guy's + girl's,
i have just come by some information showing that germany had 4 carrier's lunched by 1939, but all of them seem to have been converted to passenger ship's, why?, had these not been done as passenger ship's and left as carrier's could this have ment the difference about the bismarck's sinking.
name's are as follow's:
Europa
Gneisenau
Potsdam
Seydlitz
can you please give some information on these.
thanks
_____________________________________________________________
He who live's by the sword shall die by the sword.
German Navy's Aircraft Carrier
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sid guttridge
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Hi van-noobie,
That list not only misses out the name of the one aircradt carrier Germany really did launch, but includes the name of an existing battleship.
Where did you get this highly unikely information that four additional aircraft carriers had been launched by 1939?
There were plans to convert liners into aircraft carriers, but not to convert aircraft carriers into liners.
Cheers,
Sid
That list not only misses out the name of the one aircradt carrier Germany really did launch, but includes the name of an existing battleship.
Where did you get this highly unikely information that four additional aircraft carriers had been launched by 1939?
There were plans to convert liners into aircraft carriers, but not to convert aircraft carriers into liners.
Cheers,
Sid
Yes, let's not get it backwards! Europa, Gneisenau, and Potsdam were liners subject to conversion proposals. Gneisenau's sistership Scharnhorst (yes, that's right) actually was converted into an aircraft carrier: Shinyo of the Japanese navy.
Seydlitz was a Hipper class cruiser which began conversion under the name Weser.
There were a couple half-hearted proposals concerning captured units as well.
Seydlitz was a Hipper class cruiser which began conversion under the name Weser.
There were a couple half-hearted proposals concerning captured units as well.
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sid guttridge
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3 photos, the launching of the Flugzeugträger Graf Zeppelin.
Source: http://www.maritimequest.com/
Wiki/Graf Zeppelin: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_air ... f_Zeppelin
Michael[/img]
Source: http://www.maritimequest.com/
Wiki/Graf Zeppelin: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_air ... f_Zeppelin
Michael[/img]
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sid guttridge
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Hi RonFairley Swordfish=1030 miles [1657 km]
Are the ranges for the Swordfish and the others based on a empty plane (no bomb-load) plus drop tanks?
A Swordfish (Empty) could go some 771miles
A Swordfish (loaded with 1500ib of ordanance) could go some 548 miles
whilst a Swordfish with a 69gallon tank could hit you 1030 mark
You have enemies? Good. That means you've stood up for something, sometime in your life.
And so as I patrol in the valley of the shadow of the tricolour I must fear evil, For I am but mortal and mortals can only die
And so as I patrol in the valley of the shadow of the tricolour I must fear evil, For I am but mortal and mortals can only die
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Ron Klages
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Yes
Cheshire Yeomanry,
Empty with a drop tank.
Data from the book Wings of the Navy by Eric Brown
best regards,
Ron Klages
Empty with a drop tank.
Data from the book Wings of the Navy by Eric Brown
best regards,
Ron Klages
Ron Klages
Lynnwood, Washington USA
Lynnwood, Washington USA
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phylo_roadking
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All, someone here has missed a point - the german divebombers, the Stuka and Ju88, when used over sea were the most effective shipkillers of the war. The dozens of RN assets lost at Dunkirk and later in the Med attest to this. Just imagine the carnage if a few dozen Stukas had gotten loose in Mid-Atlantic. Torpedo bombers just wouldnt have been necessary.
The GZ as a commerce raider would not have needed a covering screen of surface vessels, a wolfpack would have been much more effective - as the loss of the Ark Royal testified.
As for finding and destroying it at sea....the RN managed this with the Graf Spee and the Bismarck at periods in the war where apart from escort duties the RN's attention and resources were not diverted elsewhere for a time. Look how long it took the Allies to finally deal with the Tirpitz in a variety of different ways. Now imagine the Graf Zeppelin operating out of a similar Fjord, and hanging over the North Sea as a threat for a similar three years. Yes she would eventually have been sunk, but cringe at the thought of no Murmansk convoys and what might have happened on other fronts, or the revised outcome of say the Battle of the Atlantic or The Med if enough vessels had been returned to Home Flet to counter her.
What I would note here is that unlike an excellent book the name of which escapes me fo the moment, regarding the final days of the Luftwaffe and what aircraft were scrapped where etc., the condition of airfields etc., there is as yet no single pulled-together source for the last days of the KM, what units were where on VE Day and what assets were dumped/disposed of where.
The GZ as a commerce raider would not have needed a covering screen of surface vessels, a wolfpack would have been much more effective - as the loss of the Ark Royal testified.
As for finding and destroying it at sea....the RN managed this with the Graf Spee and the Bismarck at periods in the war where apart from escort duties the RN's attention and resources were not diverted elsewhere for a time. Look how long it took the Allies to finally deal with the Tirpitz in a variety of different ways. Now imagine the Graf Zeppelin operating out of a similar Fjord, and hanging over the North Sea as a threat for a similar three years. Yes she would eventually have been sunk, but cringe at the thought of no Murmansk convoys and what might have happened on other fronts, or the revised outcome of say the Battle of the Atlantic or The Med if enough vessels had been returned to Home Flet to counter her.
What I would note here is that unlike an excellent book the name of which escapes me fo the moment, regarding the final days of the Luftwaffe and what aircraft were scrapped where etc., the condition of airfields etc., there is as yet no single pulled-together source for the last days of the KM, what units were where on VE Day and what assets were dumped/disposed of where.
"the german divebombers, the Stuka and Ju88, when used over sea were the most effective shipkillers of the war."
By what yardstick is this accurate? Are you suggesting that twin-engine bombers operate from GZ?
"The dozens of RN assets lost at Dunkirk and later in the Med attest to this."
RN losses at Dunkirk were amazingly light in view of their immobility and the German aerial domination. Likewise, losses in the Med in sectors of contested air were not that remarkable.
"Just imagine the carnage if a few dozen Stukas had gotten loose in Mid-Atlantic."
It does require a lot of imagination to think of Stukas having success in the Mid-Atlantic.
"The GZ as a commerce raider would not have needed a covering screen of surface vessels, a wolfpack would have been much more effective - as the loss of the Ark Royal testified."
Doesn't that testify to GZ's need for escorts? I can agree that a wolfpack would be more effective than GZ, but it wouldn't have the ability to coordinate with her movements.
"the RN managed this with the Graf Spee and the Bismarck at periods in the war where apart from escort duties the RN's attention and resources were not diverted elsewhere for a time."
I'm not sure what you mean. During the hunt for GS, German battleships sortied a few times, including specific attempts to draw attention away from GS. Rheinubung took place in the middle of the Crete invasion. Escort duties were a primary occupation of the RN in the absence of a Mahanian challenge by the Germans.
"Yes she would eventually have been sunk, but cringe at the thought of no Murmansk convoys and what might have happened on other fronts"
Shouldn't we be cringing at the thought of GZ attempting flight operations in the North Atlantic? Since the Germans themselves had come to doubt GZ's ability to operate in the Atlantic, and they didn't even understand how poorly suited she was as an aviation facility, it's difficult to see how the ship could ever have presented a threat.
By what yardstick is this accurate? Are you suggesting that twin-engine bombers operate from GZ?
"The dozens of RN assets lost at Dunkirk and later in the Med attest to this."
RN losses at Dunkirk were amazingly light in view of their immobility and the German aerial domination. Likewise, losses in the Med in sectors of contested air were not that remarkable.
"Just imagine the carnage if a few dozen Stukas had gotten loose in Mid-Atlantic."
It does require a lot of imagination to think of Stukas having success in the Mid-Atlantic.
"The GZ as a commerce raider would not have needed a covering screen of surface vessels, a wolfpack would have been much more effective - as the loss of the Ark Royal testified."
Doesn't that testify to GZ's need for escorts? I can agree that a wolfpack would be more effective than GZ, but it wouldn't have the ability to coordinate with her movements.
"the RN managed this with the Graf Spee and the Bismarck at periods in the war where apart from escort duties the RN's attention and resources were not diverted elsewhere for a time."
I'm not sure what you mean. During the hunt for GS, German battleships sortied a few times, including specific attempts to draw attention away from GS. Rheinubung took place in the middle of the Crete invasion. Escort duties were a primary occupation of the RN in the absence of a Mahanian challenge by the Germans.
"Yes she would eventually have been sunk, but cringe at the thought of no Murmansk convoys and what might have happened on other fronts"
Shouldn't we be cringing at the thought of GZ attempting flight operations in the North Atlantic? Since the Germans themselves had come to doubt GZ's ability to operate in the Atlantic, and they didn't even understand how poorly suited she was as an aviation facility, it's difficult to see how the ship could ever have presented a threat.
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phylo_roadking
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Hi Tiornu
Yes youre right about "contested areas" of the Med - but mile for mile this only really included 100miles radius of Cyprus and Gib. Everywhere else losses were VERY high. Look at the losses during Crete to see what I mean.
As for my Dunkirk comparison, view also the French losses - ok, no capital ships but many, many destroyers, simply because the shallow draught ships were the only units could operate in the vicinity of he sandbars....and Ramsay wouldn't commit major assets to certain destruction.
Who would be there in Mid-Atlantic to contest the air with GZ's fighter element? Events sept '39 to 6th December '41 had robbed the RN of 45% of its carrier capacity bit by bit, and small cheap escort cariers werent yet on line, hence catapults on merchant ships etc. One Carrier HAD to be with Force H in Gib, didnt leave much in hand. That shadow of attrition was one of the reasons the Bismark was able to break out, only to be found in the end by air reconnaisance,and only during a miraculous 6-hour break in a fortnights bad weather.
Coordinating with U-boats a problem? The only reason U-boats spent any time underwater apart from attack runs was the threat of air observation and attack. With the GZ in the vicinity the slow lumbering aircraft available to Coastal Command prior to the Sunderland and PB-Y coming online would have been minced. Whitleys, Hudsons, Walruses, Southamptons versus ME109s?? And thus U-boats could have spent a much greater percentage of their time on the surface, with no communication problem.
Look how long the GS was loose in the Atlantic - ONE ship versus at that time the whole resources available of the RN. So how long would one ship survive with 1/its own aircover 2/long-range offensive capability 3/covert support screen? The answer is - long enough to be worth the cost of its eventual loss many times over. And isnt that how you DO war????
Phylo
Yes youre right about "contested areas" of the Med - but mile for mile this only really included 100miles radius of Cyprus and Gib. Everywhere else losses were VERY high. Look at the losses during Crete to see what I mean.
As for my Dunkirk comparison, view also the French losses - ok, no capital ships but many, many destroyers, simply because the shallow draught ships were the only units could operate in the vicinity of he sandbars....and Ramsay wouldn't commit major assets to certain destruction.
Who would be there in Mid-Atlantic to contest the air with GZ's fighter element? Events sept '39 to 6th December '41 had robbed the RN of 45% of its carrier capacity bit by bit, and small cheap escort cariers werent yet on line, hence catapults on merchant ships etc. One Carrier HAD to be with Force H in Gib, didnt leave much in hand. That shadow of attrition was one of the reasons the Bismark was able to break out, only to be found in the end by air reconnaisance,and only during a miraculous 6-hour break in a fortnights bad weather.
Coordinating with U-boats a problem? The only reason U-boats spent any time underwater apart from attack runs was the threat of air observation and attack. With the GZ in the vicinity the slow lumbering aircraft available to Coastal Command prior to the Sunderland and PB-Y coming online would have been minced. Whitleys, Hudsons, Walruses, Southamptons versus ME109s?? And thus U-boats could have spent a much greater percentage of their time on the surface, with no communication problem.
Look how long the GS was loose in the Atlantic - ONE ship versus at that time the whole resources available of the RN. So how long would one ship survive with 1/its own aircover 2/long-range offensive capability 3/covert support screen? The answer is - long enough to be worth the cost of its eventual loss many times over. And isnt that how you DO war????
Phylo
"Look at the losses during Crete to see what I mean."
Yes, Crete is a good example of what can happen when air power is unchallenged.
"Who would be there in Mid-Atlantic to contest the air with GZ's fighter element?"
I don't believe there would be much of a German fighter element there. The 109 was certain to suffer severe operational attrition due to its own shortcomings, let alone GZ's. But that's overlooking the even more fundamental problem of getting GZ out there in the first place. She could not have been combat ready before the autumn of 1941, and at that point it was no longer possible for German heavy units to operate in the Atlantic due to the supply problem. Remember that Prinz Eugen barely survived Rheinubung because so many of her supply ships had been scooped up by the RN. The Germans never again tried to send out heavy ships into mid-ocean.
"Coordinating with U-boats a problem?"
Ask the Japanese. They bet their war effort on the ability of their submarines to coordinate with fleet movements; obviously, they lost the bet. The British made a run at such a technique between the wars and built the high-speed Thames class specifically for the purpose; it didn't work for them either. You can double-check this if you'd like, but I don't believe the Germans had any submarines whose top surface speed matched GZ's cruising speed until the later Type IX's which started into service only in 1942. So really, the point is moot.
"With the GZ in the vicinity the slow lumbering aircraft available to Coastal Command prior to the Sunderland and PB-Y coming online would have been minced."
Slow, lumbering patrol planes had plenty of success reporting fleet movements in the Pacific, and that was versus Americans who were not shy about using air-warning radar.
"Look how long the GS was loose in the Atlantic"
Three and a half months, all of which were in 1939, and she had negligible impact on the war until her loss provided the Allies with a morale boost.
"So how long would one ship survive with 1/its own aircover 2/long-range offensive capability 3/covert support screen?"
I don't know, a week or two before she runs out of fuel. Or perhaps five days before Dauntlesses from USS Ranger hit her with a half-dozen bombs. Or perhaps three days before a machinery casualty leaves her crippled and desperately crawling back home. All of these are realistic possibilities.
"And isnt that how you DO war?"
Not if you want to win. Plans that depend on optimism do not have a good track record. Reality has a way of stepping in and slapping the luster off novelties.
Yes, Crete is a good example of what can happen when air power is unchallenged.
"Who would be there in Mid-Atlantic to contest the air with GZ's fighter element?"
I don't believe there would be much of a German fighter element there. The 109 was certain to suffer severe operational attrition due to its own shortcomings, let alone GZ's. But that's overlooking the even more fundamental problem of getting GZ out there in the first place. She could not have been combat ready before the autumn of 1941, and at that point it was no longer possible for German heavy units to operate in the Atlantic due to the supply problem. Remember that Prinz Eugen barely survived Rheinubung because so many of her supply ships had been scooped up by the RN. The Germans never again tried to send out heavy ships into mid-ocean.
"Coordinating with U-boats a problem?"
Ask the Japanese. They bet their war effort on the ability of their submarines to coordinate with fleet movements; obviously, they lost the bet. The British made a run at such a technique between the wars and built the high-speed Thames class specifically for the purpose; it didn't work for them either. You can double-check this if you'd like, but I don't believe the Germans had any submarines whose top surface speed matched GZ's cruising speed until the later Type IX's which started into service only in 1942. So really, the point is moot.
"With the GZ in the vicinity the slow lumbering aircraft available to Coastal Command prior to the Sunderland and PB-Y coming online would have been minced."
Slow, lumbering patrol planes had plenty of success reporting fleet movements in the Pacific, and that was versus Americans who were not shy about using air-warning radar.
"Look how long the GS was loose in the Atlantic"
Three and a half months, all of which were in 1939, and she had negligible impact on the war until her loss provided the Allies with a morale boost.
"So how long would one ship survive with 1/its own aircover 2/long-range offensive capability 3/covert support screen?"
I don't know, a week or two before she runs out of fuel. Or perhaps five days before Dauntlesses from USS Ranger hit her with a half-dozen bombs. Or perhaps three days before a machinery casualty leaves her crippled and desperately crawling back home. All of these are realistic possibilities.
"And isnt that how you DO war?"
Not if you want to win. Plans that depend on optimism do not have a good track record. Reality has a way of stepping in and slapping the luster off novelties.
