Southern wing of Army Group Center 1943-44.

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Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

I. Part. From Orel to the Dnieper.

The German-Russian positions between Belgorod and Kirov were in the form of a question mark in the summer of 1943; in the lower half the Russians were on the inner line and in an arc around Kursk that projected deep into the German lines; in the upper half the ratio was reversed. Here the German formation extended far to the east in the arc around Orel.

The geographical area of the question mark became the scene of the last major offensive of the German Eastern Army in July 1943. The South and Center Army Groups took part in it with forces that were considered considerable given the German strength at the time, but small in relation to the task and the enemy. The attack was based neither on a political-strategic, war-decisive idea nor on a broad operational goal. Rather, it was an operation with a limited purpose. The German side expected another major Russian attack in the summer of 1943. The German military leadership did not want to face it passively, but rather anticipated it through its own active undertaking in order to secure the advantage in action.

In order to realize their intention, the possibility seemed to be to carry out a devastating blow against the armies in the Kursk area. The offensive battle was intended to straighten the exhausting, extensive front arc (Belgorod Sevsk-Maloarchangelsk) and to move the German positions forward to the shortest line between Belgorod and Maloarchangelsk. Ultimately, it was hoped that the act of attack would improve the situation of the own starting position before the expected Russian summer offensive - by destroying considerable parts of the Russian army, gaining a shortened, force-saving formation process and saving divisions from the battle line in order to form operational army reserves.

A pincer-like attack against the thighs without a simultaneous thrust against the forehead of the enemy's front arc around Kursk was intended to ensure success. For this purpose, the attack divisions of Army Group South had to move from Belgorod to the north, and those of Army Group Center (9th Army) from Orel to the south - both with the unification point at Kursk.

The shadow that hung over this operation from the beginning was the threat to the eastern flank and rear of the German 9th Army, which was attacking south from Orel under Colonel General Model. Only if the German 2nd Panzer Army, which was also under Model's command, was able to keep clear the 9th Army's back by maintaining its positions on both sides of Bolchow, could the risk of the attack against Kursk be justified.

However, it is very likely that the intention of leaving the battle in a better position and stronger than before could have been achieved with less risk and fewer casualties if a voluntary withdrawal from the northern arc of the front (Orel), had been preferred to an attack on the southern one (Kursk). By self-chosen giving up the area around Orel and withdrawing one's own forces to the bowstring on both sides of Briansk, one part of the goal of straightening the front and removing forces from the battle line as reserves for the highest leadership would probably have been made easier. However, the other, more questionable part of the goal of destroying large parts of the Russian army should have been dispensed with.

However, the German military leadership stuck to the pursuit of the overall goal. They preferred the offensive solution, even though the prerequisites for success were becoming increasingly unfavorable. The enemy's surprise was called into question by the fact that the German top leadership pushed back the date of the attack from week to week and inevitably jeopardized the preservation of the secrecy and camouflage of the attack preparations. In addition, the Russians brought reinforcements into the area around Kursk, so that the balance of strength on both sides shifted further to the attacker's disadvantage. The behavior of the Russian troops in the forward positions and the measures taken by the enemy leadership in the rear gave no indication that the defender could have any intention of evading the German attack threatening him by voluntarily evacuating the Kursk arc. On the contrary - all signs pointed to the fact that the German breakthrough attack on Kursk would at least be met with a determined defense and perhaps even with an enemy who would strike back.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

I. Part. From Orel to the Dnieper.

This assessment of the situation before the start of the offensive was available to AOK 9 and could not have been alien to the higher command of Army Group Center and the O.K.H. If desire nevertheless triumphed over insight and the decision to take the offensive was maintained when it already exceeded the permissible level of risk, the explanation for this lay in the characters of the men who made the final decision. They were unable to muster the mental agility to let go of the idea they had once conceived.

This led to the double battle of Kursk and Orel, which began on July 5, 1943, and the outcome of which had a decisive impact on the further course of the war in the East. The three corps of the 9th Army that attacked to the south had initial tactical successes. The enemy lost ground, but not significantly in resistance. Break-ins, but no breakthroughs, were achieved at considerable German sacrifice.

Since there were no major reserves, the impact weakened after a few days. The attack came to a halt. The German divisions now laboriously defended themselves against the enemy counterattacks, which began on July 10th with increasing superiority in men, material and in plan. The arms deliveries from the Anglo-Saxon powers to Russia were clearly noticeable in ground and air combat. The initiative passed to the enemy. The 9th Army was initially forced to defend itself by the strength of the enemy's frontal resistance.

It then had to give up the conquered territory when her backroom was lost due to the Russian counteroffensive against Orel and Karachev. After ten days of battle, the withdrawal of the 9th Army first to the north and then to the west, pivoting around the previous right wing of the attack, became inevitable in mid-July. Four weeks of difficult, protracted warfare followed for the 9th Army and 2nd Panzer Army until mid-August 1943, when the enemy's advance in the general Sevsk-Briansk-Kirov line was temporarily halted.

The front arc around Kursk had not been conquered, the enemy forces within it had not been destroyed, but the front arc around Briansk was lost and the straightening of the front by the detour of offensive and retreat was too late, with heavy losses in men and material and in one other than the desired line. In front of the prepared - albeit unfinished - field positions on both sides of Briansk, which were occupied by the troops of the 9th Army and 2nd Panzer Army (both of which later formed the 9th Army), the exhausted enemy stopped the attack in mid-August 1943.

The Russian leadership now shifted the offensive to the pivotal points of the new German position, to the areas of Kirov (4th Army of Army Group Center) and Sevsk (1st Panzer Army and 2nd Army of Army Group South). During the fortnightly fighting near Kirov that began on August 9, 1943, the enemy only achieved limited tactical success through a frontal pushback of the LVI. Panzer Corps. On August 25, 1943, he launched a large-scale breakthrough offensive to the west near Sevsk and south of it from the arc of the front near Kursk.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

I. Part. From Orel to the Dnieper.

The effects of the Russian countermeasures triggered suddenly and at various points by the German attack against Kursk on July 5, 1943 were extremely great. The Russian breakthrough at Rylsk and Sevsk unsettled the fronts of Army Groups South and Center and forced the evacuation of the entire area east of the Dnieper after the attempt to finally hold the Desna failed after a fortnight's battle in mid-September.

The connection between the two army groups was already lost at the end of August because the evasive movements on their inner wings were not carried out in coordination. During the entire month of September, the southern part of the German Eastern Army was in retreat.

Its expansion across time and space, which was actually accepted on the southern wing of Army Group Center, and which only ended at the Dnieper, was not based on a single, far-reaching decision by the army leadership with the purpose of regaining operational freedom of action, but was a consequence of numerous partial decisions with which the coercion of the The situation was generally only reluctantly taken into account by the highest authorities.

In the classical sense, it was therefore neither a retreat, in which the main force marched and covered the rear guards, nor a stalling resistance, in which the enemy was held back at the highest possible losses without without the resistant force engaging in a serious combat that could hold it.

The operational management of section-by-section evasion from one line to the other on a broad front and over an area several hundred kilometers deep meant that the troops were in any case defending themselves in view of their increasingly depleting strength. It was forced to use every last man to hold the overstretched positions, which it had never found in a finished state, but had to be completed or newly created.

The main burden of this fighting method was borne by the infantry, even if, due to the loss of grenadiers, they were only able to provide defense with heavy weapons, artillery and tanks.

The northern wing of Army Group South retreated at a faster pace than the southern wing of Army Group Center, whose forces were not only exposed to the enemy's fiercest frontal pursuit, but also to constant danger from their free southern flank. Both army groups were to form a defensive front behind the Dnieper and restore the connection of their inner wings in the Pripyat estuary. However, the German highest leadership had not taken any precautionary measures for a defensive decisive battle on the Dnieper.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

I. Part. From Orel to the Dnieper.

The river barrier had not been developed to be defended for any length of time, nor were there any fresh, unused forces to absorb the divisions returning to the Dnieper. The troops coming from the battles of Kursk, Orel and Sevsk and the subsequent battles, seriously damaged in substance and performance, had to take on the task, which exceeded their forces, under the immediate pressure of the enemy, of fighting the decisive battle in the Dnieper without prospects of reinforcing its personnel and having to accept reserves of material.

These unfavorable conditions for the defense of the Dnieper by the 2nd Army, which formed the southern wing of Army Group Center, were made even more difficult by the development of the situation with its neighbor on the right (Army Group South). Its northernmost body, the LIX. Army Corps, had failed to establish itself firmly on the Dnieper and had therefore withdrawn behind the Pripyat, near Chernobyl, before the 2nd Army of the southern wing of Army Group reached the Dnieper from the east to mid and late September 1943. The battle for the Dnieper was immediately resumed, amid the lack of unity in the internal wings of both army groups.

The LVI. Panzer Corps, which was located at the southern end of the 2nd Army, was tasked with defending the river north of the Chernigov - Owrutsch railway and, as a prerequisite, improving conditions on its southern flank by offensively restoring the connection with the LIX. Army Corps (Army Group South) in Chernobyl safely. In fifteen days of attacks, the LVI. Panzer Corps established a continuous front between the Dnieper and Pripyat along the Chernigov - Ovrutsch railway and then on the western bank of the Pripyat to Chernobyl and ensured direct contact with the LIX. Army Corps in mid-October 1943.

But this situation lasted only during the second half of October. In the first days of November, Army Group South began to move west again and retreated south of the Rokitno Marshes with the northern wing towards the Kovel area in the autumn and winter months of 1943/44. Meanwhile, the southern wing of Army Group Center, which was directly affected by this, received strict orders to hold the Pripyat and the Dnieper, an order that would soon prove impossible to fulfill.

The operational combination of the two army groups was lost again in November 1943 and was not re-established until April 1944 west of the Rokitno swamps near Kovel. Like the Rhine, the Elbe and all other rivers on the European continent, the Dnieper did not represent an insurmountable natural obstacle. Its defensive importance depended on the art of leadership and the strength of the troops that would defend it on the ground and in the air.

The idea that defense behind streams and rivers can be carried out with great independence and with less effort than in normal positions cannot be maintained after the experience of the last war. On the contrary, natural obstacles only create an increase in strength for the defender if he and the enemy's advance area can be held in their entire width and depth under continuous fire from ground and air forces, numerous tactical reserves for immediate counterattack and strong operational reserves to gain decisiveness in battle are available. Modern defense is often more of a mobile battle in deep areas than around the main line of defense and the main battlefield in terms of combat tactics.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

I. Part. From Orel to the Dnieper.

This does not mean that defense in a position has fundamentally lost its value as a means of tactics. Numerous examples from the last war can be found on the German side in which the defender maintained his position against an attacker who was superior in tanks and caused the enemy's attack to fail.

In general, however, to the extent that the one-sidedness of personal war experience allows such a determination, the useful effect remained, in the best case, limited to the success of deterring the enemy's attack, but in larger circumstances did not increase to the point of the subsequent offensive destruction of the attacker. As far as is known, the tactical defensive success was never used by the Germans as the basis for a battle decision in the European theaters of war, but it was often introduced when the prerequisites were reasonably met.

Undoubtedly, the Dnieper river basin in the broader sense was of great importance for political, military and geographical reasons. If the enemy armies succeeded in gaining space in the direction of the Balkans in the future, the defection of the allies (Romania, Hungary) would become unstoppable and the southern flank of the German Reich would be endangered. The loss of the Dnieper also had the immediate consequence of splitting the Eastern Army in two, because the almost 80,000 square kilometer swampy area between the Dnieper and the Bug (the Rokitno swamps) had to bring about the operational split of their own forces.

This disadvantage, caused by natural conditions, became more pronounced in the autumn of 1943 because the Rokitno swamps, in their entire extent, had remained almost undisputedly in the possession of strong partisan forces for years. Here, in the rear of the German Eastern Army, there was a center of irregular resistance forces which, as the Russian armies approached, became more and more active against the country's enemies.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

I. Part. From Orel to the Dnieper.

If Hitler pursued the idea of adopting permanent defense on the Dnieper front, it could not be denied that there were important reasons for this view. But it was also undeniable that its implementation depended essentially on whether a fundamental change had taken place in the previous conduct of the war in the East. Only if Germany now mustered the strength to find the transition from a hesitant defensive to a decision-seeking one would there perhaps still be a chance of stopping the onslaught from the east at the Reich's borders.

Whether this reversal in strategic thinking was possible without a renunciation of the continuation of the war in western and southern Europe, even to the point of liquidation, and without profound changes within the country, cannot be discussed here. What is certain, however, is that a strategy with a decisive effect on the war required real prerequisites in the assessment of the strength of the Eastern army.

“Hold at all costs” - this panacea of Hitler's exhaustion strategy had become a meaningless slogan, as the past had amply demonstrated. The cordon-like linear defense between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea without the backing of strong operational reserves was unsuitable for a decision.

The Russians only needed to combine superior forces at some point, especially artillery, tanks and air power, and strike (his infantry was inferior to the Germans even in these months of crisis). The thin veil of the German line then gave way in many cases.

Our method of supporting the attacked part of the front with forces that were currently taken from less threatened fronts ultimately meant nothing more than patchwork. One hole was laboriously plugged and another was torn open. This led to a weakening of the overall defense power and a loss of trust. Without a thorough strengthening of the Eastern Army, no change in the decline of its moral and material values could be expected.

It seemed almost like a miracle that the troops had so far, on the whole, endured with an exemplary attitude the enormous demands placed on their performance, which had been imposed on them not for days and weeks, but for months and years, and despite all the setbacks and the numerical superiority of the the enemy, the fighting spirit had been preserved.

Without serious damage to their spirit and discipline, but deeply disappointed by the lack of precaution on the part of the highest leadership in preparing the fighting conditions, the mortally wounded and deadly tired troops made another battle on the Dnieper at the end of September.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

II. Part. On the Dnieper and Pripyat.

In fact, more or less nothing had been done by the O.K.H. to create a permanent position on the Dnieper suitable for the requirements of autumn and winter. The leadership's lack of planning and foresight should now be compensated for at the last moment by the troop leaders' ability to improvise and the troops' manpower.

The weak infantry and armored divisions of the 2nd Army, which had moved from the Desna to the Dnieper in the second half of September and had formed the southern wing of Army Group Center since the Battle of Sevsk, had to raise reconnaissance staffs and work detachments from their ranks and order them ahead on the land march to the Dnieper. Apart from the tactical reconnaissance organs, these parts consisted of trains and supply troops, which, as organic components of their divisions, had to carry out certain functions in the supply of troops and were not easily dispensable in the disengagement battles.

In this case too, war experience was to confirm once again that the tearing up of organizationally related units, which had become common practice in the German army, brought with it more disadvantages than advantages in the long run. Although the leadership gained strength for a task that seemed urgent to it at the moment, it usually weakened the troops it gave up in the long term.

The retreating movements of the 2nd Army, which were taking place under the strongest enemy pressure in the front and southern flank and increasing in speed, and the uncertainty in which situation and condition it would arrive at the Dnieper, made it difficult for A.O.K 2 to decide at an early stage about the use of its corps and divisions to decide on the division of the future defense sections on the Dnieper.

In fact, once the river crossing was completed, the divisions often ended up in different sections than those that their work detachments sent ahead had begun to expand. The German divisions only had to rely on a few bridges, which acted like bottlenecks, to move across the bank and therefore needed time on the west bank to deploy their troops and take their positions. The enemy, however, followed in a broad front towards the river, quickly closed up and immediately began attempting to cross it.

The work detachments therefore had to be deployed quickly in places as improvised security in the positions west of the Dnieper and were now stuck in place, far from their own divisions. The majority only returned to their regular troops after a long period of time and heavy losses in men and material.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

II. Part. On the Dnieper and Pripyat.

The 2nd Army was to withdraw to the Dnieper between the Pripyat estuary and Loyev and the Sosch between Loyev and Gomel and hold in this line. Its original task was to hold off the enemy east of the Dnieper and Sosch until the expansion of the Panther position (name for the permanent position behind the Dnieper and Sosch) was completed. The unfavorable development of events in Army Group South, whose northern wing had already arrived behind the Dnieper while the 2nd Army was still fighting on the Snov river section (Снов - 80 km east of the Dnieper), forced the 2nd Army's retreat to be accelerated. Otherwise it ran the risk that the enemy, who was pursuing its southern wing, would block the crossing over the Dnieper or put it in a difficult position when crossing the bank. Under these circumstances the A.O.K. 2 decided to give greater emphasis to the preparation of the Panther position and commissioned a commanding general to supervise the construction of the position between the mouth of Pripyat and Gomel.

For this purpose, on September 23, 1943 the commanding general of the LVI. Pz.K and its staff were removed from their previous command area on the retreat front to the eastern bank of the Dnieper and sent to the western bank. When he arrived here on September 24, 1943, he found the following situation:

Russian troops that had advanced south of Chernigov had crossed the Dnieper between the mouth of the Pripyat and the intersection with the Chernigov-Ovruch railway and were advancing west and north in the “Wet Triangle”. (“Wet Triangle” was the name for the area bounded by the Dnieper to the east, Pripyat to the west and the Chernigov-Ovruch railway line to the north.) The northern wing of Army Group South (LIX. AK) was in place behind the Pripyat near Chernobyl, with weak security still near Parichev (3 km east of Chernobyl) on the east bank.

Parts of the 5th Pz. Div., previously directly subordinate to AOK 2, which was now under the command of the LVI. Pz.K, were currently still hold Gden against a superior enemy attacking from the east. Other parts of the 5th Pz.Div. stood in a defensive battle directly on the banks of the Dnieper, hard to the south and parallel to the Chernigov-Ovrutsch railway, against an enemy attacking from the south.

Aerial reconnaissance had shown that the Russians were leading additional forces across the Dnieper into the Wet Triangle. The 5th Pz.Div. was incapable of serious resistance; At the moment it still lacked a Panzergrenadier regiment, all heavy weapons, all artillery and all tracked vehicles including tanks. These missing parts, which constituted the bulk of the division, were traveling by rail from the north to Rechitsa.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

II. Part. On the Dnieper and Pripyat.

The transport sequence, unloading stations and arrival points had not yet been able to be determined due to the general overload on the railway that the withdrawal had caused. The expansion of the Panther position on the western bank of the Dnieper and Sozh had begun in places between the Chernigov-Ovrutsch railway line and the city of Gomel; However, the creation of a defensible, continuous position system using the inadequate workforce available was not to be expected for some time. The Commanding General of the LVI. Pz.K. on the one hand, it was faced with the organizational task of pushing forward the defensive preparations behind the Dnieper and Sozh with insufficient forces and resources, and on the other hand, with the tactical necessity of stopping the enemy's advance in the Wet Triangle.

In these considerations, in view of the current low combat power of the 5th Pz. Div, the desirable goal of throwing the Russian forces back across the Dnieper without delay, before they had gained a foothold on the western bank in too large a number, was ruled out as unfeasible. Since the LIX. AK of Army Group South was unable to contribute to an offensive settlement of the situation in the Wet Triangle and other German forces could not be made available to the LVI. Pz K, there was nothing left at the moment but the loss of the Dnieper Position between the mouth of Pripyat and the Chernigov-Ovruch railway was to be accepted for the time being.

At all costs it was necessary to prevent this partial loss from turning into a collapse of the entire Dnieper - Sozh position. The most important thing was to quickly supply the 5th Pz Div with its missing parts that were arriving by rail and to prevent the enemy from breaking through directly from the Wet Triangle along the Dnieper to the north in order to allow the 2nd Army, which was moving towards the river from the east, to cross the bank unhindered - their southernmost wing was to pass over at Ljubitsch - and to enable the Panther position to be occupied. On the other hand, the forces of the 5 Pz Div were not sufficient to prevent the enemy from advancing in the Wet Triangle to the west and northwest towards and across the Pripyat.

If the enemy resolutely exploited this opportunity, the Panther position would be unhinged once it was occupied by the Germans, the operational breakthrough between the two German army groups would be completed and the German 2nd Army would find itself in a very difficult position between the Dnieper and the Rokitno swamps. Everything depended on whether the 2nd Army, during its retreat operations - despite the binding of its front and the tactical threat to its southern flank east of the Dnieper and Sozh - would be able to make it possible to free up several divisions for the LVI. PzK's operations in the Wet Triangle in the next few days.

The danger threatening from the Wet Triangle was too great for the success of the general intention to establish a decisive defense behind the Dnieper and Sozh, so that it was not necessary to accept the disadvantage of weakening the delaying combat forces on the eastern bank of both rivers, accelerate the retreat and reach an unfinished position behind the river obstacles. The 2nd Army decided to add three more armored divisions (2nd, 4th and 12th) to the LVI. Pz K. in addition to the 5th Pz. Div.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

II. Part. On the Dnieper and Pripyat.

Although the lack of fuel and the very poor road conditions greatly impaired their arrival and deployment, the LVI. Pz K managed to force the enemy into the defensive in the Wet Triangle by October 10, 1943 and to erect here a continuous line along the railway with the front to the south. The danger that the enemy from the Wet Triangle would launch an offensive operation north between the Dnieper and Pripyat was temporarily averted.

On the other hand, our own attack lasting several days had not been successful in defeating the enemy, whose strength had increased to at least six infantry divisions and a tank brigade, in the Wet Triangle and throwing them back across the Dnieper. The reasons for this lay in the unfavorable terrain, the weakness of the four German tank divisions, the insufficient supply of fuel and ammunition, and above all in the inadequate participation of the LIX. AK (Army Group South) in the attack operation.

The terrain of the Wet Triangle consisted primarily of swamp, forest and water and was therefore extremely unsuitable for the movement and combat of tank units. Their shock and fire power could only be used insufficiently and in local battles involving small units. It was a time-consuming and energy-consuming battle around bottlenecks and sand islands that were equipped with strong anti-tank barriers.

The four armored divisions of the LVI. Pz K had suffered greatly in their effectiveness due to the previous, long battles. At the beginning of October, the 2nd Panzer Division only had two operational tanks left; one of its two Panzergrenadier regiments was at the LIX. AK and occupied Chernobyl.

Despite numerous requests from the LVI. Pz K to either transfer this regiment directly to the 2nd Pz Div on the eastern bank of the Pripyat or to transfer the command area of the LVI. Pz K to the western bank of the river as far as Chernobyl - in the interest of the unified management of the operation against the Wet Triangle a desirable measure - the extension failed due to the lack of consensus and the fragile seam between the two army groups. Their two high commands could not come to an agreement, and the OKH abstained from making the decisive resolution.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

II. Part. On the Dnieper and Pripyat.

Supplying the LVI. Pz.K posed a particularly difficult problem. To the rear of the 2nd Army lay the Rokitno swamps, which were dominated by partisans. The railways and roads that ran through this vast area were therefore initially unavailable as transport routes. They could only be included in the supply network once security had been established. For the time being, supplies from home were carried out solely on the Slutsk-Bobruisk-Gomel-Rechitsa railway line, that is, they went to the northern wing of the 2nd Army. From here, the supplies had to be brought to the corps and divisions by motor vehicles on a single supply route that ran close and parallel to the front.

From the railway terminus of Retschiza to the LVI. Pz. K fighting on the southern wing of the 2nd Army, there were very long, time-consuming distances that put a lot of strain on motor vehicles. The supply conditions only became more favorable when the west-east railway Pinsk-Rechitsa was put into operation.

The obvious option of having the LVI. Pz. K transferred to Army Group South in operations and supplies and basing it on the Kovel-Sarny-Owrutsch railway was ruled out as a solution because the high command of Army Group Center obviously did not transfer its strongest corps from its area of command and wanted to protect its southern wing under its own responsibility and with its own forces. In troop leadership, it was a matter of course for tactical measures that the higher-level leader of two units ensured agreement in their actions towards the common goal and regulated the behavior of the inner wings accordingly In this respect, at the higher level, the operation, there was again a lack of unity in the thoughts and actions of the two neighboring large army corps.

The operations of the LVI. Pz.K had probably frustrated the enemy's intention to push into the deep southern flank of the 2nd Army between the Dnieper and Pripyat. However, they were initially unable to prevent Russian forces from the Wet Triangle from crossing the Pripyat near Kopachi north of Chernobyl in the area of LIX. AK (Army Group South) in the first decade of October and forming a bridgehead on the western bank. If the Russian leadership took advantage of this initial success and resolutely and quickly pushed additional forces from the east to the west bank of the Pripyat, then a breakthrough between the two army groups would become unavoidable! Only on the southern flank of the bridgehead were there German protections for the LIX. AK holding Chernobyl.

In the west and north there was no German force that could have immediately opposed a Russian advance. In this situation, the Commanding General of the LVI. Pz.K, in agreement with the commander-in-chief of the 2nd Army, decided to immediately deploy the most efficient of his four panzer divisions, reinforced by parts of the three to withdraw other and further troops backwards from the battle in the Wet Triangle, to transfer them to the western bank of the Pripyat near Dowlyady and to launch an attack against the enemy who had crossed over at Kopachi.

While the 2nd, 5th and 12th Panzer Divisions were supposed to use local diversionary attacks to tie up the enemy within the Wet Triangle between the Dnieper and Pripyat, the reinforced 4th Panzer Div independently carried out an encirclement battle on the western bank of the Pripyat. Advancing south from Dowlyady in the Pripyat Valley, it first hit the northern flank of the enemy who had crossed over at Kopaschi and who had already crossed the railway leading to Owrutsch with some forces to the northwest. It pressed in the enemy's northern flank, at the same time blocking his route to the west through weak defenses and, under their protection, led attack forces into the enemy's southern flank.

In a three-day battle from October 12th to 14th, 1943, the enemy was crushed by attacks on its north and south flanks. Only weak remnants escaped to the eastern bank of the Pripyat near Kopachi. Since the situation with Army Group South on the Dnieper south of the Pripyat estuary was already becoming critical again, the LVI PzK had to extend its southern wing up to and including Chernobyl. His positions now ran on the western bank of the Pripyat from Chernobyl to the intersection with the Chernigov-Owrutsch railway with the front to the east, then between Pripyat and Dnieper along the railway with the front to the south.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more.............................

Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

II. Part. On the Dnieper and Pripyat.

Although in the second half of October the LVI. PzK was weakened by two tank divisions that were used elsewhere in the 2nd Army, it held its approximately 80 kilometer wide section until the withdrawal of Army Group South at the beginning of November, which also resulted in heavy fighting forced the 2nd Army standing around its Dnieper position to evade.

The abandonment of the Dnieper by Army Group South had the immediate consequence of dividing the Eastern Army into the two force groups separated by the Rokitno swamps and in the following winter months brought the Northern group increasingly dependent on the Southern group. The further the latter had to give up space to the west in the direction of the Bug above Brest, the more the northern group, which was holding on to the Dnieper above Slobin as instructed, had to consider extending its flank protection along the Pripyat.

Concern about the flank and rear meant that Army Group Center's entire front was subject to progressive expansion during the winter of 1943/44, with its main front, the Eastern Front, remaining in the forward echelon on the Dnieper between Slobin and Orsha, and its flank protection the secondary front (2nd Army) operating in the Rokitno Marshes constantly extended to the west and, in March 1944, its right wing reached into the area south of Pinsk. At this time the northern wing of Army Group South was stationed east of Wlodzimierz. Between the wings of the two army groups there was a gap more than 150 kilometers wide, in the middle of which lay the unfortified town of Kovel, which belonged to the Army Group South sector. Their crew, consisting of improvised units, had been surrounded by vastly superior Russian forces since mid-March 1944.

Army Group South's attempt to break through the enemy's encirclement ring by launching an infantry division along the Chelm-Kovel railway line was unsuccessful. The attack stopped just west of Kovel. The task exceeded the strength of the 131st Infantry Division, whose movements were particularly hampered by the advent of the spring mud season. After all, the perseverance of the Kovel garrison and the 131st Division's attempted relief meant that at least four Russian divisions were tied down. North of Kovel, on the other hand, in mid-March 1944 the enemy began to take advantage of the wide, unsecured gap between Kovel and Pinsk to launch an offensive operation to the northwest.

If the Russians succeeded in taking possession of the area around Brest, then they would be on the rear communications and in the deep flank of the 2nd Army; already their positions on the Pripyat downwards from Pinsk would have become untenable - a development that could not have gone without repercussions on the entire Eastern Front north of the Rokitno Marshes. If Brest had fallen into the hands of the enemy and the latter, taking advantage of the partial success, had launched a major offensive into the rear of the German forces between the Pripyat and the Baltic Sea, then it would have stood between the imperial borders and the northern half of the German Eastern Army and forced them to Fight with a related front. The fact that the enemy's intention was not or not yet based on such a far-reaching, war-decisive objective in March 1944 was suggested by the preliminary deployment of forces and the caution of the operation.

The German leadership could no longer overlook the constant threat to the flank and rear of the German forces north of the Rokitno Marshes from the area around Brest. In order to be able to counter it effectively, the high command of Army Group Center decided to launch a counteroffensive in the Brest-Kovel area.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more.............................

Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

II. Part. On the Dnieper and Pripyat.

It took a small part of the forces necessary for this from the 2nd Army at Pripyat, the majority from its Eastern Front. This weakening on Pripyat and especially on the Dnieper, which was caused by the mismatch on the inner wings of Army Groups South and Center, created one of the conditions that contributed to the catastrophe of Army Group Center between Bobruisk and Vitebsk in June/July 1944.

The General Command of the LVI. Pz K was tasked with the offensive that began in Brest on March 21, 1944. The Corps was supplied with forces from the Army Group Center area in March and April 1944:

4 Inf. Div., 2 Jäger Div., 2 Panzer Div., as well as a number of special troops. The order first required eliminating the threat to Brest and throwing the attacking enemy back across the Pripyat, then closing the gap to the 131st Div on the Chelm-Kovel railway, relieving Kovel itself and finally to defeat the enemy standing on the western bank of the Turja south of Kovel, throw them back across the Turja and establish direct communication with the northern wing of Army Group South north of Wlodzimierz. In an independent operation, the LVI. Pz K managed to successfully carry out this task in all parts by April 28, 1944.

The union of the two army groups was restored, but under conditions for Army Group Center that were worrying for the future. The High Command of Army Group Center had shifted the center of gravity to the western wing on the assumption that this was a temporary situation and that the divisions released for this purpose would be available to it again in a reasonable amount of time for use on its eastern front, before the expected Russian summer offensive would begin. This expectation was not fulfilled.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more.............................

Highlights of the operations of the southern wing of Army Group Center: from July 1943 to April 1944.

II. Part. On the Dnieper and Pripyat.

After the attack operations of the LVI. PzK had cleared up the situation on the inner wings of the two army groups, the OKH ordered the transfer of this corps to the command area of Army Group Ukraine (new name for Army Group South) in May 1944. As a result of this measure, Army Group Center lost its strongest corps and was no longer able to form larger reserves on its own and move them in a timely manner to the area north of the Rokitno Marshes. Since the Battle of Sevsk in August 1943, the operations of Army Group Center had become increasingly dependent on events on the northern wing of Army Group South, necessitating an ever greater use of forces to protect the southern flank, until finally in the winter of 1943/ 44 the entire 2nd Army was tied up in flank protection to the south in the Rokitno swamps and removed from Army Group Center's eastern front.

When the LVI. PzK also had to be freed up for flank protection tasks in the spring of 1944, the disproportion in the distribution of forces in the front and flank took away the prospect of a successful defense. Since Hitler, despite this situation, stuck to the defense of the extremely vulnerable front arc between the Rokitno swamps and Vitebsk and did not decide to evacuate voluntarily early, Army Group Center found itself faced with a situation that far exceeded its strength during the Russian offensive that began on June 22, 1944.

Their defeat in the Bobruisk-Vitebsk-Minsk area in the last days of June and the first days of July assumed the proportions of a catastrophe because the OKH decided not to transfer reserves behind the section of the army group in favor of preparing its own attack on Army Group Ukraine south of Kovel. Very similar to the situation at Kursk and Orel in the summer of 1943, the German military leadership in May and June 1944 also considered the idea of forestalling the expected Russian offensive with one of their own.

While strong German forces were gathered on the Bug on both sides of Wlodzimierz behind the northern wing of Army Group Ukraine, the Russians did not strike the first blow here, but from June 22, 1944 against Army Group Center's weak balcony position north of the Rokitno Marshes. The divisions that were now rushed north from the area of Army Group Ukraine arrived too late to be able to turn the fate of Army Group Center around. The causes of the collapse of large parts of Army Group Center were essentially due to the lack of coordination in the operations of the two Army Group wings and the failure to recognize the opposite importance that the Rokitno Marshes had for the defense to the east and the offensive to the west.

The marshland, unsuitable for operational warfare but not useless for tactical action, could be left out of a Russian offensive; It actually forced the attacker to concentrate his forces and gave him the opportunity to appear with strong superiority, first in the Belarusian and then in the Ukrainian theater of war. However, the Rokitno swamps had a weakening effect on the form of the passive German linear defense because, given the war situation in 1943/44, they determined the German army command to maintain an unsustainable expansion and operationally highly unfavorable lines on the Eastern Front.

Source: Streiflichter aus den Operationen des Südflügels der Heeresgruppe Mitte : vom Juli 1943 bis April 1944. Hossbach, Friedrich. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift : ASMZ. Band(Jahr): 117(1951). Heft 4.

It's all. Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!