Who trained the Herman Goering Panzer Division?

[sid guttridge]

Given that armoured warfare was not an air force speciality, how did the Luftwaffe train up a panzer division?

I presume that all the division's personnel came from the normal Luftwaffe manpower pool and I know that there was an ersatz brigade to train replacements for the division set up in Wehrkreis XX. But where did its training cadre come from? Was it supplied by the Ersatzheer?

Thanks.

[charlie don't surf]

Generalmajor Wilhem Schmalz

Recruitment, Training and Organisation


COMMANDERS:
Oberst Walter Heydemeier ........................ 21/7/42 - 10/42
Oberst Herbert Ewert ................................. 10/42 - 4/43
Oberleutnant Helmut Funck ....................... 4/43 - 5/43
Oberst Lothar von Corvin-Wiersbitzki ........ 15/7/43 - 11/43
Oberst Waldemar Kluge ............................ 11/43 - 7/44
Oberst Fritz Fullriede ................................ 7/44 - 8/44
Oberleutnant Robert Schulz ..................... 8/44 - 9/44
Oberst Waldemar Kluge ........................... 9/44 - 10/44
Oberst Karl-Eric Bertram .......................... 10/44 - 26.3/45
Major Kurt Mörgel .................................... 3/45 - 5/45
Major von Gemmingen ............................ 5/45 - 5/45

The origins of the Fallschirmpanzer Korps Herman Göring and also that of the Fallschirmjäger can be traced right back to the beginning of the NSDAP's rise to power.

The minister of the interior at that time was none other than the W.W.I fighter ace Herman Göring who ordered the creation of a police force who's task it would be to put down any resistance to the Nazi regime swiftly and thoroughly. The task of raising this police force fell to Polizeimajor Wecke who on the 25rd February 1933 reported the establishment of his 414 strong Polizeiabteilung a.b.V.

They were based at at the barracks of the former Prussian koniglin-Elizabeth-Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr.3 in Charlottenburg. The units first objective took place on March 2 1933 when Göring and his new police unit attacked a Communist base in Berlin. It was the first of many raids across Berlin where Communist party activists were known to frequent and during these raids Marxist and Communist ringleaders were rounded up and imprisoned.

On July 17th the organization was re-named Landespolizeigruppe Wecke z.b.V. and later in December it re-named Landespolizeigruppe "General Göring". In April 1935 it was again renamed, this time "The Regiment General Göring" and an order from Göring in September that same year stated that the regiment was to be absorbed into the Luftwaffe and the volunteers would form the cadre for the new German Fallschirmtruppe. In January 1936, the I. Jäger-Battalion/RGG under Major Bruno Bräuer and 15. Pionier Kompanie/RGG were transferred to Doberitz for parachute training with the rest of the regiment sent to Altengrabrow for reorganization with Major Walther von Axthelm resuming command of the regiment in August.

During this time the moral and camaraderie within the General Göring was very high. As with the Waffen SS the selection criteria was very strict and only volunteers were accepted. These volunteers had to be between the ages of 18 and 25, of a minimum height of 1.68 metres, be eligible and fit for military service (no spectacle wearers were accepted), be of Aryan ancestry, have a clean police record with no previous convictions, be unmarried and loyal to the National Socialist cause. These strict guidelines were adhered to until 1942 when slight adjustments were made. The need for the recruits to be German citizens was relaxed and the minimum age was dropped to 17 years old. With the shortage of manpower as the war progressed, many of these new guidelines were not adhered to and numerous replacements drafted in from other Luftwaffe units did not meet this criteria.

Those lucky enough to be accepted into the General Göring Regiment in those early years received many distinct advantages to that of their army and to a certain extent their Waffen SS counterparts. There were several different branches and speciality trades available to them such as grenadier, signaller, engineer etc. Also the barracks they were stationed at in Berlin-Reinickendorf was considered the best barracks in Europe (even better than that of the Waffen SS Officer Training School at Bad Tölz which was considered one of the most modern at the time). It was situated near the Kiefernwald near Berlin and was built under the watchful eye of Göring himself. Up until recently it was occupied by the French and was re-named "Quartier Napoleon".

In 1938 the IV Falschirmschutzen-Batalion and the 15 Fallschirmschutzen Pionier Kompanie were separated from Regiment General Göring and formed into Fallschirmjäger Regiment 1 and this unit can be seen as the originator for the cadre for the Fallschirmschule at Stendahl.

The Regiment Herman Göring participated in all the pre-war occupation offensives in Austria, the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia but played only a small part in the Polish Campaign where most of the Regiment was kept back in Germany as Flak defence and bodyguard for Herman Göring.
In March 1942 after fighting in all the subsequent campaigns it was ordered by Göring that the regiment be expanded to brigade strength and in March 1942 and was re-named "Brigade Herman Göring". The regiment was pulled out of the line for re-organization and an ersatz battalion was trained up in Utrecht in Holland. The control of men and supplies to the Brigade was down to the Special Administrative Staff (SonderStaff) and was based in Berlin along with the Wach Battalion. The bulk of the rest of the brigade based in France.

On 15th October further expansion was undertaken and the brigade was enlarged to divisional status and was officially designated Division "Herman Göring". To fill the required numbers 5000 volunteers and the complete Fallschirmjäger Regiment 5 were absorbed into the new division but this reorganization was far from complete when the Allies advanced in to Tunisia in 1943. A Panzer Division was to be formed from the existing units with the recommendations that the army supply equipment, experienced Officers, NCOs, and Panzerwaffe instructors and commanders. These recommendations brought the addition of 1,500 men per month and saw the transfer of inexperienced Luftwaffe personnel to the army panzer divisions for "on the job training" and experienced panzer officers and NCOs were transferred the the HG Division. All tanks and other equipment (apart from Flak guns were supplied by the army). The training battalion based in Utrecht was expanded to regimental size and also received in it's "Gesenden-Kompanie wounded personnel who released from hospital but were not yet ready for combat duty.

With the relentless Allied advance on Tunisia the division was ordered to move to Italy and the units who's training was not yet complete were to finish there training in Italy where further equipment was also issued to them. The bulk of the division was based at Santa Maria near Naples with the remainder (Gruppe Neuaufstellungen) being garrisoned near Bordeaux in the south of France where they received a further influx of volunteers from southern France.

The 1st and 3rd Fallschirmjäger regiments were the first to see action in Tunisia attached to 10th Panzer Division with the I./Flak Regiment undertaking air defence duties in Naples in December 1942. At this time the Grenadier Regiment HG was also transferred to Italy. During the early part of 1943 the transfer of the division to Africa had begun with the majority of the division landed by March and all units of the HG division in Africa came under the title Kampfgruppe Schmidt. By 1st May the estimated strength of the division in Africa was 11,000 officers and men most of whom surrendered on 12th May to Allied forces.

With this severe setback the remnants of the division in France, Italy and Germany were ordered to speed up their organization as a panzer division which should have been completed in April 1943 but with the despatch of so many important units to Italy and then Tunisia this was not possible. In the Summer of 1943 troops from all over Germany were transferred to Naples in Italy (with the exception of the I and III Abteilung who were based in Holland and the IV Abteilung who were based in Velten near Berlin) where they were fully trained and equipped. These new recruits made up a large part of the Ersatz-u.Ausbildungs-Regiement HG (Replacement and Training Regiment). Those Members of the Herman Göring Panzer Division based in Italy were soon flown to Sicily along with the 15th Panzergrenadier Division to counteract the expected Allied landings there. The Allies in due course and after much stiff German Resistance took Sicily and advanced onto the Italian mainland.

The HG Division was pulled out of Italy in July and sent east to Poland where it engaged the advancing Soviet forces and gave an extremely good account of itself receiving compliments from Generaloberst Walther Model for their gallant defensive actions near Warsaw.

On 1st October 1944, the division was to be expanded further into a Panzer Korps with the addition of a new panzergrenadier division. The numbers required to form the new division came by adding a Fallschirmjägerregiment along with personnel from the Luftwaffe including two signal battalions and a medium sized army artillery battalion. During this time of expansion however the HG Division were constantly engaged in action in East Prussia and by November this expansion seemed a daunting prospect due to the number of casualties sustained and the small number of replacements received. To counter this problem a practice was adopted which was common to many elite units at this time-that of incorporating transferred Luftwaffe officers, NCO's, and infantry personnel with no combat experience who were given very brief basic training and sent to the front-line. By Early 1945 both divisions were combat ready.

The make up of the HG Pz Krps at this time was:
Corps commander Generalleutnant Schmalz
Generalkommando
Korpstruppen
Fallschirm-Panzerdivision 1 HG (Generalmajor von Necker-from Feb. '45 Oberst Lemke)
Fallschirm-Panzergrenadierdivision 2 HG (Oberst Walther)
Fallschirm-Panzer Ersatz-und Ausbildungsbrigade HG (Oberst Meyer)
Ausbildungsregiment HG
HeimatStaff HG Berlin
Sonderformation und -dienstellen

The Fallschirm-Panzer Division 1 HG was transferred from East Prussia to Litsmannstadt where it was thrust into the fighting alongside another elite unit- the Großdeutschland Panzer Korps (minus it's panzer grenadier division which had remained in East Prussia) and the Panzer Division HG was assigned to Großdeutschland Panzerkorps was under direct leadership of General der Panzertruppe Jauer and in March near Konigsbruck near Saxony it achieved it's last victory of the war by annihilating the 1st Polish Division which at the time was under the command of the Soviets.

At the time of the German capitulation they were fighting north of Dresden and with the news of the surrender immediately set out westwards in the hope of reaching the American lines but were cut off by a Soviet armoured thrust from Berlin and only a few were able to reach the safety of the American lines. Those who were captured by the Soviets received lengthy sentences in prison with the last of them being released in 1956.

It has been suggested that the formation of this division (later Panzerkorps) was totally unnessecery-as was the formation of so many Luftwaffe Field Divisions and the personnel of these formations could have been better utilized elsewhere (Field Marshal Rommel was one such person who held this view). Certainly Göring saw these formations (along with the Fallschirmjäger) as his own private army (as did Himmler with the Waffen SS) and wanted anything connected with flying under his jurisdiction. Whether this was a good or bad decision is debatable but he did use his influence to obtain the best equipment for his divisions and the HG Pz Kps did prove themselves a most formidable fighting force during the defensive battles in Italy and on the Eastern front during the latter part of the war. Testimony to this is the high number of Knight's Crosses won by it's troops.


Tank crews of the panzer division Herman Göring.

from: http://www.eliteforces.freewire.co.uk/

regards

[sid guttridge]

Many thanks. I got my money's worth there!

I am one of those who feels that the formation of the Luftwaffe field divisions was a mistaken political decision, undertaken by Goering when General Fromm, commander of the Ersatzheer, began to point out in 1942 that Luftwaffe manpower strength had grown many times faster since the outbreak of war than its front line aircraft strength. Fromm's organisation was obviously better prepared than the Luftwaffe to turn this excess air force manpower into useful infantry divisions - it had, after all, produced every other infantry division created since the outbreak of war - but Goering pre-empted this sensible move by founding the Luftwaffe field divisions in order to preserve his empire. I also feel that the creation of the later, non-paratroop-trained, parachute divisions was similarly wasteful, and also the creation of the Herman Goering Panzer Division.

I am not picking on the Luftwaffe here. I don't think the army was well prepared to produce aircrew either. I also feel that the Waffen-SS units were wasteful. There is no reason to believe that their highly motivated manpower would have proved any less determined and operationally effective if they had been in army divisions.

[charlie don't surf]

I agree with about half- way. The paratroops that didn't recieve parachute training and the waffen ss had another type of training than the army. Further the waffen ss was a place were social position didn't matter. Some of their motivation might have gone lost if these soldiers were placed in ordinary divisions. I doubt that as many foreigners would have joined regular army units as those who joined the waffen ss. These units were a great resource for the wehrmacht.

The luftwaffe field divisions were a great mistake and it's failure is mostly due to Görings wish to have his own elite units.

This is why I only agree with you on some parts.

regards

[sid guttridge]

I am not sure you are right about the Waffen-SS being vital to attracting foreigners. The first thing to be said is that the Waffen-SS did not attract vast numbers of Western Europeans. The second is that it was the racist Nazi ethos, that permeated the Waffen-SS as well, which prevented the good treatment and effective enlistment of eastern peoples and Slavs in 1941-42, when they might have had some influence on events. Thirdly, the army was also capable of enlisting foreigners. For example, the Cossack Corps and 162nd Turkoman Division were set up by the army. The Spanish Blue Division was also an army creation and I believe the same is true of the original French LVF. It also trained up three Croat divisions. Perhaps there are other examples. The fact that the Waffen-SS eventually achieved a virtual monopoly of foreign units was provoked by empire building on Himmler's part and was based on political not military considerations.

[charlie don't surf]

Still, many of the foreigners wouldn't enlist if not for 'the crusade against bolshevism'. I think we both are as much right, we only put weight on differnet things.

regards

[sid guttridge]

It didn't require the existence or participation of the Waffen-SS for a German "Crusade against Bolshevism" - only a Hitler, a Nazi government and an obedient Wehrmacht. I also suspect that the absence of a Waffen-SS to join would not have deterred die-hard, non-German, anti-communists from enlisting in any Heer units open to them.

You are probably right that we are putting our emphasis on different things.

Cheers.

[charlie don't surf]

What about the fact that social origin didn't matter as much in the waffen ss as in the more conservative army?

regards

[sid guttridge]

A valid point.

However, this is only of significance if selection primarily by social status was replaced by selection primarily for military aptitude. One suspects that selection by political conformity may have had a higher priority in the Waffen-SS than selection by military aptitude. (i.e. No matter how militarily competent you were, you were not going to be allowed into the Waffen-SS as a card carrying social democrat). Therefore I wonder whether the Waffen-SS system of selection really was any better at producing good soldiers than the army's?

The other point is that the German Army seems to have done pretty well with its existing selection procedures and didn't have the benefit of mostly receiving highly motivated volunteers like the Waffen-SS.

It is also worth pointing out that the German Army of WWII did not have the elitist social structure that it had possessed in WWI and was not, perhaps, quite as socially restrictive as we might believe.

Cheers.

[charlie don't surf]

I was mostly thinking of how sons of high ranking officers had easier in making military careers. In the waffen ss even i.e. butchers as Dietrich could make it. But ofcourse, as you say, the army didn't care to much about political views.

By the way, thanks for opening up an interest in panzerdivision Herman Göring!

regards

[sid guttridge]

I am sure you are right that there was always some career advantage in the army from being of a Junker family. On the other hand, the massive contraction into the Reichswehr of the 1920s had ensured that only the best of this class were retained. When it again expanded into the Wehrmacht I believe that one of the more positive aspects of the Nazi ethos was that officer promotion was no longer made on the old restrictive social basis and that this accelerated as the war progressed. Of course, most of the senior army commanders to the very end of the war would still have been from the Reichswehr (or its Austrian equivalent) and would still have shown the class bias you describe, but I think it lessened rapidly as you went down the rank structure.

Have you read H. H. Kirst's Gunner Asch books? The first, "The Revolt of Gunner Asch" and second "Gunner Asch Goes to War" contain a cast of characters from right across the army spectrum, from old Junker's through disgruntled social democrats, to new young officers of non military background, etc.. The books were written in the 1950s and have an anachronistic anti-militarist message, but they are good at summoning up the atmosphere and attitudes in the barracks of the 1930s and early war years. Of course, they are not history as such, but they have a breadth of human understanding military memoirs usually don't.

There is also the possibility that Sepp Dietrich simply wasn't good enough to be a senior army officer. I wonder how he actually operated? Has anyone seen his staff college records? Did he even attend staff college? It may be that although he was an iron willed, determined and charismatic individual, the old street fighter was being carried by a much more professionally capable staff of professional soldiers, without whom his tactical ideas could not be put into practical effect. (A bit like Hitler in fact.) This is pure speculation on my part. Has anyone got the gen on Sep Dietrich?

It is easy for me to ask questions. It is more difficult for you to answer them. Thanks for your hard work on the Herman Goering Panzer Division.

[charlie don't surf]

I know that Hitler once said that Sepp Dietrich was best suitable as a corporal rather than high ranking officer. As always, courage and determinition doesn't make up for bad training and good tactical understanding.

regards

[heinz kling]

How woulkd you rate it?

Thanks.