Hi Benoit -
I think SOMEBODY had to test the waters - so to speak.
Without the knowledge gained from Dieppe (and there was alot) - how smoothly would the D-Day invasion have gone ?
Sad, but true, fact of warfare - if you can, always test your enemy for weak points in his defence: saves lives in the long run.
As to Harry taking no guff from Monty - my father-in-law has recounted several instances where Harry and Monty butted heads. Some of these he was an eye/ear witness to. One time Gen.Crerar was supposed to meet Monty at a certain time back at Cdn.HQs but was late because he was "out in the field with the troops - who were expecting him". Monty tore a strip off Crerar, but Crerar shot back at him that "my troops will always come before ANY visit by YOU or any other staff officer!". They then adjourned to a nearby tent (father-in-law says there were alot of open mouthed Capts and Majs standing around) to finish their discussion.
Father-in-law says after a long, and very loud, discussion - they both emerged red faced and parted company! He has other stories also.
Not taking anything away from Monty, or any other officer who reaches similiar rank during wartime! The burden of resposibility I can only imagine!
regards -
Dieppe raid
Moderator: sniper1shot
Dieppe
Seems to me that the Anglo/American invasion of North Africa, Sicily and Italy, coupled with the lessons the Americans learned in their Pacific island hopping campaigns all were brought together for the Normandy campaign.
The Dieppe landing, (Recon in force?), are from everything that I have read a botched affair.
Political pressure from Ottawa to 'get the boys involved' and London wanting to test the waters, so to speak, on the other side of the channel, on a shoestring budget created a fiasco.
The Dieppe landing, (Recon in force?), are from everything that I have read a botched affair.
Political pressure from Ottawa to 'get the boys involved' and London wanting to test the waters, so to speak, on the other side of the channel, on a shoestring budget created a fiasco.
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Freiritter
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sid guttridge
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Hi Guys,
As I understand it, the Dieppe raid was mounted to see if it was practical to capture a significant port intact by direct assault. Ports were thought necessary by both sides to speed the build-up of any invasion force and the Germans concentrated their main defences near them.
It seems that Dieppe taught the Allies that a direct assault on a port was not a viable option and they concentrated on developing means of supplying their forces over open beaches. The most obvious results of this were the two artificial Mulberry harbours and the PLUTO (pile-line under the ocean) oil pipe used in Normandy and the various specialist armoured vehicles developed for the invasion.
Dieppe was a very definite defeat for the Allies, but it was not wasted because the correct lessons seem to have been drawn from it by the British and Canadians, but not by the Germans, who continued to assume that major ports were indispensable to the Allies. Over 60,000 German troops were lost to the main German order-of-battle in late 1944 by a decision to hold the French Atlantic and Channel ports behind Allied lines on the mistaken assumption that they were vital to the Allied build-up. They were not and the French sealed them off with under equipped ex-maquisards for the rest of the war.
With regard to the after-action report by 302nd or 320th Division, it seems to me probable that it would have been circulated widely amongst other divisions holding the Atlantic and Channel Coasts and that multiple copies may have been available. The Russians need not have captured the division's own copy.
As for Mountbatten, his post facto rationalisation that for every life lost a Dieppe ten were saved in Normandy, although possibly true, doesn't exonerate him from ultimate responsibility for the debacle at Dieppe, however much he might squirm to avoid it.
Cheers,
Sid.
As I understand it, the Dieppe raid was mounted to see if it was practical to capture a significant port intact by direct assault. Ports were thought necessary by both sides to speed the build-up of any invasion force and the Germans concentrated their main defences near them.
It seems that Dieppe taught the Allies that a direct assault on a port was not a viable option and they concentrated on developing means of supplying their forces over open beaches. The most obvious results of this were the two artificial Mulberry harbours and the PLUTO (pile-line under the ocean) oil pipe used in Normandy and the various specialist armoured vehicles developed for the invasion.
Dieppe was a very definite defeat for the Allies, but it was not wasted because the correct lessons seem to have been drawn from it by the British and Canadians, but not by the Germans, who continued to assume that major ports were indispensable to the Allies. Over 60,000 German troops were lost to the main German order-of-battle in late 1944 by a decision to hold the French Atlantic and Channel ports behind Allied lines on the mistaken assumption that they were vital to the Allied build-up. They were not and the French sealed them off with under equipped ex-maquisards for the rest of the war.
With regard to the after-action report by 302nd or 320th Division, it seems to me probable that it would have been circulated widely amongst other divisions holding the Atlantic and Channel Coasts and that multiple copies may have been available. The Russians need not have captured the division's own copy.
As for Mountbatten, his post facto rationalisation that for every life lost a Dieppe ten were saved in Normandy, although possibly true, doesn't exonerate him from ultimate responsibility for the debacle at Dieppe, however much he might squirm to avoid it.
Cheers,
Sid.
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Jason Pipes
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Much has been made about the so called "lessons" learned at Dieppe. The sad fact is, I believe, that the touting of those lessons is ex post facto justification for what was simply a bloody shambles.
The first point to be made is that it is clear from the record that the original reason for undertaking the raid in the first place was NOT to learn some lessons. Primarily, it was meant to keep pressure on the Germans in the West in order to (at least try) to relieve the pressure on the Russians in the East. Remember the context in which the decision making about Dieppe was made -- spring/summer of 1942. What was going on then? It had just become clear that the slight reverses of the Germans' first winter in Russia were not critical, and indeed the Germans had just broken through on the southern portions of the eastern front and were streaming forwards in the face of only scattered Russian remmenents. The Anglo-American leadership was seriously terrified that Russia was about to collapse, which was not an unreasonable expectation. After all, that is what had happened in 1917 (everyone who goes on about how the Germans could never have won on the Eastern front in WW II due to the vast distances and huge populace forgets that). Also, now that the archives in Moscow are starting to open up, it is becoming clear that Stalin et al were indeed at least contemplating a seperate peace at that time. Just imagine what that would have meant -- at least 200 German divisions available to garrison the West. We would NEVER have been able to contemplate an OVERLORD. Anything -- and I mean ANYTHING -- that might have even a distant chance of forestalling that was a risk the leadership was willing to run.
Not to sound callous, but viewed that way, the loss of a few battalions of brave but unblooded Canadian infantry is a small price to pay.
Of course, the raid almost certainly did nothing to relieve the pressure on Russia, but that's not the relevant point here. My point is that the failure was at the operational level (ie those planning the raid); at the strategic level the decision to make a raid like that is not only understandable, it is over-powering. They had to do something beyond small unit commando raids to strike back, even at the risk of losing the entire raiding force.
Of course, none of that really excuses the bullocks at the operational level of the planning for the actual raid. That is just a sad story, the moral of which I think is that in desperate circumstances, under great pressure, do not expect great results.
As to the lessons learned -- of course the participants extoll this. How else to console the widows and orphans, mothers and fathers? However, there is no great evidence in the record that the OVERLORD planners relied overmuch on the lessons learned from Dieppe. And anyway, all of the lessons are obvious anyway. They were truisms then and they're truisms now.
For instance -- one of the oft cited "lessons" is: don't attempt amphibious assaults against beaches overlooked by defended cliffs. But aside from the fact that that is so obvious everyone knew it before, one of the D-Day invasion beaches was in fact overlooked by defended cliffs -- OMAHA (as portrayed in the opening sequence of Saving Private Ryan). So why did they do it? Because OMAHA was right in the middle of beaches and if they hadn't they would not have had a continuous beach-head. They decided on a five div assault in order to land with enough strength, and so they needed a stretch of coastline wide enough for that. And there just is no stretch of coast line that wide that does not include unfavourable portions. So ... US 1st and 29th Infantry divisions drew the short straw and had to assault a defended beach overlooked by defended cliffs.
The other major "lesson learned" usually touted from Dieppe was the importance of fire support, from bombers and naval gunfire. First point here is that this was not "learned" only as a result of Dieppe. Once again it was a simple truism, so much so that the Dieppe planners had WANTED such support, but for various reasons (some good, some bad) it just wasn't available in August 1942. (Back to the simple fact that the Allied situation was desperate that summer. Aircraft were not available and battleships couldn't be risked in the Channel.)
Furthermore, the trend of modern scholarship is to review the importance of that fire support in any case. Most of it was ineffective, or at least, not destructive (although probably suppressive). The pillboxes and gunpositions were generally not destroyed by either airbombardment or naval gunfire. It was the determined action of scattered small units of Allied infantry who worked their way forward on that desperate day.
Probably the critical difference in this regard between Dieppe and D-Day was simply the weight behind the original assault. Dieppe featured a single infantry division making essentially a single first wave. Not surprisingly, that first wave failed in assaulting a well defended coastline.
D-Day featured multiple corps making successive waves of assault. In fact, the first wave on D-Day didn't really fare any better than the first wave at Dieppe. The critical difference was that at Dieppe there were no subsequent waves to keep the pressure up and push on. On D-Day there was.
The sad fact is that in a total war with an enemy like the Third Reich there are no easy ways. As the Duke of Wellington said at Waterloo:
The first point to be made is that it is clear from the record that the original reason for undertaking the raid in the first place was NOT to learn some lessons. Primarily, it was meant to keep pressure on the Germans in the West in order to (at least try) to relieve the pressure on the Russians in the East. Remember the context in which the decision making about Dieppe was made -- spring/summer of 1942. What was going on then? It had just become clear that the slight reverses of the Germans' first winter in Russia were not critical, and indeed the Germans had just broken through on the southern portions of the eastern front and were streaming forwards in the face of only scattered Russian remmenents. The Anglo-American leadership was seriously terrified that Russia was about to collapse, which was not an unreasonable expectation. After all, that is what had happened in 1917 (everyone who goes on about how the Germans could never have won on the Eastern front in WW II due to the vast distances and huge populace forgets that). Also, now that the archives in Moscow are starting to open up, it is becoming clear that Stalin et al were indeed at least contemplating a seperate peace at that time. Just imagine what that would have meant -- at least 200 German divisions available to garrison the West. We would NEVER have been able to contemplate an OVERLORD. Anything -- and I mean ANYTHING -- that might have even a distant chance of forestalling that was a risk the leadership was willing to run.
Not to sound callous, but viewed that way, the loss of a few battalions of brave but unblooded Canadian infantry is a small price to pay.
Of course, the raid almost certainly did nothing to relieve the pressure on Russia, but that's not the relevant point here. My point is that the failure was at the operational level (ie those planning the raid); at the strategic level the decision to make a raid like that is not only understandable, it is over-powering. They had to do something beyond small unit commando raids to strike back, even at the risk of losing the entire raiding force.
Of course, none of that really excuses the bullocks at the operational level of the planning for the actual raid. That is just a sad story, the moral of which I think is that in desperate circumstances, under great pressure, do not expect great results.
As to the lessons learned -- of course the participants extoll this. How else to console the widows and orphans, mothers and fathers? However, there is no great evidence in the record that the OVERLORD planners relied overmuch on the lessons learned from Dieppe. And anyway, all of the lessons are obvious anyway. They were truisms then and they're truisms now.
For instance -- one of the oft cited "lessons" is: don't attempt amphibious assaults against beaches overlooked by defended cliffs. But aside from the fact that that is so obvious everyone knew it before, one of the D-Day invasion beaches was in fact overlooked by defended cliffs -- OMAHA (as portrayed in the opening sequence of Saving Private Ryan). So why did they do it? Because OMAHA was right in the middle of beaches and if they hadn't they would not have had a continuous beach-head. They decided on a five div assault in order to land with enough strength, and so they needed a stretch of coastline wide enough for that. And there just is no stretch of coast line that wide that does not include unfavourable portions. So ... US 1st and 29th Infantry divisions drew the short straw and had to assault a defended beach overlooked by defended cliffs.
The other major "lesson learned" usually touted from Dieppe was the importance of fire support, from bombers and naval gunfire. First point here is that this was not "learned" only as a result of Dieppe. Once again it was a simple truism, so much so that the Dieppe planners had WANTED such support, but for various reasons (some good, some bad) it just wasn't available in August 1942. (Back to the simple fact that the Allied situation was desperate that summer. Aircraft were not available and battleships couldn't be risked in the Channel.)
Furthermore, the trend of modern scholarship is to review the importance of that fire support in any case. Most of it was ineffective, or at least, not destructive (although probably suppressive). The pillboxes and gunpositions were generally not destroyed by either airbombardment or naval gunfire. It was the determined action of scattered small units of Allied infantry who worked their way forward on that desperate day.
Probably the critical difference in this regard between Dieppe and D-Day was simply the weight behind the original assault. Dieppe featured a single infantry division making essentially a single first wave. Not surprisingly, that first wave failed in assaulting a well defended coastline.
D-Day featured multiple corps making successive waves of assault. In fact, the first wave on D-Day didn't really fare any better than the first wave at Dieppe. The critical difference was that at Dieppe there were no subsequent waves to keep the pressure up and push on. On D-Day there was.
The sad fact is that in a total war with an enemy like the Third Reich there are no easy ways. As the Duke of Wellington said at Waterloo:
Hard pounding this; let us see who will pound longest.
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John Kilmartin
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Heimdal
It has always been my understanding that while the Canadian component of the operation was an abject failure the Commando component was a success. That is to say vital intelligence was collected on the German equivalent to radar (not being a really technical person I can't explain the supposed differences between the two) as well as destroying the actual installation near Dieppe.
I don't know if the Allies in gerneral learned a lot from Dieppe but the Canadians seem to have. While around four thousand of a six thousand man force were either wounded, killed or captured at Dieppe only about a thousand men became similar casualties in the D-day landing.
I don't know if the Allies in gerneral learned a lot from Dieppe but the Canadians seem to have. While around four thousand of a six thousand man force were either wounded, killed or captured at Dieppe only about a thousand men became similar casualties in the D-day landing.
' Strip war of the mantle of its glories and excitement, and it will disclose a gibbering ghost of pain , grief, dissappointment and despair'
Alas, the fact that while we lost approx 4,000 at Dieppe and only a thousand on D-Day does not prove any such thing.I don't know if the Allies in gerneral learned a lot from Dieppe but the Canadians seem to have. While around four thousand of a six thousand man force were either wounded, killed or captured at Dieppe only about a thousand men became similar casualties in the D-day landing.
This is a classic example of the post hoc ergo proctor hoc fallacy in historical reasoning -- "after the fact, therefore because of the fact".
Perhaps other factors explain the failure at Dieppe. Perhaps other factors explain the subsequent success on D-Day. One has to examine the specifics, and show some cause and effect relationship.
In that regard -- it would be odd to claim that "the Canadians" learned from Dieppe while the British and Americans did not, since the Canadians neither planned nor had any real independent control over either event.[/quote]
Dieppe between Monty and Zhukov
agree. That was a Soviet style of waging war.PaulJ wrote:Much has been made about the so called "lessons" learned at Dieppe. The sad fact is, I believe, that the touting of those lessons is ex post facto justification for what was simply a bloody shambles
Agree that Montgomery was no Batman. But all his record as a WWII commander demonstrates to me what respecting the lives of own soldiers is all about. Zhukov marks the opposite end of the scale, and this is where I would locate Dieppe.
JohnKilmartin wrote:I don't know if the Allies in gerneral learned a lot from Dieppe but the Canadians seem to have. While around four thousand of a six thousand man force were either wounded, killed or captured at Dieppe only about a thousand men became similar casualties in the D-day landing.
It also ignores that the Allies actual planned for much higher losses.PaulJ wrote:Alas, the fact that while we lost approx 4,000 at Dieppe and only a thousand on D-Day does not prove any such thing.
WO 205/405 “British Casualties During the First Month of Operation OVERLORD” mentions the pre-OVERLORD estimate was 7,750, which total included 1,500 drowned – a figure that was 3.1 times higher than the figure actually reported. The report also remarked that “it is striking and perhaps co-incidental that the US estimate was approximately 3.1 times their actual reported figure…. These figures must of course be linked to the ‘D’ Day operational picture. Opposition on the British beaches was less than anticipated, and at the same time, the rate of advance was, in many cases, slower than planned." Now, considering that the reported US casualties on UTAH and OMAHA were about 2,600, then the US estimate was also about 7,750. Thus a total of 15,500 for the five beaches or a nominal 3,100 per "division" equivalent, lower than for Dieppe, but not dramatically so.
Last edited by Rich on Wed Apr 28, 2004 7:43 am, edited 2 times in total.
Re: Dieppe raid
BTW, it is clear in the context of the original Canadian report (No. 116) that the German reports were probably obtained via sources in the Mediterranean and not from the Soviet Union. The reports of the 302.Inf.Div. were apparently widely circulated as were all similar informational Ic-Bericht and Gefechts- und Erfahrungsbericht. Given that they were originally prepared August-September 1942 and TORCH occurred November 1942, then it is likely that any such reports would have had a great impact on Ob.Sued. After HUSKY and AVALANCHE similar reports were also widely circulated, so it is not unlikely that they as well as the 302.Inf.Div. reports were among documents captured in Tunisia (the most likely candidate), Sicily or Italy.
The Soviet connection is tenuous at best since the 302.Inf.Div. was not transferred to the East until February 1943 and was not overrun or destroyed before May 1944 when the Canadian report was prepared. Which makes the possibility of the documents finding their way to England via that route even less likely.
Finally, since the Canadian report wasn't prepared until 10 May 1944 it is very unlikely that it had any impact upon the OVERLORD planning.
The Soviet connection is tenuous at best since the 302.Inf.Div. was not transferred to the East until February 1943 and was not overrun or destroyed before May 1944 when the Canadian report was prepared. Which makes the possibility of the documents finding their way to England via that route even less likely.
Finally, since the Canadian report wasn't prepared until 10 May 1944 it is very unlikely that it had any impact upon the OVERLORD planning.
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Freiritter
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If I'm not mistaken, in the Dieppe force, there was a brigade of Canadian infantry ( with tank support ? ) and force of 60 U.S. Army Rangers. I've noticed a mention that there was a Commando in the Dieppe operation. What was their mission? If I'm not mistaken, the Canadians were the main element, whose task was the seizure of the port. I'm also curious as to what mission the Rangers had at Dieppe. Also, from what I gather, the raid was a botch before the force had even landed, since German ships had spotted the raiders at sea. Then, German coastal artillery had kept up a good fire concentration on the beach and the Canadian armor either didn't/couldn't disembark. I think the Germans had staged a counterattack on the landing forces. Then, after a day (?), the force was withdrawn. Essentially, the Dieppe operation was plagued by the foul-ups that Marine planners in the 1930s had postulated could develop during operations. I would say that the Western Allies' learning experiences about amphibious landings was after the Torch, Husky and Avalanche operations. These landings had shown serious problems in how the Allies had worked these operations, so that by the time the Overlord operation was being planned, SHAEF had the fresh experience with which to incorporate.
Cordially,
Freiritter
Cordially,
Freiritter
Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.
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John Kilmartin
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The Calgary Tanks landed on the shingle beach about 15 minutes later than planned. Thus they could not support the initial landing. Due to the nature of the beach a great many of the tracks were thrown as the tanks tried to manouevre their way through the tank obstacles the rest were destroyed before getting off the beach. They were part of the main attack on Dieppe.
The flank attack at Puys started 30 minutes later than planned having been supposed to land under cover of darkness and as a consequence the Royal Regiment of Canada took significant casualties having left England with 554 men and returning with only 65.
The flank attack at Pourville lead by the South Saskatchewan Regiment became bogged down in trying to capture the bridge across the Scie river. The Cameron Highlanders of Canada who were supposed to capture the airfield beyond the town were committed to capturing the town and only moved 3 km past it before being stopped by German resistance that could not be overcome without the support of the tanks that had been stopped on the beaches.
Neither of the two flank attacks by the Canadians had cleared the ridges overlooking the main assault dooming it to failure.
The Rangers were supposed to take the opposite flank from the British Commandos but did not have the oppurtunity to do so as they never landed. Approximately 1,000 of the 5,000 Canadians also did not land.
The flank attack at Puys started 30 minutes later than planned having been supposed to land under cover of darkness and as a consequence the Royal Regiment of Canada took significant casualties having left England with 554 men and returning with only 65.
The flank attack at Pourville lead by the South Saskatchewan Regiment became bogged down in trying to capture the bridge across the Scie river. The Cameron Highlanders of Canada who were supposed to capture the airfield beyond the town were committed to capturing the town and only moved 3 km past it before being stopped by German resistance that could not be overcome without the support of the tanks that had been stopped on the beaches.
Neither of the two flank attacks by the Canadians had cleared the ridges overlooking the main assault dooming it to failure.
The Rangers were supposed to take the opposite flank from the British Commandos but did not have the oppurtunity to do so as they never landed. Approximately 1,000 of the 5,000 Canadians also did not land.
' Strip war of the mantle of its glories and excitement, and it will disclose a gibbering ghost of pain , grief, dissappointment and despair'
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Freiritter
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The RRC had only 65 men left out of 554! 
I didn't know that the casualties were that bad. So, the assault was doomed when the ridge overlooking the beach wasn't taken. Did the unit tasked with that get bogged down on the beach? Where was the naval gunfire support? Did the RAF give cover and close support to the beachhead?
Cordially,
Freiritter
I didn't know that the casualties were that bad. So, the assault was doomed when the ridge overlooking the beach wasn't taken. Did the unit tasked with that get bogged down on the beach? Where was the naval gunfire support? Did the RAF give cover and close support to the beachhead?Cordially,
Freiritter
Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.