Der Luftkrieg in Polen 1939.

[tigre]

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The air war in Poland in 1939.

For easier understanding, the following should be stated in advance:

The deployment of the German armed forces in the East at the end of August 1939 and its first objective; the deployment of the Polish army, as it actually took place, and the Polish air force.

Then follows an overview of the course of the campaign, but only to the extent that the events of the land war provide the broad framework or background for the presentation of the air war. A parallel description of the events of the land and air war is only possible with the direct support of the army. Otherwise the air war runs far ahead of the land war or is independent of what is happening there.

On the basis of these documents, the German Air Force's share in the 1939 campaign in Poland is described according to the following aspects:

a. The fight for air superiority over the Polish area.
b. The Luftwaffe in the border battles.
c. The Polish retreat at the Vistula-San Line and the German Air Force.
d. The Luftwaffe in the battles of annihilation in the Vistula arc and in the final battle.

There is a strong volume of experience written by the leadership and troops during and immediately after the campaign. What has endured has become common property and the tools of the leadership and troops. That's not what we're talking about. On the contrary, I would like to draw attention to questions that have arisen during a detailed study of the literature on the Polish campaign, are of particular interest and have not yet been written down or expressed.

I. The deployment of the German armed forces in the East on August 31st. 1939, evening.

The German-Polish dispute over the issue of the corridor led to violence. The German side had been preparing for this since mid-May 1939. The operational goal was the destruction of the Polish armed forces. The mass of the Polish army, which had been deployed north of the Narew and west of the Vistula-San-Line, was to be brought into battle west of the Vistula and destroyed. Two army groups were tasked with carrying out this operational objective:

Army Group South - Colonel General von Rundstedt - with three armies, deployed in southeast Silesia. It was responsible for the advance from the Kreuzburg area towards Warsaw. The main effort is on the central army, where the mass of fast troops are also present.

Army Group North - Colonel-General von Bock - with two armies deployed in Pomerania and East Prussia. It had to establish contact with East Prussia as quickly as possible and, with the 3rd Army, here the main effort, advance across the Narew to seek communication with the Army Group South east of the Vistula.

As part of the overall objective, the German Air Force was responsible for destroying the Polish air force and supporting the army.

Source: Der Luftkrieg in Polen 1939. ASMZ : Sicherheit Schweiz : Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 114 (1948). Heft 1

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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The air war in Poland in 1939.

I. The deployment of the German armed forces in the East on August 31st. 1939, evening.

The Ob.d.L. outlined these tasks for the Air Force in guidelines issued in mid-May as follows:
a. to prevent the Polish air force from effectively intervening in the fighting and to prevent air attacks against German living space,
b. to support the army - especially the parts that move first - both indirectly and directly from the moment the border is crossed,
c. To prepare a combined attack of all combat forces deployed for 'Weiß' against Warsaw (military installations and armaments plants).

Adapted to the military structure of the army the Ob.d.L. ordered the march. Air Fleet 4 in the south was assigned in cooperation of Army Group South, and Air Fleet 1 in the north, in cooperation with Army Group North.

Air Fleet 4, with the 2nd Flieger Division and the Fliegerführer z. b.V. had
8 Kampfgruppen (bombers)
3 Aufklärungsstaffeln (recce)
4 Stukagruppen (dive bombers)
1 Schlachtgruppe (CAS)
2 Zerstörergruppen(Bf-110)
2 Jagdgruppen (Bf-109)
a total of 676 operational aircraft, and Air Fleet 1 with 1. Flieger Division I and the Luftwaffenkommando Ostpreußen transferred to areas of Army Group North
5 Aufklärungsstaffeln
13 Kampfgruppen
4I4 Stukagruppen
3 Zerstörergruppen
3 Jagdgruppen
a total of 824 operational aircraft.

The flying units prepared for the air war in Poland, including those directly subordinate to the Reichsniarschall, numbered a total of 1,538 operational aircraft.

The deployment of the army and air force took place smoothly, disguised as deployment exercises. On August 31st In the evening, the flying units of Air Fleets 4 and 1 were ready for action at their launch airfields.

Source: Der Luftkrieg in Polen 1939. ASMZ : Sicherheit Schweiz : Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 114 (1948). Heft 1

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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The air war in Poland in 1939.

II. Deployment of the Polish Army and the Polish Air Force.

As expected, the deployment of the Polish army took place north of the Narew and west of the Vistula-San-Line in seven large groups. Three groups - a total of 9 infantry divisions and 5 cavalry brigades - the Narew group, the Modlin army and the Pomeranian army surrounded East Prussia in the south and west. Three groups - 14 infantry divisions, 5 cavalry brigades, 1 mountain brigade and 1 motorized brigade - the Poznań, Lodz and Kraków armies secured the western border between Poznań and Krakow. Three armies were still on the march as army reserves: the Prussian army with the lead around Petrikau, the Piskor army around Deblin and the Carpathian army around Tarnow.

The march was largely over at the end of August. Nothing was said about the Polish operational plan; Presumably all the armies deployed on the border had defensive tasks.

The Polish Air Force.

The Polish Air Force dates back to 1918. Around 200 aircraft of German and Austro-Hungarian origin formed the basis. Initially the Polish Air Force was entirely under French influence. It was only from 1926 onwards, when the Polish aviation industry managed to produce a usable type, that Poland began to free itself from foreign countries. It soon achieved considerable success.

In the fall of 1939, the Polish Air Force comprised six mixed aviation regiments consisting of fighter, reconnaissance, combat and liaison squadrons, an anti-aircraft regiment and eight anti-aircraft detachments with around 400 guns. There was no air signal troops.

All aircraft flown in the Polish campaign were of domestic production. Worth mentioning are the PZL 37 Łoś and the PZL 23/43 Karaś. The PZL 37 had 2 engines of 900 hp each, a top speed of 475 km at 4000 m, a range of 1250 km and was armed with 3 machine guns. The PZL 23/43 single-engine, 950 hp, 365 kilometers per hour, 1,100 km range and also 3 MG.

The total operational strength could be estimated at around 1000 aircraft, of which around 400 were usable for war. In September 1939 there were 5 airframe factories, 5 engine factories and around 30 shadow industry factories. During peacetime, the aviation industry was able to cover the air force's ongoing needs. It was also known that the Polish air force was not intended to be used as an independent weapon, but rather as part of the army.

Source: Der Luftkrieg in Polen 1939. ASMZ : Sicherheit Schweiz : Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 114 (1948). Heft 1

Cheers. Raúl M .

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The air war in Poland in 1939.

III. Course of the campaign.

On September 1st at 4:45 a.m. the spearheads of the entire German army crossed the Polish border. The 10th Army - with the tanks leading the way - broke through Częstochowa. To protect its flanks, the 14th Army attacked from the west and south towards Krakow, and the 8th Army attacked towards Lodz. The 3rd Army pushed forward with its bulk against the row of bunkers on both sides of Mlawa, with parts against Graudenz, the 4th Army advanced with its main force against Schwetz to liberate the corridor. Everywhere the German troops broke through the mostly disjointed Polish border fortifications and sometimes threw the enemy back in stubborn battles.

By September 6th, German troops were already deep into Polish land. The 10th Army had reached Tomaszow Maz and Kielce with its tanks and light troops, the 14th Army had occupied Krakow, and the 8th Army was directly in front of Lodz. The 3rd Army's attack on the Pultusk and Rozan bridgeheads was progressing well after breaking through the fortified positions around Mlawa, the corridor was liberated with the exception of the coastal strip around Danzig/Gdynia, and Bromberg was occupied by the 4th Army; Parts of this army crossed the Vistula near Kulm.

Since September 3, the Poles had been retreating eastwards along almost the entire front, towards the Vistula-San line. If the Poles were to be forced to fight west of the Vistula and destroyed, utmost urgency was required. The 10th Army moved towards the Vistula without delay: the 10th Army on the Pulawy - Gora Kalwarja section of the Vistula, the 8th Army north around Lodz via Skierniewice towards Warsaw, the 4th Army on both sides of the Vistula towards Warsaw, the 14th and 3rd Army, had to attack east of the Vistula, the 14th Army with the left wing on Sandomierz, the 3rd Army on Siedlce.

By overtaking the Polish army units loosened up by the Luftwaffe in relentless pursuit with fast troops, it was possible to place the bulk of the Polish army west of the Vistula in disjointed groups for the final battle. This enabled the Polish army “Prussia” to be surrounded around Radom, the armies “Posen” and “Pomerania” and parts of the armies “Modlin” and “Lodz” in the Kutno-Vistula-Bzura area. In the annihilation battles around Radom, near Kutno and on the Bzura, there were tough, often crisis-filled battles from September 9th to 18th. All attempts to break out by the encircled enemy forces were thwarted and they were forced to surrender. On September 13th, 60,000 men surrendered around Radom, and on September 19th, 170,000 men surrendered at Bzura. This meant that the bulk of the Polish army west of the Vistula was destroyed and the objective of the operation was achieved.

Now the fate of the enemy groups east of the Vistula quickly came to fruition. The still intact troops of the “Kraków” and “Carpathian” armies, around 70,000 men, surrendered to the 14th Army after hard battles at Tomaszow. Parts of the “Piskor” army, remnants of the Polish “Prussian” and “Lodz” armies, which had escaped across the Vistula, tried in vain to retreat south or east via Lubny. Captured in the north by the newly reorganized 4th Army advancing through Brest and in the south by the 14th Army advancing through Chelm, they too soon laid down their arms.

The bulwarks of final resistance were now the staunchly defended Warsaw, the Modlin Fortress and the difficult-to-attack Hela. After tough resistance, Warsaw fell into German hands on September 26th, Modlin on September 28th, and Hela on October 2nd. Meanwhile, the last remnants of the enemy, wedged between the Russian and German lines, had surrendered, disbanded, or fallen into Russian captivity. The Polish campaign had thus come to an end. Now about the share of the German Luftwaffe in the fighting in the Polish campaign in 1939.

Source: Der Luftkrieg in Polen 1939. ASMZ : Sicherheit Schweiz : Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 114 (1948). Heft 1

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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The air war in Poland in 1939.

IV. The battle for air superiority over the Polish area on September 1 and 2.

As the vanguards of the German army crossed the Polish border along the entire front at dawn on September 1, the Luftwaffe also launched a surprise attack against the Polish air force and its ground organization. Meanwhile, the weather had worsened on the night of August 31 to September 1. A cloud field, divided at an altitude of about 1,000 meters, extended over northern and western Poland and reached into southern Poland. Haze and vast terrestrial fog fields severely limited visibility.

While most of the fighter wings and groups of Air Fleet 4 were able to take off towards enemy territory at 04:45 as ordered, only partial attacks occurred in the Air Fleet 1 area, depending on local weather conditions. The units of the 1. Air Division (Fliegerdivision 1) were almost completely nullified for the moment. After the weather improved and after reconnaissance radio reports of occupied enemy airfields, fighting against the Polish air force continued in the morning and late afternoon.

On the first day, nine air bases (out of 12) and 19 other airfields in the northern and western border areas of Poland were attacked and their facilities were severely damaged. Hangars, workshops, technical equipment warehouses, accommodation and landing strips were severely damaged by the bombs, some were set on fire and around 100 aircraft were destroyed on the ground. Nine planes were shot down in mid-air.

The Polish ground organization had undoubtedly suffered greatly from these attacks, but the Polish air force as a whole had not appeared. No unified operation by close combat units had been carried out, apart from an ineffective bomb drop near Peiskretscham, against Reich territory or troops advancing across the border.

Polish fighters also appeared sporadically on several occasions, showing no particular desire to attack. Over Warsaw alone, about 30 Polish fighters engaged in numerous aerial combats with the attacking units of Air Fleet 1, in which nine Polish fighters were shot down. Reconnaissance, hampered by unfavorable weather, had been able to provide only scant results on the whereabouts of the Polish air force; The question of “where” worried the leaders and the troops.

Although there was no news of his whereabouts, the command and troops were aware of his complete superiority in the air. The evening reports of both air fleets on September 1 to the Ob.d.L. (Luftwaffe High Command) contained the following sentences:
“Air Fleet 4: Air superiority in the Luftflotte 4 area was guaranteed at all times.”
«Air Fleet 1: Superiority of Luftflotte 1 in the entire combat area. “The whereabouts of the enemy air force are largely unknown.”

Source: Der Luftkrieg in Polen 1939. ASMZ : Sicherheit Schweiz : Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 114 (1948). Heft 1

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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The air war in Poland in 1939.

IV. The battle for air superiority over the Polish area on September 1 and 2.

For September 2, the Ob.d.L. ordered the continuation of the fight against enemy aviation with a focus on the Warsaw-Posen-Deblin area and the fight against radio stations in Warsaw, Thorn (Torun), Lodz, Radom, Lemberg (Lwow) and Krakow.

Also on September 2nd. Bad weather delayed the operations of the combat units of both air fleets that were ready to take off. The ordered attacks could only be carried out late in the morning. Once again, the airfield facilities, i.e. those near Deblin (in five operations), Radom, Lodz, Gniezno, Kutno, Biala Podlaska, Wilna and Lida, were destroyed with the aircraft parked there (about 50- 60).

The airfields at Warsaw-Okecie and Brest-Terespol, as well as the aircraft factories, Lublin, Deblin and Mielec with their industrial airfields were severely damaged. Seven Polish planes were shot down in mid-air. Attacks on radio stations were less successful. The attack on the overseas radio station in Warsaw failed. Those from the Lodz and Radom transmitters had a questionable effect. The Krakow radio station was silenced.

Also on September 2, only Polish fighters appeared, but no combat unit assembled, nor the reconnaissance services, could find them. Only a Polish reconnaissance plane had dropped some bombs on Andreas Hütte and Glogau.

One explanation for the failure of the Polish air force seemed obvious: due to the force of the attacks of September 1 and 2, with around 900 tons of explosives, Polish air units were displaced from their very well-equipped air bases to insufficiently technically equipped bases. Although the field airfields are well camouflaged, therefore, their operational capacity has been largely paralyzed.

On September 2, the German Luftwaffe had unrestricted control of the airspace. The Polish Air Force was no longer considered an opponent. Concerned only with the territory of the Reich, the German Air Force looked forward to its next task: supporting the army.

The Polish air force was no longer used in closed formations; As a result, it was only used sporadically, although often with notable achievements, within the narrower framework of the Polish Army. On September 10, the order would have been given to gather in three groups on the Romanian border to fly over Romania towards France. That didn't happen again either. Given the hopelessness of the fighting, the last Polish planes flew over the borders with Lithuania, Russia and Romania between September 14 and 17.

Source: Der Luftkrieg in Polen 1939. ASMZ : Sicherheit Schweiz : Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 114 (1948). Heft 1

Cheers. Raúl M .

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The air war in Poland in 1939.

V. Direct support to the army in border battles.

In accordance with the basic instructions of the Ob. d. L. Both air fleets provided the army with important direct support during the battle for air superiority.

In the area of Air Fleet 4, the Stuka and fighter units of the Fliegerführer z.b.V., under the command of Generalmajor von Richthofen, accompanied the XVI. Army Corps (Mot), vanguard of the 10th Army, during its advance from the border via Częstochowa-Petrikau to the final advance through Polish lines on September 6. After arriving in Tomaszow Maz they helped to defeat the numerous fortified positions that were supposed to block the passage of tanks to the east, repeatedly destroyed enemy deployments and counterattacks in the Warta arc, near Novoradomsk and near Petrikau, and repeatedly intervened successfully in ground battles with their onboard weapons.

At the request of the Armored Corps, the units covered the advance of the tanks against Polish fighters and bomber aircraft, which stubbornly tried to stop the tanks. In the aerial combats over the zone of action of the XVI. Corps (Mot), 17 aircraft were shot down while repelling Polish aircraft. To directly support the aforementioned Corps, from September 1 to 7, in 1,634 air missions, 743 tons of explosives were unloaded on the enemy and its fortifications and 36,649 machine gun shots were fired against ground targets. When supplies were stopped due to rapid advance, the Motorized Corps received ammunition and fuel from the air for the first time on 3 September. In its difficult battles around Sieradz, the 8th Army also found effective help at a critical point from units of the Air Fleet 4.

Of particular interest is the participation of Air Fleet 1 units in individual, autonomous and spatially limited combat operations by Army Group North in the first days of the attack. In the successful attack, the Kampfgeschwader keßler with Stukas and fighters successfully attacked the Polish naval forces remaining in the port, combated the long-range fire batteries that threatened Danzig and bombarded the Westerplatte with the heaviest bombs.

When powerful Polish forces wanted to leave the corridor over the Brahe and the Vistula, the battle groups and Stukas called in time by aerial reconnaissance were able to completely disperse the dense gatherings and columns marching on the Tucheler Heide and prevent the advance.

A Kampfgeschwader assisted the 3rd Army in carefully coordinated and closely-coordinated operations to breach the individual bunkers of the bunker line near Mlawa and thus open the way into the interior of Poland. Wherever the need or opportunity arose, units of both air fleets intervened in solidarity and often decisively in the local fighting of border battles.

Source: Der Luftkrieg in Polen 1939. ASMZ : Sicherheit Schweiz : Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 114 (1948). Heft 1

Cheers. Raúl M .

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The air war in Poland in 1939.

VI. The Polish withdrawal to the Vistula-San line and the German air force.

Shortly after the first clashes in the border areas, Polish fronts began to crumble everywhere. Since September 6, the entire Polish Western Front was in full retreat towards the Vistula-San line, the Polish Northern Front was in Lublin. Both withdrawal movements were recognized in their early stages by aerial reconnaissance. If the bulk of the Polish Western Army was destroyed west of the Vistula, the retreat and crossing of the powerful watercourse had to be prevented. Only the Luftwaffe, which reached far beyond the front, could perform these tasks. The richest field of activity now emerged for both air fleets, whose units since September 3, were available to support the army after achieving air superiority.

While the main task of the Air Fleet 4 was to combat enemy movements in the bend of the Vistula and in the San, the focus of the Air Fleet 1's operations was east of the Vistula and in Warsaw as a large gateway to the East. Both air fleets had to fight together on the Vistula bridges, both those that already existed and those that were recently built after reconnaissance on the stretch of the river between Modlin and Sandomierz.

Until September 8, the units of both air fleets managed to block traffic in the main west-east axes with around 1,500 tons of explosives and through continuous attacks:
Poznan-Kutno-Warsaw
Krakow-Radom-Deblin
Krakow-Tarnow-Lviv
and completely paralyze transversal communications. Train stations were largely ruined or burned, and routes were often disrupted and blocked by transport trains that got stuck or derailed.

Driven from the rails, the Polish columns now headed east along the roads; in vain, because each column or assembly area detected by reconnaissance was dispersed by incessant attacks with bombs and machine guns. This made an orderly retreat to the San-Vistula line or any formation of a coherent battle front west of the Vistula impossible. In Radom and Kutno crowds gathered, large and small groups rushed incoherently towards the Vistula, without a unified direction, after the connecting network laid over the railway tracks was destroyed along with the railways.

The commander-in-chief of the Poznań Army, General Kutrzeba, top commander in the Kutno-Bzura area, gives the following description of the Polish retreat in his memoirs: «Night had fallen and only then everything began to move. The previously dead battlefield came to life in its entirety. Everything that until then had had to take shelter from the crushing fire of the Luftwaffe and had been forced to remain motionless began to move. And as they tried to make up for lost time, they left quickly. It was a true migration of peoples in impassable terrain, often without a map, without a guide, a journey in the dark night and under the sound of distant gunshots. This atmosphere of general uncertainty was the cradle of disorder. “All ties in the organization collapsed.”

Although it was possible to destroy even the Gora Kalwarja bridge, continued attacks on the Vistula bridges and the eastern part of Warsaw, in the Prague suburb, prevented organized enemy units from crossing the river. Meanwhile, units of the Air Fleet 1 had also stopped traffic on the railway line from Brest Litowsk and Lublin to Warsaw.

In this way, the air force, with indirect support to the army - extremely difficult given the fluidity of the fronts and the unprecedented nature of the event - created the basic conditions for the military successes associated with the names of Kutno, Bzura and Radom. Because without the powerful arm of the air force, the army alone would hardly have been able to lead the bulk of the Polish army into the decisive battle west of the Vistula, with the transportation network still intact and with the stiff resistance that the Poles were able to offer at crucial hours.

Source: Der Luftkrieg in Polen 1939. ASMZ : Sicherheit Schweiz : Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 114 (1948). Heft 1

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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The air war in Poland in 1939.

VII. The Luftwaffe in the battle of destruction in the Vistula arc around Radom, near Kutno and on the Bzura and in the final battles.

On September 9 and 10, troops of the 14th and 10th Armies surrounded considerable enemy units near Radom; Parts of the 10th and 8th Armies diverted the enemy concentrated around Kutno towards Warsaw. Subsequent Polish attempts to break through from the Radom and Kutno areas, carried out with the courage of desperation, led to intense and sometimes crisis-like fighting. This gave the Air Force two tasks; Help avoid crises and shake the morale of the trapped enemy through continuous attacks.

On September 9, important Polish forces were on the verge of breaking the closed encirclement around Radom on Ilza. The units of Generalmajor von Richthofen (135 aircraft on numerous missions) and the Anti-Aircraft Detachment (flakabteilung) I/II in ground combat, together with the ground troops, managed to prevent the breakout.

From September 10, the 8th Army, in a large and irregular formation at the Sochaczew-Lowicz bridgeheads, could only defend itself with difficulty from the attacks of three Polish divisions and a strong cavalry. To support them, Army Group South required “the use of strong aviation forces on September 11 against the enemy in the area around Kutno.”

On September 11, units of the Air Fleet 4 fought the advancing enemy and their rear communications in multiple missions with 35 tons of explosives and "enabled the 8th Army to intercept enemy forces and drive them back in a counterattack."

While the enemy group around Radom surrendered on 13 September, the encircled Poles in the area east of Kutno continued to put up stiff resistance. To help break it, fighter units, Stuka, destroyers (Bf-110) and fighters from Air Fleet 4 (the focus had shifted from Air Fleet 1 to Air Fleet 4) fought from September 12 to 17 in 1,693 missions from early morning to late afternoon against the densely concentrated and surrounded enemy between Kutno and the Bzura.

"After the bombs were dropped, the combat units," as one German fighter put it, "but especially the destroyers (Bf-110) and fighters, flying at tree height, rushed over the Polish columns and completed destruction with machine guns and cannons".

Source: Der Luftkrieg in Polen 1939. ASMZ : Sicherheit Schweiz : Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 114 (1948). Heft 1

Cheers. Raúl M .

[Prosper Vandenbroucke]

Very intresting post Raul.
Many thanks to you.

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The air war in Poland in 1939.

VII. The Luftwaffe in the battle of destruction in the Vistula arc around Radom, near Kutno and on the Bzura and in the final battles.

From September 18, the Poles began to surrender and on September 19, the battle for Radom ended. Did the airstrikes really have such a decisive effect? General Kutrzeba described these days in his memoirs as follows:

«Around 10 in the morning a massive attack by enemy aircraft began on the crossing points near Witkowice. In terms of the number of aircraft, the intensity of the attacks and the acrobatic audacity, it was a record: every movement, every concentration, every approach route was under crushing fire from the air. The crossing points were bravely defended by the anti-aircraft battery of the 15th Infantry Division. But when at noon they had to remain silent due to lack of ammunition, the entire mass of the enemy aircraft, which was no longer exposed to any danger, pounced on us like a falcon on a flock of defenseless chicks.

The planes flew very low, the Stukas pilots performed their dives as if they were in a training field. Hell had opened on earth. The bridge was destroyed, the fords blocked, the convoys waiting to cross were bombed, the anti-aircraft guns and some of the artillery were destroyed. This was the result of airstrikes that lasted several hours and took place without any air combat.

Myszory was on fire; Every movement was immediately subject to fire from the airmen. The three of us, myself, the Chief of Staff and the head of Department III (Operations), found some shelter under some birch trees a few hundred meters from the exit of the city of Myszory. A motorcyclist and two staff officers joined us. We were able to see Myszory well and had good viewing opportunities all around. Maintaining the strictest anti-aircraft discipline, we remained there unable to move until noon, when the air attacks ceased. However, bombs and machine gun fire were falling all around us from low-flying planes, firing at any object in the area that anyone might have used to seek shelter or even cover. "Despite our best intentions, it was impossible to enter a house that was about 50 - 60 meters from us, because there was water there and a cautious person had to have breakfast there."

«Continuing the battle would have been just a matter of resisting. If they remained in place, the cemetery would be threatened by the Luftwaffe, since there was no anti-aircraft defense. This mass, brought together in a small space, would have provided an excellent and tempting target for the enemy air force, which at that time carried out its activities unhindered."

Beginning on September 19, Polish groups in eastern Poland rapidly disintegrated and the last centers of resistance, Warsaw and Modlin, were soon taken. By the time of Kutno and Radom, units of the Air Fleet 1 had prevented all traffic on the railways and roads of northern and eastern Poland, despite often unfavorable weather conditions, thus making it impossible to form a group of forces near Biels. Due to bad weather and the close integration of the fronts, the Luftwaffe no longer had a direct role or a very small one in the final battles near Tomaszow and Zamosz.

Source: Der Luftkrieg in Polen 1939. ASMZ : Sicherheit Schweiz : Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 114 (1948). Heft 1

Cheers. Raúl M .