Kevin, no - the British knew it was coming.....but made a BIG boo boo; they thought it was aimed at London - was among the very first of the 1941 Spring bombing campaign - and were ready to intercept and "Bend" the guide beams for the Luftwaffe away from the capital. Can't remember now if it was Knickenbein or the first test of the counter against the X-gerat system - but they made the wrong call, and Churchill was at Paddock, the duplicate war room built out in the London metroland. His only use of it during the war.
Anyway, the British watched aghast as at the last minute the interconnecting beam swung NORTH away from London and their listening posts, and crossed over Coventry....
Wasn't a retaliation, it was an industrial/strategic target all of its own -not only the COW plant, but also Daimler - producing at that time nearly all the armored car output of the UK, and other plants, If it had been totally on target, British war production its reckoned would have dropped by anything up to 15% in a night.
Arthur "Bomber " Harris.....
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phylo_roadking
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Torquez
Well I don't know about Coventry....But I know about Poland...1/ Coventry wasnt a "terror raid" aimed at the civilian population
Frampol was chosen as an experimental object, because test bombers, flying at low speed, weren't endangered by AA fire. Also, the centrally placed town hall was an ideal orientation point for the crews. We watched possibility of orientation after visible signs, and also the size of village, what guaranteed that bombs nevertheless fall down on Frampol. From one side it should make easier the note of probe, from second side it should confirm the efficiency of used bombs." (Wolfgang Schreyer's book "Eyes on the sky")
Picture of Frampol before and after September 1939 bombing:
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phylo_roadking
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Torquez, shold this not be in the other RAF thread in Allies at war?
Civilians in NO circumstance should be target of military action IF....
1/ they do not have the means to counter the attack, or have it provided,
2/ they do not have suitable or sufficient protection provided.
However, its VERY interesting to note that its the CHURCHILL government of Spring 1940 owards that took TWO major decisions...
1/ the adoption of the Lindemann Report to justify Harris' civilian bombing programme JUST after it started.....Was it the Butt Report (may have the name wrong) that showed that up to 1941 only 8% of RAF bombs dropped dropped within a MILE of the target, and if cows and trees were of strategic value then Britain was winning the war by bombing LMAO...The Lindemann Report as we know approving the bombing of a civilian industrial working poplation to distrupt industry and break morale...
and perhaps more revealingly...
2/ In 1940 the War Cabinet stopped ALL work on the Deep Shelter pogramme for London, after only four of the proposed deep shelters were dug, including Tottenhan Court Road and Googe Street. The Tottenham Court Rd surface installation can still be seen, in the grounds of the National Science Museum, and Googe Street was furnished and used as an underground transit camp for G.Is...i.e. no civilians. MUCH work was done Underground to ensure continuation of government, and the dafety of the Royal Family, but NO further thought was given to the safety of the civilian poplatiom; it was even proposed that in the events of bombing, the Underground stations would NOT be opened to the public for shelter!!! As we all know, in the end this had to be rescinded....on two nights at the threat of violence to the Police guarding the surface entrances.
So we have two strands here - the Churchill government having NO care for its own civilian population, and willing to bomb the enemy's. Sort of closes the case on British bombing policy here, BUT it does NOT make it right.
Every other European country had by 1941 rejected Alphonso Douet's stidy of the early 1920s that said "the bomber will always get through" and that it was practical to make war on an enemy's civilian population. The Germans discovered over London that it didnt work - next morning the population of London came out of shelter and went back to work. Yet at THAT time they had the largest tactical bombing forces in Europe. Which is why in 1941 they returned to a less costly programme of military/industrial targets with COLLATERAL civilian loss.
Throughout the rest of the war, only the BRITISH made a policy of targeting civilian populations, though they had already proved that it didn't work! The Red Airforce possesed literally only a handful of longrange bombers that were squandered on two propaganda raids on Berlin, so the rest of their bombing was perforce on tactical targets. The USAAF and their belief in the thoroughly-average Norden DAYLIGHT bombsight meant they were free to ATTEMPT to stick to industrial/military targets...accepting collateral civilian deaths.
For fairness I'll mention Italy here - the ONLY urban poplation they tried to bomb into submission was MALTA, and they failed dismally as we all know.....
It wasn't right because it didn't work, and it wasn't right because non-combatants shouldn't be targeted. Of course it doesnt meant it didnt happen, just that it shouldnt
Civilians in NO circumstance should be target of military action IF....
1/ they do not have the means to counter the attack, or have it provided,
2/ they do not have suitable or sufficient protection provided.
However, its VERY interesting to note that its the CHURCHILL government of Spring 1940 owards that took TWO major decisions...
1/ the adoption of the Lindemann Report to justify Harris' civilian bombing programme JUST after it started.....Was it the Butt Report (may have the name wrong) that showed that up to 1941 only 8% of RAF bombs dropped dropped within a MILE of the target, and if cows and trees were of strategic value then Britain was winning the war by bombing LMAO...The Lindemann Report as we know approving the bombing of a civilian industrial working poplation to distrupt industry and break morale...
and perhaps more revealingly...
2/ In 1940 the War Cabinet stopped ALL work on the Deep Shelter pogramme for London, after only four of the proposed deep shelters were dug, including Tottenhan Court Road and Googe Street. The Tottenham Court Rd surface installation can still be seen, in the grounds of the National Science Museum, and Googe Street was furnished and used as an underground transit camp for G.Is...i.e. no civilians. MUCH work was done Underground to ensure continuation of government, and the dafety of the Royal Family, but NO further thought was given to the safety of the civilian poplatiom; it was even proposed that in the events of bombing, the Underground stations would NOT be opened to the public for shelter!!! As we all know, in the end this had to be rescinded....on two nights at the threat of violence to the Police guarding the surface entrances.
So we have two strands here - the Churchill government having NO care for its own civilian population, and willing to bomb the enemy's. Sort of closes the case on British bombing policy here, BUT it does NOT make it right.
Every other European country had by 1941 rejected Alphonso Douet's stidy of the early 1920s that said "the bomber will always get through" and that it was practical to make war on an enemy's civilian population. The Germans discovered over London that it didnt work - next morning the population of London came out of shelter and went back to work. Yet at THAT time they had the largest tactical bombing forces in Europe. Which is why in 1941 they returned to a less costly programme of military/industrial targets with COLLATERAL civilian loss.
Throughout the rest of the war, only the BRITISH made a policy of targeting civilian populations, though they had already proved that it didn't work! The Red Airforce possesed literally only a handful of longrange bombers that were squandered on two propaganda raids on Berlin, so the rest of their bombing was perforce on tactical targets. The USAAF and their belief in the thoroughly-average Norden DAYLIGHT bombsight meant they were free to ATTEMPT to stick to industrial/military targets...accepting collateral civilian deaths.
For fairness I'll mention Italy here - the ONLY urban poplation they tried to bomb into submission was MALTA, and they failed dismally as we all know.....
It wasn't right because it didn't work, and it wasn't right because non-combatants shouldn't be targeted. Of course it doesnt meant it didnt happen, just that it shouldnt
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds
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Torquez
Throughout the war only Luftwaffe has engaged in bombardment for the sake of murdering civilians-as shown in example of Frampol above.Throughout the rest of the war, only the BRITISH made a policy of targeting civilian populations, t
All British targets were legitimate military targets-had industrial, military significance, had air defences.
And thus do not form any violation of international law.
Bombing undefended, non-military, non-industrial sites is however against law.
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Rajin Cajun
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phylo_roadking
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Torquez, for the greater good, please start reading posts carefully before you choose to post a reply.
You'll have of course noted that i said
I note that yor given example of Frampol dates from 1939.
You'll have of course noted that i said
following on from my earlier comment ofThroughout the rest of the war
So I have to accept as will all the others readers here that once again to try and prove a point you're choosing to quote out of context. As I only edit posts to try and eradicate spelling errors, you and anyone here will be able to check my context. Don't misquote me intentionally again.Every other European country had by 1941 rejected Alphonso Douet's study of the early 1920s
I note that yor given example of Frampol dates from 1939.
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds
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Cott Tiger
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Hi chaps,
The effect on German industry and production is an interesting one. It is often countered that Allied bombing was largely ineffectual as German productivity actually increased through the war despite the raids. However it should be noted that German productivity, although rising was not rising anywhere the projected and necessary levels needed to sustain the German war effort, due to the effect of strategic bombing.
The following is a quote, often used in debates such as these about the effectiveness of Allied strategic bombing, taken from “Why the Allies Won” by Richard Overy:
Perhaps of more importance however, is the redirecting of resources that Germany had to do to counter the threat and damage of Allied bombing. Huge resources were shifted from the fighting front to combating the aerial threat over Germany itself. A notable example being the number of Luftwaffe units devoted to protecting the Reich from Allied bombers as the war progressed, and the subsequent forced shift from bombers to fighters in new aircraft production.
How this effects the question of legitimacy of area bombardment and the resulting death of civilians is a much more difficult question. Britain had very limited options in regards to offensive action against Nazi Germany in 1941/1942. Hitler had occupied most of Western Europe, had the Soviets retreating at a staggering pace and had Britain’s vital supply lines in a strangle hold in the Atlantic.
These were dark and desperate times. Arthur Harris put together a strong case for taking the war to the Nazi Germany and at least attempting to disrupt the war machine and draw resources away from the front. He obviously further believed that area bombardment could itself win the war, given sufficient resources. In hindsight we know that was not the case, but how many governments, leaders or lets face it the population at large, wouldn’t have sanctioned Harris to use Bomber Command in offensive action over Germany in such times?
Regards,
Andre
The effect on German industry and production is an interesting one. It is often countered that Allied bombing was largely ineffectual as German productivity actually increased through the war despite the raids. However it should be noted that German productivity, although rising was not rising anywhere the projected and necessary levels needed to sustain the German war effort, due to the effect of strategic bombing.
The following is a quote, often used in debates such as these about the effectiveness of Allied strategic bombing, taken from “Why the Allies Won” by Richard Overy:
Whilst it can argued whether the bombing was “fatal” to Germany’s war effort it certainly cannot be dismissed as largely ineffectual.At the end of January 1945 Albert Speer and his ministerial colleagues met in Berlin to sum up what bombing had done to production schedules for 1944. They found that Germany had produced 35 percent fewer tanks than planned, 31 percent fewer aircraft and 42 percent fewer lorries as a result of bombing. The denial of these huge resources to German forces in 1944 fatally weakened their response to bombing and invasion and eased the path of Allied armies."
Perhaps of more importance however, is the redirecting of resources that Germany had to do to counter the threat and damage of Allied bombing. Huge resources were shifted from the fighting front to combating the aerial threat over Germany itself. A notable example being the number of Luftwaffe units devoted to protecting the Reich from Allied bombers as the war progressed, and the subsequent forced shift from bombers to fighters in new aircraft production.
How this effects the question of legitimacy of area bombardment and the resulting death of civilians is a much more difficult question. Britain had very limited options in regards to offensive action against Nazi Germany in 1941/1942. Hitler had occupied most of Western Europe, had the Soviets retreating at a staggering pace and had Britain’s vital supply lines in a strangle hold in the Atlantic.
These were dark and desperate times. Arthur Harris put together a strong case for taking the war to the Nazi Germany and at least attempting to disrupt the war machine and draw resources away from the front. He obviously further believed that area bombardment could itself win the war, given sufficient resources. In hindsight we know that was not the case, but how many governments, leaders or lets face it the population at large, wouldn’t have sanctioned Harris to use Bomber Command in offensive action over Germany in such times?
Regards,
Andre
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Torquez
The year is irrelevant.I note that yor given example of Frampol dates from 1939.
There were no military sites in Frampol.
There were no industrial sites in Frampol
There was no military importance of Frampol.
There was no industrial importance of Frampol.
There was no defence of Frampol.
The bombing wasn't made to disrupt anything.
The bombing wasn't made to change anything.
The bombing was only made to see how effectively German Luftwaffe can kill people and destroy cities by bombing. By using Polish city and Polish civilians as test subjects.
This was not comperable to military bombings of British air forces.
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phylo_roadking
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Andre, unfortunately when authors quote things like this its not that theyre out of context, more like not fully IN context at times. The vast majority of underproduction from bombing was actually NOT de to RAF and USAAF strategic bombing - but actually the vastly more effective medium daybombing that both were carrying out, making road and rail travel nearly impossible throughout europe. By 1944 a lot of tank parts - gearboxes, track bogies, suspension parts come to mind - were being made in French factories for example. Medium-level day bombing meant raw materials couldn't travel, and finished parts couldnt travel to where they were needed. Night time travel wasnt the answer - the rail network was need then for military transport.....
THEN you had low-level fighterbombers roaming all over Europe in advance of the invading armies, making road transport very nearly as problematical from June 1944 onwards. Certainly before that too, with the RAF's "circus" expeditions into France, but after Normandy nothing valuable could move in Europe by day without being at risk.
Bomber Command at night and the USSAF by day targeted production as they knew how - workers by night, plants by day - but it was the everyday bombing that made transport impossible.
phylo
THEN you had low-level fighterbombers roaming all over Europe in advance of the invading armies, making road transport very nearly as problematical from June 1944 onwards. Certainly before that too, with the RAF's "circus" expeditions into France, but after Normandy nothing valuable could move in Europe by day without being at risk.
Bomber Command at night and the USSAF by day targeted production as they knew how - workers by night, plants by day - but it was the everyday bombing that made transport impossible.
phylo
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phylo_roadking
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Entirely relative - when I was talking about after 1941. I accept you aren't, but I wasnt discussing your material at the time. When I discuss my material or someone else, I'm very careful to target replies to the issue I'm discussing, or to supply the time/geography/personality context. So please don't misuse what I so carefully supplied here. I had been discussing the Bomber Command situation from 1941 and onward after the Lindemann Report, and was very specific. While your material has great value for a discussion of German bombing BEFORE that date, thats not what I was talking about. Don't create arguments out of my posts and expect not to be called on it.
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds
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San Martin
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The firestorms at Dresden and Hamburg were, IMHO warcrimes. Exellent points were made about German production, for which Speer also should get some credit, but also indiscriminate bombings of civilian areas (let alone using phosphorous or napalm) is classed without a doubt in modern times as a warcrime, and as was demonstrated during the London Blitzkrieg only hardens resolve and morale against the enemy (before this when only military and industrial targets were bombed by the Luftwaffe morale was much lower).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firestorm
As Napoleon said, history is written by the victors. Furthermore, as we can see such acts would legitimate the initial provocations in the minds of apologists/revisionists. We should not become what we wish to destroy, or we lose our moral clarity, as it would be called today.
Obviously Bomber Harris' philosophy was not the only one present at the Air ministry, but Harris had the connections and drive to get his view across, by the end of WWII most of his contemporaries viewed precision bombing as being less couter-productive than carpet bombing, hence even colleagues at the RAF (let alone modern Germans throwing red paint on his statue outside of the RAF chapel in Central London) calling him Butcher Harris.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bomber_Harris
These would constitute my own opinions on Harris based on some facts as a Briton, however they are not the majority view over here. I agree with those military scientists that view his strategems as being couterproductive at best, war crimes at worst.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firestorm
As Napoleon said, history is written by the victors. Furthermore, as we can see such acts would legitimate the initial provocations in the minds of apologists/revisionists. We should not become what we wish to destroy, or we lose our moral clarity, as it would be called today.
Obviously Bomber Harris' philosophy was not the only one present at the Air ministry, but Harris had the connections and drive to get his view across, by the end of WWII most of his contemporaries viewed precision bombing as being less couter-productive than carpet bombing, hence even colleagues at the RAF (let alone modern Germans throwing red paint on his statue outside of the RAF chapel in Central London) calling him Butcher Harris.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bomber_Harris
These would constitute my own opinions on Harris based on some facts as a Briton, however they are not the majority view over here. I agree with those military scientists that view his strategems as being couterproductive at best, war crimes at worst.
"I like to think that, apart from being a bit of a Butcher that I have more to offer" Ron "Chopper" Harris, CFC
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phylo_roadking
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SM, getting more mainstream all the time, dont worry. That started as far back as John Thaw's excellent portrayal of Harris many years ago, around the time the statue was unveiled. Certainly RAF veterans have no blinkers on any more.
The RAF was a strange organisation - then ALL British war planning was "odd" at times. A split personality, which led the precision bombers, the men with real skills, off to the Pathfinders and Mosquito squadrons and Beaufighters, while arguably leaving the "mass production" of entirely competent - but not outstanding - aircrew of to the heavies. Maybe this lack was due to all the old 30s hands being lost in the first two years of the war, wasted in all those daylight raids onto the continent in virtually unprotected Hampdens and the like, or in entirely nsuitable aircraft like the Whitley, operating at extreme range time after time over Germany.
In turn, Ive seen it argued that Bomber Command was an even more focused weapon than the USAAF day bomber force - because the weapons the government put at its disposal - Stirlings, Halifaxes...then Manchesters (shudder)...and finally the Lancaster were all but useless in any other role UNLESS the RAF enjoyed air superiority. Look at the legendary DAYLIGHT RAF raids in the 2nd half of the war....617 Sqdn's final sccess at the Tirpitz, and Beilefeld viaduct....both enjoyed empty skies and fighter escort.
Compare this with the Battle of Britain, when TACTICAL bombers carried out daylight raid after daylight raid with excellent results on Ten Group's airfields, enjoying ONLY fighter escort, and not always that, and certainly NOT air speriority.
Given THAT comparison - which force did the better job???
The RAF was a strange organisation - then ALL British war planning was "odd" at times. A split personality, which led the precision bombers, the men with real skills, off to the Pathfinders and Mosquito squadrons and Beaufighters, while arguably leaving the "mass production" of entirely competent - but not outstanding - aircrew of to the heavies. Maybe this lack was due to all the old 30s hands being lost in the first two years of the war, wasted in all those daylight raids onto the continent in virtually unprotected Hampdens and the like, or in entirely nsuitable aircraft like the Whitley, operating at extreme range time after time over Germany.
In turn, Ive seen it argued that Bomber Command was an even more focused weapon than the USAAF day bomber force - because the weapons the government put at its disposal - Stirlings, Halifaxes...then Manchesters (shudder)...and finally the Lancaster were all but useless in any other role UNLESS the RAF enjoyed air superiority. Look at the legendary DAYLIGHT RAF raids in the 2nd half of the war....617 Sqdn's final sccess at the Tirpitz, and Beilefeld viaduct....both enjoyed empty skies and fighter escort.
Compare this with the Battle of Britain, when TACTICAL bombers carried out daylight raid after daylight raid with excellent results on Ten Group's airfields, enjoying ONLY fighter escort, and not always that, and certainly NOT air speriority.
Given THAT comparison - which force did the better job???
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds
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phylo_roadking
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Harris was "the right man for the right job" in 1942 - because his predecessor was 1/ hopeless and 2/ tried to object to the Butt Report on the RAFs performance. So once the War Cabinet had his head, and Harris was promoted...with his drive the complete opposite of his predecessor..... Churchill could hardly push for a "less" competent Air Chief Officer Commanding, could he???
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds
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pzrmeyer2
The year is irrelevant.
There were no military sites in Frampol.
There were no industrial sites in Frampol
There was no military importance of Frampol.
There was no industrial importance of Frampol.
There was no defence of Frampol.
The bombing wasn't made to disrupt anything.
The bombing wasn't made to change anything.
The bombing was only made to see how effectively German Luftwaffe can kill people and destroy cities by bombing. By using Polish city and Polish civilians as test subjects.
This was not comperable to military bombings of British air forces.
lets tweak this, just a tad...
The year is irrelevant.
There were no military sites in Dresden.
There were no industrial sites in Dresden
There was no military importance of Dresden.
There was no industrial importance of Dresden.
There was no defence of Dresden.
The bombing wasn't made to disrupt anything.
The bombing wasn't made to change anything.
The bombing was only made to see how effectively RAF can kill people and destroy cities by bombing. By using German city and German civilians as test subjects.
This was not comperable to military bombings of German air forces.
There! See? easy!
Abolutely right Tom. I should have made the distinction. I do believe that the factories themselves are legitimate targets and civilian casualties are 'colateral damage' in that case.I see absolutely no problem with bombing targets related to the war industry, even though they are staffed by civilians. Destroy the tank plants, aircraft production lines, and bullet factories, and the war is directly affected.
However, bombing the neighborhood where the factory workers live should be most certainly out of bounds. Even if Papa makes bullets, that is no reason to bomb Mama and the children.
It's the carpet bombing of cities that I find morally distasteful.
Paul