At the risk of drawing down opprobrium on myself I must state that I believe one of Hitler's orders should apply to all armies: the highest ranking soldier who doesn't want to surrender should take command!
An order to surrender is to me, an illegal order. It means that men value life over honour - a poor choice in my opinion. (fortunately - most folks are smarter than me )
Look at Percival - what's he remembered for? Nothing I'd care to be remembered for. The man who surrendered Singapore. Whew...He could have been remembered as the Gordon Pasha of Singapore but chose to live. And made that call for men who wanted to continue fighting!
On the other hand, Johnny Frost himself had to surrender, and I wouldn't call him a coward.
Well, if this isn't the start of an interesting discussion?! Interestingly enough, both generals under discussion are British, so there is a commonality of sorts.
So, the question of the day is: WHEN WAS IT ACCEPTABLE TO SURRENDER?
Don't use hindsight. The surrender of Singapore meant that thousands of men suffered and died in Japanese captivity, building rail lines, and other nasty things. Should they have fought to the last round to save Singapore, or was it hopeless.
Frost, on the other hand, was surrounded by tired, wounded men, rapidly running out of ammunition. Almost down to the last round. His surrender isn't remembered in quite the same way as Percival's.
Who was right, and why? Who was wrong, and why? Is it acceptable to surrender, and save the lives of your men, or should we all emulate the Spartans, and all go down fighting? [/quote]
Last edited by Tom Houlihan on Wed Feb 07, 2007 6:55 am, edited 1 time in total.
Another thing worth remembering is that Singapore is an island, and has no own water sources. When Japanese forces cut the fortress out of Malaya's inland water sources (for example: destroying water pipes), defenders situation became hopeless.
I would have agreed with TPMM before I started reading up on the Pacific conflict recently. Sure, the water supply was cut off, but there is always water around - fresh water in lakes and rivers, and salt water surrounds Singapore, which can always be boiled up.
US troops on the 'Canal proved that hardships beyond imagination could be endured, and by enduring them, they could beat the Japanese. The odds on the 'Canal were stacked much higher against the Allies than they were in Singapore - the Japanese had many more troops than the US forces, wheras in Singapore, we outnumbered them by almost 3:1 - and the supply situation, and length of the battle, could be argued to be much "harder" or "impossible" on Guadalcanal than it was in Singapore.
By standing fast, and doing the "impossible", US troops broke the myth of Japanese invincibility. I sometimes wonder if in Singapore, the hardships and deaths of many British and Colonial troops could have done that earlier, if only they had accepted their deaths, and their "hopeless" struggle could have changed the course of the war. Many men would go on to die in the Pacific, and suffer much worse than they - Why were they special? Not to say that the men thought that, but with the gift of hindsight, it almost appears that Percival was saying that his men were more special than those who went on to die horrible deaths over 3 years of brutal fighting in the Pacific.
Iactura paucourum serva multos
But hindsight is the wonderful gift that father time has given, and enables me to make this judgement. The commanders of the time do not have this gift, and so can only see what they see at the time. But it takes sacrifice, and the death of good men to win a war, and turn the tide. They will have to die at some point, so its not a question of when, just who and where. It takes a brave man to die. It takes an even braver man to die when there seems no reason for his death.
I'll refrain from answering the question right now, and see what else people have to say on the matter. My final thought is similar to my words above - men will always die in war, that's inevitable. It's also a fact that men will die for no reason. But sometimes time will prove that there was, or could have been a reason.
Cheers,
Last edited by Jock on Sun Feb 25, 2007 5:58 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Tom Houlihan wrote:
So, the question of the day is: WHEN IS IT ACCEPTABLE TO SURRENDER?
I rather see it like this: When WAS it acceptable to surrender.
In real time when we don't know everything about enemy we must decide with current knowledge. Few years later we could see real situation and say: We could hold on few days (weeks, monhts) longer!
I think there are times when some commanders have been too quick to surrender....but others where it was the right decision to surrender rather than waste men's lives in a futile last-ditch struggle.
I can't fault John Frost for surrendering, and I don't think he can be called a coward by anyone.
It's also worth noting that his troops were treated substantially better by the Germans than the men on Singapore were by the Japanese, though maybe hindsight is 20/20.
Pirx wrote:I rather see it like this: When WAS it acceptable to surrender.
I see your point, but maybe you missed mine. I don't want to discuss individual surrenders, necessarily. I am more interested in how we all feel about the command decision to surrender. Or not. At what point do you decide which choice to make?
The comparison between Singapore and Guadalcanal was interesting, and not because I'm a retired US Marine.
Whether they surrendered, or fought literally to the death, generals throughout history who have surrendered have been called cowards or heroes. Why?
Tom Houlihan wrote:
Whether they surrendered, or fought literally to the death, generals throughout history who have surrendered have been called cowards or heroes. Why?
Hindsight?
Like what I touched on earlier, the commanders have no way of knowing whether they are sacrificing their men pointlessly, or for the greater good. Or if they will pull off the biggest victory in history, or cover themselves in shame. And human life is important to preserve, especially if there is no point or reason behind endangering human life, in any given situation.
Look at the Japanese - they never surrendered, until the A-bombs. Japanese generals would happily sacrifice thousands of men, even if there was no point, except honour. So why did they surrender after Hiroshima/Nagasaki? Because a large number of civilian lifes were at stake? Because a military man is often expected to die, wheras civilians are not? Were they cowards to surrender at that point (given their "bushido code", and their previous massive sacrifices) or were they brave (given the huge potential sacrifice of civilian life they would have had to of made)? Right or wrong?
I've got more to say on this, but again, I'd like to see the discussion open up a little, also my lunch is ready and I need a while to think some of this discussion over. Its an really interesting topic Tom, and worth some serious thought.
A three-way comparison with Johnny Frost, Percival, and the Bataan Peninsula would be perhaps better that Guadalcanal.
Johnny Frost correctly surrendered his men when out of ammunition except for what was scavenged for captured weapons, and the vastly "reduced" condition of his command meant that despite the willingness of his men to fight on, he judged that they were unable to inflict any further damage to the enemy in return for the lives of his men. There does come a point where even the awkwardness of imposing the care and feeding of prisoners upon an enemy, and taking the men it needs to guard them out of the front line becomes the only practical way to hinder/reduce the enemy's fighting capability while preserving the greatest number of the lives of your men.
The commanders on Bataan fought on some three more weeks after MacArthur's "withdrawal", when the U.S. and Phillipino armies there were at the end of their supplies, water and ammunition. They had been put in an intolerable position to fight a battle but yet they fought it until the same point as Johnny Frost, where any further resistance would have cost more of their own lives than it would have to the enemy.
Percival, however - there was no "fresh" as in piped water into Singapore, that is correct, but in addition to all the sources of standing water there were two desalination plants and a number of cisterns specifically for emergencies of this nature. The subject of Singapore's defences facing the maniland has come up before, and yes they were considerable. There were a number of major fires raging out of control after bombing raids, but at the time of surrender these were in civilian areas and did not hamper the defending forces in any way. Percival had - relatively untouched - the entire food stocks of the city, and the military materiel he required.
Two things should be noted however;
1/ not only had the defending British forces in Malaya been repeatedly outmanouvered down the legnth of the peninsula, but their fighting capabilities in the defence of the city were remarkably poor. landings had been made by small Japanese parties in three locations against what SHOULD have been overwhelming defensive firepower - but wasn't. Churchill, and particularly his private secretaries, noted on many occasions up until El Alamein the poor fighting abilities of the average British soldier and his officers - France, where the behaviour of a large percentage of the evactuated troops was deplorable, not withstanding the excellence of the troops involved in the fighting perimeter; North Africa in their first contacts with the DAK, and later the second battle of Tobruk, and Singapore.
2/ NEVER overlook the fact that Percival wasn't just an officer "whose professional merits are in doubt" - he was a complete idiot. This was a man who had previously had complete and total failure in ONE county in Ireland, West Cork, against a maximum of 500 armed insurgents in the field, travelling normally on foot from training camp to safe house...whereas he had FIFTEEN THOUSAND men at his disposal, vehicular transport, armoured cars and if necessary aerial observation - which though offered he NEVER asked for. He never at any point in the War of Independence authorised or carried out one single offensive sweep through the county, being happy to remain on the defensive from Day One. He left freedom of movement entirely with the enemy - ON FOOT. He made no attempt in any way to hinder their movements outside towns and villages, or to remove the material support for the guerillas bar arresting their families. Basically the complete opposite of the SUCCESSFUL tactics the British Army later used in MALAYA!
And the qualitative judgement of this man as to whether he should have surrendered in Singapore is questioned? The only question should have been why on earth he reamined on establishment after 1921!!!
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds
phylo_roadking wrote:. There does come a point where even the awkwardness of imposing the care and feeding of prisoners upon an enemy, and taking the men it needs to guard them out of the front line becomes the only practical way to hinder/reduce the enemy's fighting capability while preserving the greatest number of the lives of your men.
I'd never thought of that point, but it does make sense. I guess it's when the cost in your men's lives outweighs any possible gain.
How do you calculate where you are in that cost:benefit analysis? Each commander will know instinctively where the point is, beyond which he is not prepared to go. That point is somewhere on a continuum from a Quaker pacifist, who would never fight, and an SS man in Berlin, who would never surrender. Only the great commanders can apply logic in that kind of impossible situation, and come out of a surrender looking like brave men.
All armies can be divided into two parts:
1. Infantry;
2. Support arms.
I think it is difficult to assign labels of hero, coward, or traitor in these situations. The same person could be viewed differently depending on others view of the situation. How about the example of Paulus at Stalingrad? Some would argue he was a coward for not standing up to Hitler and doing what was in his men's best interest, which was surrendering and sparing them the hardships they faced in the kessel. Or, conversly, did he act in the best interest of his men by holding out for a possible breakthrough/breakout attempt? Others have suggested that by holding out as long as he did, he actually performed a service to the greater strategic situation by tying down millions of Russians and allowing the rest of the German front to stabilize. The logic that assigns one hero status and another that of coward is often a fine line.
How do you calculate where you are in that cost:benefit analysis? Each commander will know instinctively where the point is, beyond which he is not prepared to go. That point is somewhere on a continuum from a Quaker pacifist, who would never fight, and an SS man in Berlin, who would never surrender. Only the great commanders can apply logic in that kind of impossible situation, and come out of a surrender looking like brave men
Some really good points.
Now here are mine....Surrender is an option. A very valid one.
If I was sitting on a hill in the middle of nowhere with say 40 men, barely any ammo, no water etc.....yet I knew the enemy kills everyone even after capture....THEN NO SURRENDER...go down fighting. Might as well take a few of them with you.
However
If the enemy was known to treat their prisoners "fairly" then definately surrender is the best for your men.
Now, Same point.....but the hill is vital to protect a crossroads, a jump off position for another attack, protection of wounded etc etc then I personally would hold that hill and not surrender because your valiant defence will enable more of your buddies lives to be saved in the end.
I guess deep down you have to look at yourself in the mirror and decide what you would do.......Does the mission come first or your men?
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Didn't a U-Boat surrender to an Aircraft?? I believe the U-Boat Captain was tried by a German "Kangaroo Court" while in POW custody.
Percival was bluffed. Singapore could of been held had int been better and the defence been better planned.
Not a coward to surrender....you are a coward to run away from the fight.
Thats the sort of decision where the officer's skill / knowledge / personality / courage comes into play to influence his actions. The militarily-correct answer is obvious....but how often has that EVER stopped someone doing something or made them do something???
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds
I think it's also alot cultural to some extent, in Japanese culture it's win or die. no surrender. same more or less for Russia, if you surrendered you were a traitor, no matter how many Fritzes you killed.
in my opinion, surrender beats slaughter. best not to get in the position first.
When Stalin says "Dance" a wise man dances.- Nikita Kruschev
Some excellent points being made, this is a good discussion. As of yet, I've got no more to add, just posted to say...
Jesus Phylo, I didn't even make the connection that Percival was the very same one who made such an arse of the Irish troubles following the Easter rising! Captain then, wasn't he? It puts the Singapore situation in a bit more clarity, anyway. He used to ride around in an open topped Rolls in Ireland, taking pot shots at farm labourers, who, in his own words, "had no right or claim to the land". What a muppet.
Anyway, better get back on topic, this is shaping up to be an excellent discussion.
[quote="sniper1shot] Does the mission come first or your men?[/quote]
It also depends on how much imagination you have. If The Man says, 'Hold the hill', and then that's what you do, then fine. If he says that, and you think, ooh, that might hurt, will I get home in time for tea and medals, did I turn the gas off etc., then maybe you're in the wrong job.
Last edited by 5RANGLIAN on Thu Feb 08, 2007 8:31 am, edited 1 time in total.
All armies can be divided into two parts:
1. Infantry;
2. Support arms.
