance to achieve even a partial victory in the south.
While it makes a dramatic story, nearly all of this battle scenario is essentially myth. Careful study of the daily tank strength reports and combat records of II SS Panzer Corps-- available on microfilm at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.--provides information that forces a historical reappraisal of the battle. These records show, first of all, that Hausser's corps began with far fewer tanks than previously believed and, more important, that they suffered only moderate losses on July 12, 1943. As those reports were intended to allow the corps commander to assess the combat strength of his divisions, they can be considered reasonably accurate. Considering that information, it seems that the Germans may have been near a limited success on the southern flank of the salient.
The number of SS tanks actually involved in the battle has been variously reported as high as 700 by some authorities, while others have estimated between 300 to 600. Even before the Battle of Kursk began, however, the II SS Panzer Corps never had 500 tanks, much less 700. On July 4, the day before Operation Citadel was launched, Hausser's three divisions possessed a total of 327 tanks between them, plus a number of command tanks. By July 11, the II SS Panzer Corps had a total of 211 operational tanks--Totenkopf had 94 tanks, Leibstandarte had only 56 and Das Reich possessed just 61. Damaged tanks or tanks undergoing repairs are not listed. Only 15 Tiger tanks were still in action at Prochorovka, and there were no SS Panthers available. The battalions that were equipped with Panthers were still training in Germany in July 1943.
On July 13, the day after the Battle of Prochorovka, Fourth Panzer Army reports declared that the II SS Panzer Corps had 163 operational tanks, a net loss of only 48 tanks. Actual losses were somewhat heavier, the discrepancy due to the gain of repaired tanks returned to action. Closer study of the losses of each type of tank reveals that the corps lost about 70 tanks on July 12. In contrast, Soviet tank losses, long assumed to be moderate, were actually catastrophic. In 1984, a history of the Fifth Guards Tank Army written by Rotmistrov himself revealed that on July 13 the army lost 400 tanks to repairable damage. He gave no figure for tanks that were destroyed or not available for salvage. Evidence suggests that there were hundreds of additional Soviet tanks lost. Several German accounts mention that Hausser had to use chalk to mark and count the huge jumble of 93 knocked-out Soviet tanks in the Leibstandarte sector alone. Other Soviet sources say the tank strength of the army on July 13 was 150 to 200, a loss of about 650 tanks. Those losses brought a caustic rebuke from Josef Stalin. Subsequently, the depleted Fifth Guards Tank Army did not resume offensive action, and Rotmistrov ordered his remaining tanks to dig in among the infantry positions west of the town.
Another misconception about the battle is the image of all three SS divisions attacking shoulder to shoulder through the narrow lane between the Psel and the rail line west of Prochorovka. Only Leibstandarte was aligned directly west of the town, and it was the only division to attack the town itself. The II SS Panzer Corps zone of battle, contrary to the impression given in many accounts, was approximately nine miles wide, with Totenkopf on the left flank, Leibstandarte in the center and Das Reich on the right flank. Totenkopf's armor was committed primarily to the Psel bridgehead and in defensive action against Soviet attacks on the Psel bridges. In fact, only Leibstandarte actually advanced into the corridor west of Prochorovka, and then only after it had thrown back initial Soviet attacks.
Early on July 12, Leibstandarte units reported a great deal of loud motor noise, which indicated massing Soviet armor. Soon after 5 a.m., hundreds of Soviet tanks, carrying infantry, rolled out of Prochorovka and its environs in groups of 40 to 50. Waves of T-34 and T-70 tanks advanced at high speed in a charge straight at the startled Germans. When machine-gun fire, armor-piercing shells and artillery fire struck the T-34s, the Soviet infantry jumped off and sought cover. Leaving their infantry behind, the T-34s rolled on. Those Soviet tanks that survived the initial clash with SS armor continued a linear advance and were destroyed by the Germans.
When the initial Soviet attack paused, Leibstandarte pushed its armor toward the town and collided with elements of Rotmistrov's reserve armor. A Soviet attack by the 181st Tank Regiment was defeated by several SS Tigers, one of which, the 13th (heavy) Company of the 1st SS Panzer Regiment, was commanded by 2nd Lt. Michael Wittmann, the most successful tank commander of the war. Wittmann's group was advancing in flank support of the German main attack when it was engaged by the Soviet tank regiment at long range. The Soviet charge, straight at the Tigers over open ground, was suicidal. The frontal armor of the Tiger was impervious to the 76mm guns of the T-34s at any great distance. The field was soon littered with burning T-34s and T-70s. None of the Tigers were lost, but the 181st Tank Regiment was annihilated. Late in the day, Rotmistrov committed his last reserves, elements of the V Mechanized Corps, which finally halted Leibstandarte.
Das Reich began its attack from several kilometers southwest of Prochorovka and was quickly engaged by aggressive battle groups of the II Tank Corps and II Guards Tank Corps. Fierce, somewhat confused fighting broke out all along the German division's axis of advance. Battle groups of 20 to 40 Soviet tanks, supported by infantry and ground-attack planes, collided with Das Reich regimental spearheads. Rotmistrov continued to throw armor against the division, and combat raged throughout the day, with heavy losses of Soviet armor. Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward, advancing into the night while suffering relatively light tank losses.
Meanwhile, on the left flank, Soviet First Tank Army elements unsuccessfully tried to crush Totenkopf's bridgehead. The SS division fought off the XXXI and X Tank Corps, supported by elements of the XXXIII Rifle Corps. In spite of the Soviet attacks, Totenkopf's panzer group drove toward a road that ran from the village of Kartaschevka, southeast across the river and into Prochorovka.
The fighting, characterized by massive losses of Soviet armor, continued throughout July 12 without a decisive success by either side--contrary to the accounts given in many well-known studies of the Eastern Front, which state that the fighting ended on July 12 with a decisive German defeat. These authors describe the battlefield as littered with hundreds of destroyed German tanks and report that the Soviets overran the SS tank repair units. In fact, the fighting continued around Prochorovka for several more days. Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward in the area south of the town until July 16. That advance enabled the III Panzer Corps to link up with the SS division on July 14 and encircle several Soviet rifle divisions south of Prochorovka. Totenkopf eventually reached the KartaschevkaProchorovka road, and the division took several tactically important hills on the north edge of its perimeter as well. Those successes were not exploited, however, due to decisions made by Adolf Hitler.
After receiving the news of the Allied invasion of Sicily, as well as reports of impending Soviet attacks on the Mius River and at Izyum, Hitler decided to cancel Operation Citadel. Manstein argued that he should be allowed to finish off the two Soviet tank armies. He had unused reserves, consisting of three experienced panzer divisions of XXIV Panzer Corps, in position for quick commitment. That corps could have been used to attack the Fifth Guards Tank Army in its flank, to break out from the Psel bridgehead or to cross the Psel east of Prochorovka. All of the available Soviet armor in the south was committed and could not be withdrawn without causing a collapse of the Soviet defenses. Manstein correctly realized that he had the opportunity to destroy the Soviet operational and strategic armor in the Prochorovka area.
Hitler could not be persuaded to continue the attack, however. Instead, he dispersed the divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps to deal with the anticipated Soviet diversionary attacks south of the BelgorodKharkov sector. On the night of July 17-18, the corps withdrew from its positions around Prochorovka. Thus, the battle for Prochorovka ended, not because of German tank losses (Hausser had over 200 operational tanks on July 17) but because Hitler lacked the will to continue the offensive. The SS panzer divisions were still full of fight; in fact, two of them continued to fight effectively in southern Russia for the rest of the summer.
Leibstandarte was ordered to Italy, but Das Reich and Totenkopf remained in the East. Those two divisions and the 3rd Panzer Division, which replaced Leibstandarte, were transferred to the Sixth Army area, where they conducted a counterattack from July 31 to August 2 that eliminated a strong Soviet bridgehead at the Mius River. Without pause, the three divisions were then transferred to the Bogodukhov sector in early August 1943. Under the command of the III Panzer Corps, they were joined by another unit, the Fifth SS Panzergrenadier Division Wiking. During three weeks of constant combat, the four divisions played a major role in stopping the main Soviet post-Kursk counteroffensive, Operation Rumyantsev. They fought Rotmistrov's Fifth Guards Tank Army, rebuilt to 503 tanks strong, and major portions of the First Tank Army, now at 542 tanks.
By the end of the month, Rotmistrov had less than 100 tanks still running. Katukov had only 120 tanks still in action by the last week of August. While at no time did any of the German divisions have more than 55 tanks in operation, they repeatedly blunted the thrusts of the two Soviet tank armies, which were also reinforced by several rifle corps.
Totenkopf repeatedly cut off and defeated all of the First Tank Army's thrusts toward the KharkovPoltava rail line. Das Reich threw back two Soviet tank corps south of Bogodukhov and blunted Rotmistrov's last major attack west of Kharkov, and the III Panzer Corps halted Operation Rumyantsev. (...)
(...) Prochorovka is one of the best-known of the many battles on the Eastern Front during World War II. It has been covered in articles, books and televised historical documentaries, but these accounts vary in accuracy; some are merely incomplete, while others border on fiction. In the generally accepted version of the battle, the three SS divisions attacked Prochorovka shoulder to shoulder, jammed into the terrain between the Psel and the railroad. A total of 500 to 700 German tanks, including dozens of Panzerkampfwagen Mark V Panther medium tanks with 75mm guns and Panzerkampfwagen Mark VI Tiger heavy tanks with deadly 88mm cannons, lumbered forward while hundreds of nimble Soviet T-34 medium tanks raced into the midst of the SS armor and threw the Germans into confusion. The Soviets closed with the panzers, negating the Tigers' 88mm guns, outmaneuvered the German armor and knocked out hundreds of German tanks. The Soviet tank force's audacious tactics resulted in a disastrous defeat for the Germans, and the disorganized SS divisions withdrew, leaving 400 destroyed tanks behind, including between 70 and 100 Tigers and many Panthers. Those losses smashed the SS divisions' fighting power, and as a result Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army had no chance to achieve even a partial victory in the south.
While it makes a dramatic story, nearly all of this battle scenario is essentially myth. Careful study of the daily tank strength reports and combat records of II SS Panzer Corps-- available on microfilm at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.--provides information that forces a historical reappraisal of the battle. These records show, first of all, that Hausser's corps began with far fewer tanks than previously believed and, more important, that they suffered only moderate losses on July 12, 1943. As those reports were intended to allow the corps commander to assess the combat strength of his divisions, they can be considered reasonably accurate. Considering that information, it seems that the Germans may have been near a limited success on the southern flank of the salient.
The number of SS tanks actually involved in the battle has been variously reported as high as 700 by some authorities, while others have estimated between 300 to 600. Even before the Battle of Kursk began, however, the II SS Panzer Corps never had 500 tanks, much less 700. On July 4, the day before Operation Citadel was launched, Hausser's three divisions possessed a total of 327 tanks between them, plus a number of command tanks. By July 11, the II SS Panzer Corps had a total of 211 operational tanks--Totenkopf had 94 tanks, Leibstandarte had only 56 and Das Reich possessed just 61. Damaged tanks or tanks undergoing repairs are not listed. Only 15 Tiger tanks were still in action at Prochorovka, and there were no SS Panthers available. The battalions that were equipped with Panthers were still training in Germany in July 1943.
On July 13, the day after the Battle of Prochorovka, Fourth Panzer Army reports declared that the II SS Panzer Corps had 163 operational tanks, a net loss of only 48 tanks. Actual losses were somewhat heavier, the discrepancy due to the gain of repaired tanks returned to action. Closer study of the losses of each type of tank reveals that the corps lost about 70 tanks on July 12. In contrast, Soviet tank losses, long assumed to be moderate, were actually catastrophic. In 1984, a history of the Fifth Guards Tank Army written by Rotmistrov himself revealed that on July 13 the army lost 400 tanks to repairable damage. He gave no figure for tanks that were destroyed or not available for salvage. Evidence suggests that there were hundreds of additional Soviet tanks lost. Several German accounts mention that Hausser had to use chalk to mark and count the huge jumble of 93 knocked-out Soviet tanks in the Leibstandarte sector alone. Other Soviet sources say the tank strength of the army on July 13 was 150 to 200, a loss of about 650 tanks. Those losses brought a caustic rebuke from Josef Stalin. Subsequently, the depleted Fifth Guards Tank Army did not resume offensive action, and Rotmistrov ordered his remaining tanks to dig in among the infantry positions west of the town.
Another misconception about the battle is the image of all three SS divisions attacking shoulder to shoulder through the narrow lane between the Psel and the rail line west of Prochorovka. Only Leibstandarte was aligned directly west of the town, and it was the only division to attack the town itself. The II SS Panzer Corps zone of battle, contrary to the impression given in many accounts, was approximately nine miles wide, with Totenkopf on the left flank, Leibstandarte in the center and Das Reich on the right flank. Totenkopf's armor was committed primarily to the Psel bridgehead and in defensive action against Soviet attacks on the Psel bridges. In fact, only Leibstandarte actually advanced into the corridor west of Prochorovka, and then only after it had thrown back initial Soviet attacks.
Early on July 12, Leibstandarte units reported a great deal of loud motor noise, which indicated massing Soviet armor. Soon after 5 a.m., hundreds of Soviet tanks, carrying infantry, rolled out of Prochorovka and its environs in groups of 40 to 50. Waves of T-34 and T-70 tanks advanced at high speed in a charge straight at the startled Germans. When machine-gun fire, armor-piercing shells and artillery fire struck the T-34s, the Soviet infantry jumped off and sought cover. Leaving their infantry behind, the T-34s rolled on. Those Soviet tanks that survived the initial clash with SS armor continued a linear advance and were destroyed by the Germans.
When the initial Soviet attack paused, Leibstandarte pushed its armor toward the town and collided with elements of Rotmistrov's reserve armor. A Soviet attack by the 181st Tank Regiment was defeated by several SS Tigers, one of which, the 13th (heavy) Company of the 1st SS Panzer Regiment, was commanded by 2nd Lt. Michael Wittmann, the most successful tank commander of the war. Wittmann's group was advancing in flank support of the German main attack when it was engaged by the Soviet tank regiment at long range. The Soviet charge, straight at the Tigers over open ground, was suicidal. The frontal armor of the Tiger was impervious to the 76mm guns of the T-34s at any great distance. The field was soon littered with burning T-34s and T-70s. None of the Tigers were lost, but the 181st Tank Regiment was annihilated. Late in the day, Rotmistrov committed his last reserves, elements of the V Mechanized Corps, which finally halted Leibstandarte.
Das Reich began its attack from several kilometers southwest of Prochorovka and was quickly engaged by aggressive battle groups of the II Tank Corps and II Guards Tank Corps. Fierce, somewhat confused fighting broke out all along the German division's axis of advance. Battle groups of 20 to 40 Soviet tanks, supported by infantry and ground-attack planes, collided with Das Reich regimental spearheads. Rotmistrov continued to throw armor against the division, and combat raged throughout the day, with heavy losses of Soviet armor. Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward, advancing into the night while suffering relatively light tank losses.
Meanwhile, on the left flank, Soviet First Tank Army elements unsuccessfully tried to crush Totenkopf's bridgehead. The SS division fought off the XXXI and X Tank Corps, supported by elements of the XXXIII Rifle Corps. In spite of the Soviet attacks, Totenkopf's panzer group drove toward a road that ran from the village of Kartaschevka, southeast across the river and into Prochorovka.
The fighting, characterized by massive losses of Soviet armor, continued throughout July 12 without a decisive success by either side--contrary to the accounts given in many well-known studies of the Eastern Front, which state that the fighting ended on July 12 with a decisive German defeat. These authors describe the battlefield as littered with hundreds of destroyed German tanks and report that the Soviets overran the SS tank repair units. In fact, the fighting continued around Prochorovka for several more days. Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward in the area south of the town until July 16. That advance enabled the III Panzer Corps to link up with the SS division on July 14 and encircle several Soviet rifle divisions south of Prochorovka. Totenkopf eventually reached the KartaschevkaProchorovka road, and the division took several tactically important hills on the north edge of its perimeter as well. Those successes were not exploited, however, due to decisions made by Adolf Hitler.
After receiving the news of the Allied invasion of Sicily, as well as reports of impending Soviet attacks on the Mius River and at Izyum, Hitler decided to cancel Operation Citadel. Manstein argued that he should be allowed to finish off the two Soviet tank armies. He had unused reserves, consisting of three experienced panzer divisions of XXIV Panzer Corps, in position for quick commitment. That corps could have been used to attack the Fifth Guards Tank Army in its flank, to break out from the Psel bridgehead or to cross the Psel east of Prochorovka. All of the available Soviet armor in the south was committed and could not be withdrawn without causing a collapse of the Soviet defenses. Manstein correctly realized that he had the opportunity to destroy the Soviet operational and strategic armor in the Prochorovka area.
Hitler could not be persuaded to continue the attack, however. Instead, he dispersed the divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps to deal with the anticipated Soviet diversionary attacks south of the BelgorodKharkov sector. On the night of July 17-18, the corps withdrew from its positions around Prochorovka. Thus, the battle for Prochorovka ended, not because of German tank losses (Hausser had over 200 operational tanks on July 17) but because Hitler lacked the will to continue the offensive. The SS panzer divisions were still full of fight; in fact, two of them continued to fight effectively in southern Russia for the rest of the summer.
Leibstandarte was ordered to Italy, but Das Reich and Totenkopf remained in the East. Those two divisions and the 3rd Panzer Division, which replaced Leibstandarte, were transferred to the Sixth Army area, where they conducted a counterattack from July 31 to August 2 that eliminated a strong Soviet bridgehead at the Mius River. Without pause, the three divisions were then transferred to the Bogodukhov sector in early August 1943. Under the command of the III Panzer Corps, they were joined by another unit, the Fifth SS Panzergrenadier Division Wiking. During three weeks of constant combat, the four divisions played a major role in stopping the main Soviet post-Kursk counteroffensive, Operation Rumyantsev. They fought Rotmistrov's Fifth Guards Tank Army, rebuilt to 503 tanks strong, and major portions of the First Tank Army, now at 542 tanks.
By the end of the month, Rotmistrov had less than 100 tanks still running. Katukov had only 120 tanks still in action by the last week of August. While at no time did any of the German divisions have more than 55 tanks in operation, they repeatedly blunted the thrusts of the two Soviet tank armies, which were also reinforced by several rifle corps.
Totenkopf repeatedly cut off and defeated all of the First Tank Army's thrusts toward the KharkovPoltava rail line. Das Reich threw back two Soviet tank corps south of Bogodukhov and blunted Rotmistrov's last major attack west of Kharkov, and the III Panzer Corps halted Operation Rumyantsev. (...)
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Roger Griffiths
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Panzeralex
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Re: Kursk / Prokhorovka Questions
Hi Reb and all.
The 200 Panthers under Pz. Rgt. 39 (von Lauchert) were assigned to the XLVIII Panzer-Korps of the 4. Panzer-Armee under Heersgruppe Sued.
On 4 July, the entire Pz.Rgt. 39, including Panzer Abteilung 51,52 and Pz.Rgt. Stab. 39 advanced to front line.
Pz.Brig.Stab. 10, commanded by Oberst Decker, was assigned to Pz.Gren.Div Grossdeutchland to take command of both Pz.Rgt. 39 and Pz.Rgt. GD.
On the morning of the offnsive on 5 July, the Pz.Rgt. 39 was attached to Pz.Gren.Div. GD under the command Brigade-Stab 10.
There were not any Panthers in Army Group Center during operation Zitadelle.
P.S. About russian tank losses west of Prokhorovka on 12 July.
1. 18 Tank Corps:
110 Tank Bde: 5 destroyed (burned) and 6 damaged - 11
170 Tank Bde: 7 and 22 - 29
181 Tank Bde: 14 and 13 - 27
36 Heavy Tank Rgt: 9 and 8 - 17
Total 18 TC: 35 and 49 - 84
2. 29 Tank Corps:
25 Tank Bde: 23 and 32 - 55
31 Tank Bde: 44 burned
32 Tank Bde: 36 and 18 - 54
1446 Art SP gun Rgt: 14 and 5 - 19
Total 29 TC: 103 and 50 - 153 tanks + 19 SP guns.
3. 2. Tank Corps:
Total: 8 and 14 - 22 tanks.
4. 2 Guard Tank Corps:
4 G.Tank Bde: 8 and 14 - 22
25 G.Tank Bde: 25 and 4 - 29
Total 2 G TC: 33 and 18 - 51
5. 5 Guard Mech. Corps.
Around 10 tanks (burned and damaged).
Total 5 Guard Tank Army:
Around 176 tanks (burned) and 122 tanks (damaged) + 19 SP guns (burned and damaged)
Best regards,
Panzeralex.
Reb wrote: Also - re Panthers at Kursk. Usual figures are 200 for Lauchert's Brigade plus more with GD 1st Pz Bn and SS Pz Korps. I've seen a photo of a guy in SS camo waving on some panthers from the turret in what looks like a wheat field. Near as I can tell that was Das Reich. Did LAH and T-Div have any?
Where there any panthers with Model?
Can someone tell me the actual distribution of Panthers at Kursk? How many, who had them, etc.
Thanks
Reb
The 200 Panthers under Pz. Rgt. 39 (von Lauchert) were assigned to the XLVIII Panzer-Korps of the 4. Panzer-Armee under Heersgruppe Sued.
On 4 July, the entire Pz.Rgt. 39, including Panzer Abteilung 51,52 and Pz.Rgt. Stab. 39 advanced to front line.
Pz.Brig.Stab. 10, commanded by Oberst Decker, was assigned to Pz.Gren.Div Grossdeutchland to take command of both Pz.Rgt. 39 and Pz.Rgt. GD.
On the morning of the offnsive on 5 July, the Pz.Rgt. 39 was attached to Pz.Gren.Div. GD under the command Brigade-Stab 10.
There were not any Panthers in Army Group Center during operation Zitadelle.
P.S. About russian tank losses west of Prokhorovka on 12 July.
1. 18 Tank Corps:
110 Tank Bde: 5 destroyed (burned) and 6 damaged - 11
170 Tank Bde: 7 and 22 - 29
181 Tank Bde: 14 and 13 - 27
36 Heavy Tank Rgt: 9 and 8 - 17
Total 18 TC: 35 and 49 - 84
2. 29 Tank Corps:
25 Tank Bde: 23 and 32 - 55
31 Tank Bde: 44 burned
32 Tank Bde: 36 and 18 - 54
1446 Art SP gun Rgt: 14 and 5 - 19
Total 29 TC: 103 and 50 - 153 tanks + 19 SP guns.
3. 2. Tank Corps:
Total: 8 and 14 - 22 tanks.
4. 2 Guard Tank Corps:
4 G.Tank Bde: 8 and 14 - 22
25 G.Tank Bde: 25 and 4 - 29
Total 2 G TC: 33 and 18 - 51
5. 5 Guard Mech. Corps.
Around 10 tanks (burned and damaged).
Total 5 Guard Tank Army:
Around 176 tanks (burned) and 122 tanks (damaged) + 19 SP guns (burned and damaged)
Best regards,
Panzeralex.
Minor correction here, Pz.Rgt. 39 (it only had one Abt. at this time) remained with 17 Pz. Div. near Slavyansk. Only the Rgt. staff was a part of 10 Pz.Brigade. In documents from the period the regiment is generally refered to as "Panzer Rgt. von Lauchert".On 4 July, the entire Pz.Rgt. 39, including Panzer Abteilung 51,52 and Pz.Rgt. Stab. 39 advanced to front line.
FWIW
Jerry
When you're in command..... command!
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Panzeralex
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Yes, you are right Jerry.Jerry wrote:Minor correction here, Pz.Rgt. 39 (it only had one Abt. at this time) remained with 17 Pz. Div. near Slavyansk. Only the Rgt. staff was a part of 10 Pz.Brigade. In documents from the period the regiment is generally refered to as "Panzer Rgt. von Lauchert".On 4 July, the entire Pz.Rgt. 39, including Panzer Abteilung 51,52 and Pz.Rgt. Stab. 39 advanced to front line.
FWIW
Jerry
Yes, the Prokhorovka issue is an interesting one. I wrote a good post about it a little while ago, I'll see if I can dig it up. It is interesting about the Soviet numbers and I have seen quite a few contradictions. Here is a link from The Russian Battlefield:
http://www.battlefield.ru/library/books ... sses2.html
It is very interesting when you see the numbers for 18th Tank Corps. They "left on the battlefield" 45 T34, of these 23 were "fully destroyed" and 10 were "evacuated", what about the other 12? Were they damaged and not evacuated or were they destroyed or what? The same with the T60/70, they "left on the battlefield" 44 and 11 were "evacuated", what about the other 33?
Anyways, these are some interesting questions that we must ask ourselves. I will see if I can find that post I made, I had all kinds of numbers and stats for both German and Soviet.
Cheers,
Wolfkin
http://www.battlefield.ru/library/books ... sses2.html
It is very interesting when you see the numbers for 18th Tank Corps. They "left on the battlefield" 45 T34, of these 23 were "fully destroyed" and 10 were "evacuated", what about the other 12? Were they damaged and not evacuated or were they destroyed or what? The same with the T60/70, they "left on the battlefield" 44 and 11 were "evacuated", what about the other 33?
Anyways, these are some interesting questions that we must ask ourselves. I will see if I can find that post I made, I had all kinds of numbers and stats for both German and Soviet.
Cheers,
Wolfkin
Amateurs limit their study to either Tactics, Strategy or Logistics. Professionals study ALL THREE of these!!!
Hello all!
I found my old post. Here is a "copy and paste" of an old post of mine. Enjoy!
"In the battle for Prokhorovka, it was the II SS Panzer Corps that attacked. The tank strength was 211 Panzers. But, not all of II SS Panzer Corps was engaged in the action West of Prokhorovka. Totenkopf was fighting with it's Panzer Regiment in a bridgehead North of the Psel at this time. Das Reich was South of the large railroad embankment and not involved West of Prokhorovka. Only the Leibstandarte was engaged West of Prokhorovka.
The Leibstandarte at this time had 4 PzKpfw II, 5 PzKpfw III, 47 PzKpfw IV, 4 PzKpfw VI and 7 PzBef. That is, 67 Panzers. They were attacked by the 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The 5th Guards had two other tank corps attached to them on that day, the 2nd Tank Corps and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, these two attacked Das Reich. Totenkopf was attacked by the 31st Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Army.
On that day, West of Prokhorovka 18th Tank Corps had 187 tanks; 21 Churchill, 103 T34 and 63 T70. 29th Tank Corps had 216 tanks; 1 KV, 130 T34 and 85 T70. This is 403 tanks. Not all of the 18th Tank Corps were committed that day though. I would say at least 300 of the 403 tanks available were committed. So, 300 Soviet tanks against the 67 Panzers of the Leibstandarte.
Losses for the Soviets were 51 tanks (30 written off) for 18th Tank Corps and 154 written off for 29th Tank Corps. That is about 184 tanks destroyed. The Leibstandarte on 13th July had 4 PzKpfw II, 5 Pzkpfw III, 31 PzKpfw IV, 3 PzKpfw VI and 7 PzBef. That is, 50 Panzers. A loss of 17 Panzers. So, 184 Red Army tanks for 17 German Panzers. Not quite what we are led to believe, eh?
There is still the actions that happened on July 12 that were not in the Prokhorovka area. This is what everyone mixes up with Prokhorovka, I believe. Totenkopf lost about 47 Panzers fighting in the Psel bridgehead area and Das Reich also saw heavy fighting in their area Southwest of Prokhorovka.
I have used numbers from some quotes that I have from the book Kursk: A Statistical Analysis by Zetterling. I do not have this book but a kind fellow gave me some info from it online a few years back. I also used The Leibstandarte Volume III by Lehmann and Decision In The Ukraine by Nipe. I never use only one source. I then compare the numbers and look for any differences and try decide which is more accurate. Most of the time, Soviet sources are good for their own numbers and German sources are good for their own numbers. But both do bad at guessing at each others numbers.
Y'all will notice something interesting about the numbers for the 18th Tank Corps. At the start of the battle they had 21 Churchill, 103 T34 and 63 T60/70. They "left on the battlefield" 9 Churchill, 45 T34 and 44 T60/70. Of these 7 Churchill and 23 T34 were "Fully Destroyed" and 10 T34 and 11 T60/70 were "evacuated". So, my question is...what about the other 2 Churchill, 12 T34 and 33 T60/70 that were "left on the battlefield"? Were they not repairable, not recoverable, abandoned or something?
These numbers come from here:
http://www.battlefield.ru/library/books ... sses2.html
Some people say that the Allied landing in Sicily caused German units to be moved. I believe that this is incorrect as well. One division, the Leibstandarte, was moved to Italy to help disarm the Italian Army. That is it. No, it was the Red Army's awesome use of Maskirovka that sent the German units running up and down the front chasing ghosts.
What happened is that on July 12 the Red Army launched an offensive in the Orel sector. On July 15 (or 17, can't remember which) the Red Army launched offensives in the Izyum and Mius sectors. German units were sent to these areas to help stop the Soviet attacks, with a result of the weakening of the Kursk area. Then, on August 3, in the now weakened Kursk area, the Red Army launches an offensive aimed around Belgorod.
For the Kursk battle itself, the German losses have been exaggerated, but they did get a bloody nose in some areas. In the North, Model's Army did not advance very far and were stopped. In the South, Manstein's Army Group advanced further and... maybe had a chance to keep going..who knows?
The Germans did in fact still advance after July 12, albeit only little gains. Leibstandarte and Das Reich each capturing a village here, a hill there and such. So, the Red Army did slow down and stop the German attack, but it was not the huge losses on the German side that is so often stated, instead the Red Army suffered the huge tank losses. The losses for the Germans in other areas were larger, I believe some German Panzer divisions losing up to half of their strength and such.
Anyways, it looks to me that the Red Army suffered great losses in stopping the German Army. The German Army suffered losses as well, just not as much as the Red Army. The Red Army High Command (Stavka) recognized that they would continue having a hard time so they launched attacks to pull the German strength away from Kursk. There we have the other offensives launched during July and August. So, the Germans may have had the better tactics and such but the Soviets sure had the strategy."
I hope this helps!
Cheers,
Wolfkin
I found my old post. Here is a "copy and paste" of an old post of mine. Enjoy!
"In the battle for Prokhorovka, it was the II SS Panzer Corps that attacked. The tank strength was 211 Panzers. But, not all of II SS Panzer Corps was engaged in the action West of Prokhorovka. Totenkopf was fighting with it's Panzer Regiment in a bridgehead North of the Psel at this time. Das Reich was South of the large railroad embankment and not involved West of Prokhorovka. Only the Leibstandarte was engaged West of Prokhorovka.
The Leibstandarte at this time had 4 PzKpfw II, 5 PzKpfw III, 47 PzKpfw IV, 4 PzKpfw VI and 7 PzBef. That is, 67 Panzers. They were attacked by the 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The 5th Guards had two other tank corps attached to them on that day, the 2nd Tank Corps and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, these two attacked Das Reich. Totenkopf was attacked by the 31st Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Army.
On that day, West of Prokhorovka 18th Tank Corps had 187 tanks; 21 Churchill, 103 T34 and 63 T70. 29th Tank Corps had 216 tanks; 1 KV, 130 T34 and 85 T70. This is 403 tanks. Not all of the 18th Tank Corps were committed that day though. I would say at least 300 of the 403 tanks available were committed. So, 300 Soviet tanks against the 67 Panzers of the Leibstandarte.
Losses for the Soviets were 51 tanks (30 written off) for 18th Tank Corps and 154 written off for 29th Tank Corps. That is about 184 tanks destroyed. The Leibstandarte on 13th July had 4 PzKpfw II, 5 Pzkpfw III, 31 PzKpfw IV, 3 PzKpfw VI and 7 PzBef. That is, 50 Panzers. A loss of 17 Panzers. So, 184 Red Army tanks for 17 German Panzers. Not quite what we are led to believe, eh?
There is still the actions that happened on July 12 that were not in the Prokhorovka area. This is what everyone mixes up with Prokhorovka, I believe. Totenkopf lost about 47 Panzers fighting in the Psel bridgehead area and Das Reich also saw heavy fighting in their area Southwest of Prokhorovka.
I have used numbers from some quotes that I have from the book Kursk: A Statistical Analysis by Zetterling. I do not have this book but a kind fellow gave me some info from it online a few years back. I also used The Leibstandarte Volume III by Lehmann and Decision In The Ukraine by Nipe. I never use only one source. I then compare the numbers and look for any differences and try decide which is more accurate. Most of the time, Soviet sources are good for their own numbers and German sources are good for their own numbers. But both do bad at guessing at each others numbers.
Y'all will notice something interesting about the numbers for the 18th Tank Corps. At the start of the battle they had 21 Churchill, 103 T34 and 63 T60/70. They "left on the battlefield" 9 Churchill, 45 T34 and 44 T60/70. Of these 7 Churchill and 23 T34 were "Fully Destroyed" and 10 T34 and 11 T60/70 were "evacuated". So, my question is...what about the other 2 Churchill, 12 T34 and 33 T60/70 that were "left on the battlefield"? Were they not repairable, not recoverable, abandoned or something?
These numbers come from here:
http://www.battlefield.ru/library/books ... sses2.html
Some people say that the Allied landing in Sicily caused German units to be moved. I believe that this is incorrect as well. One division, the Leibstandarte, was moved to Italy to help disarm the Italian Army. That is it. No, it was the Red Army's awesome use of Maskirovka that sent the German units running up and down the front chasing ghosts.
What happened is that on July 12 the Red Army launched an offensive in the Orel sector. On July 15 (or 17, can't remember which) the Red Army launched offensives in the Izyum and Mius sectors. German units were sent to these areas to help stop the Soviet attacks, with a result of the weakening of the Kursk area. Then, on August 3, in the now weakened Kursk area, the Red Army launches an offensive aimed around Belgorod.
For the Kursk battle itself, the German losses have been exaggerated, but they did get a bloody nose in some areas. In the North, Model's Army did not advance very far and were stopped. In the South, Manstein's Army Group advanced further and... maybe had a chance to keep going..who knows?
The Germans did in fact still advance after July 12, albeit only little gains. Leibstandarte and Das Reich each capturing a village here, a hill there and such. So, the Red Army did slow down and stop the German attack, but it was not the huge losses on the German side that is so often stated, instead the Red Army suffered the huge tank losses. The losses for the Germans in other areas were larger, I believe some German Panzer divisions losing up to half of their strength and such.
Anyways, it looks to me that the Red Army suffered great losses in stopping the German Army. The German Army suffered losses as well, just not as much as the Red Army. The Red Army High Command (Stavka) recognized that they would continue having a hard time so they launched attacks to pull the German strength away from Kursk. There we have the other offensives launched during July and August. So, the Germans may have had the better tactics and such but the Soviets sure had the strategy."
I hope this helps!
Cheers,
Wolfkin
Amateurs limit their study to either Tactics, Strategy or Logistics. Professionals study ALL THREE of these!!!
Kursk / Prokhorovka Questions
Thanks to all who took the trouble to reply. Relying on English language reference can be risky. Osprey shows me approx 250-300 AFV for II SS Pz Korps at beginning of the battle - then quotes that 700 figure for prokorovka. I've seen the same figures elsewhere.
I suspect that writers (even Paul Carrel who sometimes seems to think he is Sven Hassel) just like hyperbole. I'm not knocking Carrel - the book that got me interested in this many years ago was his Foxes of the Desert.
Re suspending Kursk because of Sicily. I'd have to say that from Hitler's table talk and other sources he was genuinely panicked by the Allied invasion - although ultimately he did only sent LAH to Italy.
I've recently read two books by Michael Reynolds about I SS Pz Korps which got me really questioning much of what I'd read previously - for instance the many books that state the Germans were at 'full strength' in the Ardennes! A division (LAH) short of over 1000 officers and nco's with no time for tank training and fielding only one integral pz battalion and virutally no SP artillery is hardly full strength!
Alternately - Reynolds suggests the HJ and Pz Lehr where nowhere near as 'wiped out' as previously suggested by many authors (in Normandy).
Data on this site support that. What to believe eh?
One more eye-opener that may provoke comment - I saw a picture recently that showed a Panther that had purportedly been hit six times by a M-36 Jackson (90mm) in the frontal armour at 600 metres. Only one shot penetrated. Six hundred metres is pretty close... Can't be sure of these captions of course, but if true it reinforces my conclusion that most of the heavier German armour was lost due to the pace of battle rather than the weight of shot - at least in the West!
For more on that I can refer to War As I Knew It by Patton himself - his claims of knocked out Panthers make me wonder just where the Germans were getting all the darn things! Reading between the lines - I think most of them were just over-run due to breakdown or fuel issues. At the end of the war for example - all tanks in Patton's zone of operations were "casualties." Not detracting from Patton, a favorite general of mine, but the vets I've talked from the ETO speak reverently of the German tanks - you can hear in their voices how it must of been to face them in a Sherman or from a foxhole.
cheers
reb
I suspect that writers (even Paul Carrel who sometimes seems to think he is Sven Hassel) just like hyperbole. I'm not knocking Carrel - the book that got me interested in this many years ago was his Foxes of the Desert.
Re suspending Kursk because of Sicily. I'd have to say that from Hitler's table talk and other sources he was genuinely panicked by the Allied invasion - although ultimately he did only sent LAH to Italy.
I've recently read two books by Michael Reynolds about I SS Pz Korps which got me really questioning much of what I'd read previously - for instance the many books that state the Germans were at 'full strength' in the Ardennes! A division (LAH) short of over 1000 officers and nco's with no time for tank training and fielding only one integral pz battalion and virutally no SP artillery is hardly full strength!
Alternately - Reynolds suggests the HJ and Pz Lehr where nowhere near as 'wiped out' as previously suggested by many authors (in Normandy).
Data on this site support that. What to believe eh?
One more eye-opener that may provoke comment - I saw a picture recently that showed a Panther that had purportedly been hit six times by a M-36 Jackson (90mm) in the frontal armour at 600 metres. Only one shot penetrated. Six hundred metres is pretty close... Can't be sure of these captions of course, but if true it reinforces my conclusion that most of the heavier German armour was lost due to the pace of battle rather than the weight of shot - at least in the West!
For more on that I can refer to War As I Knew It by Patton himself - his claims of knocked out Panthers make me wonder just where the Germans were getting all the darn things! Reading between the lines - I think most of them were just over-run due to breakdown or fuel issues. At the end of the war for example - all tanks in Patton's zone of operations were "casualties." Not detracting from Patton, a favorite general of mine, but the vets I've talked from the ETO speak reverently of the German tanks - you can hear in their voices how it must of been to face them in a Sherman or from a foxhole.
cheers
reb
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Panzeralex
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Something else about II SS-Pz.K.
Panzers strength in II SS-Pz.Korps on 1 July 1943. (including AFVs in short-term repair)
LSSAH: 3 Pz. I, 4 Pz II, 13 Pz. III, 83 Pz. IV, 13 Pz. VI and 35 StuG 40, 21 Marder, 6 Hummel, 12 Wespe, 12 Bison
DR: 1 Pz. I, 70 Pz. III, 33 Pz. IV, 14 Pz. VI and 34 StuG 40, 26 T-34 (used as anti-tank SP gun), 12 Marder, 6 Hummel, 12 Wespe, 12 Bison.
T: 63 Pz. III, 52 Pz. IV, 15 Pz. VI and 35 StuG 40, 8 Marder, 6 Hummel, 12 Wespe.
Total in II SS-Pz.K:
4 Pz. I, 4 Pz. II, 146 Pz. III, 168 Pz. IV, 42 Pz. VI, 104 StuG 40 and 26 T-34, 41 Marder, 18 Hummel, 36 Wespe, 24 Bison
Best regards,
Panzeralex.
Panzers strength in II SS-Pz.Korps on 1 July 1943. (including AFVs in short-term repair)
LSSAH: 3 Pz. I, 4 Pz II, 13 Pz. III, 83 Pz. IV, 13 Pz. VI and 35 StuG 40, 21 Marder, 6 Hummel, 12 Wespe, 12 Bison
DR: 1 Pz. I, 70 Pz. III, 33 Pz. IV, 14 Pz. VI and 34 StuG 40, 26 T-34 (used as anti-tank SP gun), 12 Marder, 6 Hummel, 12 Wespe, 12 Bison.
T: 63 Pz. III, 52 Pz. IV, 15 Pz. VI and 35 StuG 40, 8 Marder, 6 Hummel, 12 Wespe.
Total in II SS-Pz.K:
4 Pz. I, 4 Pz. II, 146 Pz. III, 168 Pz. IV, 42 Pz. VI, 104 StuG 40 and 26 T-34, 41 Marder, 18 Hummel, 36 Wespe, 24 Bison
Best regards,
Panzeralex.
Last edited by Panzeralex on Thu Jan 22, 2004 4:43 am, edited 1 time in total.
Hello Panzeralex!
Thanks for the great information on II SS Panzer Corps! I have the number of Panzers in each Division but did not have the numbers of SP Artillery, SP Panzerjager and StuG! Thanks again, this information will be a good addition to what I have.
Cheers,
Wolfkin
Thanks for the great information on II SS Panzer Corps! I have the number of Panzers in each Division but did not have the numbers of SP Artillery, SP Panzerjager and StuG! Thanks again, this information will be a good addition to what I have.
Cheers,
Wolfkin
Amateurs limit their study to either Tactics, Strategy or Logistics. Professionals study ALL THREE of these!!!
-
Panzeralex
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- Location: Moscow
Hallo,
Ok, Wolfkin.
Some correct
1. There were 3 Marders handed over to Totenkopf from 7 Pz.D on the 2nd July.
And there were 11 Marder in Totenkopf on 3 July and later.
2. About Pz. II.
There were only 4 Pz. II in LSSAH.
But there were 3 Pz. I in LSSAH and 1 Bef.Pz. I in Das Reich.
3. About Pz. III Beob.
I don't know about all Divisions, but there were 8 Pz. III Beob (which not included in my early post) in LSSAH.
4. There was 1 Pz. IV Munitions in LSSAH.
Best regards,
Panzeralex.
Ok, Wolfkin.
Some correct
1. There were 3 Marders handed over to Totenkopf from 7 Pz.D on the 2nd July.
And there were 11 Marder in Totenkopf on 3 July and later.
2. About Pz. II.
There were only 4 Pz. II in LSSAH.
But there were 3 Pz. I in LSSAH and 1 Bef.Pz. I in Das Reich.
3. About Pz. III Beob.
I don't know about all Divisions, but there were 8 Pz. III Beob (which not included in my early post) in LSSAH.
4. There was 1 Pz. IV Munitions in LSSAH.
Best regards,
Panzeralex.
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Roger Griffiths
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Panzeralex
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- Location: Moscow