Polish offensive at the Bzura 1939 - Polish lost victory?

[Domen123]

General Kutrzeba well took advantage of the favourable moment, and took the initiative at the moment, when he had got local superiority over German forces (9 IX). Later he successfully continued his attack for one day in conditions of the balance of power (10 IX) and for two days in difficult conditions of enemy superiority over his forces (11 - 12 IX), just in in order to resign and stop his attack on 13 IX - despite the fact, that Polish counteroffensive was still progressing (slower than at the beginning, but it was progressing).

In addition, it happened so that the moment when general Kutrzeba decided to stop his attack (because of allegedly stiffening German resistance), exactly coincided with the moment when general Blaskowitz finally and decisively ordered the general retreat of his 8th Army.

In consequence, on 13 IX Poles withdrew to the north behind the Bzura river, and at the same time Germans retreated to the south, behind the city of Lodz. Both armies retreated !!!

Astonishment of Germans must have been considerable, when - while once again marching to the north on 14 IX (in the face of lack of any further Polish pressure after the German retreat behind the city of Lodz) - they did not encounter literally any Polish units south of the Bzura river!

In other words - in the moment when the scale of victory decisively turned for the Polish side, despite numerical and material superiority of the enemy - Kutrzeba decided to stop the counteroffensive, instead of chasing and finishing off the already beaten along the whole frontline at the Bzura enemy.

Kutrzeba made a serious mistake - he did not finish the once started job, despite the fact that he was yet making his way towards the end of it. He hesitated and doubted in strength of his forces in the most inappropriate moment - when determination was indispensable.

Welcome to discussion!

[Glyndower]

According to the version I am reading the Polish attacks had bogged down by the 12th and by then the Germans had restored numerical superiority artillery superiority and armoured vehicle superiority. The strategy of the OKW was not to meet the Polish forces frontally but to encircle them.

Kutrzeba decided to regroup and reorient the direction of his attacks but the Germans were bringing in large forces and attacked on the 16th and by the end of the 16th it was over. The Poles were in a pocket and were trying to break out on the 17th and they were collapsing by the 18th and mopping up operations finished by the 21st.

It seems that by the end of the battle the Germans had available 19 divisions of which 2 were panzer and 3 light together with total air superiority. The Poles had 9 infantry and 2 cavalry brigades so a German victory was inevitable.

It can be argued that by doing this or that they would have prolonged the battle and inflicted greater casualties but the end result would not have been any different their total destruction. They may have scored an initial success but they could not be re-enforced and the Polish communications system had broken down while the Germans were constantly bringing in re-enforcements.

The Polish campaign had been decided by the 8th and if my memory is correct a staff officer told Hitler on the 5th that from then on it would be a rabbit shoot. I do not think any other army in Europe would have performed much better than the Polish in 1939. They adopted a poor strategy maybe for good reasons and underestimated the German forces. They put great hopes on a French offensive after 17 days but common sense should have told them this was unlikely and a military study from one of their top officers concluded that a French offensive was unlikely for at least six weeks from the commencement of hostilities.

[Domen123]

According to the version I am reading the Polish attacks had bogged down by the 12th

Not exactly, Polish attack did not bog down by 12th of September. Polish attack only slowed down, but was still developing, despite the constantly increasing strength of German defenders.

On 12th of September 25th Infantry Division captured Wróblew, Solca Wielka*, Sokolniki and Ozorków. 17th Infantry Division captured Borowiec, forest near Borowiec, Modlna, forest south of Modlna and started attacking towards Stryków. 14th Infantry Division lost Osie and Koźle due to German counterattacks, but later recaptured both localities, in the evening on 12th of September it attacked and captured forest near locality Pludwiny and started to prepare to attack the town of Stryków. Wielkopolska CB supported by one regiment from 14th ID was still attacking Głowno defended by German 24. ID and Podolska CB was attacking German forces south-west of Łęczyca together with 25th Infantry Division.

During the night from 12th to 13th of September general Blaskowitz ordered his forces along the whole frontline at the Bzura to detach from the enemy and retreat to the south (behind the city of Łódź). Almost simultaneously Kutrzeba also ordered his forces to stop the offensive operation and to withdraw to the north, behind the Bzura river.

* There were some photos of Infanterie-Regiment 55. (17. ID) from Solca Wielka on Historical Media:

The strategy of the OKW was not to meet the Polish forces frontally but to encircle them.

You are absolutely right.

And that is why Blaskowitz ordered the general retreat of his army to the south behind the city of Łódź. He wanted to avoid suffering further casualties and to avoid destruction of his divisions. But he also wanted to establish a new defensive line in more favourable place and he probably hoped that while Polish forces would chase his 8th Army, incoming fresh reinforcements from 10th Army, OKH reserves and 4th Army would attack Kutrzeba's wings.

So - after thinking it over for a while - I must say that withdrawing back behind the Bzura was not such a bad idea of general Kutrzeba (he could inflict more casualties to defeated 8th Army, but he was definitely not able to defeat the incoming German reinforcements), but in my opinion he did it too early, the moment itself was not proper.

In my opinion Kutrzeba should have been continuing his attack for at least one day (13th of September) more.

by the 12th and by then the Germans had restored numerical superiority artillery superiority and armoured vehicle superiority.

They did it even earlier, but Polish attack was still advancing (despite the German superiority).

Germans brought in major parts of 17th, 10th and 221st divisions to the battle of Bzura yet on 10th of September, as well as major part of I./Pz.Rgt.23. On 11th of September all units of these divisions and the whole I./Pz.Rgt.23 were already involved in defensive combats at the Bzura, as well as significant part of 24th Infanterie-Division which entered the battle too.

One German infantry division in 1939 had got firepower of at least 1,5 Polish infantry divisions (significant superiority was visible yet on regimental level; not mentioning different organization of Polish and German infantry squads).

One Polish cavalry brigade was de facto an equivalent of one considerably strengthened infantry regiment (one cavalry regiment = one infantry battalion), but with stronger support of artillery, much stronger means of AT combat and also much more mobile and much faster.

Since September 10/11 three Polish infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades were fighting against 4,5+ German infantry divisions (30, 10, 17, 221 and significant part of 24) supported by one Panzer Abteilung (I./Pz.Rgt.23).

In the region of Uniejów, south-west of Łowicz and near Ozorków Polish Podolska CB (with remnants of Pomorska CB) was fighting against part of German 221st Infantry Division supported by elements of 17th Infantry Division and part of I./Pz.Rgt.23 yet since 10th of September. Along the central part of the frontline (from Ozorków to Stryków) since 10th of September 2 and 2/3 of Polish divisions (25, 17 and 2/3 of 14) were confronting 3+ German divisions (30, 10, major part of 17 and part of 221) supported by the rest of I./Pz.Rgt.23. Along the western wing of the frontline at the Bzura – in the region of Głowno - Polish Wielkopolska CB supported by one regiment from 14 ID was confronting significant part of German 24. ID supported by some elements of 10 ID since 11.09.1939, before that Wielkopolska CB was fighting against units of 30 ID (for example during the battle of Walewice).

Moreover - Germans also had got support of numerous Korpstruppen and Armeetruppen – including artillery. Poles did not have support of Corps units because they did not have any Corps (and - which is obvious - Corps units).

So since 10.09.1939 we cannot say about any Polish superiority and since 11.09.1939 even about the balance of power. German forces defending this area had got both numerical and firepower superiority over Polish forces which were attacking it since at least 11.09.1939.

Despite this German superiority, Polish offensive was still developing on 11.09.1939 and on 12.09.1939 – until the night from 12th to 13th of September, when Kutrzeba ordered his units to retreat.

The Poles had 9 infantry and 2 cavalry brigades so a German victory was inevitable.

Even 8 infantry divisions because 9th ID was not a division any longer (it had got only 30% of its initial strength after breaking through from the Corridor pocket) and its units were used to reinforce units of 27th ID which also suffered very heavy casualties in the Corridor pocket and while breaking through from the Corridor pocket – so it was not a separated division any more.

Apart from Wielkopolska and Podolska Cavalry Brigades, there was also the Combined Regiment of Pomorska Cavalry Brigade – remnants of this brigade, which suffered huge casualties while breaking through from the Corridor Pocket.

So in total 8 infantry divisions and 2 & 1/3 cavalry brigades.

Kutrzeba decided to regroup and reorient the direction of his attacks but the Germans were bringing in large forces and attacked on the 16th and by the end of the 16th it was over.

In general I agree with you, however this is a major simplification of the course of this battle. The course of this battle was not so easy and not so one-sided.

The 16th was de facto the German defeat (despite the huge losses also sustained by the Polish side on that day – mainly due to Luftwaffe attacks). Both Panzer-Divisions – 4. and 1. – failed to complete their tasks on 16th of September and were defeated. Part of 1. Pz.Div. (including entire Pz.Rgt.1) was even encircled and dispersed by Polish 16th ID near Kiernozia, and although majority managed to break through from this encirclement on 17th, some part remained imprisoned there longer, even until the 19th. Many tanks were destroyed or knocked out by Poles. See here:

viewtopic.php?f=45&t=30059

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5&t=146348

Only the German huge Air Offensive against Polish forces in the pocket (majority of Luftwaffe bombers involved in the Polish Campaign) combined with repeated infantry attacks and Panzer attacks on 17th, 18th and 19th caused the Polish collapse between 18th and 19th of September.

But not all Polish forces in the pocket were completely destroyed by 21st of September – part of them (15th and 25th Infantry Divisions + parts of 14th Infantry Division + Wielkopolska and Podolska with remnants of Pomorska Cavalry Brigades) – spearheaded by cavalry – managed to break through to Warsaw between 14th and 22nd / 24th of September 1939 (majority of these forces until the 21st - and major part of both cavalry brigades reached Warsaw yet on the 20th).

General Kutrzeba also was not captured by German forces and got to Warsaw (but General Bortnowski was captured).

On 14th of September Polish Operational Group of Cavalry under command of general Roman Abraham (Wielkopolska CB + Podolska CB + remnants of Pomorska CB) attacked German forces at the western bank of the Bzura river (elements of 4. Panzer-Division + attached and supporting units) and on the 15th managed to push them back and crossed the Bzura.

These forces later inflicted serious casualties to German forces – including major part of 4th Pz.Div. with Pz.Rgt.36., part of LAH & attached and supporting units – which were encircled and partially dispersed or even destroyed by Polish cavalry (and when cavalry advanced further to the west – by infantry) between 15th and 19th of September (on 19th of September in the morning German counterattack – spearheaded by Pz.Rgt.35. – liberated these German forces).

German units encircled in this "pocket inside the pocket" were:

Pz.Rgt.36 (commander of II. battalion from Pz.Rgt.36 - Oberstleutnant Günther Seupel - was KIA on 18.09.1939),
I.R.36,
I./LAH
III./I.R.33 (mot.),
I./S.R.12,
II./S.R.12,
Pz.Jg.Abt.49,
5./Fla66
A.A.7,
Art.Kdr.20 with II./A.R.54, I./A.R.103, II./A.R.93, II./A.R.103, II./A.R.115,
Le.Flakabteilung 77.,
2./Pi.Btl.79,
Major part of Pz.Abw.Abt.49 (including entire 1. and 2. companies)

Here - on my map - this "pocket inside the pocket" can be seen (after enlarging it):

This map is showing situation on 17.09.1939 (but without Soviet operations):



Descriptions of this very hard situation of German forces encircled by Polish cavalry (and later infantry) in Kampinoska Forest west of the Bzura river can be found in memories of Oberstleutnant Eberbach (commander of Pz.Rgt.35 – which liberated these forces on 19.09.1939) in chapter titled “Die Vernichtungsschlacht an der Bzura”. Information about these combats can be found also on ww2 day by day by Christoph Avender (reports from between 14th and 19th of September):

http://web.archive.org/web/200801100925 ... byday.com/

And here Kutrzeba made a really serious mistake – because he could have saved probably much bigger (or at least bigger) part of Polish forces, if he ordered Polish cavalry brigades (Wielkopolska and Podolska) to hold their positions at the western bank of the Bzura river which were captured by them on 15.09.1939 for a longer period of time.

But he didn’t do it – and both Polish brigades (as well as later two infantry divisions which were advancing behind them – 15. and 25.) – instead of staying there and holding these positions until more Polish forces would be able to get there and to cross the Bzura, attacked further to the west towards Warsaw, abandoning the western bank of the river.

As the result of this event, Polish forces which wanted to cross the Bzura later (especcialy since 19.09.1939 – when counterattack of Panzer-Regiment 35. liberated German forces in the pocket and Germans finally recaptured entire western bank of the Bzura river) had to confront strong German defense once again – and could not overcome it.

15. Infantry Division and 25. Infantry Division managed to cross the river near Brochów on 17.09.1939 (so exactly in the same place where cavalry brigades two days earlier).

But next Polish forces which were withdrawing towards the Bzura river, were no longer able to cross it because Germans managed to recapture its banks and reorganize their defense – and it was partially Kutrzeba’s fault. Only dispersed parts of 14. ID and just small elements of other units managed to break through to Kampinoska Forest and later to Warsaw.

Also the fact that Germans managed to liberate the cut-off elements of 4. Panzer-Division and other units on 19.09.1939 was partially Kutrzeba’s fault, because if Polish cavalry and infantry which crossed the Bzura between 15th and 17th had not advanced further so quickly and had not abandoned the captured area so soon, it wouldn’t have been so easy for the Germans to liberate these forces and save them from destruction.

General Kutrzeba is partially responsible for the fact that after 17th of September and especially since the morning on 19th of September such views could be commonly seen along the western part of the Bzura:

The Polish campaign had been decided by the 8th

What so special happened on 8th of September that the campaign was decided by the 8th and not – for example – by the 9th or 7th or maybe yet by the 31st of August (so even before it started it was already decided)?

and if my memory is correct a staff officer told Hitler on the 5th that from then on it would be a rabbit shoot.

Well, so why on 5th of September Germans were forced to change their plans?

And they decided to introduce the “Fall 5 September” – the second phase of Fall Weiss – because they did not believe any longer that they would be able to destroy Polish army west of the Vistula river (so fast the Polish withdrawal was).

Maybe this staff officer was just trying to cheer Hitler up?

Btw - the fact is that German human losses during the 2nd week of the Polish Campaign were bigger than during the 1st week, and during the 3rd week were bigger than during the 2nd week (most of them suffered until 18.09.1939):

The three most bloody (for the Germans) days of the campaign were the 16th, the 18th and the 12th:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... &start=120

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5&t=152480

viewtopic.php?f=45&t=13512&p=216051

So I don't think that what this staff officer allegedly told Hitler turned out to be true if it comes to his prediction.

But what he told Hitler means that before the 5th it was not easy for the Germans (which is true I think - especially during the first 3 days). While after the 5th they were suffering bigger human losses than before that day (of course extent of losses does not yet reflect level of difficulty, but still I am sure that predictions of this officer were wrong).

Btw - as a general matter Germans / German sources sometimes used / use to either dramatize or exaggerate.

For example history of German 1. Gebirgs-Division claims, that Lemberg surrendered to the Germans on 21st of September, while in fact Lemberg only confirmed receiving German proposal of surrendering from German messenger, and did not agree to that proposal (did not surrender).

Another example - history of German 8th Infantry Division says, that on 23rd of September this division was "repulsing attacks of an entire Army", while in fact not the division but almost the whole Corps (also parts of other divisions and Korpstruppen) and not entire Army but two - three weak cavalry brigades and one weak infantry division.

[Domen123]

(and when cavalry advanced further to the west – by infantry)

– instead of staying there and holding these positions until more Polish forces would be able to get there and to cross the Bzura, attacked further to the west towards Warsaw, abandoning the western bank of the river.

Of course to the east - not to the west.

[Glyndower]

The unknown German staff officer was right for in the manner of a chess game that can go on a long time but has been decided in the opening moves the Polish front had cracked wide open after five days. On the evening of the 5th Smigly ordered the withdrawal of Army Krakov, Army Prusy, Army Poznan and Army Lodz to defensive positions on the Vistula and behind the Dunajec.

As the Germans had air superiority and their units could advance faster then the Poles could retreat not unnaturally the Polish army started to unravel in the race to new defensive positions. Smigly decided on the evening of the 7th to move the High Command from Warsaw to Brzesc. Polish communications were inadequate units had less equipment than an equivalent German unit and reliance was placed on the civilian telephone network the telegraph and liason planes to maintain contact with the High Command whose communications were based on the capital. The move to Brzesc ensured the increasingly chaotic situation would get worse the High Command now lost effective control of the war.

The instructions issued on the 8th called for the establishment of a defensive line on the Narev, Vistula, and Bug. Most of the Polish forces were now in full retreat trying to get behind this river line a line that could never be esablished but retreating from a force whose air force had total superiority and moved faster than they could. Tactical success here and there may have been possible but the campaign was decided.

Kutrzeba may have had communication problems which could explain some of his decisions.

[Domen123]

Kutrzeba may have had communication problems which could explain some of his decisions.

Yes, I agree. All in all - Kutrzeba's command deserves a positive mark - despite some mistakes.

On the evening of the 5th Smigly ordered the withdrawal of Army Krakov, Army Prusy, Army Poznan and Army Lodz to defensive positions on the Vistula and behind the Dunajec.

Withdrawal of Army Krakow was ordered yet on September 3rd.

Army Prusy was not ordered to withdraw on September 5th (its Northern Grouping was fighting a battle near Piotrkow Trybunalski on 5th of September and near Tomaszow Mazowiecki during the next day; also its Southern Grouping was involved in combats near Kielce, Radom and Ilza).

Out of these armies which were mentioned by you, only Army Lodz started withdrawal in the evening on September 5th, because if I remember correctly Army Poznan was already withdrawing from Greater Poland.

the Polish front had cracked wide open after five days.

I would say that it cracked after 6 days - after the battle of Tomaszów Mazowiecki. But only in the Warsaw direction (German 4. Pz.Div. went into this gap in the Polish frontline), not in other parts of the frontline.

And for example in the southern part of the frontline - where Army "Krakow" was fighting - German fast forces managed to make a detour round the southern wing of this army from the south not before September 7th of 1939 (despite the fact that it started to withdraw yet on 3rd of September - but was successfully delaying German forces chasing it).

Smigly decided on the evening of the 7th to move the High Command from Warsaw to Brzesc. Polish communications were inadequate units had less equipment than an equivalent German unit and reliance was placed on the civilian telephone network the telegraph and liason planes to maintain contact with the High Command whose communications were based on the capital. The move to Brzesc ensured the increasingly chaotic situation would get worse the High Command now lost effective control of the war.

High Command had got problems with communication in Brzesc only because of an unfortunate coincidence. High Command's radio station was damaged by Luftwaffe bombs while it was enroute from Warsaw to Brzesc.

Also rooms for new headquarters in Brzesc were not properly prepared and adapted for communication equipment such as telephones - etc. - on time. So for some period of time High Command had got constant telephone communication only with Army Lublin, Operational Group Grodno and temporarily also with Independent Operational Group Narew. As the radio station was damaged by bombs, High Command usually had to send couriers by planes or cars to all other armies.

The instructions issued on the 8th called for the establishment of a defensive line on the Narev, Vistula, and Bug. Most of the Polish forces were now in full retreat trying to get behind this river line a line that could never be esablished

The defense along the river Bug was already successfully established during the night from 7th to 8th of September.

Heavy combats were in progress along the Bug from 8th to 9th of September. All German attacks against Polish defensive lines along the river Bug which started on the 8th and continued on 9th of September were repulsed.

The defensive lines along the Bug were abandoned by Polish forces on 10th of September in the morning because of contradictory orders of High Command and general Przedrzymirski (commander of Army Modlin) and insubordination of general Kowalski to his superior - general Przedrzymirski.

General Przedrzymirski ordered Kowalski to keep holding the defensive lines, while marschal Rydz-Smigly sent his messenger by car with a verbal order to withdraw - written order of Przedrzymirski was superior, especially that Przedrzymirski knew the current situation of his forces better than Smigly, but Kowalski listened to Smigly's order. Przedrzymirski did not know about Smigly's order, because Kowalski didn't even inform him about it.

Yet during the same day - when it turned out that there was a "misunderstanding" - Poles tried to recapture these defensive lines - but failed. Polish infantry for several times during that day was ordered to change directions of march - once soldiers were ordered to entrench, several dozens minutes later to prepare to counterattack and few hours later to start withdrawal. These contradictory orders caused tiredness and gradual loss of faith in abilities of their commanders.

In the end Polish forces decisively withdrew from the river Bug line to the south, as Smigly wanted (he was already concentrating forces to gather them in the Romanian Bridgehead later).

As the Germans had air superiority and their units could advance faster then the Poles could retreat not unnaturally the Polish army started to unravel in the race to new defensive positions.

But as you can see on the map above (situation in the morning on 17th of September) some Polish units still had chance to get to the area around Lemberg and later withdraw to the Romanian Bridgehead - especially that most of German divisions were still involved at the Bzura and around Warsaw and Modlin on 17th of September.

Of course this chance and all hope for further organized resistance perished after the Soviet Invasion of Poland.

Yet during the first day of Soviet Invasion - 17th of September - forward Soviet units from 13th Rifle Corps almost reached the city of Kołomyja in the Romanian Bridgehead - when the Polish High Command was stationing. That's why marschal Smigly had to escape to Romania to avoid being captured by Soviet soldiers.

[Glyndower]

Rydz-Smigly issued orders (in what I’m reading) on the 11th for a withdrawal to the Rumanian bridgehead he clearly accepted that the campaign was lost after 11 days. In Rumania it seems he said that he thought Poland would be over run but it would be re formed after the allied victory. He may have just been saying it but if he had believed it prior to the September campaign it was a dangerous gamble to take with your country.

The September campaign was lost before it started Hitler was the nearest in guessing how long it would last. For Poland to go to war with Germany given the imbalance in their military forces (Germany spend more on its air force than Poland on all its military) can be seen as amazingly brave or amazingly stupid. Reliance on another country to save you is a very risky strategy.

The Polish Army was one of the better European armies but the strategy it adopted gave it no change. It would always score the occasional tactical victory but once the Germans punched through its lines moving at the speed of 1939 not 1920 as had been expected it was in serious trouble. Throw in the equipment and numbers imbalance and a High Command that does not seem to have been the brightest and defeat was inevitable from day one.

The Soviet invasion of the 17th made no difference except that the German army would not have to mop up Polish forces in eastern Poland nor move against the Rumanian bridgehead which could not have held out long.

While the failure of the military once it came to war may have been inevitable the failure of Polish diplomacy which failed to stop war was not.

The Bzura is interesting as it shows what could have happened if the two armies had been roughly equel.

[Domen123]

Rydz-Smigly issued orders (in what I’m reading) on the 11th for a withdrawal to the Rumanian bridgehead he clearly accepted that the campaign was lost after 11 days.

Marschal Rydz-Smigly wanted and planned to defend in the Romanian Bridgehead until the Spring of 1940 - and he really believed in practicability of his plan - so he certainly did not acknowledge that the campaign was lost. He accepted it only after the Soviet Invasion - and not immediately. According to what I was reading, Smigly's first reaction for the message about the Soviet Invasion was that he wanted to continue fighting and continue commanding his army. But when first reports from the frontline came to his headquarters, and after consulting further steps with other members of military command and with civilian authorities, he realized that any resistance against the Soviet Union would be hopeless and he decided to escape to Romania - especially that forward Soviet forces were approaching his headquarters very quickly.

Despite his command mistakes, one cannot deny that Smigly was a patriot - and wanted to fight against both aggressors as long as possible. The history did not judge him fully fairly.

The September campaign was lost before it started Hitler was the nearest in guessing how long it would last.

And how long it would last according to Hitler's prediction?

I think that Stefan Mossor - author of the excellent book "Sztuka wojenna w warunkach nowoczesnej wojny" ("The art of war in conditions of the modern warfare") published in Poland in 1938 - predicted its duration better.

Unfortunately soon after that Mossor was removed from GISZ (General Inspectorate of Armed Forces) for defeatism.

[Domen123]

The Polish Army was one of the better European armies but the strategy it adopted gave it no change.

It was much, much, much weaker than - for example - French army.

The September campaign was lost before it started Hitler was the nearest in guessing how long it would last. For Poland to go to war with Germany given the imbalance in their military forces (Germany spend more on its air force than Poland on all its military) can be seen as amazingly brave or amazingly stupid. Reliance on another country to save you is a very risky strategy.

"A nation... does not have any more sacred duty to fulfil than obeying the major law that a spot on its honour caused by cowardly surrender will be never wiped off, that you can lose your honour only once, that the honour of authorities is also the honour of a nation..., that even the loss of freedom after bloody and honourable struggle guarantees rebirth of a nation and is the bud of a new live from which a new tree will take root in the future." – Carl von Clausewitz

[Domen123]

While the failure of the military once it came to war may have been inevitable the failure of Polish diplomacy which failed to stop war was not.

Someone had to oppose Hitler and his ambitions.

Outbreak of that war - earlier or later - was inevitable.

From the point of view of morality and justice - Polish decision to start opposing Hitler as the first country - was good.

And in the end - Poland did not suffer the most in that war - and it gained the whole Silesia after its end.

[Domen123]

One more thing:

For Poland to go to war with Germany given the imbalance in their military forces (Germany spend more on its air force than Poland on all its military) can be seen as amazingly brave or amazingly stupid. Reliance on another country to save you is a very risky strategy.

While the failure of the military once it came to war may have been inevitable the failure of Polish diplomacy which failed to stop war was not.

In my opinion if Poland had not opposed Hitler in 1939, it would have suffered exactly the same like in reality or maybe even more. Remember what happened to Czechoslovakia - several months after it accepted Hitler's demands, it was erased from the map of Europe without resistance. If Poland had accepted Hitler demands in 1939, certainly the same would have happened to it several months later. If the best comes to the best - Poland would have become one of Hitler's puppet states (like e.g. Slovakia) a bit later. Poland in 1939 had got only three / four possible ways of behaviour:

- giving up to Hitler (and most probably it would have ended in exactly the same way like Czechoslovakia)
- opposing Hitler (and also Stalin - due to the secret protocol of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact)
- becoming Hitler's ally (becoming a member of the Anti-Comintern Pact - like Hitler offered) - and being defeated together with him by the Soviet Union supported by the USA and Great Britain in 1945

- becoming Stalin's ally against Hitler (and Stalin was even bigger threat to Poland than Hitler)

Each of these solutions was extremely unfavourable for Poland, but opposing Hitler was the most honourable solution. And certainly not the most stupid one.

If Poland had become Hitler's ally in 1939, it would have suffered exactly the same, but mostly from the Soviet side - not German. It is also very probable that it would have become one of the USSR union republics in 1945, instead of a separate - certainly not fully independent but at least a separate - state.

In 1939 nobody in Poland could even imagine how cruel war crimes would Nazi Germany commit in Poland after conquering it - but I believe that if Poland had been seized without any resistance (like Czechoslovakia), Germans would have commited very similar crimes in this country. At least if it comes to Polish Jews.

And if Poland had become Hitler's ally in 1939, it would have been forced to exterminate Jews within its borders - and it would have become co-responsible for Holocaust and other Nazi crimes.

[Glyndower]

Hitler said he would crush Poland in three weeks unfortunately my source does not say when he made the remark he may have got the idea from General Halder Chief of the General Staff. Halder told senior officers in April 1939 that the Polish army “forms no serious opponent” and that “we must be finished with Poland within three weeks, if possible already in a fortnight”.

Around the 12th the Polish High Command had to move from Brzesc and from then on its control of the Polish Army already limited fell apart. If Smigly thought as late as the 12th that he could form and hold a Rumanian Bridgehead till the spring of 1940 he had probably turned to the Vodka bottle for inspiration.

Clausewitz may be right or he may be wrong but if a man knocks on my door and tells me I have to lick his boots or he will burn my house down cripple me rape my girlfriend and eat my parrot honour or not I will lick his boots. As in everything the notion of honour can be taken too far.

When reading about the diplomatic moves prior to September what strikes me is that Hitler’s demands for Danzig and a corridor across the corridor seem to have taken the Poles by surprise. Chamberlain years prior to the Danzig/corridor crisis had said that its return would be one of Germanys demands eventually. It was clear that given the relative strength of Germany and Poland an accommodation with Germany would have to be found just saying no or fringe concessions was not an option. A French minister said he could not understand why the Poles had thought they could negotiate with the Germans as equals. The situation was similar to the crisis that had taken place in 1938 between Lithuania and Poland then Lithuania realising that a war meant inevitable defeat swallowed its pride and agreed to Polish demands.

Poland would probably have ended up as a German satellite the same as Hungary and Rumania but was Poland treated any differently then these countries for being the first to stand up to Hitler. If it was possible to go back in time and live the war in Czechoslovakia or Poland I am sure most people would not choose Poland. After the war Benes looked out over Prague and said “Is it not beautiful? The only central European city not destroyed, and all my doing”. I wonder what Beck and Rydz-Smigly would have said if after the war they could have looked out over the pile of rubble that was Warsaw.

Polish diplomacy during 1939 was based on self delusion the idea that Hitler was bluffing and nobody except the Poles thought their army had any chance if it came to war. They overestimated what their allies would do to help and their importance to their allies. They thought the Anglo French guarantee would help stop Hitler but it had the reverse effect. A remarkable catalogue of errors.

[Domen123]

Hitler said he would crush Poland in three weeks

Oh, and Stefan Mossor said that Poland - fighting alone - will not be able to hold longer than 2 weeks in case of German Invasion. And that is why he suggested to try to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union.

But he was removed from GISZ for defeatism as a result.

He said that also around April of 1939, but I'm not sure what was the exact date.

Hitler said he would crush Poland in three weeks unfortunately my source does not say when he made the remark he may have got the idea from General Halder Chief of the General Staff. Halder told senior officers in April 1939 that the Polish army “forms no serious opponent” and that “we must be finished with Poland within three weeks, if possible already in a fortnight”.

But remember that Germans were assuming, that Poland would deploy 60 infantry divisions, more cavalry brigades, more fast units and more planes (including P-24 fighters) than in reality. So they overestimated Polish strength very much.

Clausewitz may be right or he may be wrong but if a man knocks on my door and tells me I have to lick his boots or he will burn my house down cripple me rape my girlfriend and eat my parrot honour or not I will lick his boots. As in everything the notion of honour can be taken too far.

If you will lick his boots once, he will come back later with more demands - like every criminal.

You should eventually go and call the polce (like Poland called France).

Chamberlain years prior to the Danzig/corridor crisis had said that its return would be one of Germanys demands eventually.

Chamberlain - in my opinion - was a pro-Nazi and short-sighted man with also weak memory.

If he was able to say so, it even convinces me in this opinion - especially that Britain was among those who decided about the creation of the Free City of Gdansk.

France was rather supporting incorporating Gdansk to Poland.

A French minister said he could not understand why the Poles had thought they could negotiate with the Germans as equals.

He could not understand it, really?

But he could understand Locarno in 1925, and he also could understand that it was the fault of his countrymen and British "Appeasement" that Hitler managed to get to such a power?

Locarno was - de facto - French and British betrayal of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and also betrayal of their own ideas.

In Locarno Britain & France de facto guaranteed that Poles would no longer be equals in negotiations with Germans.

The situation was similar to the crisis that had taken place in 1938 between Lithuania and Poland then Lithuania realising that a war meant inevitable defeat swallowed its pride and agreed to Polish demands.

Poland did not demand territory from Lithuania, but only renewal of diplomatic relations and reopening the Polish-Lithuanian border (which had been closed by Lithuanians because of Wilno) for free trade and mutual relations.

This is not a similar situation. There is a difference.

Similar crisis had taken place in 1939 between Germany and Lithuania - Germany had stolen Klaipeda.

If it was possible to go back in time and live the war in Czechoslovakia or Poland I am sure most people would not choose Poland.

I have no doubt that no people would choose Poland, because I know what were Germans doing in Poland (my family also suffered - several members of my family were murdered by Germans).

But one question - would the situation in occupied Poland have been different if it had surrendered without resistance?

Would Britain and France (and half of the world) have declared war to the III Reich yet in September of 1939 if Poland had surrendered without any resistance?

If Smigly thought as late as the 12th that he could form and hold a Rumanian Bridgehead till the spring of 1940 he had probably turned to the Vodka bottle for inspiration.

No, he counted for British and French supplies through the Black Sea and Romania.

And for Autumn / Winter weather.

Poland would probably have ended up as a German satellite the same as Hungary and Rumania but was Poland treated any differently then these countries for being the first to stand up to Hitler.

Even today - 70 years after the end of that war - hard to say.

[Glyndower]

The idea that a bridgehead could be held on the Rumanian frontier was a fantasy and gives cause to wonder about the mental state of Smigly. The bridgehead would be held by remnants of forces that had proved unable to hold the German invasion but now lacking in equipment and with few supplies they would fight off the whole German army. The road and rail network through Rumania towards Kolomiya was not adequate for a major supply operation. More importantly the Poles seem to have had no comprehension of how the western allies viewed their role in the war. There would never be a major re supply through Rumania even if Rumania agreed the view of the British prior to war over the question of aid to Poland was that there was no point as it would all be lost in the inevitable Polish defeat.

If Poland agreed to German demands then the other small states of Eastern Europe would probably follow particularly Rumania so it was important for the UK and France to keep Poland from becoming an ally of Germany. Once Britain and France decided war was inevitable they wanted to keep the states of east central Europe on their side so the guarantee was given to stiffen the Poles in negotiations with Germany. That Poland would be overrun within six months was expected but Poland destroyed by Germany was better than Poland allied to Germany. If Poland had come to an agreement with Germany then the war would have taken a completely different path but there would have been a war as Britain and France had decided Hitler wanted European domination and they would resist it.

Danzig was not essential to Poland in 1939 they now had Gdynia so why stand in the way of its union with Germany. Hitler’s offer over the corridor was reasonable if you take the view that Poland at some time would have to take account of German wishes and find a settlement, but could Hitler be trusted? He didn’t always break his word.

When Hitler made his demand to settle the issue he was not asking for Poland to surrender and be occupied but the subsequent relations between the countries would have seen Poland in a subservient role. Poland had notions of being a major power in eastern European and pride and loss of prestige may have made agreement on Germanys terms impossible as it meant accepting that Poland was not a 1st division country but a 2nd division county.

Beck seems not to have understood the relationship with Germany it was not between equals he was only treated as an equal as long as Hitler needed him; Hitler seems to have completely fooled him. The Soviet Union would have been a dangerous ally not to be trusted and may have demanded frontier revision in the east and its atheist ideology was anathema to the Polish rulers.

Locarno may have been a disappointment for Poland but just as Hitler tore up the 1934 treaty he would probably have torn up an eastern Locarno. Poland and Germany had enjoyed good relations since 1934, if war had broken out over Czechoslovakia Poland was not going to fight on the side of Britain and France. Poland was already almost in the arms of Germany in 1939 breaking off the relationship would be as we know with the benefit of hindsight suicidal as a spurned suitor can be vengeful.

Chamberlain was never pro Nazi but he thought Germany had a legitimate grievance over Danzig and the corridor. If you accept that Poland had a legitimate grievance with Lithuania and its method of resolving this grievance was ok and that Poland had a legitimate grievance with Czechoslovakia over Teschen and its method of resolving this was ok then there can be little complaint over the methods Germany used to resolve the Danzig and corridor problem.

In case you ever live in the UK a few words of advice on calling the police. If someone breaks into your house and you attack them it is you will be charged with assault and be careful if he is a member of a minority you do not utter any racist remarks in the course of the struggle. If the police do not come when called do not tie him up and take him to the police as you will probably be charged with kidnap to add to the assault and racism charges. When the police do come if they suspect there is an armed person on the premises be careful you are not carrying anything such as a chair leg as you may be shot dead, if in bed do not spring up naked in poor light as you may also be shot dead. If the attacker has left and you are seriously injured the police will not enter the premises if they believe the attacker was armed and still there and will leave you to bleed to death so no matter what your condition try to crawl out but do not use something like a chair leg for help. You will probably have to pay compensation to the attacker especially if you have made a racist remark as being accused of racism is probably akin to being accused of witchcraft in the 16c. If after paying compensation you need to sell your house the burglar could well buy it with his compensation leaving you in a tent, the state will not re house you as it will deem you have deliberately made yourself homeless. The law will side with the burglar unless you can prove you acted in self defence. My advice would be after beating the burglar senseless call the police then beat your self up put his fingerprints on the weapon and claim self defence.

[Domen123]

Polish offensive at the Bzura 09.09.1939 - 12.09.1939 - Polish advances - maps:

Map no. 1 (out of four) - western part of the central part of the frontline (from Wartkowice to Biala):

PS: here is the link to similar discussion in friendly AHF: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 2#p1350952